[Cite as In re E.W., 2011-Ohio-2123.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: :
: Case Nos. 10CA18
E.W. : 10CA19
J.W. : 10CA20
J.W. : Released: April 26, 2011
:
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Joseph H. Brockwell, Marietta, Ohio, for Appellant.
James E. Schneider, Washington County Prosecutor, and Susan L. Vessels,
Washington County Assistant Prosecutor, Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
McFarland, J.:
{¶1} Appellant, A.Y. (the biological mother of E.W., J.W., and J.W.),
appeals the trial court’s decision granting S.W., the children’s natural father,
legal custody of their three children. Appellant argues that the trial court
erred by holding the annual review hearing when the guardian ad litem
failed to file her report at least seven days before the hearing, as Sup.R.
48(F) requires. Because appellant failed to object to the untimely filing of
the guardian ad litem’s report before the hearing, she has waived all but
plain error. Plain error does not exist. A violation of Sup.R. 48 does not
mandate a reversal. Furthermore, appellant cannot show how the guardian
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 2
ad litem’s failure to file the report at least seven days before the hearing
caused her any prejudice. Thus, we reject appellant’s assertion that the trial
court erred by holding the hearing when the guardian ad litem failed to
comply with Sup.R. 48(F). Appellant additionally contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by awarding S.W. legal custody of the three
children and by denying her motion for legal custody. Because the record
contains some evidence that the children’s best interests would be served by
placing them in S.W.’s legal custody, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. Consequently, we overrule appellant’s two assignments of error
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTS
{¶2} Appellant and S.W. are the biological parents of three children,
E.W. (born February 18, 2000), J.W., and J.W (male and female twins born
on September 21, 2001).1 On April 9, 2009, the trial court granted S.W.
emergency temporary custody of the children upon allegations that appellant
had physically abused the children. The next day, Washington County
Children Services (WCCS) filed a complaint that alleged the children to be
neglected and dependent and that requested the court to grant temporary
custody to S.W.. The statement attached to the complaint averred that: (1)
1
Appellant has three or four other children fathered by different men--at times the record indicates
appellant has a total of seven children, but at others, the record refers to six children. The present appeal
involves only appellant’s and S.W.’s children, E.W., J.W., and J.W.
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 3
appellant had beaten at least two of the children with a belt and/or an
extension cord for failing to clean their rooms; (2) appellant had verbally
abused her children; (3) on multiple occasions, appellant threatened to kill
her children and stated that she understood how a mother could kill her own
children; and (4) all three children stated that appellant hit them every day.
At a shelter care hearing, the court continued the children in S.W.’s
temporary custody, where they continued to remain throughout the
proceedings.
{¶3} In June of 2009, appellant and S.W. filed separate motions that
requested the court to award them (individually) legal custody of the
children. The court, upon the parties’ admissions, subsequently adjudicated
the children dependent and dismissed the neglect allegations.
{¶4} On July 7, 2009, the guardian ad litem filed her report. She
noted that the children have reported appellant’s “fits of violent rage”
directed towards them and that they have suffered physical abuse. The
guardian stated that the children have advised her that food is often scarce in
the home and, as a result, the children often are hungry. The guardian ad
litem recommended that the children remain in S.W.’s temporary custody.
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 4
{¶5} On July 10, 2009, the court entered a dispositional order,
pursuant to the parties’ agreement, that placed the children in S.W.’s
temporary custody, subject to WCCS’s protective supervision.
{¶6} The matter then was set for an annual review hearing to be held
on April 6, 2010, but appellant’s counsel requested the court to continue it
until May 5, 2010.2 Before the hearing, WCCS filed a motion in support of
S.W.’s motion for custody.3
{¶7} On May 4, 2010, the day before the hearing, the guardian ad
litem filed a final report. She recommended that the court place the children
with S.W. and allow appellant to have visitation with the children for three-
to-four day stretches.
{¶8} On June 17, 2010, the court granted custody to S.W.. The court
observed that appellant has been involved with children services since 1997.
