[Cite as State v. Griffith, 2011-Ohio-4476.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO :
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 24275
vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 09CR3834
GERRY E. GRIFFITH, JR. : (Criminal Appeal from
Common
Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
. . . . . . . . .
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 2nd day of September, 2011.
. . . . . . . . .
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Pros. Attorney; Laura M. Woodruff, Asst.
Pros. Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0084161, P.O. Box 972, Dayton, OH
45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
Lawrence J. Greger, Atty. Reg. No. 0002592, Suite 1100 Liberty
Tower, 120 W. Second Street, Dayton, OH 45402
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
. . . . . . . . .
GRADY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant, Gerry Griffith, appeals from his conviction
for possession of crack cocaine between one and five grams. R.C.
2925.11(A). The conviction, which includes a sentence of five
years of community control sanctions, was ordered on a plea of no
2
contest Defendant entered after the court denied his Crim.R.
12(C)(3) motion to suppress evidence of crack cocaine. Defendant
appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 2} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING THE APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE CRACK COCAINE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THE
SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT’S TRUNK.”
{¶ 3} When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court
assumes the role of the trier of facts and is therefore in the best
position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71,
2006-Ohio-3665. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the
trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent,
credible evidence. Id. Accepting those facts as true, the
appellate court must then independently determine, without
deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether those facts
satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id.
{¶ 4} The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence in a written decision (Dkt. 21), in which the court made
findings of fact consistent with the testimony of Dayton Police
Officer Jeff C. Heiber at the hearing on Defendant’s motion.
{¶ 5} Officer Heiber testified that he had nine years experience
as an officer of the Dayton Police Department. While he was on
3
patrol in his cruiser on November 11, 2009, at about 11:54 p.m.,
Officer Heiber saw a tan vehicle parked in the lot of a BP gas
station at the corner of Salem and Grand Avenues. The vehicle was
“parked to the right in the parking lot, not by the pumps but just
parked off to the side, off to the right.” (T. 9). The building
serving the station was closed, the gates to its entrance having
been pulled down. Officer Hieber explained:
{¶ 6} “I then pulled into the gas station just to drive through.
I had made it a routine to [when I] end my shift I customarily drive
through that parking lot just on the way back to the District to
patrol it because we’ve had an increase of drug activity in that
gas station parking lot.” (T. 9).
{¶ 7} As he drove into the lot Officer Hieber saw that the driver
and sole occupant of the vehicle, Defendant Gerry Griffith, “had
his head down as if he was doing something or manipulating something
in his lap.” Id. When he looked up and made eye contact with the
officer, Defendant “immediately went into gear and started to pull
out of the parking lot.” Id.
{¶ 8} Officer Hieber testified that Defendant drove to an exit
for Salem Avenue, where he engaged his signal to turn right.
Defendant “actually started going right, and then turned left in
the middle of the road to go in the opposite direction . . . It
was almost like a u-turn.” (T. 11).
4
{¶ 9} Officer Hieber decided to follow Defendant’s vehicle for
a short distance to determine whether he was “drunk or been
drinking.” Id. Defendant turned from Salem Avenue onto a side
street without first signaling his turn. Officer Hieber believed
this was a turn signal violation. As Officer Hieber’s cruiser
approached Defendant’s vehicle, Defendant “abruptly just pulled
over to the right real quick and parked along side of the road.”
(T. 12). Officer Hieber said: “I had to stop and put on my brakes
quickly to keep from running right past him.” (T. 13).
{¶ 10} Officer Hieber exited his vehicle and approached
Defendant’s vehicle on foot, intending to issue a citation for the
turn signal violation he witnessed. While speaking with Defendant
through the opened driver’s window, and using a flashlight to
better see Defendant, Officer Hieber saw a bag of marijuana, in
plain view, on the console between the driver’s and passenger
seats, near the vehicle’s shift lever. Officer Hieber testified
that, based on his nine years experience as a police officer, the
amount of marijuana he saw presented probable cause of a minor
misdemeanor offense, being less than 100 grams by weight. (T.
34-35). 1 Absent circumstances which are not portrayed by this
record, minor misdemeanors are subject to citation instead of
1
Possession of marijuana weighing less than 100 grams is
a minor misdemeanor. R.C. 2925.11(C)(3)(a), (b).
5
arrest. R.C. 2935.26(A).
{¶ 11} Officer Hieber removed Defendant from his vehicle and
placed him in the officer’s cruiser. Even though Defendant was
not subject to arrest, Officer Hieber returned to Defendant’s
vehicle to search the vehicle, including its trunk, for drugs.
Officer Hieber explained that he performed the search because
Defendant “had drugs in plain view in the vehicle.” (T. 38). When
he searched the trunk, Officer Hieber seized digital scales and
a bag that was later determined to contain crack cocaine. The
cocaine was the basis of the violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) with which
Defendant was charged.
{¶ 12} Defendant did not contest the traffic stop in the motion
to suppress he filed. Defendant instead challenged the
warrantless search of the trunk of his vehicle that yielded the
crack cocaine the officer seized. The trial court overruled
Defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court concluded that
“once probable cause to search a vehicle has been established by
discovering contraband in open view in the passenger compartment,
an officer may search the entire vehicle, including the trunk and
all containers therein that might contain contraband.” (Decision
at p. 6.)
