[Cite as Price v. Frederick C. Smith Clinic, 2010-Ohio-4551.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
THELMA PRICE, CASE NO. 9-10-13
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
THE FREDERICK C. SMITH OPINION
CLINIC, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 09 CV 0277
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: September 27, 2010
APPEARANCES:
Robert E. Wilson, for Appellant
James P. Myers, for Appellees
Case No. 9-10-13
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Thelma Price (“Price”), appeals the January 20,
2010 judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Marion County, Ohio, granting
summary judgment in favor of Defendants-appellees, The Frederick C. Smith
Clinic and Clinic Investment LLC (collectively hereinafter “the clinic”) and
dismissing her complaint against them.
{¶2} On September 19, 2005, Price, who was ninety-years old, went to
see her physician at the clinic. After the appointment, Price’s granddaughter, who
drove Price to her appointment, went to get the car while Price waited in the clinic
lobby. Upon seeing her granddaughter drive up, Price, who uses a walker, began
to exit the lobby through the automatic sliding doors located at the main entrance
of the clinic. As Price was in the threshold of the interior set of doors, she felt
something against her right hand. When she looked at her hand, she noticed that
the automatic door was closing on her. Price raised her arm to stop the door but it
continued to close, knocking both Price and her walker to the floor. As a result of
this fall, Price’s right leg was broken.
{¶3} Price filed a complaint in the Marion County Common Pleas Court
on September 6, 2007, against the clinic for the injuries she sustained from the
accident. However, Price voluntarily dismissed her complaint pursuant to Civ.R.
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41(A)(2) on June 12, 2008. On March 31, 2009, Price re-filed her complaint
against the clinic. The clinic filed its answer to Price’s complaint.
{¶4} On November 9, 2009, the clinic filed a motion for summary
judgment. In its motion, the clinic asserted that Price could not demonstrate that
the clinic breached any duty it owed to Price. In addition, the clinic maintained
that the automatic sliding doors were an open and obvious danger, thereby
eliminating any duty that the clinic may have owed to Price. Price responded to
this motion on December 31, 2009. Thereafter, the clinic filed its reply brief in
support of its motion for summary judgment.
{¶5} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the clinic on
January 20, 2010, and dismissed Price’s complaint. This appeal followed, and
Price now asserts two assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE DOCTRINE
OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR TO THE PREMATURE CLOSING
OF THE AUTOMATIC SLIDING GLASS DOORS WHICH
CAUSED INJURY TO THE PLAINTIFF WHICH WOULD
DEFEAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT OF WHETHER A
BUSINESS OWNER IS NEGLIGENT WHEN THE OWNER
OF THE BUSINESS HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN ADVISED
THAT ITS AUTOMATIC SLIDING GLASS DOORS
PREMATURELY CLOSED ON A BUSINESS INVITEE AND
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FAILS TO REMEDY THAT HAZARD WHICH CAUSES AN
INJURY TO A SUBSEQUENT BUSINESS INVITEE.
{¶6} For ease of discussion, we elect to address these assignments of error
out of the order in which they appear.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶7} In Price’s second assignment of error, she contends that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the clinic because there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the clinic breached the duty of care it
owed to her based upon its prior knowledge of the premature closing of the
automatic doors and failure to remedy this hazard. An appellate court reviews a
grant of summary judgment de novo, without any deference to the trial court.
Conley-Slowinski v. Superior Spinning & Stamping Co. (1998), 128 Ohio App.3d
360, 363, 714 N.E.2d 991; see, also, Hasenfratz v. Warnement, 3rd Dist. No. 1-06-
03, 2006-Ohio-2797, citing Lorain Nat’l. Bank v. Saratoga Apts. (1989), 61 Ohio
App.3d 127, 572 N.E.2d 198. A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed only
when the requirements of Civ.R. 56(C) are met. This requires the moving party to
establish that
when, looking at the evidence as a whole, (1) no genuine issue of
material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from
the evidence, construed most strongly in favor of the nonmoving
party, that reasonable minds could only conclude in favor of the
moving party.
