[Cite as Said v. Admr., Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2014-Ohio-841.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
TINA R. SAID (Deceased), : APPEAL NO. C-130355
C-130360
and : TRIAL NO. A-1006028
STEVEN M. SAID :
(Widower/Claimant), O P I N I O N.
:
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-
Appellants, :
vs. :
ADMINISTRATOR, OHIO BUREAU :
OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION,
:
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-
Appellee, :
and :
BLUE CHIP 2000 COMMERICAL :
CLEANING,
Defendant. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 7, 2014
Manley Burke, LPA, and George F. Moeller, for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Straus, Assistant Attorney General, for
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
D INKELACKER , Judge.
I. Factual Background
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant Tina Said was injured in an industrial
accident at her place of employment. She committed suicide on December 21, 2005, as a
result of depression arising from her injury. Her husband, plaintiff-appellee/cross-
appellant Steven M. Said, filed an application for death benefits. Defendant-
appellant/cross-appellee the administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“the
bureau”) assigned Steven’s application the same claim number as Tina’s, and granted it
because Tina’s suicide was a direct and proximate result of her workplace accident.
{¶2} Subsequently, the bureau filed a motion alleging that Steven was not living
with Tina at the time of her death, as he had claimed in his application for benefits. It
sought a finding of fraud, termination of the death benefits, and a finding of overpayment
related to the benefits Steven had already received. The Industrial Commission granted the
bureau’s motion, terminated the death benefits, and found that Steven had been overpaid by
$76,759.28.
{¶3} Steven appealed the Industrial Commission’s order to the court of common
pleas. Subsequently, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Under the terms of
the agreement, the bureau awarded Steven $95,000. But the agreement also provided that
“[a]ny overpayment in any of the decedent’s workers’ compensation claims may be deducted
from the amount of this settlement[.]” On September 14, 2011, the trial court journalized an
entry dismissing the case. The bureau then issued Steven a check for $18,240.72, which was
the settlement amount of $95,000 less the overpayment of $76,759.28.
{¶4} Subsequently, Steven filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment in
which he alleged that there had been no “meeting of minds” in the drafting of the settlement
agreement. He argued that Tina’s workers’ compensation claim was separate from his claim
for death benefits and that he had never agreed to have the alleged overpayment deducted
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
from the settlement award of $95,000. He also filed a motion to enforce the settlement
agreement, in which he contended that the bureau should have paid him the $95,000 “less
any overpayment made in the claim of the decedent – Tina Said.”
{¶5} The trial court granted Steven’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion because “there was no
meeting of the minds as to the executed Settlement Agreement.” It denied Steven’s motion
to enforce the settlement agreement. Both parties have appealed the trial court’s judgment.
II. Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement
{¶6} We address Steven’s cross-appeal first. In his sole assignment of error, he
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to enforce the settlement
agreement. He also argues that under the plain language of the agreement the $95,000
payment should only have been set-off against any overpayment of Tina’s workers’
compensation claim, not his separate claim for death benefits. We need not reach the
merits of that argument, because we hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce
the settlement agreement after the filing of the entry dismissing the case.
{¶7} A trial court possesses authority to enforce a settlement agreement voluntarily
entered into by the parties to a lawsuit because the agreement is a binding contract. Mack
v. Polson Rubber Co., 14 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 470 N.E.2d 902 (1984); Infinite Security
Solutions, LLC v. Karam Properties I., Ltd., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1313, 2013-Ohio-4415,
¶ 11. But a trial court loses jurisdiction to proceed when the court has unconditionally
dismissed the action. State ex rel. Rice v. McGrath, 62 Ohio St.3d 70, 71, 577 N.E.2d 1100
(1991); Infinite Security Solutions at ¶ 11. The determination of whether a dismissal order is
unconditional and the court is thus deprived of jurisdiction to entertain a motion to enforce
a settlement agreement is dependent on the terms of the dismissal order. Infinite Security
Solutions at ¶ 12; Showcase Homes v. Ravenna Sav. Bank, 126 Ohio App.3d 328, 331, 710
N.E.2d 347 (3d Dist.1998).