The court found that: (1) appellant physically and verbally abused her
children; (2) appellant experienced difficulty handling the stress of raising
the children as a single mother; (3) the three children “are doing very well”
in S.W.’s care and have adjusted well to his home and their new school; (4)
2
Both appellant and WCCS assert that the April hearing was continued due to the guardian ad litem’s
failure to file a report. The reason for the continuance is not apparent from the written record. However,
because the parties do not dispute the reason for the April 20101 continuance, we assume the accuracy of
the parties’ statements that it was continued due to the guardian ad litem’s failure to file a report before the
scheduled hearing.
3
We observe that the docket does not show that S.W. filed a motion for custody after the court’s July 10,
2009 dispositional order. As we explain, infra, we do not find this failure operates as a procedural bar to
the trial court’s actions in this matter.
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 5
the guardian ad litem reported that the children feel safe at S.W.’s home and
that the children appear calmer and more relaxed; (5) the children told the
guardian ad litem that if they were returned to appellant’s house, they
wanted the guardian to guarantee that they would not suffer any more verbal
or physical abuse; (6) the guardian ad litem believes that appellant would
have difficulty raising the three children along with her three older children
presently residing in her home; and (7) since the children have been in
S.W.’s temporary custody, the children’s behavior has improved “and they
no longer cower in fear when around other people.” The court further noted
that it had interviewed the children and that: (1) the oldest child, age 10,
wishes to remain at S.W.’s house, where she feels safe; (2) the female twin,
J.W., age 8, likes appellant’s house better; and (3) the male twin, J.W., age
8, did not express a preference and stated that he equally likes both homes.
The court thus determined that the children’s best interests would be served
by placing them in S.W.’s legal custody, subject to appellant’s visitation in
accordance with the court’s standard orders. The court additionally
terminated WCCS’s protective supervision.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶9} Appellant timely appealed the trial court’s judgment and raises
two assignments of error:
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 6
First Assignment of Error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THE REVIEW
HEARING AND RULING ON THE MOTIONS FOR
CUSTODY WHEN THE WRITTEN REPORT OF THE
GUARDIAN AD LITEM WAS NOT MADE AVAILABLE
TO THE PARTIES AT LEAST SEVEN DAYS PRIOR TO
THE HEARING.
Second Assignment of Error:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR CUSTODY
WHEN THE APPELLANT HAD DONE EVERYTHING
REQUIRED OF HER AND IT WAS IN THE CHILDREN’S
BEST INTEREST TO BE RETURNED TO HER CUSTODY.
III. GUARDIAN AD LITEM’S REPORT
{¶10} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial
court erred by holding the hearing when the guardian failed to file the report
at least seven days before the hearing, as Sup.R. (F)(1)(c) requires. She
asserts that the guardian ad litem’s failure to file the report at least seven
days before the hearing deprived her of the opportunity to examine the
guardian’s statements and to explore counter-arguments.
{¶11} In analyzing appellant’s argument, we initially observe that she
did not object to proceeding with the May 5, 2010 hearing due to the
guardian’s failure to comply with Sup.R. 48(F)(1)(c). It is well-settled that
failing to object at the trial court level to a complained of error results in a
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 7
waiver of that error on appeal. See, e.g., Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 79
Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099; Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns
Football Co. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 427, 436-37, 659 N.E.2d 1232. Thus, an
appellate court may recognize an error that an appellant waived only if it
constitutes plain error. See, e.g., In re Etter (1998), 134 Ohio App.3d 484,
492, 731 N.E.2d 694. Courts should exercise extreme caution when invoking
the plain error doctrine, especially in civil cases. Courts should therefore
limit applying the doctrine to cases “involving exceptional circumstances
where error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously
affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
process * * *.” Goldfuss, 79 Ohio St.3d at 122-123; see, also, In re Alyssa
C. 153 Ohio App.3d 10, 2003-Ohio-2673 at ¶35, 790 N.E.2d 803; In re
Curry, Washington App. No. 03CA51, 2004-Ohio-750 at ¶42 (applying
plain error doctrine, overruled on other grounds). The case at bar is not one
of those exceptional cases in which the alleged error seriously affects the
fairness of the proceedings.
{¶12} The “Rules of Superintendence are designed (1) to expedite the
disposition of both criminal and civil cases in the trial courts of this state,
while at the same time safeguarding the inalienable rights of litigants to the
just processing of their causes; and (2) to serve that public interest which
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 8
mandates the prompt disposition of all cases before the courts.” State v.