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Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 1995-Ohio-286, paragraph
three of the syllabus, 653 N.E.2d 1196; see, also, Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶8} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
identifying the basis for its motion in order to allow the opposing party a
“meaningful opportunity to respond.” Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d
112, 526 N.E.2d 798, syllabus. The moving party also bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential
element of the case. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 1996-Ohio-107, 662
N.E.2d 264. Once the moving party demonstrates that he is entitled to summary
judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence on any
issue which that party bears the burden of production at trial. See Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶9} In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court is not permitted to
weigh evidence or choose among reasonable inferences, rather, the court must
evaluate evidence, taking all permissible inferences and resolving questions of
credibility in favor of the non-moving party. Jacobs v. Racevskis (1995), 105
Ohio App.3d 1, 7, 663 N.E.2d 653. Additionally, Civ.R.56(C) mandates that
summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written
stipulations of fact show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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{¶10} To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached
that duty, and (3) the defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff to be
injured. Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 120, 2009-Ohio-2495, 909
N.E.2d 120, at ¶ 10, citations omitted. The applicable duty is determined by the
relationship between the landowner and the plaintiff when the alleged negligence
occurs in a premises-liability context. Id., citing Gladon v. Greater Cleveland
Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315, 1996-Ohio-137, 662 N.E.2d 287.
Here, the parties do not dispute that Price was a business invitee of the clinic.
{¶11} “A shopkeeper ordinarily owes its business invitees a duty of
ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition and has
the duty to warn its invitees of latent or hidden dangers.” Armstrong v. Best Buy
Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 1088, at ¶ 5, citing
Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 203, 480 N.E.2d 474;
Jackson v. Kings Island (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 357, 390 N.E.2d 810. In a
premises-liability action, the plaintiff can prove the defendant’s breach of duty if
any one of three conditions is satisfied:
(1) the defendant, through its officers or employees, was
responsible for the hazard complained of; (2) at least one of such
persons had actual knowledge of the hazard and neglected to
give adequate notice of its presence or to remove it promptly; or
(3) such danger existed for a sufficient length of time reasonably
to justify the inference that the failure to warn against it or
remove it was attributable to a want of ordinary care.
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Gouhin v. Giant Eagle, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-548, 2008-Ohio-766, at ¶ 8, citing,
Sharp v. Anderson’s, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 06AP81, 2006-Ohio-4075, at ¶ 7, citing
Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584, 589, 49 N.E.2d 925.
Further, “[w]hen it is shown that the owner had superior knowledge of the
particular danger which caused the injury, liability attaches because, in such a
case, invitees may not reasonably be expected to protect themselves from a risk
they cannot fully appreciate.” Hairston v. Gary K. Corp., 8th Dist. No. 87199,
2006-Ohio-5566, at ¶ 10, citing Mikula v. Slavin Tailors (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 48,
263 N.E.2d 316; LaCourse v. Fleitz (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 209, 503 N.E.2d 159;
see, also, Cochran v. Ohio Auto Club (Oct. 3, 1996), 3rd Dist. No. 9-96-33, 1996
WL 562055.
{¶12} Moreover,
[i]n Perry v. Eastgreen Realty Co. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 51,
a per curiam opinion, at pages 52 and 53, it is stated: “* * * once
the evidence establishes that a dangerous condition existed, and
that it is a condition about which the owner should have known,
evidence of actual knowledge on his part is unnecessary.
‘The occupier is not an insurer of the safety of invitees,
and his duty is only to exercise reasonable care for their
protection. But the obligation of reasonable care is a full one,
applicable in all respects, and extending to everything that
threatens the invitee with an unreasonable risk of harm. The
occupier must not only use care not to injure the visitor by
negligent activities, and warn him of latent dangers of which the
occupier knows, but he must also inspect the premises to
discover possible dangerous conditions of which he does not
know, and take reasonable precautions to protect the invitee
from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement or
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use. The obligation extends to the original construction of the
premises, where it results in a dangerous condition.’ Prosser on
Torts (4 Ed.), 392-93 (1971). See, also, Peaster v. William Sikes
Post No. 4825 V.F.W. (1966), 113 Ga.App. 211, 147 S.E.2d 686,
687-8; De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co. (1956), 5 Utah 2d 116, 297
P.2d 898, 901; Gallagher v. St. Raymond’s Roman Catholic
Church (1968), 21 N.Y.2d 554, 236 N.E.2d 632, 633-34 (so
changing the pre-existing common law as to require outdoor
lighting where none had been requisite); F.W. Woolworth Co. v.
