[Cite as State v. Cooper, 2011-Ohio-5017.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO :
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 24321
vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 09CR4069/1
JAYTRON COOPER : (Criminal Appeal from
Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
. . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 30th day of September, 2011.
. . . . . . . . .
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Pros. Attorney; Timothy J. Cole, Asst. Pros.
Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0084117, P.O. Box 972, Dayton, OH 45422
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
Andrea G. Ostrowski, Atty. Reg. No. 0075318, 25 East Central Avenue,
Suite 4, Springboro, OH 45066
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . .
GRADY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant, Jaytron Cooper, appeals from his conviction
and sentence for possession of crack cocaine and trafficking in
marijuana.
{¶ 2} On December 2, 2009, at 6:53 p.m., an unidentified male
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called 911 and reported that he had heard six gunshots and saw
three African-American males run into the apartment at 5150
Northcutt Place in Harrison Township. Montgomery County sheriff’s
deputies were dispatched to the scene. Deputy Hutson went to the
back door while another deputy watched the front door. Deputy
Hutson could hear a television or radio playing inside the apartment
and, after Hutson knocked on the door several times, without any
response, the volume was turned up.
{¶ 3} At 7:11 p.m., a person identifying himself as Shawn
Parker called 911. Parker reported that his son had sent him a
text message saying that he was being robbed and held against his
will in the apartment at 5150 Northcutt Place. The police
dispatcher advised deputies on the scene that the caller’s son
said he could see the responding officers outside, and that he
was being held inside a closet upstairs.
{¶ 4} While standing by the back door, Deputy Hutson saw a
male briefly stick his head out of second story bathroom window
and then quickly close that window. Deputy Hutson knocked louder
on the back door to overcome the sound of the radio or television.
Moments later, Defendant opened the door. When Defendant saw
the officers, he immediately slammed the door shut. Believing
that emergency circumstances existed justifying a warrantless
entry into the residence, officers entered the apartment.
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{¶ 5} Inside the residence police found six men in the living
room, another man coming down the stairs, and another man upstairs.
Officers immediately began searching for the victim of the
reported robbery/abduction, but no victim was found. While in
the kitchen area, police noticed a very strong odor of marijuana
and observed, in plain view, a plastic cup half full of marijuana
lying in an open trash can. A second search for the victim was
conducted by police because none of the people present admitted
to being the victim of a robbery/abduction. During that second
search police looked inside closets and under the bed. In a first
floor closet, police discovered a bulletproof vest. In an upstairs
bedroom, when police lifted the mattress to look under the bed,
they discovered several firearms. Police recognized many of the
individuals in the apartment as persons who had previously been
trespassed off the property, and they were arrested.
{¶ 6} After police removed all of the individuals from that
apartment, they obtained a search warrant for the premises. During
execution of that search warrant, in the upstairs bedroom police
recovered from under the mattress the multiple firearms they had
previously seen while searching for the victim. Also in that
bedroom, police discovered an electric utility bill for the
residence in Defendant’s name, and a cigar box inside a tub full
of men’s clothing. Inside that cigar box police found a small
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plastic baggie containing crack cocaine, and a large plastic baggie
filled with twelve smaller baggies that each contained a small
amount of marijuana. The small baggies of marijuana were packaged
for sale. A search of the remainder of that apartment produced
baggies with pills in them, digital scales, and other drugs and
guns. After the search, Defendant told Detective Reed that he
lived at that apartment and had been home sleeping since 9:00 a.m.
{¶ 7} Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of
crack cocaine, less than one gram, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A),
and one count of trafficking in marijuana in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(2). Three one-year firearm specifications, R.C.
2941.141, were attached to each count. Defendant filed a motion
to suppress the evidence, which the trial court overruled following
a hearing. At trial, Defendant’s theory was that the drugs and
guns found in his apartment were not his and must have been put
there by someone else who was present.
{¶ 8} Defendant was found guilty of both charges and two of
the three firearm specifications attached to each count. The trial
court sentenced Defendant to concurrent one year prison terms for
possession of crack cocaine and trafficking in marijuana, and
merged all of the firearm specifications and imposed one additional
and consecutive one year term on those, for a total sentence of
two years.
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{¶ 9} Defendant timely appealed to this court from his
conviction and sentence.