Singer (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 109-110, 362 N.E.2d 1216. Courts have
interpreted the Rules of Superintendence as general guidelines for the
conduct of the courts that do not create substantive rights. See Id. at 110
(stating that the Rules of Superintendence are not meant “to alter basic
substantive rights”); see, also, In re K.G., Wayne App. No. 10CA16, 2010-
Ohio-4399, at ¶11; Allen v. Allen, Trumbull App. No.2009-T-0070, 2010-
Ohio-475, at ¶31; Sultaana v. Giant Eagle, Cuyahoga App. No. 90294,
2008-Ohio-3658, at ¶ 45. “They are not the equivalent of rules of procedure
and have no force equivalent to a statute. They are purely internal
housekeeping rules which are of concern to the judges of the several courts
but create no rights in individual defendants.” State v. Gettys (1976), 49
Ohio App.2d 241, 243, 360 N.E.2d 735.
{¶13} Sup.R. 48(F) outlines the guardian ad litem’s duties when
preparing a final report in a juvenile matter. As relevant in the case at bar,
Sup.R. 48(F)(1)(c) states:
(1) In juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency cases and
actions to terminate parental rights:
***
(c) Unless waived by all parties or unless the due date is
extended by the court, the final report shall be filed with the
court and made available to the parties for inspection no less
than seven days before the dispositional hearing. * * *
****
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 9
{¶14} Sup.R. 48 became effective in March of 2009, and, thus, there
is little case law interpreting its application. See In re J.L.R., Washington
App. No. 08CA17, 2009-Ohio-5812, at ¶50 (noting scarcity of case law
interpreting Sup.R. 48). However, at least two appellate courts have
examined the rule, and both courts concluded that the guardian ad litem’s
failure to comply with the rule did not constitute grounds for reversal. See
In re K.G., supra; Allen, supra. In Allen, for example, the guardian ad litem
did not attend the final day of hearings, in contravention of Sup.R. 48(D)(4),
and did not make his written report available to the parties until the day
before the final hearing, in violation of Sup.R. 48(F)(2). Id. at ¶30; see, also,
In re K.G. at ¶13 (determining that alleged violations of Sup.R. 48 either did
not exist or that the mother could not demonstrate any prejudice resulting
from the alleged violations).
{¶15} In the case at bar, appellant does not have any substantive right
to enforce under Sup.R. 48. Instead, the rule is a general guideline that does
not have the force of statutory law. Moreover, beyond a general assertion
that she could have conducted a further examination of the guardian ad
litem’s report, appellant has failed to demonstrate how the guardian ad
litem’s failure to file the report at least seven days before the hearing caused
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 10
her any prejudice. Thus, we do not find any plain error that the trial court
should have noticed.
{¶16} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule
appellant’s first assignment of error.
IV. LEGAL CUSTODY
{¶17} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying her motion for custody.4
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶18} We apply the same standard to a trial court’s decision to award
a party legal custody of a child that we apply to all child custody disputes—
that is, we afford the utmost deference to a trial court’s child custody
decision. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523
N.E.2d 846. Consequently, absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court
will not reverse a trial court’s decision regarding child custody matters. See,
e.g., Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 550 N.E.2d 178, syllabus.
Thus, when “an award of custody is supported by a substantial amount of
credible and competent evidence, such an award will not be reversed as
4
Because neither party raises any issue as to whether appellant or S.W. actually filed a motion for custody
after the court’s initial dispositional order, we do not address it. We observe, however, that a juvenile court
may review its dispositional orders at any time and must conduct an annual review. See R.C. 2151.417; In
re Young Children (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 632, 637, 669 N.E.2d 1140 (“[R.C. Chapter 2151] ensure[s] that a
child’s welfare would always be subject to court review. That is, given that a child, by virtue of being
before the court pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2151, was at risk of some harm, the General Assembly provided
for the child’s safety and welfare by ensuring that the juvenile court would retain jurisdiction over the child
through the age of majority.”).
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 11
being against the weight of the evidence by a reviewing court.” Bechtol at
syllabus; see, also, Davis v. Flickinger (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674
N.E.2d 1159.
