[Cite as State v. Henderson, 2014-Ohio-3121.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
:
-vs- :
:
JOHNNIE HENDERSON, JR. : Case No. 13CA98
:
:
Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
2013-CR-0409
JUDGMENT: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part,
and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT: July 14, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JAMES J. MAYER, JR. RANDALL E. FRY
Prosecuting Attorney 10 West Newlon Place
Mansfield, OH 44902
By: JOHN C. NIEFT
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
38 South Park Street
Mansfield, OH 44902
Richland County, Case No.13CA98 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Appellant Johnnie Henderson appeals a judgment of the Richland County
Common Pleas Court convicting him of kidnapping (R.C. 2905.01(A)(4)) and rape (R.C.
2907.02(A)(2)). Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On June 20, 2013, appellant went to the home of his friends, Corey Payne
and S.C., to ask for assistance in walking home. Appellant, who S.C. knew by his street
name of “Red Bone,” was intoxicated. He gave synthetic marijuana, known as “posh,”
to Corey. Corey did not want to leave because his children were visiting, and so S.C.
offered to walk appellant home. Appellant agreed to give S.C. marijuana located at his
apartment if she would help him walk home.
{¶3} After reaching appellant’s apartment, S.C. went to the kitchen for a drink
of water. Appellant stood too closely behind her, making her uncomfortable. She
began to get nervous when appellant started looking for the promised marijuana. When
S.C. told appellant that she was going to leave, appellant told her she could not leave
because she was “about to get some dick.” Tr. 148. S.C. began to cry and ran for the
door. Appellant grabbed her from behind and placed her in a chokehold.
{¶4} When S.C. awoke, she was naked and appellant was on top of her,
engaging in sexual intercourse with her. She managed to push appellant off her, and
he pushed her back onto the bed. He pinned her on her stomach. S.C. asked to use
the bathroom. While in the bathroom, she found her purse and dialed 911, although
she did not speak into the phone.
Richland County, Case No.13CA98 3
{¶5} Appellant left S.C. alone for a moment, and she ran for the door.
Appellant tripped her, and pinned her down. Appellant took a glass crack pipe located
nearby, heated the ends, and placed it in her vaginal area. Appellant suddenly stood up
and began looking out the window. S.C. again dialed 911, and spoke to an operator.
S.C. told the operator that her friend would not allow her to leave his home. Appellant
then opened the door and allowed S.C. to leave.
{¶6} S.C. ran into the street naked, yelling for help. She met a family friend
and told him that appellant had just raped her. S.C. was crying and hysterical. She
used the friend’s phone to call her mother, repeating that Red Bone had raped her.
{¶7} S.C. was taken to the hospital. No injuries were noted. Appellant gave a
statement to the nurse and to police.
{¶8} Mansfield Police officers arrived at appellant’s apartment and found
appellant lying unresponsive on the floor near the front door. They obtained a search
warrant and recovered S.C.’s bra, shirt and phone from appellant’s apartment, as well
as a crack pipe.
{¶9} Appellant gave a taped statement to police. He claimed that he was out
walking and came across S.C. near Simpson School. They stopped at S.C.’s house,
and appellant gave “posh” to Corey. They started to walk to appellant’s house, talking
about “sex for drugs.” Tr. 312. According to appellant, S.C. agreed to have sex with
him in exchange for crack cocaine. Appellant claimed that when they reached his
apartment, S.C. went to the bathroom, then engaged in consensual sex with him on the
couch. He told police that he did not ejaculate because his phone rang, and he was
Richland County, Case No.13CA98 4
afraid it was his girlfriend. By the time he finished his phone call, S.C. had put her
clothes on and left.
{¶10} Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury with kidnapping
(R.C. 2905.01(A)(4)), felonious assault (R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)), and two counts of rape
(R.C. 2907.02(A)(2)). The case proceeded to jury trial. The court allowed the jury to
consider the lesser included offense of attempted rape as to Count 4 of the indictment.
The jury found appellant guilty of counts one and three, kidnapping and rape. He was
found not guilty of felonious assault and the remaining count of rape, including the
lesser included offense.
{¶11} At sentencing, appellant and the State agreed that Counts 1 and 3 were
allied offenses and should therefore merge. The State opted to sentence on the rape
conviction. The court failed to merge the offenses and instead sentenced appellant to
eight years incarceration on each count, to be served concurrently. Appellant assigns
three errors on appeal:
{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE APPELLANT TO
EIGHT YEARS OF INCARCERATION ON COUNT II OF THE INDICTMENT AND
STATING THE APPELLANT SHOULD RECEIVE FIVE YEARS OF MANDATORY
POST RELEASE CONTROL ON COUNT II OF THE INDICTMENT.
{¶13} “II. THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS THE TRIAL COUNSEL DID
NOT RENEW HIS CRIMINAL RULE 29 MOTION OF ACQUITTAL AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE CASE, THEREBY WAIVING ANY ERROR MADE BY THE
Richland County, Case No.13CA98 5
TRIAL JUDGE IN OVERRULING THE RULE 29 MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL MADE BY
THE TRIAL COUNSEL AT THE END OF THE STATE’S CASE.