Bland (1933), 22 Ohio Law Abs. 660, 660-61; 39 Ohio
Jurisprudence 2d 586-87, Negligence, Section 64. * * *.”
Vondenhuevel v. Overhead Door Corp. (Apr. 26, 1988), 3rd Dist. No. 1-86-23,
1988 WL 40434.
{¶13} In the case sub judice, Price maintains that the clinic was responsible
for the hazard, i.e. the doors closing while a person was in the threshold, because it
had no policies and procedures for implementing the daily safety checklist
provided to it by Stanley Access Technologies (“Stanley”), the company that
serviced the doors at the clinic, and had no method by which it documented which
employee implemented the checklist on any particular day. In addition, Price
asserts that the clinic was responsible for the hazard because it determined the
length of time the doors would remain open before the doors automatically closed
and because it was informed by a Stanley technician that the OmniScan sensor that
operated the opening and closing of the doors was obsolete and should be
upgraded.
{¶14} We find Price’s assertion regarding the clinic’s control of the length
of time the doors would remain open before automatically closing has merit. First,
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Rich Cole, a supervisor for Stanley, testified about the operation of various
sensors. For instance, Cole testified that one type of threshold sensor, referred to
as the “Stan-Guard,” “looks straight down from the bottom of the header across
the opening of the door to make sure that there’s nobody standing in the opening
of the door.” However, this sensor has a blind spot because of its limited width,
and if there is no movement in the threshold for a certain period of time, the sensor
will “time-out,” resulting in the doors closing. Cole testified that the timer on the
Stan-Guard is determined by the customer and can be set to time-out from
anywhere between thirty seconds and three minutes. He further testified that
because of the Stan-Guard’s limitations, a redundant threshold sensor, referred to
as a “holding beam”, is often used in the sides of the doorway so the door will not
close on someone who is in the threshold. Although Cole was unfamiliar with the
OmniScan sensor and how it operated, his testimony reveals that there are
numerous options available to customers and that it is the customer who chooses
the door and the safety mechanisms that will be installed. Further, a Stanley
technician recommended in June of 2003, that the OmniScan sensors be upgraded.
Although this recommendation was made based upon the sensors being obsolete
rather than because they were not working, the fact that the technician was making
a recommendation to the clinic to upgrade demonstrates that the choice of sensors
was the clinic’s, rather than the service provider’s. Thus, the clinic determined
what safety devices would be utilized.
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{¶15} Second, the testimony of Ralph Neddleton, the Facilities Director for
the clinic, revealed that the clinic chose what company would maintain these doors
and when the doors would be serviced. Further, the clinic knew in September of
2002, that another incident similar to Price’s had occurred when Lee Ann
Murraya, who was utilizing a walker to assist her, was knocked down by the same
doors as she was entering the clinic. Once the clinic knew this type of incident
could happen, it alone had the power to determine whether to have new sensors
installed to accommodate the types of invitees that frequented its establishment or,
if possible on the current sensors, to lengthen the amount of time before the doors
would time-out or adjust the sensors that detected whether someone/something
was in the pathway of the doors to ensure that the doors would not close if
someone was in the threshold. Yet, even after a second similar incident in April of
2004, involving Martha Smith, the record is devoid of any evidence that the clinic
took any measures to protect its invitees from this hazard.
{¶16} When construing this evidence in a light most favorable to Price, we
find that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the clinic created this
hazard by failing to choose adequate safety measures or otherwise warning its
invitees about the length of time they had to safely traverse the threshold.
{¶17} Price also maintains that the clinic had actual knowledge of the
hazard and neglected to give adequate notice of its presence or to remove it
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promptly. In support of her position, Price relies upon the occurrence of two
similar incidents involving these doors.
