[Cite as State v. Barrett, 2011-Ohio-2303.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO :
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 24150
v. : T.C. NO. 09CR3642
MARKUS H. BARRETT : (Criminal appeal from
Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 13th day of May , 2011.
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CARLEY J. INGRAM, Atty. Reg. No. 0020084, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 W.
Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
BYRON K. SHAW, Atty. Reg. No. 0073124, 4800 Belmont Place, Huber Heights, Ohio
45424
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
MARKUS H. BARRETT, #A635-045, London Correctional Institute, P. O. Box 69,
London, Ohio 43140
Defendant-Appellant
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FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} On December 11, 2009, the appellant was indicted on two counts of
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aggravated robbery (first degree felonies, each with a three-year firearm specification), one
count of receiving stolen property, motor vehicle (a fourth degree felony), one count of
possession of criminal tools (a fifth degree felony), and one count of failure to comply with
the order or signal of a police officer (a fourth degree felony). The appellant subsequently
entered a plea of guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree. The
other charges and the firearm specifications were dismissed. He was sentenced to three
years in prison to run consecutively with a two-year sentence in case 09-CR-3961.
{¶ 2} Appellant’s assigned counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California
(1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, stating that he filed his “brief of
appeal as requested by appellant but after thorough review of the case, concludes that there
were no errors from the trial level.” We then informed the appellant that his attorney had
filed such a brief and granted him time in order to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has
been filed. Pursuant to our duty under Anders, we have conducted an independent review
of the record.
{¶ 3} Appellant’s counsel raises as his only potential assignment of error that the
“conviction and sentencing is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” The appellant’s
guilty plea left nothing for the State to prove because a guilty plea is a complete admission
of guilt. Crim.R. 11(B)(1); Huber Heights v. Duty (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 244. By
entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives his right to present
manifest-weight-of-the-evidence or sufficiency-of-the-evidence attacks against his
convictions. State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415. The Anders brief in this
case was filed October 4, 2010. Counsel has raised the same issue in Anders briefs filed
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both before and after October 4. In each of those cases we have held, as we do today, that
an appellant waives any manifest weight of the evidence argument by a plea of guilty. See,
for example, State v. Martin, Montgomery App. No. 23379, 2010-Ohio-976; State v. Steele,
Montgomery App. No. 23402, 2009-Ohio-6019; State v. Gebhart, Montgomery App. No.
23347, 2009-Ohio-5739; State v. Bailey, Montgomery App. No. 23164, 2009-Ohio-4107;
State v. Pierre, Montgomery App. No. 23245, 2009-Ohio-3125. If counsel believes this to
be a good faith, non-frivolous, argument, he is still under a responsibility to cite to these
contrary opinions.
{¶ 4} On May 28, the defendant appeared in court and entered a plea of guilty to the
charge of aggravated robbery. Appellant was represented by counsel and the court engaged
in a comprehensive Rule 11 colloquy. Appellant indicated that he understood his rights and
wished to waive them and enter a plea of guilty and, further, signed a plea form in open
court acknowledging these rights. Although he faced substantially more time, there had
been a sentencing agreement of three years which the defendant acknowledged.
{¶ 5} The court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and set the case in the future
on a date after a trial which the appellant had scheduled on another case. Apparently, the
appellant pled guilty to a charge in the other case, 2009-CR-3961, since he appeared for
sentencing on both matters on July 12, 2010. Before proceeding to sentencing, the court
stated its understanding there was an agreed-upon, two-year prison sentence in
2009-CR-3961 (felonious assault, a second degree felony), which would be served
consecutively to the three-year sentence in 09-CR-3642. Both attorneys for the defendant
acknowledged that understanding, as did the defendant himself.
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{¶ 6} In imposing sentence, the trial court correctly informed the appellant that he
would be required to serve five years of post-release control on the aggravated robbery and
three years on the felonious assault. The court informed the defendant that the post-release
control “would essentially be served concurrently, at the same time, for a total of five years
post-release control.”
{¶ 7} Further, upon examination of the record before us, we see nothing that would
indicate the trial counsel was ineffective. The defendant faced substantially longer
incarceration if all the charges for which he was indicted had proceeded, and he received
the minimum sentences on the aggravated robbery and felonious assault.
{¶ 8} Based on the record before us and after performing our duty of independent
review, we have found no potential assignments of error having arguable merit and we
conclude that the appeal is wholly frivolous. The judgment of the trial court will be
affirmed.
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GRADY, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Carley J. Ingram
Byron K. Shaw
Markus H. Barrett
Hon. Connie S. Price