Gaskins v. Dept. of Transp.

[Cite as Gaskins v. Dept. of Transp., 2010-Ohio-6552.] Court of Claims of Ohio The Ohio Judicial Center 65 South Front Street, Third Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 www.cco.state.oh.us SARAH C. GASKINS Plaintiff v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Defendant Case No. 2010-04904-AD Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert MEMORANDUM DECISION {¶ 1} Plaintiff, Sarah C. Gaskins, filed this action against defendant, Department of Transportation (ODOT), contending her 2001 Mitsubishi Eclipse was damaged as a proximate cause of negligence on the part of ODOT in maintaining a hazardous condition on Interstate 75 in Warren County. Plaintiff related she “was traveling north in the middle lane on Interstate 75 in Middletown near mile marker 30” when her vehicle struck a pothole causing bumper and rim damage. Plaintiff recalled the described incident occurred on February 26, 2010 at approximately 8:00 a.m. Plaintiff requested damage recovery in the amount of $1,202.76, the stated total cost of repairs and two replacement rims. The filing fee was paid. {¶ 2} Defendant acknowledged the roadway area where plaintiff’s incident occurred was within the limits of a working construction project under the control of ODOT contractor, John R. Jurgensen Company (Jurgensen). Defendant explained the particular construction project “dealt with widening I-75 between Cincinnati-Dayton Road and SR 122 in Butler and Warren Counties.” According to defendant, the construction project limits “corresponds to state mileposts 21.0 to 32.0” on Interstate 75 and plaintiff’s damage incident occurred at milepost 30.0, a location within the construction area limits. Defendant asserted that this particular construction project was under the control of Jurgensen and consequently ODOT had no responsibility for any damage or mishap on the roadway within the construction project limits. Defendant argued that Jurgensen, by contractual agreement, was responsible for maintaining the roadway within the construction zone. Therefore, ODOT contended that Jurgensen is the proper party defendant in this action. Defendant implied that all duties such as the duty to inspect, the duty to warn, the duty to maintain, and the duty to repair defects were delegated when an independent contractor takes control over a particular section of roadway. Furthermore, defendant contended that plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove her damage was proximately caused by roadway conditions created by ODOT or its contractors. All construction work was to be performed in accordance with ODOT requirements and specifications and subject to ODOT approval. Also evidence has been submitted to establish that ODOT personnel were present onsite conducting inspection activities. {¶ 3} For plaintiff to prevail on a claim of negligence, she must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant owed her a duty, that it breached that duty, and that the breach proximately caused her injuries. Armstrong v. Best Buy Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St. 3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573,¶8 citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Products, Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 75, 77, 15 OBR 179, 472 N.E. 2d 707. Plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she suffered a loss and that this loss was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence. Barnum v. Ohio State University (1977), 76-0368-AD. However, “[i]t is the duty of a party on whom the burden of proof rests to produce evidence which furnishes a reasonable basis for sustaining his claim. If the evidence so produced furnishes only a basis for a choice among different possibilities as to any issue in the case, he fails to sustain such burden.” Paragraph three of the syllabus in Steven v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 145 Ohio St. 198, 30 O.O. 415, 61 N.E. 2d 198, approved and followed. This court, as trier of fact, determines questions of proximate causation. Shinaver v. Szymanski (1984), 14 Ohio St. 3d 51, 14 OBR 446, 471 N.E. 2d 477. {¶ 4} Defendant had the duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition for the motoring public. Knickel v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 335, 3 O.O. 3d 413, 361 N.E. 2d 486. However, defendant is not an insurer of the safety of its highways. See Kniskern v. Township of Somerford (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 189, 678 N.E. 2d 273; Rhodus v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 67 Ohio App. 3d 723, 588 N.E. 2d 864. The duty of ODOT to maintain the roadway in a safe drivable condition is not delegable to an independent contractor involved in roadway construction. ODOT may bear liability for the negligent acts of an independent contractor charged with roadway construction. Cowell v. Ohio Department of Transportation, Ct. of Cl. No. 2003-09343-AD, jud, 2004-Ohio-151. Despite defendant’s contentions that ODOT did not owe any duty in regard to the construction project, defendant was charged with duties to inspect the construction site and correct any known deficiencies in connection with the particular construction work. