[Cite as Office of Scioto Twp. Zoning Insepctor v. Puckett, 2013-Ohio-703.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PICKAWAY COUNTY
OFFICE OF THE SCIOTO :
TOWNSHIP ZONING INSPECTOR, :
ET AL., :
:
Plaintiffs-Appellees, : Case No. 12CA5
:
vs. :
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
ROBERT AND BERNA PUCKETT, : ENTRY
:
Defendants-Appellants. : Released: 02/07/13
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
James R. Kingsley, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellant.
William L. Archer, Jr., Circleville, Ohio, for Appellees.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, P. J.
{¶1} Appellants, Robert and Berna Puckett, appeal the decisions of
the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Appellees. They also appeal the granting of Appellees’ request for a
permanent injunction with the respect to Appellants’ operation of a pay
pond. On appeal, they contend 1) the trial court committed prejudicial error
when it found Appellants were not engaged in aquaculture; and 2) the trial
Pickaway App. No. 12CA5 2
court committed prejudicial error when it enjoined Appellants from
committing a nuisance. Because we conclude that the order and decision
appealed from is not a final, appealable order, Appellants’ appeal is
dismissed.
Facts
{¶2} On October 27, 2009, Appellee, Office of the Scioto Township
Zoning Inspector, filed a complaint which included a claim for injunctive
relief, against Appellants, Robert and Berna Puckett, in connection with
Appellants’ operation of a pay lake, or pay pond. Specifically, the complaint
alleged that the operation of the pay lake was an unlawful home occupation
being conducted in violation of the terms and provisions of the Scioto
Township Zoning Resolution. The complaint alleged that the area in which
Appellants’ pay lake was located is an AG district, or Agriculture district.
The complaint further alleged that Section 13.05 of the Resolution “limits
the Conditional Uses in an AG district to ‘public parks and/or nature
preserves, and private landing fields for aircraft.’ ”1 Appellant’s overall
complaint contained a claim for declaratory judgment, a permanent
injunction, a preliminary injunction, and the assessment of civil sanctions.
1
In a previous decision related to this matter, this Court held that this pay lake was not a “public park,” as
the phrase is used in the zoning resolution setting forth the permitted conditional uses. Puckett v. Scioto
Township Board of Zoning, 4th Dist. No. 05CA20, 2005-Ohio-5430.
Pickaway App. No. 12CA5 3
The prayer for relief also contained a request for costs, expenses and
attorneys’ fees.
{¶3} The matter proceeded along, and at one point was consolidated
with another case, James David Fisher et al., v. Robert Puckett, et al., case
no. 2010-CI-0030, which also contained as the primary issue, the operation
of Appellants’ pay lake. On March 1, 2011, Appellee filed a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of Appellants’ “pay pond qualifying as
aquaculture.” On April 8, 2011, Appellants filed their memo contra to
Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and also filed their own motion
for summary judgment, addressing only the issue of aquaculture. Appellee
responded to Appellants’ motion for summary judgment on April 18, 2011.2
On August 23, 2011, the trial court entered a decision granting summary
judgment in favor of Appellees on the issue “aquaculture” and denied
Appellants’ motion for summary judgment. Then, on November 1, 2011,
the trial court issued a “Judgment Entry On Whether The Defendants Are
Engaged In Aquaculture,” ultimately deciding that they were not. The
matter was deconsolidated from the other related case on November 17,
2011.
2
In addition to these summary judgment motions, there were other summary judgment motions filed with
respect to the related, consolidated case. However, as these motions are not relevant to our disposition of
the current appeal, we omit them from our discussion herein.
Pickaway App. No. 12CA5 4
{¶4} Subsequently, on January 17, 2012, Appellants filed a motion for
reconsideration, requesting the trial court to reconsider its decision on the
issue of aquaculture, which motion was denied by the trial court on February
28, 2012, finding “no just cause for delay.” Finally, on March 19, 2012, the
trial court issued a “Final Judgment Entry Containing Permanent
Injunction,” in which it granted Appellee’s request for a permanent
injunction and ordered Appellants to “permanently cease any activity related
to and associated with the operation of a pay pond[.]” It is from the trial
court’s February 28, 2012, and March 19, 2012, entries that Appellants bring
their appeal, assigning the following errors for our review.
Assignments of Error
“I. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR
WHEN IT FOUND DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENGAGED IN
AQUACULTURE?
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR
WHEN IT ENJOINED APPELLANT FROM COMMITTING A
NUISANCE?”
Legal Analysis
{¶5} Before we reach the merits of Appellants’ assignments of error,
we must initially address the threshold issue of whether the judgment entry
appealed is a final, appealable order. Appellate courts have no “jurisdiction
to review an order that is not final and appealable.” Oakley v. Citizens Bank
Pickaway App. No. 12CA5 5
of Logan, 4th Dist. No. 04CA25, 2004-Ohio-6824, ¶ 6; citing Section
3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution; General Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins.
Co. of N. America, 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 540 N.E.2d 266 (1989); Noble v.
Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989). Further, “[a] trial
court's finding that its judgment is a final appealable order is not binding
upon this court.” In re Nichols, 4th Dist. No. 03CA41, 2004-Ohio-2026, ¶ 6;
citing Ft. Frye Teachers Assn. v. Ft. Frye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 87
Ohio App.3d 840, 843, 623 N.E.2d 232, fn. 4 (1993); citing Pickens v.
Pickens, 4th Dist. No. 459, 1992 WL 209498 (Aug. 27, 1992). This court has
“no choice but to sua sponte dismiss an appeal that is not from a final
appealable order.” Id. at ¶ 6, citing Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Geupel Constr.
