[Cite as State v. Williams, 2014-Ohio-1526.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-130277
TRIAL NO. B-1203511
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed.
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 11, 2014
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Elizabeth E. Agar, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
D INKELACKER , Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Christopher Williams appeals his convictions for
murder under R.C. 2903.02(A), with accompanying firearm specifications, and having
weapons while under a disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). We find no merit in his five
assignments of error, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Factual Background
{¶2} Evidence presented at a jury trial showed that during the afternoon of
May 19, 2012, Demarco Thompson and his girlfriend, Robin Taylor, were visiting
Winton Terrace. While driving through the neighborhood, Taylor saw Williams, known
as “Network,” walking around the area. He stood out because he was dressed in a
turquoise shirt and hat. Taylor dropped Demarco off to visit some friends and left to run
an errand.
{¶3} Those friends were sisters Jessica and Tonice Thompson. Even though
they shared the same last name as Demarco, they were not related to him. It was a
warm, sunny day, and Jessica and Tonice were watching their children, as well as other
neighborhood children, play with a water hose. They were standing in front of a next-
door neighbor’s house when Demarco came over to chat.
{¶4} Jessica and Tonice saw a green van drive by, which Demarco seemed to
recognize. He told Tonice to go inside her house. As Tonice gathered the children, she
recognized a man who had threatened her and Jessica during a previous run-in. Tonice
stated that he wore a blue shirt and hat, and had tattoos on his neck. The man, who was
accompanied by another man, approached Demarco. The man in the blue shirt and hat
started arguing with Demarco. The man told Demarco that he would “air it out,”
meaning that he would start shooting.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶5} Tonice had just reached her doorway when she heard three gunshots.
She saw Demarco fall after the second shot. The shooter was standing over Demarco
when he fired the third shot. As soon as he was hit, Demarco yelled, “I’m shot, I’m shot,
call the police.” He fell to the ground, and rolled down a grassy slope, landing in front of
Tonice’s porch. Tonice saw the shooter run from the scene, carrying a small black gun.
{¶6} Jessica testified that as she was talking with Demarco, she saw a van drive
towards them. She identified Williams as a passenger in the van. She and Demarco
walked down the street to see where the van had gone, when Williams and another man
“popp[ed] out of nowhere” and approached them. She testified that Williams was
wearing a blue polo shirt and blue hat.
{¶7} According to Jessica, Demarco told both her and Tonice to go inside the
house. But Jessica did not go because she was afraid and because Demarco had her
phone. Williams confronted Demarco and accused Demarco of saying that he was
going to kill Williams. Williams added that he was going “to air this shit out on my
mama,” which alarmed Jessica because on a prior occasion, Williams had confronted
her and used the same words.
{¶8} Jessica stated that Williams immediately pulled a gun out from under his
shirt and began shooting. The first shot hit Demarco in the leg. After the second shot,
Demarco fell to the ground. Williams stood over Demarco as he lay on the ground and
shot two more times, although Jessica believed that those shots had missed Demarco.
Jessica later identified Williams’s picture from a photo lineup.
{¶9} Tonya Warren lived across the street from where Demarco was shot. She
was standing outside with a large group of children when she heard gunshots. She
looked over to see a light-skinned black man wearing a bright turquoise shirt and hat
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
shooting at Demarco. She said that she saw fire from the muzzle of the gun as the man
shot. She then saw the shooter run from the scene.
{¶10} Cincinnati police officers responded to a 911 call and found Demarco
lying on the ground with wounds to his abdomen and leg. They stated that he was
“scared, crying, screaming in pain.” He told one of them, “please don’t let me die.”
Demarco was taken to the hospital, where he died a short time later.
{¶11} The police recovered bullets and bullet casings from the scene and from
Demarco’s body. They were identified as being fired from a .9 mm Luger semiautomatic
pistol, a gun that would give off an identifiable flash when fired. The police never
recovered the murder weapon.