{¶18} In the first incident, the affidavit of Lee Ann Murraya stated that she
was injured at the clinic on September 23, 2002. More specifically, Murraya
averred that she was entering the clinic through the automatic sliding doors at the
main entrance with the aid of her walker when the doors started to close on her.
She attempted to stop the doors but was unable to do so. The doors then knocked
her to the ground. This fall resulted in a broken finger on her right hand. Murraya
further stated that she was immediately taken by wheelchair to a receptionist
where she checked in for her doctor’s appointment. She told the receptionist about
her fall and completed an incident report. Four days later, Murraya was contacted
by a claims specialist from the clinic’s insurance company and her claim was later
settled out of court.
{¶19} In the second incident, Martha Smith was entering the clinic on
April 20, 2004, aided by the use of a cane, when she was knocked down by the
automatic sliding doors at the main entrance while in the threshold of the doors.
As a result, Smith suffered a broken elbow. Gayle Hayman, who witnessed the
incident, stated that she waited with Smith until employees of the clinic arrived
and placed Smith on a stretcher and removed her from the scene.
{¶20} When viewed in a light most favorable to Price, this evidence
reveals that the clinic was aware of two prior incidents where people, who were
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unable to walk without assistance, were injured while in the threshold of these sets
of doors. Yet, there is no evidence that the clinic took any steps to alleviate this
problem. While the evidence shows that Stanley conducted routine preventive
maintenance on these doors in March and June of 2003, and the doors were
functioning properly and within ANSI1 standards, there is nothing to indicate that
anyone attempted to determine at any point after Murraya’s fall or Smith’s fall
how long a person could remain in the threshold before the doors would close.
{¶21} Further, the record is devoid of any evidence that steps were taken
by the clinic to ensure that disabled persons entering the clinic, who require more
time to walk through a doorway than the average non-disabled person, could
safely traverse through the doors. Notably, this is not a general place of business.
This is a medical clinic, catering to the needs of those who may be ill, injured,
and/or disabled. Although the doors may be operating properly and the time-out
setting is satisfactory for the average person using those doors, the clinic was
aware of at least two incidents wherein invitees who had to use assistance in order
to walk were struck by these doors closing on them. At that point, reasonable
minds could conclude that the clinic should have done one of two options: (1)
remedied this problem by installing better sensors that could detect whether an
object was in the threshold, even if that object was immobile, so that the doors
would either not begin to close or not continue to close while someone/something
1
ANSI is the acronym for the American National Standards Institute.
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Case No. 9-10-13
was in the path of these doors; or (2) placed some sort of notice in a location easily
observed by those entering and exiting these doors, warning people to use caution
and notifying them that the doors automatically close in “x” amount of time.
Given this evidence, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
clinic had actual knowledge of the hazard and neglected to give adequate notice of
its presence or to remove it promptly.
{¶22} In addition, the clinic was made aware of the second incident on
April 20, 2004, some seventeen months prior to Price’s accident. However, the
record reveals only one time that the doors were serviced in any kind of manner
during this time frame. On that occasion in December of 2004, a service
technician for Thomas Door Controls, Inc. (“Thomas Door”), the company that
was under contract to service the clinic’s doors at that time, came to the clinic.
However, the work order shows that the technician was contacted because of a
“dragging threshold,” which the technician repaired by installing new guide rollers
and a new operator. Nothing in this work order indicates that the technician did
anything with the sensors, testing them for safety or otherwise inspecting them.
Accordingly, reasonable minds could conclude that this hazard existed for a
sufficient length of time, i.e. seventeen months, reasonably to justify the inference
that the failure to warn against it or remove it was attributable to a want of
ordinary care. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to this issue as
well.
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{¶23} Lastly, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the clinic
failed to take reasonable precautions to protect the invitee, Price, from dangers
which were foreseeable from the arrangement or use of these doors. As previously
noted, this obligation extends to the original installation of these doors, where it
results in a dangerous condition. See Perry, 53 Ohio St.2d at 53, 372 N.E.2d 335.