{¶19} In Davis, the court explained the abuse of discretion standard
that applies in custody proceedings:
“‘Where an award of custody is supported by a
substantial amount of credible and competent evidence, such an
award will not be reversed as being against the weight of the
evidence by a reviewing court. (Trickey v. Trickey [1952], 158
Ohio St. 9, 47 O.O. 481, 106 N.E.2d 772, approved and
followed.)’ [Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 550
N.E.2d 178, syllabus].
The reason for this standard of review is that the trial
judge has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude,
and credibility of each witness, something that does not
translate well on the written page. As we stated in Seasons
Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80-81, 10
OBR 408, 410-412, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276-1277:
‘The underlying rationale of giving deference to the
findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial
judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these
observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered
testimony. * * *
***
* * * A reviewing court should not reverse a decision
simply because it holds a different opinion concerning the
credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted before the
trial court. A finding of an error in law is a legitimate ground
for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of
witnesses and evidence is not. The determination of credibility
of testimony and evidence must not be encroached upon by a
reviewing tribunal, especially to the extent where the appellate
court relies on unchallenged, excluded evidence in order to
justify its reversal.’ This is even more crucial in a child custody
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 12
case, where there may be much evident in the parties’ demeanor
and attitude that does not translate to the record well.”
Id. at 418-419. Thus, reviewing courts should afford great deference to trial
court child custody decisions. Pater v. Pater (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 393,
396, 588 N.E.2d 794. Additionally, because child custody issues involve
some of the most difficult and agonizing decisions that trial courts are
required to decide, courts must have wide latitude to consider all of the
evidence and appellate courts should not disturb a trial court’s judgment
absent an abuse of discretion. See Davis, 77 Ohio St.3d 418; Bragg v.
Hatfield, 152 Ohio App.3d 174, 2003-Ohio-1441,, 787 N.E.2d 44, at ¶24;
Hinton v. Hinton, Washington App. No. 02CA54, 2003-Ohio-2785, at ¶9;
Ferris v. Ferris, Meigs App. No. 02CA4, 2003-Ohio-1284, at ¶ 20.
B. LEGAL CUSTODY STANDARD
{¶20} A trial court may terminate or modify a prior dispositional
order and return legal custody to one of the child’s parents if the child’s best
interests would be served by awarding that parent legal custody. See R.C.
2151.42(A). See, generally, In re Pryor (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 327, 332,
620 N.E.2d 973 (stating that “the primary, if not only, consideration in the
disposition of all children’s cases is the best interests and welfare of the
child”). In determining which of two parents would better meet a child’s
best interests, a trial court must follow R.C. 3109.04. See R.C.
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 13
2151.23(F)(1); In re Poling (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 211, 594 N.E.2d 589, at
paragraph two of the syllabus (“[w]hen a juvenile court makes a custody
determination under R.C. * * * 2151.353, it must do so in accordance with
R.C. 3109.04”); Pryor, 86 Ohio App.3d at 333, fn.4 (stating that a trial court
applies the same best interest standard in child custody disputes originating
from a divorce and originating from a neglect, dependency, abuse
complaint).
{¶21} R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) requires a trial court that is ascertaining a
child’s best interests to consider all relevant factors, including, but not
limited to:
(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s
care;
(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers
pursuant to division (B) of this section regarding the child’s
wishes and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns
of the child, as expressed to the court;
(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the
child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child’s best interest;
(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school,
and community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all persons
involved in the situation;
(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-
approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship
rights;
(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child
support payments, including all arrearages, that are required of
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 14
that parent pursuant to a child support order under which that
parent is an obligor;
(h) Whether either parent or any member of the
household of either parent previously has been convicted of or
pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that
resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child;
whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been
adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has
been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or
neglectful act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either
parent or any member of the household of either parent
previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a
violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually
oriented offense involving a victim who at the time of the
commission of the offense was a member of the family or
household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether
either parent or any member of the household of either parent
previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any
offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of
the offense was a member of the family or household that is the
subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to
the victim in the commission of the offense; and whether there
is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner
resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected child;
(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents
subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and
willfully denied the other parent’s right to parenting time in
accordance with an order of the court;
(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or
is planning to establish a residence, outside this state.
