[Cite as State v. Dickerson, 2014-Ohio-1391.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs-
Case No. 13-CA-69
CHRISTOPHER DICKERSON
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Municipal
Court, Case No. 13CRB00191
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 26, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
J. MICHAEL KING ANDREW T. SANDERSON
Assistant Law Director Burkett & Sanderson, Inc.
40 West Main Street 73 North Sixth Street
Newark, Ohio 43055 Newark, Ohio 43055
Licking County, Case No. 13-CA-69 2
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Christopher Dickerson appeals his conviction on one
count of sexual imposition entered by the Licking County Municipal Court. Plaintiff-
appellee is the state of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On January 8, 2013, A.B., a twenty-three year old female, was shopping
at the Wal-Mart store in Heath, Ohio with her mother. Appellant visited the store on the
same day. Appellant followed A.B. and her mother around the store for approximately
40 minutes. At most times, Appellant was present in the same aisle as A.B. and her
mother. Appellant did not have grocery bags, items or anything in his hands. A.B. and
her mother separated briefly, at which point, Appellant swiftly approached A.B. "groping"
her right buttock. Appellant immediately proceeded to leave the store.
{¶3} As a result of the altercation, Appellant was charged with one count of
sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.06. The matter proceeded to a bench trial
after Appellant waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court found Appellant guilty of the
charge, imposing a sentence of sixty days in jail, fifty days suspended. The court
further classified Appellant as a Tier I sexual offender, requiring Appellant register
accordingly.
{¶4} Appellant now appeals, assigning as error:
{¶5} "I. THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS
OBTAINED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEING PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH
EACH AND EVERY ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
Licking County, Case No. 13-CA-69 3
{¶6} "II. THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BELOW."
I. and II.
{¶7} Appellant's assigned errors raise common and interrelated issues;
therefore, we will address the arguments together.
{¶8} Appellant maintains his conviction for sexual imposition is against the
manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶9} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire
record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ “ State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387,
1997–Ohio–52, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485
N.E.2d 717 (1983).
{¶10} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574
N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus (1991).
{¶11} Appellant was convicted of sexual imposition, in violation of R.C. 2907.06,
which reads:
Licking County, Case No. 13-CA-69 4
{¶12} "(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of
the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with
the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of
the following applies:
{¶13} "(1) The offender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the other
person, or one of the other persons, or is reckless in that regard.
{¶14} "***
{¶15} "(B) No person shall be convicted of a violation of this section solely upon
the victim's testimony unsupported by other evidence."
{¶16} Sexual contact is defined at R.C. 2907.01(B) as,
{¶17} "(B) 'Sexual contact' means any touching of an erogenous zone of
another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the
person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either
person."
{¶18} Appellant admits to making contact with A.B., but maintains he attempted
to steal her wallet from her back pocket. He asserts there was no purpose of sexual
gratification.
{¶19} The evidence presented at trial, including the video introduced into
evidence at trial, established Appellant followed A.B. in the store for a substantial period
of time. He had no cart, bags and nothing in his hands. Upon A.B.'s separation from
her mother in the store, Appellant swiftly went out of his way to touch A.B.'s right
buttock. He did not appear to be searching for her pocket area, and focused his visual
attention on another area as he made contact. A.B.'s reaction was immediate and
Licking County, Case No. 13-CA-69 5
evident. The video surveillance demonstrates Appellant hastily left the area, and
immediately thereafter, the store.
{¶20} A.B. testified at trial she wore yoga pants to the store, which she was
certain did not have pockets. Her wallet was in her purse, which hung on her shoulder.
A.B.'s mother testified she had noticed Appellant's presence near them in the store,
particularly his presence in each aisle they entered, but assumed he worked for the
store. She also testified her purse and wallet were obvious on her shoulder, as were
other female patrons.
{¶21} Based upon the evidence presented, we find Appellant's conviction for
sexual imposition is not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence. The
trier of fact reasonably found Appellant made sexual contact with A.B. knowing or with
reckless disregard to the same being offensive to A.B. and could infer based upon his
prolonged following of A.B. throughout the store, the sexual arousal or touch was for his
gratification rather than to accomplish a theft.
Licking County, Case No. 13-CA-69 6
{¶22} Appellant's conviction on one count of sexual imposition entered by the
Licking County Municipal Court is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Farmer, J. and
Delaney, J. concur
State v. Dickerson
Combined Opinion