[Cite as State v. Hartley, 2010-Ohio-2018.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-09-42
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
KEITH HARTLEY, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 08-CR-0071
Appeal Dismissed
Date of Decision: May 10, 2010
APPEARANCES:
Alison Boggs, for Appellant
Terry L. Hord, for Appellee
Case No. 14-09-42
ROGERS, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Keith A. Hartley, appeals the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Union County convicting him of two counts each of
receiving stolen property and tampering with evidence, and ordering him to serve
an aggregate nine-year and ten-month prison term. On appeal, Hartley argues that
his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court erred in ordering him to
serve consecutive prison terms.
{¶2} Before we can reach the merits of Hartley’s assignments of error, we
must first determine whether jurisdiction exists to hear this appeal.
{¶3} Appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of lower courts’ final
judgments. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. To be a final
appealable order, a judgment entry must meet the requirements of R.C. 2505.02
and, if applicable, Crim.R. 32(C). Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989),
44 Ohio St.3d 86, 88; State v. Teague, 3d Dist. No. 9-01-25, 2001-Ohio-2286.
Additionally, the issue of whether a judgment is a final appealable order is a
jurisdictional question, which an appellate court may raise sua sponte. Chef
Italiano Corp., 44 Ohio St.3d at 87.
{¶4} R.C. 2505.02(B) discusses final orders and provides, in pertinent
part:
(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed,
modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of
the following:
-2-
Case No. 14-09-42
(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that
in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;
As R.C. 2505.02(B) requires a final order to “determine the action” and “prevent a
judgment,” “‘[a] judgment that leaves issues unresolved and contemplates that
further action must be taken is not a final appealable order.’” State ex rel. Keith v.
McMonagle, 103 Ohio St.3d 430, 2004-Ohio-5580, ¶4, quoting Bell v. Horton,
142 Ohio App.3d 694, 696, 2001-Ohio-2593. Further, “‘[f]or an order to
determine the action and prevent a judgment for the party appealing, it must
dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some separate and distinct branch
thereof and leave nothing for determination of the court.’” State ex rel. Bd. of
State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis, 113 Ohio St.3d 410, 2007-Ohio-
2205, ¶45, quoting State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto, 107 Ohio St.3d 347, 2006-
Ohio-8, ¶20.
{¶5} Here, the trial court’s November 2009 judgment entry ordered
Hartley to pay “restitution to the victims herein in the total amount of $32,275.57
which was the amount agreed to by the Defendant and the State of Ohio. Said
restitution amount shall be paid through the Union County Clerk of Court’s
Office” (Emphasis added) (Nov. 2009 Judgment Entry, pp. 1-2). However, the
November 2009 Judgment Entry did not list any victims, did not describe how the
restitution would be allocated among the victims, and did not incorporate any
document providing this information. Accordingly, we find that the judgment
-3-
Case No. 14-09-42
entry appealed from left unresolved issues and contemplated further action. As
such, the judgment entry was not a final appealable order, and this Court is
without jurisdiction to determine this appeal. Cf. State v. Kuhn, 3d Dist. No. 4-05-
23, 2006-Ohio-1145, ¶8 (finding that judgment entry failing to set forth a specific
amount of restitution or method of payment was not a final appealable order).
{¶6} Accordingly, we must dismiss Hartley’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
Appeal Dismissed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
/jnc
-4-