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 10} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”
{¶ 11} Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress the evidence because his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when police unlawfully entered his home
without a warrant and conducted a warrantless search of the
premises. If the initial entry by police into Defendant’s home
was unlawful, that tainted the warrant which authorized the
subsequent search which produced the cocaine and marijuana that
form the basis for the charges in this case, and that evidence
must be suppressed. The trial court concluded that police entry
into Defendant’s home was lawful because it fell within a
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the exigent
circumstances or emergency exception, and overruled the motion
to suppress on that basis.
{¶ 12} In State v. Overholser (July 25, 1997), Clark App. No.
96CA0073, this court stated:
{¶ 13} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects people from ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures.
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under
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the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a few well recognized
exceptions. Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct.
507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576. One such recognized exception is the exigent
circumstances or ‘emergency’ exception. Pursuant to that rule,
a police officer, even absent a warrant or probable cause, may
lawfully enter a structure, including a private home, when the
totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer gives
rise to a reasonable belief that immediate entry is necessary to
either protect that property or assist people inside who may be
in danger or in need of immediate aid. Ringel, Searches, Seizures,
Arrests and Confessions, Section 10.5(a); Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search
and Seizure, Section 10.01-10.03.
{¶ 14} “A myriad of factual circumstances may give rise to an
emergency situation and the corresponding need for an immediate
warrantless entry. See Wayne v. United States (D.C.Cir., 1963),
318 F.2d 205, 212; Ringel, Searches, Seizures, Arrests and
Confessions, Section 10.5(a), fn 41 and 42. When police reasonably
believe that a burglary is in progress or has occurred at a
particular structure, an immediate warrantless entry undertaken
to investigate and protect that property and assist any victims
inside who may be in danger or in need of immediate aid has been
upheld by the courts as a reasonable search. See Lafave, Search
and Seizure, Section 6.6(a) and (b).
7
{¶ 15} “The concept of emergency circumstances justifying an
immediate warrantless entry by police has long been recognized
in Ohio. State v. Hyde (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 32, 268 N.E.2d 820;
State v. Roach (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 42, 455 N.E.2d 1328; State
v. Morris (November 29, 1989), Montgomery App. No. 10992,
unreported. However, the warrantless entry and search must be
limited in duration and scope to the purpose justifying that
intrusion, including only that which is necessary to alleviate
the emergency and the dangers associated therewith. Mincey v.
Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290. During
a warrantless emergency entry police may seize contraband which
is in plain view. Michigan v. Tyler (1978), 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct.
1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486; Thompson v. Louisiana (1984), 469 U.S. 17,
105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246.”
{¶ 16} Defendant challenges the initial warrantless entry into
his home by police. Thus, the question becomes whether at the
time police entered Defendant’s home they had a reasonable belief,
based upon the totality of the facts and circumstances, that there
might be a person inside that residence who was in danger or in
need of immediate aid. Overholser. Based upon the particular
facts of this case, we answer that question in the affirmative
and conclude, as did the trial court, that police entry into
Defendant’s home was reasonable and constitutionally permissible.
8
{¶ 17} Police were dispatched to Defendant’s home as a result
of a 911 call wherein an anonymous caller reported that he heard
six gunshots and saw three African-American males run into the
apartment at 5150 Northcutt Place. Police repeatedly knocked on
the door for some 20-25 minutes but no one answered the door.
Police were aware there were people inside that apartment because
in response to the police knocking, a radio or television inside
the apartment was turned up louder.
{¶ 18} Shortly after officers arrived on the scene, a second
911 call came in. This second call was made by a person who
identified himself as Shawn Parker. Calls from identified citizen
informants are recognized as possessing greater reliability than
tips received from anonymous callers or known criminal informants,
and therefore a strong showing as to other indicia of reliability
may be unnecessary. City of Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295,
1999-Ohio-68. Parker reported that his son had sent him a text
message saying he was being held against his will upstairs in the
apartment at 5150 Northcutt Place, and the occupants had attempted
to rob him. The police dispatcher advised deputies at the scene
that according to Parker, his son could see the responding officers
outside, and that his son was being held in a closet upstairs.
{¶ 19} While standing by the back door, Deputy Hutson looked
up and observed a man stick his head out of a second story bathroom
9
window and then quickly close that window. Deputy Hutson began
knocking on the door more loudly. In response, Defendant finally
opened the door. When Defendant observed the officers, he
immediately slammed the door shut.