Co., 29 Ohio St.2d 184, 280 N.E.2d 922 (1972).
{¶6} “An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed,
modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is * * * [a]n order that
affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and
prevents a judgment” or “[a]n order that affects a substantial right made in a
special proceeding[.]” R.C. 2505.02(B). “A final order * * * is one disposing
of the whole case or some separate and distinct branch thereof.” Lantsberry
v. Tilley Lamp Co., 27 Ohio St.2d 303, 306, 272 N.E.2d 127 (1971).
Pickaway App. No. 12CA5 6
{¶7} An order adjudicating “one or more but fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties must meet the
requirements of R.C. 2505.02 and Civ. R. 54(B) in order to be final and
appealable.” Noble at syllabus. However, when a trial court does not resolve
an entire claim, regardless of whether the order meets the requirements of
Civ.R. 54(B), the order is not final and appealable. See Jackson v. Scioto
Downs, Inc., 80 Ohio App.3d 756, 758, 610 N.E.2d 613 (1992). Further, a
judgment contemplating further action by the court is not a final appealable
order. Nationwide Assur. Inc, v. Thompson, 4th Dist. No. 04CA2960, 2005-
Ohio-2339, ¶ 8; citing Bell v. Horton, 142 Ohio App.3d 694, 696, 756
N.E.2d 1241 (2001).
{¶8} As this court previously noted in Fagan v. Boggs, 4th Dist. No.
08CA45, 2009-Ohio-6601, ¶ 11, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “
‘[w]hen attorney fees are requested in the original pleadings, an order that
does not dispose of the attorney-fee claim * * * is not a final, appealable
order.’ ” Internatl. Bhd. Of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 8 v. Vaughn
Industries, L.L.C., 116 Ohio St.3d 335, 2007-Ohio-6439, 879 N.E.2d 187,
paragraph two of the syllabus. This court has continuously held that “[a]
determination of liability without a determination of damages is not a final
appealable order because damages are part of a claim for relief, rather than a
Pickaway App. No. 12CA5 7
separate claim in and of themselves.” Shelton v. Eagles Foe Aerie 2232
(Feb. 15, 2000), 4th Dist. No. 99CA678, 2000 WL 203857 (Feb. 15, 2000);
citing Horner v. Toledo Hospital, 94 Ohio App.3d 282, 640 N.E.2d 857
(1993).
{¶9} Where a prayer for relief requests a particular type of damages
and the court fails to specifically adjudicate that aspect of the damages
requested, no final appealable order exists. See Britton v. Gibbs Assoc., 4th
Dist. No. 06CA34, 2008-Ohio-210, ¶ 12; In re Sites, 4th Dist. No. 05CA39,
2006-Ohio-3787, ¶ 16; see, also, Miller v. First International Fidelity &
Trust Building, Ltd., 165 Ohio App.3d 281, 2006-Ohio-187, 846 N.E.2d 87,
¶ 36. In Jones v. McAlarney Pools, Spas & Billiards, Inc., 4th Dist. No.
07CA34, 2008-Ohio-1365, ¶ 11, this Court interpreted the syllabus in
Vaughn “in light of its underlying facts” and applied the “broad syllabus
language” only to those instances where attorney fees are requested pursuant
to a “specific statutory or rule authority[.]” See, also, Jones v. Burgess, 4th
Dist. No. 07CA37, 2008-Ohio-6698, ¶12. Absent an attorney fee request
under specific authority, appellate courts should “treat the fee request as
having been overruled sub silento” when not specifically disposed of in the
trial court's order. Id. Further, we have historically dismissed appeals for
lack of a final, appealable order when a trial court specifically 1) raises the
Pickaway App. No. 12CA5 8
attorney issue and defers its adjudication, or 2) awards attorney fees and
defers the determination of the amount of fees. Jones v. McAlarney at ¶10
(citations omitted).
{¶10} Here, Appellees initial complaint requested civil sanctions,
costs and expenses. Appellees also prayed for reasonable attorneys’ fees in
their amended complaint. Although they did not argue that they were
entitled to attorney fees pursuant to a specific statute, the trial court
specifically raised the issue of damages in its entry, but deferred the
determination of damages at that time. The trial court’s entry dated March
19, 2012, stated as follows: “The Court expressly finds that pursuant to
Civ.R. 54(B), there is no just reason for delay, as the only issue remaining is
damages, which is not itself a claim.”
{¶11} As set forth above, when a trial court does not resolve an entire
claim, regardless of whether the order meets the requirements of Civ.R.
54(B), the order is not final and appealable. See Jackson v. Scioto Downs,
Inc., supra, at 758. Further, “[a] finding of ‘no just cause for delay’ pursuant
to Civ.R. 54(B) does not make appealable an otherwise nonappealable
order.” McKee v. Inabnitt, 4th Dist. No. 01CA711, 2001 WL 1913873, *2
(Sept. 26, 2001). Because the trial court's order specifically raised, but
failed to determine the issue of damages, including attorney fees which were
Pickaway App. No. 12CA5 9
requested in Appellants’ initial complaint, the judgment clearly
contemplated further action by the court and therefore is not a final
appealable order. Fagan v. Boggs at ¶ 14; citing Nationwide Assur. Inc, v.
Thompson at ¶ 8; citing Bell v. Horton at 696. Accordingly, we dismiss this
appeal because we lack of jurisdiction to consider it.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Pickaway App. No. 12CA5 10
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED and that the
Appellees recover of Appellants costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of
the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Abele, J. & Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.