{¶12} The day after the murder, the police arrested Williams. He was housed at
the Hamilton County Justice Center. Abdul McMillon, an inmate who had been
Demarco’s friend, testified that he had confronted Williams about Demarco’s murder
and that the two had fought. Later, Williams came to McMillon’s cell to explain what
had happened. According to McMillon, Williams had stated that “he didn’t want it to
happen the way that it went down, but it did.” Williams told McMillon that Demarco
had robbed Williams in front of Williams’s son. The two had fought about the robbery
the afternoon that Demarco had been killed. According to McMillon, Williams said that
Demarco had taken a swing at him, and, on instinct, Williams had pulled out his gun
and shot Demarco.
II. Certificate of Nondisclosure
{¶13} In his first assignment of error, Williams contends that the trial court
erred in granting the state’s motion to withhold discoverable evidence from the defense
until after jury selection was completed. He argues that the state did not comply with
Crim.R. 16(D) and that it did not meet its burden to show reasonable, articulable
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
grounds to believe that disclosure of the witnesses’ names would have compromised the
witnesses’ safety or subjected them to intimidation or coercion. This assignment of error
is not well taken.
A. Crim.R. 16(D) and (F)
{¶14} We review issues relating to discovery under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. State v. Parson, 6 Ohio St.3d 442, 445, 453 N.E.2d 689 (1983); State v.
Trollinger, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110340, 2012-Ohio-6396, ¶ 7. Crim.R. 16(I)
requires each party to “provide to opposing counsel a written witness list, including
names and addresses of any witness it intends to call[.]”
{¶15} But, under Crim.R. 16(D)(1), if “[t]he prosecuting attorney has
reasonable, articulable grounds to believe that disclosure will compromise the safety of a
witness, victim, or third party, or subject them to intimidation or coercion,” the
prosecuting attorney shall certify to the court that he or she is not disclosing
discoverable materials. Trollinger at ¶ 8. Reasonable, articulable grounds may include,
but are not limited to, “the nature of the case, the specific course of conduct of one or
more parties, threats or prior instances of witness tampering or intimidation, whether or
not those instances resulted in criminal charges, whether the defendant is pro se, and
any other relevant information.” Crim.R. 16(D).
{¶16} In this case, the prosecuting attorney’s certification stated that the
prosecuting attorney sought “non-disclosure of the names and addresses of all the
civilian/private witnesses in the above-captioned case. The disclosure of such
information will compromise the safety of these witnesses and subject them to
intimidation or coercion.” It further stated that “in virtually every homicide case[,]
coercion and threats to the witnesses now play a critical role. With today’s broad
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
expansion of information via the Internet or cell phones, witnesses’ names quickly
spread through the communities involved.”
{¶17} These generalized assertions are insufficient to meet the requirement of
Crim.R. 16(D) that the prosecuting attorney must have reasonable, articulable grounds
to believe that disclosure will compromise the witnesses’ safety. “ ‘Articulable’ is the key
word, as it is, analogously, in Terry stop and frisk cases.” State v. Howard, 2d Dist.
Greene No. 2012-CA-39, 2013-Ohio-2343, ¶ 65. In this case, the prosecuting attorney
provided no specific and articulable facts to justify the certification. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Luckett, 1st Dist. Hamilton
Nos. C-070539, C-070360, and C-070361, 2008-Ohio-441, ¶ 7.
{¶18} Nevertheless, the state was able to cure that defect later in the
proceedings. Crim.R. 16(F) provides that “[u]pon motion of the defendant, the trial
court shall review the prosecuting attorney’s decision of nondisclosure * * * for abuse of
discretion during an in camera hearing conducted seven days prior to trial, with counsel
participating.” The trial court held a hearing as required by the rule. As long as the
reason for nondisclosure satisfies one of the factors listed in Crim.R. 16(D), an oral
certification during a hearing before the parties is sufficient. State v. Hebdon, 12th Dist.