{¶14} “III. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY
ON COUNT I, KIDNAPPING, AND COUNT III, RAPE, WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
I.
{¶15} Appellant argues that he should be resentenced because the court
improperly sentenced him on count 2, felonious assault, of which he was found not
guilty.
{¶16} The court’s judgment correctly identifies the counts of which appellant was
convicted as count one, kidnapping, and count three, rape. However, in the sentencing
portion of the judgment, the court sentenced appellant on counts one and two, but not
on count three. The State concedes that there is a scrivener’s error in the sentencing
entry. From the transcript of the sentencing hearing, it is clear that the court
understood he was sentencing appellant on Count 1 of kidnapping, and Count 3 of rape,
and the court apparently mislabeled the second conviction as “count 2” in the
sentencing entry.
{¶17} The State further notes that appellant and the State agreed at sentencing
that the offenses were allied offenses of similar import, and the State opted to have
appellant sentenced only on count three of rape. Instead of merging the offenses, the
court in its sentencing entry sentenced appellant separately, but to concurrent terms.
The court erred in failing to merge the offenses and sentence appellant solely on count
three of rape, as conceded by the State.
Richland County, Case No.13CA98 6
{¶18} The first assignment of error is sustained.
II.
{¶19} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to renew his motion for acquittal based on insufficient evidence
at the conclusion of the case.
{¶20} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 37
Ohio St.3d 153, 524 N.E.2d 476 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable representation and but for counsel’s error,
the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674(1984); State v. Bradley , 42 Ohio St.3d 136,
538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). In other words, appellant must show that counsel’s conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.
{¶21} Crim. R. 29(A) provides that the court on the motion of defendant or on its
own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order a judgment of
acquittal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Appellant argues that
counsel waived his right to raise the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal by failing to
renew his motion for acquittal at the conclusion of the case, citing State v. Whitmeyer,
20 Ohio App. 3d 279, 485 N.E.2d 1055 (1984).
{¶22} However, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a failure to timely make a
Crim.R. 29(A) motion during a jury trial does not waive an argument on appeal
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 346, 744
Richland County, Case No.13CA98 7
N.E.2d 1163, 2001-Ohio-57; State v. Carter, 64 Ohio St.3d 218, 223, 594 N.E.2d 595
(1992). In both Jones and Carter, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the defendant's
“not guilty” plea preserves his right to object to the alleged insufficiency of the evidence.
Id. This Court has previously recognized that a Crim. R. 29 motion is not necessary to
preserve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for appeal. State v. Straubhaar, 5th
Dist. Stark No. 2008 CA 00106, 2009-Ohio-4757, ¶40.
{¶23} Further, appellant has not demonstrated that the result of the proceeding
would have been different had counsel made a motion for a judgment of acquittal based
on the sufficiency of the evidence. An appellate court's function when reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61
Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus (1991).
{¶24} Kidnapping is defined by R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), which reads:
{¶25} “(A) No person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case of a victim
under the age of thirteen or mentally incompetent, by any means, shall remove another
from the place where the other person is found or restrain the liberty of the other
person, for any of the following purposes:
{¶26} “(4) To engage in sexual activity, as defined in section 2907.01 of the
Revised Code, with the victim against the victim's will[.]”
{¶27} Rape is defined by R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), which reads: “No person shall
engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other
person to submit by force or threat of force.”
Richland County, Case No.13CA98 8
{¶28} S.C. testified that after she walked appellant to his apartment, she told
appellant that she was going to leave. She testified that appellant told her she could not
leave because she was “about to get some dick.” Tr. 148. S.C. began to cry and ran
for the door. Appellant grabbed her from behind and placed her in a chokehold. When
S.C. awoke, she was naked and appellant was on top of her, engaging in sexual
intercourse with her. This is sufficient evidence when viewed in a light most favorable
to the State to support the convictions for kidnapping and rape.
{¶29} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶30} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the judgment is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. He stresses the absence of any physical
injuries to S.C., and argues that his version of the facts as provided through his
statement to the police is more credible than S.C.’s testimony.
{¶31} As noted in assignment of error two, S.C.’s testimony was sufficient, if
believed by the jury, to convict appellant of rape and kidnapping. When S.C. ran into a
family friend in the street after running from appellant’s home, she was naked and
hysterical, S.C. kept yelling that appellant had raped her. S.C. also told the nurse at
the hospital and the Mansfield police that appellant had raped her. Physical harm is not
an element of the offense, and the jury apparently disbelieved S.C’s testimony that
appellant had repeatedly punched her, based on the jury’s finding of not guilty of
felonious assault. We cannot find that the jury lost its way in finding S.C.’s testimony of
the events that occurred on the night in question more credible than appellant’s
statement to the police that she agreed to trade sex for crack cocaine.
Richland County, Case No.13CA98 9
{¶32} The third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶33} The judgment of the Richland County Common Pleas court convicting him
of rape and kidnapping is affirmed. This case is remanded to that court for resentencing
consistent with this opinion. Costs are to be split evenly between the parties.
By: Baldwin, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Farmer, J. concur.