{¶8} This court discussed the issue in Lamp v. Richard Goettle, Inc., 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-040461, 2005-Ohio-1877. We stated:
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
To enforce a settlement agreement after an entry of dismissal, the terms of the
settlement must be embodied in an order of dismissal or the order must
contain a provision for the court’s continuing jurisdiction over disputes that
may arise out of the settlement. If instead the court enters a general and
unconditional order of dismissal or there is a general notice of dismissal, the
court cannot entertain a subsequent motion to enforce a settlement
agreement.
Id. at ¶ 10.
{¶9} In this case, the entry of dismissal stated in its entirety: “Case settled and
dismissed with prejudice by agreement of the parties. No record. Costs are to be paid by
the Plaintiff.” Because the trial court’s entry of dismissal was unconditional, the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.
{¶10} Steven argues that because the dismissal entry referred to the settlement
agreement, it was not unconditional. We disagree. The entry does not actually refer to the
settlement agreement. It says only that the case had been settled. But, even if it actually
referred to the agreement, this court specifically stated in Lamp that unless the entry of
dismissal contains the terms of the agreement or specifically retains jurisdiction to enforce
the settlement agreement, the trial court has no jurisdiction to enforce it. But see Infinite
Security Solutions at ¶ 13-16; State ex rel. Spies v. Lent, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2008 AP
05 0033, 2009-Ohio-3844, ¶ 47. Consequently, we overrule Steven’s sole assignment of
error.
{¶11} In a related matter, the bureau argues in its second assignment of error that
because the dismissal was unconditional, the trial court had no jurisdiction to “set aside” the
settlement agreement. Essentially, it argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
consider Steven’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. But, in Lamp, this court
specifically stated that “[w]here there is a general order or notice of dismissal, the party
seeking enforcement of a settlement agreement must file either a new action for breach of
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
contract or a motion to vacate the dismissal.” Lamp at ¶ 10. Consequently, the trial court
had jurisdiction to decide Steven’s motion for relief from the dismissal entry, and we
overrule the bureau’s second assignment of error.
III. Civ.R. 60(B) Motion for Relief from Judgment
{¶12} In its first assignment of error, the bureau contends that the trial court erred
in granting Steven’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. It argues that he failed to
show any of the grounds under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5) justifying relief from judgment
or that he had a meritorious defense. This assignment of error is well taken.
{¶13} To prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, the moving
party bears the burden to demonstrate that (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim
to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds
stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is timely made. GTE Automatic
Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), paragraph two
of the syllabus; Kell v. Verderber, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120665, 2013-Ohio-4223, ¶ 35.
The decision whether to grant relief from judgment lies within the trial court’s discretion.
Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 520 N.E.2d 564 (1988); Kell at ¶ 35.
{¶14} Steven did not specify in his motion the subsection of Civ.R. 60(B) on which
he relied. He argued that there was “no meeting of the minds” on the settlement agreement,
a claim which does not fall within any of the grounds for relief set forth in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)
through (4). He argues on appeal that his claim for relief fell under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), the
“catchall provision,” which allows a court to set aside a judgment for “any other reason
justifying relief from judgment.” See Kell at ¶ 36.
{¶15} The grounds for invoking Civ.R. 60(B)(5) must be substantial; it cannot be
used as a substitute for the more specific provisions of Civ.R. 60(B). Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v.
Lohman, 5 Ohio St.3d 64, 448 N.E.2d 1365 (1983), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus;
Kell at ¶ 36. Public policy favors the finality of judgments, and this case does not present
the exceptional circumstances necessary to afford relief from the judgment, especially when
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Steven can file a separate action challenging the settlement agreement. See Wine v. Wine,
4th Dist. Hocking No. 06CA6, 2006-Ohio-6995, ¶ 18.
{¶16} While Steven’s claim may survive in another action in another jurisdiction, he
is not entitled to relief from judgment in the present case. We hold that the trial court erred
in granting his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. We sustain the bureau’s first assignment of error, and
reverse that part of the trial court’s judgment granting Steven’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for
relief from judgment.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
HENDON, P.J., and FISCHER, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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