Butler Nos. CA2012-03-052 and CA2012-03-062, 2013-Ohio-1729, ¶ 49.
{¶19} At the hearing, Detective Kurt Ballman of the Cincinnati Police
Department testified that several witnesses had approached him and stated that they
were afraid of being harmed by Williams, who had numerous prior offenses of violence,
his family or his associates if they testified against him. They were most fearful of
Williams’s older brother, William Williams, known as “Bill Bill,” who also had a violent
criminal history. Detective Ballman further stated that “[h]is brothers and the group he
runs are known for doing robberies and shooting people. Mr. Williams’ [other] brother
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
was even murdered as a result of this kind of activity that they’re all involved in.” The
witnesses had expressed to Detective Ballman their specific fear of retaliation if they
testified. Thus, the state presented testimony showing that the disclosure of the
witnesses’ names would have compromised their safety or subjected them to
intimidation or coercion as required by Crim.R. 16(D).
{¶20} Based on Detective Ballman’s testimony, the court found that it
“[a]ppears they’re afraid, as his family’s out there, apparently has a violent brother. And
in order to get the witnesses to come forward the officer–to the extent he’s able to—did
promise that their names would not be disclosed.” The trial court found no abuse of
discretion by the prosecuting attorney in the nondisclosure. We cannot hold that the
trial court’s decision failing to order disclosure of the witnesses’ names was so arbitrary,
unreasonable or unconscionable as to connote an abuse of discretion. See State v. Clark,
71 Ohio St.3d 466, 470, 644 N.E.2d 331 (1994).
B. Disclosure of Favorable Evidence under Brady v. Maryland
{¶21} Williams also argues that he was denied due process because the state
withheld evidence favorable to him that he needed to fully contest the eyewitness
identification procedure, and to investigate any of the witnesses’ biases or motives to
fabricate until after the trial court had heard and denied his motion to suppress
identification evidence. We find no merit in this argument.
{¶22} In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963), the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s suppression of
evidence favorable to the accused violates due process where the evidence is material to
guilt or punishment, regardless of the prosecution’s good or bad faith. State v.
Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 529 N.E.2d 898 (1988), paragraph four of the syllabus;
State v. Kalejs, 150 Ohio App.3d 465, 2002-Ohio-6657, 782 N.E.2d 112, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.).
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Evidence is material if a reasonable probability exists that, had the state disclosed the
evidence to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Kalejs at ¶
16. This rule applies to impeachment evidence, which, if disclosed by the state and used
properly by the defense, may make the difference between conviction and acquittal.
Bagley at 676; Kalejs at ¶ 19.
{¶23} Williams argues that one of the items withheld from him until after jury
selection was a videotape showing eyewitness Tonice Thompson as she sat in the back of
a police cruiser. At the hearing on Williams’s motion to suppress identification
evidence, Cincinnati police officer Anthony Upchurch testified that Tonice had been
talking on her cell phone as she waited for the police to interview her. In the meantime,
Officer Upchurch had been doing searches for possible suspects on the computer in his
cruiser. Williams’s picture came up, and Tonice shouted, “That’s him.” Williams
contended that the video directly contradicted that testimony because it showed that
Tonice was talking to a police detective on her cell phone and that the detective had
given her Williams’s name, and that Officer Upchurch had specifically showed her
Williams’s picture.
{¶24} Williams acknowledges that he obtained a copy of the videotape “in
time for trial.” The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that no Brady violation occurs
when the evidence in question was presented to the defense during the trial. State v.
Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 116, 552 N.E.2d 913 (1990); Trollinger, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-110340, 2012-Ohio-6396, at ¶ 13.
{¶25} The trial court also granted Williams a three-day continuance, and
Williams cross-examined the witnesses about the issue. Further, the record
unequivocally shows that Tonice knew Williams, although she did not know his name.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
From the beginning, she recognized the shooter from a prior incident. Therefore, the
videotape was not material, and the state’s failure to disclose it before trial, which would
have revealed the witness’s identity, did not violate Williams’s due-process rights.