Therefore, even if these prior incidents did not occur, the clinic should have taken
reasonable precautions to protect its invitees, which undoubtedly included disabled
and ill persons, who often times require more time to walk through a doorway than
the average non-disabled person, by equipping its doors with protection devices to
prevent closure in the event that someone is in the threshold of the door.
{¶24} In light of the evidence and construing all of the evidence in a light
most favorable to Price, we find that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the clinic breached its duty of care to Price, and the trial court erred in
finding otherwise. Nevertheless, the clinic asserts that it did not owe Price a duty
of care because the opening and closing of the doors was an open and obvious
danger. We disagree, as did the trial court.
{¶25} The Supreme Court of Ohio summarized the case law on the open-
and-obvious doctrine in the following manner:
“Where a danger is open and obvious, a landowner owes no duty
of care to individuals lawfully on the premises.” Armstrong v.
Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d
1088, syllabus, approving and following Sidle v. Humphrey
(1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 45, 42 O.O.2d 96, 233 N.E.2d 589. “[T]he
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owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering
the premises will discover those dangers and take appropriate
measures to protect themselves.” Simmers v. Bentley Constr. Co.
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 597 N.E.2d 504. Thus, when a
plaintiff is injured by an open and obvious danger, summary
judgment is generally appropriate because the duty of care
necessary to establish negligence does not exist as a matter of
law. Armstrong ¶ 14-15.
Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 120, 2009-Ohio-2495, at ¶ 11, 909
N.E.2d 120.
{¶26} Although a commercial building with automatic sliding doors is very
common place in today’s society, common experience with these doors does not
suggest that they are likely to close in on a person. To the contrary, most expect
that these doors are equipped with safety mechanisms to prevent the door from
closing on a person to prevent injuries from occurring. For instance, these doors
usually begin to close after a certain amount of time but when someone/something
enters the threshold, they cease closing and either remain in their position or begin
to open again. Thus, we do not find that automatic sliding doors pose the open
and obvious danger of closing in on a person and causing injury such that an
owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises will
take appropriate measures to protect themselves. Accordingly, the open-and-
obvious doctrine does not apply in this case.
{¶27} For all of these reasons, the first assignment of error is sustained.
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Second Assignment of Error
{¶28} Price maintains in her second assignment of error that the trial court
erred by failing to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the premature closing
of the automatic sliding doors. In contrast, the clinic asserts that this doctrine is
inapplicable because the clinic did not have exclusive control over the automatic
doors and two or more equally probable causes exist for the injuries sustained by
Price.
{¶29} “The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is an evidentiary rule which permits,
but does not require, an inference of negligence when the elements of the doctrine
are shown.” Cochran v. Ohio Auto Club (Oct. 3, 1996), 3rd Dist. No. 9-96-33,
1996 WL 562055, citing Morgan v. Children’s Hospital (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d
185, 480 N.E.2d 464. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies is
determined on a case-by-case basis. Jennings Buick, Inc. v. Cincinnati (1980), 63
Ohio St.2d 167, 171, 406 N.E.2d 1385.
To warrant the application of the rule plaintiff must adduce
evidence in support of two conclusions (1) That the
instrumentality causing the injury was, at the time of the injury,
or at the time of the creation of the condition causing the injury,
under the exclusive management and control of the defendant;
and (2) that the injury occurred under such circumstances that
in the ordinary course of events it would not have occurred if
ordinary care had been observed.
Id. at 170, citing Hake v. George Wiedemann Brewing Co. (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d
65, 66-67, 262 N.E.2d 703; Fink v. New York Cent. R. Co. (1944), 144 Ohio St. 1,
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56 N.E.2d 456. “Res ipsa loquitur does not apply where the facts are such that an
inference that the accident was due to a cause other than defendant’s negligence
could be drawn as reasonably as if it was due to his negligence.” Cochran, supra,
citing Greer v. Frazier-Williams Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. (Apr. 3, 1991), 1st
Dist. No. C-900242.
{¶30} Here, the clinic asserts that it did not have exclusive management
and control of the door because it contracted with Stanley and later Thomas Door
for the maintenance and inspection of the doors. The clinic also maintains that
there are other efficient and probable causes of Price’s injury that are not
attributable to the negligence of the clinic.