{¶ 20} Under these facts and circumstances, it was reasonable
for police to believe that the reported robbery victim who was
being held hostage, as well as the perpetrators of the robbery,
were still inside the home, and that the victim might be in danger
or in need of immediate aid. Overholser. Accordingly, police
were privileged to enter the home without a warrant for the sole
purpose of looking for the victim and rendering any assistance
the victim might need. Furthermore, the brief 20-25 minute delay
here between the 911 calls and police entry into Defendant’s home
does not negate the exigency that existed. State v. Berry, 167
Ohio App.3d 206, 2006-Ohio-3035.
{¶ 21} Defendant argues that even if police were justified in
initially entering Defendant’s home to search for the reported
robbery victim that was being held hostage, the second search of
the home police conducted exceeded the duration and scope of the
purpose justifying the initial intrusion, to alleviate the
emergency and the dangers associated therewith. Overholser.
{¶ 22} The evidence demonstrates that upon entering Defendant’s
home, police immediately conducted an initial search for the
10
victim. During that initial search, police rounded up all of the
people that they found inside the home. When asked by police,
none of the people present came forward and admitted to being the
robbery/abduction victim. Based upon information contained in
the second 911 call, Sergeant Adkins believed, and reasonably so,
that there could still be another person inside the home, a robbery
victim who was being held hostage in a less visible location such
as a closet or under a bed, who might be injured or in need of
immediate aid. Berry. Accordingly, Sergeant Adkins ordered a
second search of the home for the victim. This time police looked
inside closets, and under the bed, but properly limited the scope
of their search to places where a person or body can hide or be
hidden. It was during this second search that police discovered
several firearms when they lifted a mattress to look under the
bed, and marijuana in plain view in the kitchen.
{¶ 23} As we noted in Overholser,
{¶ 24} “Every Fourth amendment question turns on the issue of
reasonableness, and every determination of reasonableness is sui
generis. When in an investigation of crime a search and seizure
is impelled by reasons of genuine physical danger to any person,
it presents concerns and needs that are not easily served by a
slow, deliberative process. Actions are to be judged on a common
sense standard, . . .”
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{¶ 25} Here, applying a common sense review to all of the facts
and circumstances known to police on the scene, we conclude that
their entry into Defendant’s home was reasonable and lawful. The
contraband police observed in plain view during their warrantless
emergency entry could be seized. Overholser. Their observations
could likewise be the basis for a warrant permitting seizure of
the contraband, which is what occurred. Defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated, and the trial court properly
overruled his motion to suppress the evidence.
{¶ 26} Defendant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 27} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ADMITTED HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT PROBATIVE.”
{¶ 28} Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting into evidence, over his objection, various
items found in Defendant’s apartment during execution of the search
warrant, including baggies and bottles of pills, a bulletproof
vest, a video surveillance camera, and loose ammunition.
Defendant claims that these items were never connected to him and
are not relevant to the specific charges against him. Defendant
argues that whatever minimal probative value these items may have
had was far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and thus
this evidence should therefore have been excluded. Evid.R.
12
403(A). Defendant further argues that the prosecutor used these
items found in Defendant’s apartment as a basis to suggest that
Defendant engages in a lot of criminal activity, including drug
dealing, and that he was acting in conformity with that bad
character on this particular occasion, in violation of Evid.R.
404(B).
{¶ 29} With respect to the admission or exclusion of evidence,
the trial court has broad discretion and its decision in such
matters will not be disturbed by a reviewing court absent an abuse
of discretion that has caused material prejudice. State v. Noling,
98 Ohio St.3d 44, 781 N.E.2d 88, 2002-Ohio-7044.
{¶ 30} “‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude
that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair
Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 19 OBR 123, 126, 482
N.E.2d 1248, 1252. It is to be expected that most instances of
abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply
unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or
arbitrary.
{¶ 31} “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound
reasoning process that would support that decision. It is not
enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de
novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive,
perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would
13
support a contrary result.” AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place
Community Redevelopment (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161.
{¶ 32} Evid.R. 401 defines relevant evidence:
{¶ 33} “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” Evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible. Evid.R. 402. Furthermore, Evid.R. 403(A)
provides:
{¶ 34} “Exclusion mandatory. Although relevant, evidence is
not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues,
or of misleading the jury.”
