[Cite as State v. Grubbs, 2013-Ohio-4611.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO :
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 25522
v. : T.C. NO. 11CR3464
MICHAEL H. GRUBBS : (Criminal appeal from
Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 18th day of October , 2013.
..........
CARLEY J. INGRAM, Atty. Reg. No. 0020084, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W.
Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
WILLIAM T. DALY, Atty. Reg. No. 0069300, 70 Birch Alley, Suite 240, Dayton, Ohio
45440
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
MICHAEL H. GRUBBS, #675114, Chillicothe Correctional Institute, P. O. Box 5500,
Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
Defendant-Appellant
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FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} After the trial court overruled his motion to suppress evidence,
Michael H. Grubbs was found guilty by a jury of possession of heroin and possession of
cocaine. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of three years in prison. Grubbs appeals
from his conviction.
{¶ 2} Grubbs’s appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), stating that after thoroughly examining
the record and the law, he found no potentially meritorious issues for appeal. By entry, we
informed Grubbs that his attorney had filed an Anders brief on his behalf and granted him
sixty days from that date to file a pro se brief. Grubbs did not file a pro se brief.
{¶ 3} The case is now before us for our independent review of the record. Penson
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). We find no potential
assignments of error having arguable merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
will be affirmed.
{¶ 4} On October 6, 2011, City of Dayton police officers obtained and executed a
search warrant at 4541 Blueberry Avenue in Dayton. The search warrant was based on
information from a confidential informant, controlled drug purchases by the confidential
informant, and police officers’ observations of activities at the house. The warrant stated
that there was probable cause to believe that items connected with the sale of drugs would be
found at the house or on the person of “Little D,” an “unknown black/male” who was the
confidential informant’s contact at the house.
{¶ 5} When the police executed the warrant, three people were present, including
Grubbs. Based on a conversation between a police officer and Grubbs on the back porch of
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the house, during which Grubbs was not under arrest, the officer connected Grubbs with
some of the drugs in the house. Specifically, Grubbs identified the room in which he had
been staying, and the police found a baggie of crack cocaine and a baggie of gelcaps
containing heroin in that particular bedroom.
{¶ 6} Grubbs was arrested and charged with: 1) possession of heroin in an
amount greater than one gram but less than five grams, a felony of the fourth degree, and 2)
possession of cocaine in an amount greater than 20 grams but less than 27 grams, a felony of
the second degree. A plea of not guilty was entered on Grubbs’s behalf, and he filed a
motion to suppress. The motion asserted that the search was “unconstitutional and illegal”
because Grubbs was not identified on the warrant (and did not fit the description of the
person who was described therein) and because two addresses “were used * * *
interchangeably” on the warrant.
{¶ 7} Following a hearing, the trial court overruled the motion to suppress. With
respect to the addresses on the affidavit in support of the search warrant, the trial court
concluded that the second address (other than the Blueberry Avenue location of the search)
was “merely a prior address of Little D,” and that the addresses were “in no way being used
interchangeably.” The other address was a prior address of the dealer from whom the
confidential informant had purchased drugs. The court further found that Grubbs’s
detention was reasonable, although he was not specifically identified on the search warrant,
because the police had a reasonable belief that the house was the scene of criminal activity
and “it was reasonable to detain the individuals inside” while they investigated. The court
also concluded that Grubbs’s statements would not be suppressed because the police officer
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who interviewed him “credibly testified” that Grubbs had been informed of his rights before
each of the officer’s conversations with Grubbs and that other procedural safeguards were
followed, such as ending the conversations when Grubbs expressed a desire to do so.
{¶ 8} Grubbs was tried by a jury on October 22 and 23, 2012. He was found guilty as
charged on both counts. The trial court sentenced Grubbs to twelve months of imprisonment for
possession of heroin and to a mandatory three-year term for possession of cocaine, to be served
concurrently. The court also suspended Grubbs’s driver’s license and imposed a three-year
mandatory term of postrelease control on the cocaine charge.1
{¶ 9} Grubbs appeals from his conviction, but his appellate attorney has stated in the
brief that he is unable to locate any meritorious issues for appeal. Neither Grubbs nor his
attorney raises any assignments of error. The attorney’s brief makes reference to the arguments
contained in the motion to suppress regarding the second address on the affidavit and the absence
of Grubbs’s name or description on the search warrant but, like the trial court, he finds these
arguments to be without merit.
{¶ 10} We agree with appellate counsel’s assessment that the affidavit in support of the
search warrant was sufficient to support the issuance of a warrant, that the reference in the
affidavit to another address at which “Little D” had previously dealt with the confidential
informant did not in any way confuse the locations of the drugs sales that were pertinent to the
search warrant, and that Grubbs’s presence at the home when the warrant was executed justified
further investigation of his involvement, even if his name was not listed on the warrant.
1
The trial court imposed a discretionary three-year term of postrelease control on the count of possession of heroin as
well, but only one term of postrelease control may be served. See State v. Lewis, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2012-CA-31,
2013-Ohio-809, fn. 1.
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{¶ 11} Furthermore, with regard to the jury trial, we find no arguably meritorious issues
for appeal. The State presented the testimony of four detectives; the defense called one witness,
a forensic chemist, who testified about lab procedures at the Miami Valley Regional Crime Lab,
the identity of the substances found at 4541 Blueberry, and their weight. Voir dire was
conducted appropriately, the evidence against Grubbs was properly admitted, the jury instructions
were complete and appropriate, and sufficient evidence was presented to support the verdict.
The jury asked one question during its deliberations, which the court reasonably resolved, with
input from both attorneys, by referring to a definition that had already been provided in the
instructions. The jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and its
verdict forms were properly completed. The trial court’s sentences were within the statutory
range for the offenses. (R.C. 2929.14(A)(2 and 4)).
{¶ 12} Upon review of the entire record, we agree with appellate counsel that there are
no issues having arguable merit.
{¶ 13} The trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
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FAIN, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Carley J. Ingram
William T. Daly
Michael H . Grubbs
Hon. Barbara P. Gorman