{¶31} As to the issue of exclusive management and control, Cole testified
that the customer, such as the clinic, signs a contract for preventative maintenance
with the company and the contract terms provide how often maintenance will be
performed. Further, the customer determines when maintenance will be
performed. For instance, Cole testified that some customers request that the
Stanley technician call before coming to the customer’s location. Otherwise, the
technician will simply go to the location and inquire of the customer whether “it’s
a good day for the inspection.” (Cole Depo., p. 16-17.) Beyond preventative
maintenance, the service provided by Stanley is at the request of the customer
because “we [Stanley] don’t go somewhere we’re not asked to go.” (id. at p. 18.)
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{¶32} Neddleton testified that the service contract with Stanley, and later
Thomas Door, was for a yearly inspection of the doors and for any
repairs/maintenance needed on the doors. If a repair was needed, the technician
would provide a service ticket to Neddleton, who would either approve or
disapprove of the repair. Then any approved repairs would be performed by the
technician. Beyond this, the clinic’s maintenance department is not responsible
for the maintenance of the doors but is responsible for making sure that the doors
operate safely at the beginning of each business day. In order to do this, a
maintenance worker unlocks the doors2 and turns them on at approximately 6:30
each morning. The worker then follows a checklist, which is located on the upper
right-hand corner of the outside door frame. This procedure consists of allowing
the doors to “cycle” close, and then the worker walks through both sets of doors
(beginning on the inside of the clinic, as the worker enters the clinic through an
employee entrance) and back through them. This walk-through is done one time.
However, this does not include stopping in the threshold to determine whether the
doors will close on the worker.
{¶33} A review of the evidence also reveals that Stanley conducted
preventative maintenance in March and June of 2003, and at that time the
threshold scan and/or safety beams were working properly and within ANSI
2
Neddleton testified that security for the clinic locks the doors each night between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30
p.m.
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Case No. 9-10-13
standards. The only other documentation regarding the servicing of these doors
was in December of 2004. At that time, the work order shows that a Thomas Door
technician was contacted because of a “dragging threshold.” This document states
in a section entitled “Service Performed” that the technician, “REMOVED
DOORS. INSTALLED NEW BOTTOM GUIDE ROLLERS AND INSTALLED
NEW OPERATOR. SET & ADJUST. AS NEEDED. WORKING GREAT AT
THIS TIME.” However, nothing in this work order indicates that the technician
did anything else with the door, including with the sensors, such as testing them
for safety or otherwise inspecting them, or that the technician was making any
representations as to whether the sensors on the door were within ANSI standards.
{¶34} Price was injured in September of 2005, some nine months after this
last service. During this time, the evidence reveals that the only people
responsible for ensuring that the doors worked properly and safely were the
employees in the clinic’s maintenance department. While anyone entering and
exiting the clinic was capable of activating the doors by merely entering the
pathway of the sensors responsible for automatically opening the doors, the record
is devoid of any evidence that the general public could manipulate the activity
and/or sensitivity of the sensors either purposely or inadvertently or, more
importantly, could make decisions about the timing of the sensors or the closing of
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the doors.3
{¶35} Further, the clinic exerted exclusive management and control over
when these doors were accessible to the public by locking them at night and
unlocking them in the morning. Neddleton also provided testimony as to what
would happen if the doors did not function properly, such as shutting them down
in the event that they malfunctioned or securing them in an open position if there
was an operational problem. (Neddleton Depo., pp. 27, 30.) Thus, the evidence
when viewed in a light most favorable to Price indicates that the clinic had the sole
power to determine when and if the public would have access to these doors.
{¶36} Moreover, the clinic determined what kind of doors it would have,
what sensors it wanted on these doors,4 what company would maintain these
doors, and when the doors would be serviced. Further, once the clinic knew of
two other incidents similar to Price’s, it alone had the power to determine whether
to have new sensors installed to accommodate the types of invitees that frequented
its establishment or, if possible on the current sensors, to lengthen the amount of
time before the doors would time-out or adjust the sensors that detected
3
We find the cases cited by the clinic regarding public access to instrumentalities causing an invitee injury
to be inapposite to the case sub judice. Rather, those cases involved situations wherein the public’s access
to these things could have as readily resulted in the injuries to the plaintiff as any act or omission by the
defendant-business. See e.g., Hansen v. Wal-Mart Stores, 4th Dist. No. 07CA2990, 2008-Ohio-2477
(merchandise display was in location that customers could access and manipulate).