{¶ 35} Evid.R. 404(B) states:
{¶ 36} “Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
{¶ 37} In State v. Williams, Montgomery App. No. 20271,
2005-Ohio-1597, the defendant was charged with possession of both
heroin and cocaine. At trial, the State admitted over the
14
defendant’s objection various other items found in defendant’s
apartment during a drug raid, including numerous drugs, scales,
and two loaded firearms, as well as cash found on defendant’s
person. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting
these items because they were never connected to him and do not
form any part of the charges against him, and that whatever minimal
probative value the items may possess is far outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. In concluding that the trial court
properly admitted these items because they were relevant and
admissible to prove that Defendant knew the purse he possessed
and attempted to conceal contained controlled substances, we
stated:
{¶ 38} “{¶ 60} Where, as in this case, the collateral matters
in Evid.R. 404(B) such as knowledge and plan are at issue in the
case, evidence probative of them is admissible per Evid.R. 404(B)
to prove the offense charged, notwithstanding that the same
evidence might also prove another, uncharged offense. Of course,
the trial court must exclude the evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. Evid.R. 403(A).
{¶ 39} “{¶ 61} The State was obligated to prove that Defendant
knew or was probably aware that the purse he had in his possession
and threw out of the window during this drug raid contained
15
controlled substances. It is common knowledge that in locations
where drug activity is prevalent, drugs, scales, weapons and large
sums of money are often present. The Ohio Supreme Court has
recognized that a connection exists between drugs and guns to such
an extent that if drugs are present, it is reasonable to assume
that weapons may also be present and the suspect(s) may be armed.
State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 618 N.E.2d 162, 1993-Ohio-186.”
{¶ 40} The same is true in this case. Defendant was charged
with violations of R.C. 2925.11(A) and 2925.03(A)(2), which
required the State to prove that Defendant knowingly possessed
crack cocaine, and knowingly prepared marijuana for distribution,
when he knew the marijuana was intended for sale. The various
pills, guns, ammunition, bulletproof vest and video surveillance
camera found inside Defendant’s apartment during this drug raid
were relevant and admissible to prove Defendant’s knowledge, plan,
purpose/intent with respect to possessing controlled substances
and reselling them. Williams. Furthermore, the probative value
of this evidence is not substantially outweighed by the dangers
of unfair prejudice. Id. No abuse of discretion is demonstrated
with respect to the trial court’s admission of this evidence.
{¶ 41} Defendant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 42} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT LIMITED
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CROSS-EXAMINATION.”
{¶ 43} Defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine the
police officers concerning their knowledge of the criminal
histories and reputation of the various individuals who were
present inside Defendant’s apartment when police entered.
Defendant wanted to introduce that evidence to support his theory
that it was one or more of the other people who were present, and
not Defendant, who hid the drugs and guns inside Defendant’s
apartment.
{¶ 44} The trial court allowed Defendant to elicit the names
of the other people present, and allowed Deputy Zollers to testify
that he recognized some of the individuals in Defendant’s apartment
and knew them from the community, and he classified them as “bad
guys.” The court also permitted Defendant to advance his argument
that some of the other people present may have placed the guns
and drugs in Defendant’s apartment. The court, however, excluded
any testimony by the officers concerning their knowledge of the
various individual’s criminal histories or reputation because that
information was “irrelevant and immaterial” to the issues in the
case.
{¶ 45} In State v. Foust, Montgomery App. No. 20470,
2005-Ohio-440, at ¶13-14, we stated:
17
{¶ 46} “The constitutional right of cross-examination includes
the right to impeach a witness's credibility. State v. Green, 66
Ohio St.3d 141, 1993-Ohio-26; State v. Brewer (August 24, 1994),
Montgomery App. No. 13866; Evid.R. 611(B). Unlike Federal Crim.R.
611, which generally limits cross-examination to matters raised
during direct, Ohio Crim.R. 611(B) permits cross-examination on
all relevant issues and matters relating to credibility.
Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence 2005 Courtroom Manual, at p. 245-246.
Possible bias, prejudice, pecuniary interest in the litigation
or motive to misrepresent facts, are matters that may affect
credibility. Evid.R. 616(A); State v. Ferguson (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d
160, 450 N.E.2d 265. The denial of full and effective
cross-examination of any witness who identifies Defendant and the
perpetrator of the offense, is the denial of the fundamental
constitutional right of confrontation essential to a fair trial.
State v. Hannah (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 84, 374 N.E.2d 1359; Brewer,
supra.