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (June 28, 2001), Franklin App. 00AP-1119. {¶ 5} Alternatively, defendant denied that neither ODOT nor Jurgensen had any notice of the particular pothole prior to plaintiff’s property damage event. Defendant pointed out that ODOT records “indicate that no calls or complaints were received regarding a pothole prior to Plaintiff Gaskins’ incident.” Defendant advised, “[i]t should be noted that this portion of I-75 has an average daily traffic volume between 73,320 and 93,130, however, no other complaints were received (regarding a roadway defect) prior to plaintiff’s alleged incident.” Defendant contended plaintiff failed to offer any evidence of negligent roadway maintenance on the part of ODOT and failed to produce evidence to establish her property damage was attributable to conduct on either the part of ODOT or Jurgensen. Defendant denied receiving any complaints before February 26, 2010 regarding a pothole on Interstate 75 at approximate milepost 30.0. {¶ 6} Defendant submitted a letter from Jurgensen Project Manager, Kate Holden, who advised Jurgensen personnel patched potholes in the vicinity of milepost 30.0 on February 26, 2010, the day of plaintiff’s incident. Holden denied Jurgensen had any prior knowledge of a pothole at or near milepost 30.0. {¶ 7} In order to find liability for a damage claim occurring in a construction area, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether ODOT acted in a manner to render the highway free from an unreasonable risk of harm for the traveling public. Feichtner v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1995), 114 Ohio App. 3d 346, 683 N.E. 2d 112. In fact, the duty to render the highway free from an unreasonable risk of harm is the precise duty owed by ODOT to the traveling public under both normal traffic and during highway construction projects. See e.g. White v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (1990), 56 Ohio St. 3d 39, 42, 564 N.E. 2d 462. {¶ 8} In order to prove a breach of the duty to maintain the highways, plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the precise condition or defect alleged to have caused the accident. McClellan v. ODOT (1986), 34 Ohio App. 3d 247, 517 N.E. 2d 1388. Defendant is only liable for roadway conditions of which it has notice but fails to reasonably correct. Bussard v. Dept. of Transp. (1986), 31 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 31 OBR 64, 507 N.E. 2d 1179. {¶ 9} Generally, in order to recover in a suit involving damage proximately caused by roadway conditions including potholes, plaintiff must prove that either: 1) defendant had actual or constructive notice of the pothole and failed to respond in a reasonable time or responded in a negligent manner, or 2) that defendant, in a general sense, maintains its highways negligently. Denis v. Department of Transportation (1976), 75-0287-AD. There is no evidence that defendant had actual notice of the pothole condition. Therefore, in order to recover plaintiff must produce evidence to prove constructive notice of the defect or negligent maintenance. {¶ 10} “[C]onstructive notice is that which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice or knowledge.” In re Estate of Fahle (1950), 90 Ohio App. 195, 197-198, 48 O.O. 231, 105 N.E. 2d 429. “A finding of constructive notice is a determination the court must make on the facts of each case not simply by applying a pre-set time standard for the discovery of certain road hazards.” Bussard. {¶ 11} The trier of fact is precluded from making an inference of defendant’s constructive notice, unless evidence is presented in respect to the time the defective condition developed. Spires v. Ohio Highway Department (1988), 61 Ohio Misc. 2d 262, 577 N.E. 2d 458. {¶ 12} In order for there to be constructive notice, plaintiff must show sufficient time has elapsed after the dangerous condition appears, so that under the circumstances defendant should have acquired knowledge of its existence. Guiher v. Dept. of Transportation (1978), 78-0126-AD. Size of the defect is insufficient to show notice or duration of existence. O’Neil v. Department of Transportation (1988), 61 Ohio Misc. 2d 287, 587 N.E. 2d 891. “Obviously, the requisite length of time sufficient to constitute constructive notice varies with each specific situation.” Danko v. Ohio Dept. of Transp. (Feb. 4, 1993), Franklin App. 92AP-1183. No evidence has shown ODOT had constructive notice of the pothole. {¶ 13} Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to infer that defendant, in a general sense, maintains its highways negligently or that defendant’s acts caused the defective condition. Herlihy v. Ohio Department of Transportation (1999), 99-07011-AD. Plaintiff has failed to prove that her damage was proximately caused by any negligent act or omission on the part of ODOT or its agents. See Wachs v. Dept. of Transp., Dist. 12, Ct. of Cl. No. 2005-09481-AD, 2006-Ohio-7162; Nicastro v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., Ct. of Cl. No. 2007-09323-AD, 2008-Ohio-4190. Court of Claims of Ohio The Ohio Judicial Center 65 South Front Street, Third Floor Columbus, OH 43215 614.387.9800 or 1.800.824.8263 www.cco.state.oh.us SARAH C. GASKINS Plaintiff v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Defendant Case No. 2010-04904-AD Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION Having considered all the evidence in the claim file and, for the reasons set forth in the memorandum decision filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. ________________________________ DANIEL R. BORCHERT Deputy Clerk Entry cc: Sarah C. Gaskin Jolene M. Molitoris, Director 1373 Corydale Drive Department of Transportation Apt. D 1980 West Broad Street Fairfield, Ohio 45014 Columbus, Ohio 43223 RDK/laa 8/10 Filed 9/20/10 Sent to S.C. reporter 12/29/10