{¶ 13} Defendant argues that the search of his vehicle was not
justified because he was not under arrest when the search was
6
performed. Defendant points out that his alleged traffic code
offenses permitted his citation, not an arrest. Defendant also
points to Officer Hieber’s testimony that, from his experience,
the officer knew that the amount of marijuana he saw presented
probable cause of a minor misdemeanor offense, for which a citation
instead of arrest is likewise required.
{¶ 14} The United States Constitution requires the exclusion of
evidence only when a particular arrest, search, or seizure violates
the Fourth Amendment. Michigan v. Long (1983), 463 U.S. 1032, 103
S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201. The Ohio Supreme Court has
consistently held that the exclusionary rule will not be applied
to evidence secured in violation of state law, but not in violation
of constitutional rights. See State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio
St.3d 1. To justify application of the exclusionary rule, the
effect of the violation of state law must create a collateral
violation of the defendant’s federal or state constitutional
rights. State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2002-Ohio-3931.
Therefore, the fact that Officer Hieber may have been barred by
R.C. 2935.26(A) from placing Defendant under arrest because of the
marijuana the officer saw in the passenger compartment of his
vehicle does not, in and of itself, present basis for the
suppression of the evidence the officer seized in the search of
the vehicle’s trunk. That search must itself have been an
7
unconstitutional search or seizure for the lack of a necessary
warrant.
{¶ 15} The State does not rely on the search incident to arrest
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to justify
the warrantless search of the trunk of Defendant’s vehicle.
Instead, the State argues that the warrantless search was
reasonable because the officer had probable cause to perform the
search. The existence of probable cause satisfies the purposes
of the warrant requirement, and relieves an officer of the need
to obtain a prior warrant when that is not practicable. Probable
cause exists when a reasonably prudent person would believe that
a place to be searched contains evidence of a crime. Beck v. Ohio
(1964), 37 9 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142.
{¶ 16} Under the well recognized automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, police may conduct a
warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains contraband, and exigent
circumstances necessitate a search or seizure. State v. Mills
(1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357; Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U.S.
42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419. A vehicle’s mobility is the
traditional exigency for this exception to the warrant
requirement. Mills; California v. Carney (1985), 471 U.S. 386,
105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406.
8
{¶ 17} Defendant relies upon State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d
519, 2006-Ohio-3255, wherein the Ohio Supreme Court wrote that a
trunk and a passenger compartment of an automobile are subject to
different standards of probable cause to conduct searches, to argue
that the search of his trunk was unlawful. Defendant’s reliance
upon Farris is misplaced because that case is factually
distinguishable.
{¶ 18} In Farris, following a traffic stop, an officer detected
a “light odor” of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle’s
passenger compartment. He subsequently searched the vehicle’s
trunk where drugs were discovered and seized. The Supreme Court
held:
{¶ 19} “{¶ 51} A trunk and a passenger compartment of an
automobile are subject to different standards of probable cause
to conduct searches. In State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489,
764 N.E.2d 986, syllabus, this court held that ‘[w]hen a police
officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an
automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.’
(Emphasis added.) The court was conspicuous in limiting the search
to the passenger compartment.
{¶ 20} “{¶ 52} The odor of burnt marijuana in the passenger
compartment of a vehicle does not, standing alone, establish
9
probable cause for a warrantless search of the trunk of the vehicle.
United States v. Nielsen (C.A.10, 1993), 9 F.3d 1487. No other
factors justifying a search beyond the passenger compartment were
present in this case. The officer detected only a light odor of
marijuana, and the troopers found no other contraband within the
passenger compartment. The troopers thus lacked probable cause to
search the trunk of Farris's vehicle. Therefore, the automobile
exception does not apply in this case.”
{¶ 21} The Fourth Amendment limits searches to places where
evidence of criminal activity is likely to be found. Farris stands
for the proposition that the odor of burnt marijuana in a vehicle’s
passenger compartment, standing alone, doesn’t present a
likelihood that the vehicle’s trunk contains marijuana. The point
of distinction is whether the character or nature of drugs found
“in plain view” (or smell) in the passenger compartment presents
a likelihood that the vehicle’s trunk contains drugs or other
contraband, such that a search of the trunk is justified by the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
{¶ 22} In Farris, “[n]o other factors justifying a search beyond
the passenger compartment were present.” Farris identified one
of those other potential factors to include “contraband within the
passenger compartment.” That precise factor was present here.
In addition, the officer first saw Defendant in a parking lot which,
10
in the officer’s experience, has seen “an increase in drug
activity.” (T. 9). Coupled with that, Defendant’s pattern of
driving after he saw the officer was evasive, possibly suggesting
that he had reason to avoid contact with the officer. California
v. Hodari D. (1991), 499 U.S. 621, 113 L.Ed.2d 690, 111 S.Ct. 1547,
n. 1.
{¶ 23} The trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence. The assignment of error is overruled. The
judgment from which the appeal is taken will be affirmed.
FAIN, J., and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Laura M. Woodruff, Esq.
Lawrence J. Greger, Esq.
Hon. Mary Katherine Huffman