4
The June, 2003, work order of Stanley indicated that the Stanley technician recommended the OmniScan
sensors be upgraded. As noted, this recommendation was made based upon the sensors being obsolete,
rather than because they were not working. The fact that the technician was making a recommendation to
the clinic to upgrade obviates the fact that the choice of sensors was the clinic’s, rather than the service
provider’s.
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whether someone/something was in the pathway of the doors.
{¶37} For all of these reasons, we find that Price presented sufficient
evidence that at the time of her injury, the doors were under the exclusive
management and control of the clinic.
{¶38} Our inquiry does not end there, however. The next question is
whether the injury occurred under such circumstances that in the ordinary course
of events it would not have occurred if ordinary care had been observed. Several
courts have concluded that “[a]utomatic doors do not, in the ordinary course of
things, cause injury to those who pass through them.” Brown v. Scrivner, Inc.
(1992), 241 Neb. 286, 488 N.W.2d 17, 19, see, also, Rose v. Port of New York
Auth. (1972), 61 N.J. 129, 293 A.2d 371, 375 (holding that “[m]embers of the
public passing through automatic doors, whether in an airport, office building or
supermarket do so generally, without sustaining injury. What happened to the
plaintiff here is fortunately unusual and not commonplace. It strongly suggests a
malfunction which in turn suggests neglect.”) (noted in Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984)); Landmark Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Moore
(1988), 104 Nev. 297, 757 P.2d 361, 364 (finding that “[a]utomatic sliding glass
doors * * * are ubiquitous, affording the public safe ingress and egress to
countless facilities on a daily basis. What happened to Moore is unusual; it
strongly suggests a malfunction attributable to negligence.”). But see, Hisey v.
Cashway Supermarkets, Inc. (1967), 77 N.M. 638, 426 P.2d 784.
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{¶39} We agree with those courts that have found that automatic doors do
not ordinarily close on a person absent negligence. Nevertheless, the clinic
maintains that there is more than one reasonable probable cause of the doors
closing on Price, which is not attributable to the clinic’s negligence: (1) the
manufacturer’s limit to a maximum of three minutes for the doors to remain open
when Price may have needed more time to traverse the doors; (2) poor design of
the sensor that may not have “seen” Price while she was standing in that area of
the door; and (3) Price’s failure to position herself where the sensors could detect
her or “to move quickly enough to have avoided the closing door.”
{¶40} What the clinic fails to acknowledge is that none of these
contentions alleviates its knowledge of the door’s sensors and thus, its negligence
in failing to address these issues. The clinic knew the make-up of its clientele.
The clinic would be the party with the knowledge about what doors it used and
what type of timing the sensors had. The clinic knew of two other incidents
wherein disabled invitees were injured when they did not “move quickly enough”
to avoid being struck by the closing automatic doors. Yet, the record is devoid of
any evidence that the clinic did anything to obtain more sensitive sensors, lengthen
the amount of time before the doors timed-out, if possible, or otherwise warn its
disabled invitees to stay in the path of the sensors and/or “move quickly enough to
avoid injury.” Further, there is nothing in the record to show that Price acted in
any negligent manner. Her undisputed testimony demonstrates that she merely
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attempted to walk through the doorway as one would ordinarily do, albeit slowly
due to the fact that she needed a walker to walk, having had six hip replacements
in her lifetime. Simply not having the agility to avoid being hit by a closing door
does not amount to negligence. Therefore, we find that Price was injured under
such circumstances that in the ordinary course of events would not have occurred
if ordinary care had been observed. Accordingly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does apply, and the first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶41} For all of these reasons, the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of
Marion County, Ohio, is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., and ROGERS, J., concur.
/jnc
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