{¶22} In the case at bar, the trial court’s decision denying appellant’s
request for legal custody is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
The trial court could have rationally concluded that the children’s best
interests would be better served by awarding S.W. legal custody. Although
the trial court did not engage in a specific analysis of the foregoing best
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 15
interests, factors, in the absence of a proper Civ.R. 52 request for findings of
fact and conclusions of law, it had no obligation to do so.
{¶23} Civ.R. 52 states: “When questions of fact are tried by a court
without a jury, judgment may be general for the prevailing party unless one
of the parties in writing requests otherwise * * * in which case, the court
shall state in writing the conclusions of fact found separately from the
conclusions of law.” The failure to request findings of fact and conclusions
of law ordinarily results in a waiver of the right to challenge the trial court’s
lack of an explicit finding concerning an issue. See Pawlus v. Bartrug
(1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 796, 801, 673 N.E.2d 188; Wangugi v. Wangugi
(Apr. 12, 2000), Ross App. No. 2531; Ruby v. Ruby (Aug. 11, 1999),
Coshocton App. No. 99CA4. When a party fails to request findings of fact
and conclusions of law, we must generally presume the regularity of the trial
court proceedings. See, e.g., Bunten v. Bunten (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 443,
447, 710 N.E.2d 757; see, also, Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348,
356, 421 N.E.2d 1293; Security Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Springfield City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. (Sept. 17, 1999), Clark App. No. 98-CA-104; Donese
v. Donese (April 10, 1998), Green App. No. 97-CA-70. In the absence of
findings of fact and conclusions of law, we generally must presume that the
trial court applied the law correctly and must affirm if some evidence in the
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 16
record supports its judgment. See, e.g., Bugg v. Fancher, Highland App.
No. 06CA12, 2007-Ohio-2019, at ¶10, citing Allstate Financial Corp. v.
Westfield Serv. Mgt. Co. (1989), 62 Ohio App.3d 657, 577 N.E.2d 383; see,
also, Yocum v. Means, Darke App. No. 1576, 2002-Ohio-3803, at ¶7 (“The
lack of findings obviously circumscribes our review.”). As the court
explained in Pettet v. Pettet (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 128, 130, 562 N.E.2d
929:
“[W]hen separate facts are not requested by counsel and/or
supplied by the court the challenger is not entitled to be
elevated to a position superior to that he would have enjoyed
had he made his request. Thus, if from an examination of the
record as a whole in the trial court there is some evidence from
which the court could have reached the ultimate conclusions of
fact which are consistent with [its] judgment the appellate court
is bound to affirm on the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence. The message is clear: If a party wishes to challenge
the * * * judgment as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence he had best secure separate findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Otherwise his already ‘uphill’ burden of
demonstrating error becomes an almost insurmountable
‘mountain.’”
See, also, Bugg; McClead v. McClead at ¶10, Washington App. No.
06CA67, 2007-Ohio-4624 at ¶25.
{¶24} In the case at bar, there is some evidence to support the trial
court’s judgment. As the trial court found, the children remain fearful of
appellant’s verbal and physical abuse and had even informed the guardian ad
litem that they did not wish to be returned to appellant unless the guardian
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 17
ad litem could guarantee that they would no longer suffer verbal and
physical abuse. Moreover, the evidence presented at the hearing shows that
the children have adjusted well to S.W.’s home and their new school. The
trial court could have rationally determined that uprooting them once again,
after being in S.W.’s custody for over one year, and returning them to
appellant’s custody would do more harm than good. The trial court could
have determined that the children’s stability outweighed appellant’s alleged
good deeds and progress. Moreover, the record contains evidence that
appellant, who already has three children in her home, could become
overwhelmed were the three children involved in this case returned to her
custody. Appellant’s history shows that when she becomes overwhelmed
with caring for six children, she verbally and physically abuses the children.
In sum, the totality of the factors fully supports the trial court’s decision to
award S.W. legal custody and to reject appellant’s request for custody.
Thus, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
{¶25} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second assignment of
error and affirm the court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Washington App. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, & 10CA20 18
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the
Appellee recover of Appellant costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry
this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of
the date of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Harsha, P.J. and Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.
In re E.W.
Combined Opinion