{¶26} Williams next argues that the state also withheld McMillon’s statement to
the police because he was one of the witnesses whose name was not disclosed until the
day of trial. Williams attempted to get some records from the Department of Youth
Services (“DYS”) because McMillon had claimed that he and Williams had become
friends when they had been incarcerated as juveniles. Williams wanted to show that
that McMillon had lied to the police to make his testimony more credible. But he was
unable to get the records between the time that McMillon’s name was disclosed and
when McMillon testified at trial.
{¶27} Nevertheless, while Williams could not obtain the records he sought, he
had McMillon’s statement by the time of trial. He attacked McMillon’s credibility on
cross-examination even without the evidence he was unable to obtain. Williams has not
shown that had he obtained the DYS records he had sought, a reasonable probability
existed that the result of the trial would have been different. Therefore, he has not
demonstrated that the additional evidence he sought to obtain was material. Trollinger,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110340, 2012-Ohio-6396, at ¶ 14; Kalejs, 150 Ohio App.3d 465,
2002-Ohio-6657, 782 N.E.2d 112, at ¶ 16.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶28} Finally, Williams argues that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel when the state withheld evidence vital to the preparation of an effective defense
until the trial began. Again, the court granted Williams a three-day continuance after
the state had disclosed the names of the witnesses. Counsel was able to investigate and
provide Williams with a diligent and thorough defense. Williams has not demonstrated
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or
that, but for counsel’s lack of investigation or preparation, the result of the proceeding
would have been otherwise. Therefore, he has failed to meet his burden to show
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-689,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
120561, 2013-Ohio-5386, ¶ 50-52. Consequently, we overrule Williams’s first
assignment of error.
III. Identification Evidence
{¶29} In his second assignment of error, Williams contends that the trial court
erred in overruling his motion to suppress identification evidence. He argues that the
identification procedures were so unduly suggestive that the identifications were not
reliable. This assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶30} Generally, a trial court must suppress a pretrial identification of a suspect
if (1) the confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive of the suspect’s guilt and (2) the
identification was unreliable under the circumstances. State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d
424, 438, 488 N.E.2d 819 (1992); State v. Ojile, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-110677 and C-
110678, 2012-Ohio-6015, ¶ 75. The defendant bears the burden of proving both prongs
of the test. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140
(1977); Ojile at ¶ 75. Suggestive identification procedures are unreliable if they create a
substantial likelihood of misidentification. Waddy at 439; Ojile at ¶ 75.
{¶31} Williams argues that Tonice’s identification of him as the shooter was the
result of a suggestive procedure. He states that “[i]t is difficult to imagine anything more
‘suggestive’ than police officers telling a witness the name of their suspect and showing
her a mug shot on a police terminal.” But, this court has stated that “[t]he most overtly
suggestive process might not be grounds for suppression where the witness had more
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
than ample opportunity to view the suspect, or perhaps already knew the suspect, * * *
and was certain in her or her identification.” State v. Nix, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
030696, 2004-Ohio-5502, ¶ 21, citing Waddy at 439.
{¶32} Here, Tonice stood within six or seven feet of Williams when he shot
Demarco in the middle of the day. She knew Williams from a prior incident and
recognized him at the time of the shooting, although she did not know his name.
Although at first she denied seeing the shooting out of fear, she eventually decided to
cooperate with the police. When police showed her the picture of Williams, she
recognized him immediately as the man who had shot Demarco. Under the
circumstances, there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification, and her
identification was reliable. See State v. Levingston, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090235,
2011-Ohio-1665, ¶ 8-10.
