[Cite as State v. Wem, 2014-Ohio-2326.]
COURT OF APPEALS
COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs-
Case No. 13 CA 20
SHAWN C. WEM
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Municipal Court,
Case No. TRC 1300616
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 29, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
CHRISTIE M. L. THORNSLEY JEFFREY G. KELLOG
ASSISTANT LAW DIRECTOR ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
760 Chestnut Street 239 North Fourth Street
Coshocton, Ohio 43812 Coshocton, Ohio 43812
[Cite as State v. Wem, 2014-Ohio-2326.]
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant appeals the July 29, 2013, decision of the Coshocton County
Municipal Court denying his motion to suppress.
{¶2} Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶3} On April 24, 2013, Rickie Workman an employee of the Coshocton Village
Inn and Suites called the Coshocton County Sheriff to report a possible intoxicated
driver. Mr. Workman identified himself and his place of employment and advised the
dispatcher that a male who appeared to be intoxicated, later identified as Appellant
Shawn C. Wem, came into the hotel and took a large number of brochures from a rack
located by the front door. (T. at 6). This rack of brochures is about 15 feet from the
clerk's desk. (T. at 9). Mr. Workman stated that Appellant was stumbling and staggering.
At one point, Appellant nearly fell down as he was looking at the brochures. (T. at 6)
Appellant never spoke to Mr. Workman and never got close enough to him for Mr.
Workman to smell the odor of alcohol. (T. at 6). Mr. Workman further testified that when
Appellant left the lobby, he walked north. Mr. Workman knew there were no vehicles
parked in that direction, so he went to the front door to watch Appellant. (T. at 6). He
observed Appellant turn around and walk to the south end of the hotel. Appellant then
got into his vehicle and drove toward McDonald's. Mr. Workman went back into the
hotel and contacted the Sheriff’s Office. (T. at 6).
{¶4} The Dispatch Narrative stated: "Rick Workman of Coshocton Village Inn
and Suites advised a male subject came into the hotel and took a bunch of brochures,
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 3
got into a silver Jeep Liberty and drove over to McDonalds drive-thru. FOE9857 was the
license plate. Unit 42 went out for a test." (T. at 19).
{¶5} Deputy Adam Mast was dispatched to investigate. Dispatch advised
Deputy Mast that "an employee of Coshocton Village Inn and Suites said a man had
come in and picked up a bunch of brochures from their brochure rack and he appeared
to be drunk and got in his silver or gray Jeep and wound up in the McDonald's parking
lot. And the clerk said he appeared to be intoxicated." (T. at 14).
{¶6} Deputy Mast testified that when he arrived at McDonald's, Appellant's
vehicle was stopped in the drive through. Deputy Mast parked his cruiser and
approached Appellant's vehicle. Deputy Mast did not activate his sirens or lights. (T. at
16-17). Deputy Mast advised Appellant that he had received a report that Appellant was
under the influence and asked that Appellant pull over so he could conduct field sobriety
tests to see if Appellant was able to drive. (T. at 15-16). Deputy Mast reported that he
could not smell the odor of alcohol at this time. Appellant pulled over into a parking spot.
(T. at 16-17).
{¶7} Appellant was subsequently arrested and taken to the Coshocton County
Jail for a breath test.
{¶8} On April 24, 2013, Appellant was charged two counts of Operating a
Vehicle under the Influence in violation of R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(a) and
§4511.19(A)(1)(d).
{¶9} Appellant was set for arraignment on April 30, 2013. Appellant failed to
appear on that date so a bench warrant was issued. Appellant was picked up on the
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 4
bench warrant and appeared for the arraignment on May 10, 2013. Appellant entered a
not guilty plea.
{¶10} On July 12, 2013, Appellant filed a motion to suppress.
{¶11} On July 17, 2013, a hearing on the motion to suppress was held.
{¶12} On July 29, 2013, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress.
{¶13} On August 7, 2013, Appellant entered a no contest plea.
{¶14} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶15} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.”
I.
{¶16} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity in this case. We disagree.
{¶17} Appellate review of a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress
involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332,
713 N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist .1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the
role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to
evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 1996–Ohio–134,
661 N.E.2d 1030. A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if
they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d
142, 145, 675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate
court must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial
court's conclusion, whether the trial court's decision meets the applicable legal
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 5
standard. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 42, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993),
overruled on other grounds.
{¶18} There are three methods of challenging a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's finding of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial
court's findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State v.
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486,
597 N.E.2d 1141(4th Dist 1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to
apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate
court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See, Williams, supra.
Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or
final issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an
appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court's
conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case.
State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994).
{¶19} In the case sub judice, Appellant challenges the stop of his vehicle. An
investigative stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution if the police have reasonable suspicion that “the person stopped is, or is
about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417,
101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Reasonable suspicion can arise from information
that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). But it requires something more
than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 6
27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires at least a
minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed .2d 570 (2000).
{¶20} In the case sub judice, the police received a call from an identified
informant. Where the information possessed by the police before the stop was solely
from an informant's tip, the determination of reasonable suspicion will be limited to an
examination of the weight to be given the tip and the reliability of the tip. Id. at 299, 720
N.E.2d 507. Courts have generally identified three classes of informants: the
anonymous informant, the known informant from the criminal world who has provided
previous reliable tips, and the identified citizen informant. Id. at 300, 720 N.E.2d 507. An
identified citizen informant may be highly reliable, and therefore a strong showing as to
other indicia of reliability may be unnecessary. Id. Thus, courts have routinely credited
the identified citizen informant with greater reliability. Id.
{¶21} Here, Appellant does not contest that the caller in this case was a reliable
identified citizen informant. Rather, Appellant asserts the officer lacked sufficient
probable cause to effectuate the stop as the officer did not personally observe
Appellant's impaired driving.
{¶22} In Maumee v. Weisner (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 295, the Ohio Supreme
Court held:
{¶23} “Having resolved this issue, we emphasize that our categorization of the
informant as an identified citizen informant does not itself determine the outcome of this
case. Instead it is one element of our totality of the circumstances review of this
informant's tip, weighing in favor of the informant's reliability and veracity. Continuing
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 7
our review, we believe that the informant's basis of knowledge also furthers his
credibility. Typically, a personal observation by an informant is due greater reliability
than a secondhand description. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-234, 103 S.Ct. at 2329-2330, 76
L.Ed.2d at 545. Here, the citizen's tip constituted an eyewitness account of the crime.
His version of that night was not mere rumor or speculation. It was a firsthand report of
the events as they happened. Also significant is the fact that the tip was an exact relay
of the circumstances as they were occurring. Immediately upon witnessing the events,
the citizen described them to the dispatcher. This immediacy lends further credibility to
the accuracy of the facts being relayed, as it avoids reliance upon the informant's
memory.
{¶24} “We also believe the informant's motivation supports the reliability of his
tip. According to the evidence, the informant reported that Weisner was weaving all over
the road. He made this report from the perspective of a motorist sharing the road with
another motorist driving erratically. We can reasonably infer from these circumstances
that he considered Weisner a threat to him personally, as well as to other motorists and
that he was motivated, therefore, not by dishonest and questionable goals, but by his
desire to eliminate a risk to the public's safety.
{¶25} “Taken together, these factors persuade us that the informant's tip is
trustworthy and due significant weight. The informant was an identified citizen who
based his knowledge of the facts he described upon his own observations as the events
occurred. As a result, his tip merits a high degree of credibility and value, rendering it
sufficient to withstand the Fourth Amendment challenge without independent police
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 8
corroboration. Accordingly, the dispatch based upon this tip was issued on sufficient
facts to justify Patrolman Roberts's investigative stop.”
{¶26} “The simple corroboration of neutral details describing the suspect or other
conditions existing at the time of the tip, without more, will not produce reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory stop.” State v. Ramsey (Sept. 20, 1990), Franklin App No.
89AP-1298, unreported. “A tip which standing alone would lack sufficient indicia of
reliability may establish reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop if it is
sufficiently corroborated through independent police work.” Id.
{¶27} Upon review, we find that Mr. Workman’s statements to the dispatcher
included sufficient information to provide reasonable suspicion that Appellant was
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Mr. Workman provided
the dispatcher with the make and color of Appellant's vehicle, along with the license
plate number. Mr. Workman advised dispatch that he witnessed Appellant stumbling,
staggering and nearly falling down in the hotel lobby. He further relayed to dispatch that
he followed Appellant outside where he observed Appellant head in the wrong direction
before eventually locating his car and driving away in the direction of the McDonald’s
restaurant.
{¶28} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding there was reasonable
articulable suspicion for the stop based on suspicion of criminal activity.
Coshocton County, Case No. 13 CA 20 9
{¶29} Appellant’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶30} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Municipal Court of
Coshocton County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.
By: Wise, J.
Hoffman, P. J., and
Delaney, J., concur.
JWW/d 0502