{¶ 47} “On the other hand, trial courts have wide latitude in
imposing reasonable limits on the scope of cross-examination based
upon concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
the witness's safety, or repetitive, marginally relevant
interrogation. Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986), 475 U.S. 673, 106
S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674. It is within the trial court's broad
18
discretion to determine whether testimony is relevant, and to
balance its potential probative value against the danger of unfair
prejudice. In re Fugate (2000), Darke App. No. 1512. We will not
interfere with the trial court's decision in those matters absent
an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion means more than
a mere error of law or an error in judgment. It implies an arbitrary,
unreasonable, unconscionable attitude on the part of the trial
court. Id.”
{¶ 48} We agree with the trial court that the issues about which
Defendant wished to cross-examine the police officers, their
knowledge concerning the criminal histories and reputation of the
other people present inside Defendant’s apartment, had little if
any relevance to whether Defendant knowingly possessed cocaine
and knowingly prepared for distribution marijuana, knowing it was
intended for sale. Such collateral matters would have injected
into this case confusion of the issues by placing these other
individuals who were present on trial, when they were not defendants
or even witnesses in this case. The information being sought by
Defendant was not for the purpose of impeaching the credibility
of the police officers or anyone else who testified.
{¶ 49} Whatever marginal probative value these extraneous areas
of inquiry might have had in supporting Defendant’s theory that
other people present in his apartment were responsible for putting
19
the drugs and guns there, was far outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice that could result from inquiry into those areas. Evid.R.
403(A). Under those circumstances, the limits the trial court
placed on the scope of cross-examination of the police officers
was entirely reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 50} Defendant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 51} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S
MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT.”
{¶ 52} Defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling
his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal based upon insufficient
evidence because the State failed to prove that he knowingly
possessed the cocaine and marijuana police found in the bedroom
of his apartment.
{¶ 53} When considering a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, the
trial court must construe the evidence in a light most favorable
to the State and determine whether reasonable minds could reach
different conclusions on whether the evidence proves each element
of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261. The motion will be granted
only when reasonable minds could only conclude that the evidence
fails to prove all of the elements of the offense. State v. Miles
20
(1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 738.
{¶ 54} A Crim.R. 29 motion challenges the legal sufficiency
of the evidence. A sufficiency of the evidence argument challenges
whether the State has presented adequate evidence on each element
of the offense to allow the case to go to the jury or sustain the
verdict as a matter of law. State v. Thompkins, (1997), 78 Ohio
St.3d 380. The proper test to apply to such an inquiry is the
one set forth in paragraph two of the syllabus of State v. Jenks
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259:
{¶ 55} “An appellate court's function when reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is
to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant
inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.”
{¶ 56} Defendant was charged in count one with violating R.C.
2925.11(A), which required the State to prove that Defendant
knowingly possessed crack cocaine, and in count two with violating
R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), which required the State to prove that
Defendant knowingly prepared for distribution marijuana, knowing
21
or having reasonable cause to believe the marijuana was intended
for sale or resale.
{¶ 57} “Knowingly” is defined in R.C. 2901.22(B):
{¶ 58} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose,
when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain
result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has
knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances
probably exist.”
{¶ 59} “Possession” is defined in R.C. 2925.01(K):
{¶ 60} “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over
a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere
access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation
of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.”
{¶ 61} Possession of a drug may be either actual physical
possession or constructive possession. State v. Butler (1989),
42 Ohio St.3d 174. A person has constructive possession of an
item when he is conscious of the presence of the object and able
to exercise dominion and control over that item, even if it is
not within his immediate physical possession. State v. Hankerson
(1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 87; State v. Wolery (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d
316.
{¶ 62} Readily usable drugs found in very close proximity to
22
a defendant may constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support a conclusion that he constructively possessed those drugs.
State v. Miller, Montgomery App. No. 19174, 2002-Ohio-4197. In
determining whether a defendant knowingly possessed a controlled
substance, it is necessary to examine the totality of the facts
and circumstances surrounding its discovery. State v. Teamer,
82 Ohio St.3d 490, 492, 1998-Ohio-193; State v. Pounds, Montgomery
App. No. 21257, 2006-Ohio-3040.
{¶ 63} Defendant points out that his fingerprints were not found
on the baggies of cocaine or marijuana, and that there were eight
other people present inside his apartment when police arrived.