{¶33} Further, several other witnesses also identified Williams, whom they
knew as “Network,” as being on the scene at the time of the shooting. Tonice’s sister
Jessica, another eyewitness to the crime, testified to the same version of events as
Tonice. She also knew Williams as “Network,” and identified “Network” as the shooter.
Therefore, even if the trial court had erred in allowing Tonice’s identification into
evidence, any error was harmless. See State v. Bayless, 48 Ohio St.2d 73, 357 N.E.2d
1035 (1976), paragraph seven of the syllabus, vacated as to death penalty, 438 U.S. 911,
98 S.Ct. 3135, 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978); State v. Williams, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-
060631 and C-060668, 2007-Ohio-5577, ¶ 39. We overrule Williams’s second
assignment of error.
IV. Batson Challenges
{¶34} In his third assignment of error, Williams contends that the trial court
erred when it overruled his objections to the state’s use of peremptory challenges to
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
exclude African-American jurors. He argues that the state’s use of those challenges
without a valid race-neutral reason violated his right to equal protection. This
assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶35} In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69
(1986), the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution precludes purposeful discrimination by the state in the
exercise of peremptory challenges so as to exclude members of minority groups from
petit juries. State v. O’Neal, 87 Ohio St.3d 402, 402, 721 N.E.2d 73 (2000); Thomas, 1st
Dist. Hamilton No. C-120561, 2013-Ohio-5386, at ¶ 14. Batson established a three-step
procedure for evaluating claims of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges. State v. White, 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 435, 709 N.E.2d 140 (1999); Thomas at ¶
14.
{¶36} First, the opponent of a peremptory strike must make a prima facie
showing of discrimination. Second, the proponent of the strike must give a race-neutral
explanation for the strike. State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 255-256, 762 N.E.2d
940 (2002); Thomas at ¶ 15. The state’s reason is deemed to be race-neutral unless
discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation. Thomas at ¶ 15. Third, the trial
court must determine whether, under all the circumstances, the opponent has proven
purposeful discrimination. Herring at 256; Thomas at ¶ 16.
{¶37} The burden of persuasion always stays with the opponent of the
strike. A reviewing court will defer to the trial court’s finding that no discriminatory
intent existed since it turns largely on an evaluation of credibility. Herring at 256;
Thomas at ¶ 16. The reviewing court may only reverse a trial court’s finding if that
finding is “clearly erroneous.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct.
1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); Thomas at ¶ 16.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶38} Williams argues that the state used four of its peremptory challenges
against African-Americans, even though they formed a small percentage of the venire.
Consequently, the trial court erred in failing to make a finding that he had established a
prima facie case of discrimination. But the Ohio Supreme Court has held that once a
prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge and the
court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary
issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing of discrimination
becomes moot. State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 583, 589 N.E.2d 1310 (1992).
{¶39} Williams also argues that the trial court did not adequately assess the
explanations offered by the state to determine whether or not a discriminatory purpose
was established. This argument is without merit.
{¶40} The record shows that the state used a peremptory challenge on juror
number 5 because he had a prior assault conviction, a prior gun charge, family members
with trafficking convictions, and familiarity with Winton Terrace. The prosecutor also
felt that his demeanor and body language showed that he could not be fair and
impartial. Body language and demeanor are permissible race-neutral justifications for
exercising a peremptory challenge. State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84059,
2004-Ohio-6862.
{¶41} The state used a peremptory challenge on juror number 6 because she
knew one of the witnesses who had been a client of hers with whom she had worked
closely. She also said on her juror questionnaire that she did not think that she would be
a good juror because her job “clouded her judgment of people.”
{¶42} The state used a peremptory challenge against juror number 9
because of inconsistent or incomplete answers on the jury questionnaire. He had stated
on the questionnaire that neither he nor a family member had been convicted of a crime.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
But he later stated that he had been convicted of arson and his son had recently been
convicted of attempted murder. He also indicated that his brother had been the victim
of a shooting, so the prosecutor had concerns about whether he could be fair and
impartial since the charges against Williams involved a shooting.
{¶43} Finally, the state used a peremptory challenge against juror number
17. That juror had also stated in the jury questionnaire that neither he nor a family
member had ever been convicted of a crime. But it was revealed during voir dire that he
had been convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and that his stepson
was incarcerated on a manslaughter charge. The prosecutor also felt that juror 17 was
evasive in answering questions, and the prosecutor was concerned that he had stated
during questioning that he did not believe in judging people, which was “exactly what
the State [was] going to ask all of these jurors to do.”
{¶44} Thus, the prosecutor provided race-neutral reasons for the use of the
challenges. The explanation need not rise to the level justifying the exercise of a
challenge for cause. O’Neal, 87 Ohio St.3d at 409, 721 N.E.2d 73; Thomas, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-120561, 2013-Ohio-5386, at ¶ 18. The trial court’s acceptance of these
race-neutral reasons was not clearly erroneous. Williams has not met his burden to
show discriminatory intent, and we, therefore, overrule his third assignment of error.
V. Mistrial
{¶45} In his fourth assignment of error, Williams contends that the trial
court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial. He argues that the prosecutor’s
repeated conduct during closing argument, the failure to disclose favorable and relevant
evidence, and the deliberate use of peremptory challenges to exclude African-American
jurors all combined to deny him his right to due process. This assignment of error is not
well taken.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶46} The decision whether to grant a mistrial lies within the trial court’s
discretion. A trial court should not order a mistrial merely because an error or
irregularity occurred, unless it affects the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Sage,
31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987); State v. Brown, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
120327, 2013-Ohio-2720, ¶ 32. The court should declare a mistrial “only when the ends
of justice so require and when a fair trial is no longer possible.” Brown at ¶ 32.
{¶47} We have already rejected most of the arguments Williams raises in
this assignment of error. He also argues that the prosecutor made improper comments
during closing argument. But most of the comments about which he complains were
fair comments on the evidence. But even if they were not, Williams has not shown that
they denied him a fair trial. See State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 405, 613 N.E.2d
203 (1993); Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120561, 2013-Ohio-5386, at ¶ 37-38.
Under the circumstances, we cannot hold that the trial court’s decision to overrule
Williams’s motion for a mistrial was so arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable as to
connote an abuse of discretion. See Clark, 71 Ohio St.3d at 470, 644 N.E.2d 331; Brown
at ¶ 42. We, therefore, overrule Williams’s fourth assignment of error.
VI. Weight and Sufficiency
{¶48} In his fifth assignment of error, Williams contends that that the state’s
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. He also argues that the trial court
erred in overruling his Crim.R. 29 motions for judgments of acquittal, which is the same
as a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. See State v.
Brewster, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-030024 and C-030025, 2004-Ohio-2993, ¶ 73.
This assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶49} Our review of the record shows that a rational trier of fact, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found that
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of murder under R.C.
2903.02(A), along with the accompanying specifications, and having weapons while
under a disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to
support the convictions. See State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus; Ojile, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-110677 and C-110678,
2012-Ohio-6015, at ¶ 48.
{¶50} Williams argues that no “forensic evidence supports the state’s theory
of the offense.” But no rule of law exists that a witness’s testimony must be corroborated
by physical evidence. Thomas, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120561, 2013-Ohio-5386, at ¶
45. He also argues that the state’s evidence was not credible. But in deciding if the
evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility
of the witnesses. Id.
{¶51} Williams also argues that his convictions were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the trier of fact
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse
Williams’s convictions and order a new trial. Therefore, the convictions were not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387,
678 N.E.3d 541 (1997); State v. Blair, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-100150 and C-100151,
2010-Ohio-6310, ¶ 24. Consequently, we overrule Williams’s fifth assignment of error
and affirm his convictions.
Judgment affirmed.
H ENDON , P.J., and D E W INE , J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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