According to Defendant, the only evidence of his possession was
the mere fact that he was the lessor and lived at that apartment
where the drugs were found, and he was present at the time the
drugs were discovered by police. Defendant claims that is
insufficient to prove knowing possession. R.C. 2925.01(K).
{¶ 64} The evidence presented by the State, which includes
Defendant’s statements to Detective Reed and the electric utility
bill found on the desk in the bedroom of the apartment, demonstrates
that Defendant was the resident of this apartment and was present
when police entered and discovered the contraband in question.
A blue tub full of men’s clothing was found at the end of the bed.
Inside that tub police found a cigar box which contained a small
23
baggie of crack cocaine, and a large baggie filled with twelve
smaller baggies, each of which contained a similar sized small
amount of marijuana. Deputy Moore and Detective Reed both
testified that the marijuana was packaged for sale. Inside that
same bedroom where the cocaine and marijuana were found, police
discovered several loaded firearms between the mattress and box
springs. In the kitchen area, police discovered baggies with pills
in them, digital scales, and marijuana in plain view.
{¶ 65} From the combination of direct and circumstantial
evidence in this case, viewed in a light most favorable to the
State, a rational trier of facts could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Defendant constructively possessed the crack cocaine
and marijuana police found in the bedroom of his apartment.
Defendant’s convictions are supported by legally sufficient
evidence and the trial court properly overruled his Crim.R. 29
motion for acquittal.
{¶ 66} Defendant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 67} “APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶ 68} A weight of the evidence argument challenges the
believability of the evidence and asks which of the competing
inferences suggested by the evidence is more believable or
24
persuasive. State v. Hufnagle (Sept. 6, 1996), Montgomery App.
No. 15563, unreported. The proper test to apply to that inquiry
is the one set forth in State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175:
{¶ 69} “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the
evidence, the jury lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered.” Accord: State v. Thompkins, supra.
{¶ 70} The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given to their testimony are matters for the trier of facts to
resolve. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230. In State
v. Lawson (Aug. 22, 1997), Montgomery App.No. 16288, we observed:
{¶ 71} “[b]ecause the factfinder . . . has the opportunity to
see and hear the witnesses, the cautious exercise of the
discretionary power of a court of appeals to find that a judgment
is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires that
substantial deference be extended to the factfinder’s
determinations of credibility. The decision whether, and to what
extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within
the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard
the witness.”
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{¶ 72} This court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the trier of facts on the issue of witness credibility unless
it is patently apparent that the trier of facts lost its way in
arriving at its verdict. State v. Bradley (Oct. 24, 1997),
Champaign App. No. 97-CA-03.
{¶ 73} Defendant argues that his conviction on the firearm
specifications is against the manifest weight of the evidence
because the State failed to prove that Defendant had possession,
custody or control over those firearms. Defendant points out that
no one saw him in actual possession of any firearm, and there was
no evidence that Defendant’s fingerprints were found on any of
the firearms. According to Defendant, merely being the tenant
of the apartment where the firearms were found is not sufficient
to prove that Defendant possessed or had control over those
firearms.
{¶ 74} For essentially the same reasons we discussed in
overruling the previous assignment of error, the combination of
direct and circumstantial evidence presented by the State, when
viewed in its totality, was sufficient to prove that Defendant
constructively possessed the firearms found in the bedroom of his
apartment. Defendant admitted to police that he lived at the
apartment and had been home sleeping from 9:00 a.m. until police
arrived. The guns were found in the bed in Defendant’s bedroom,
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between the mattress and box springs. Defendant’s close personal
proximity and ready access to these loaded, operable firearms
establishes his constructive possession/control over them. The
jury did not lose its way in choosing to believe the State’s version
of events rather than Defendant’s, which it had a right to do.
DeHass.
{¶ 75} Reviewing the record as a whole, we cannot say that the
evidence weighs heavily against a conviction, that the jury lost
its way in choosing to believe the State’s witnesses, or that a
manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. Defendant’s conviction
on the firearm specifications is not against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
{¶ 76} Defendant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
DONOVAN, J. And WAITE, J., concur.
(Hon. Cheryl L. Waite, Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting
by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.)
Copies mailed to:
Timothy J. Cole, Esq.
Andrea G. Ostrowski, Esq.
Hon. John D. Schmitt (Visiting Judge)
Hon. Mary Wiseman
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