[Cite as Watts v. Watts, 2014-Ohio-665.]
COURT OF APPEALS
TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
FREDA M. WATTS : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2013 AP 08 0033
LARRY D. WATTS :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Tuscarawas County
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
Relations Division, Case No. 2012 TM 02
0052
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 21, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
ERICK BAUER TRAVIS COLLINS
204 W. High Avenue P.O. Box 271
New Philadelphia, OH 44663 Cadiz, OH 43907
[Cite as Watts v. Watts, 2014-Ohio-665.]
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant appeals the July 10, 2013 judgment entry of the Tuscarawas
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, overruling his objections
to the magistrate’s decision, granting a divorce, and adopting the magistrate’s decision
as the final orders of the trial court.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} Plaintiff-appellee Freda M. Watts filed a complaint for divorce on February
6, 2012, alleging gross neglect of duty and extreme cruelty. After Defendant-appellant
Larry D. Watts filed an answer and the parties attempted to settle the case at mediation,
a hearing was conducted by a magistrate on March 7, 2013.
{¶3} At the March 7, 2013 hearing, the parties informed the magistrate they
had reached a settlement agreement in the case. The magistrate and counsel for each
party extensively detailed the agreement of the parties. The magistrate stated, “as I
understand it, the parties are agreeing that the grounds will be living separate and apart
for more than one year.” Appellant confirmed this was his understanding of the
agreement and that he was entering the agreement of his own free will. Subsequently,
the magistrate inquired again of both appellee and appellant. Both appellee and
appellant confirmed what they heard read into the record was the full agreement, they
had all questions answered to their satisfaction, they were satisfied with the terms of the
agreement, and each was entering into the agreement of their own free will. Both
appellee and appellant confirmed they had been living separate and apart without
cohabitation for at least one year as of the date of the hearing. At the hearing, appellant
and appellee waived their right to object to the magistrate’s decision.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0033 3
{¶4} On March 27, 2013, appellant filed pro se objections to the magistrate’s
decision and stated that because no evidence, testimony, or facts were given at the
March 7, 2013 hearing, the magistrate’s decision should be vacated. Appellant filed an
additional pro se letter with the trial judge on April 2, 2013, again expressing his concern
about the lack of evidence as to the grounds for the divorce. The trial court held an oral
hearing on April 8, 2013. The trial court indicated a judgment entry had not yet been
completed by the magistrate, so any objections to the magistrate’s decision were
premature.
{¶5} The magistrate entered her decision on May 21, 2013. The judgment
entry indicated that “after several hours of negotiations, the parties reached a full and
final settlement of all matters concerning their divorce.” The magistrate detailed the full
agreement made by the parties, including the parties’ agreement the divorce would be
granted on the grounds of living separately and apart for one year without cohabitation.
The agreed judgment entry was approved and adopted by the magistrate in the
judgment entry.
{¶6} Appellant filed his objections to the magistrate’s decision on June 3, 2013.
Appellant argued the magistrate told the parties a divorce would be granted by the end
of the day unless appellee “was chained to her bed” and the magistrate told each party
she would only allow them 3.5 hours to present their case at trial. In appellant’s
objections, he states that he “participated in negotiation of all issues in this matter,
including the grounds for divorce, but [appellant] believes he should have been given
the opportunity to present evidence on the grounds for the divorce.” Appellant
requested that he be allowed to present his evidence on the grounds for divorce. The
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0033 4
trial court held an oral hearing on appellant’s objections on June 24, 2013 and let each
appellant and appellee testify. Appellant testified he maintained a cohabitable
residence since appellee left the home and requested the trial court dismiss the divorce
action. On June 26, 2013, the trial court took appellant’s objections under advisement
to allow the trial court to review a written response by the magistrate and to review the
audio recording of the March 7, 2013 hearing.
{¶7} The magistrate filed a written response on July 5, 2013. The magistrate
confirmed she declined to continue the trial in March of 2013. The magistrate
specifically denied forcing the parties into making any agreements, but did point out the
reality that there was not unlimited time available for trial and counsel should use their
time wisely. Further, since both parties admitted to living separate and apart for more
than one year, there would need to be significant evidence of involuntariness and she
would likely grant the divorce on those grounds and, as such, she suggested the parties
continue to negotiate a settlement on all of the issues. The magistrate also stated trial
counsel for appellant indicated if appellee told appellant it was her free will to live
separately, appellant would be satisfied with the grounds for divorce. The magistrate
recalled appellee told appellant on the day of the trial it was her own decision to live
separately. The magistrate stated she detailed the settlement agreement on the record,
appellant asked relevant questions, clarified information, appeared to have a clear
understanding of the agreement, and did not raise the issue of grounds for the divorce
during the March 2013 hearing.
{¶8} The trial court issued a judgment entry on July 10, 2013. The trial court
overruled appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopted the findings of
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0033 5
fact, conclusions of law, and agreement of the parties in the magistrate’s May 21, 2013
decision. The trial court found the marriage was terminated upon the grounds that the
parties were living separate and apart for one year. Further, that both appellant and
appellee fully, completely, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into the
settlement agreement as evidenced by the May 21, 2013 magistrate’s decision.
{¶9} Appellant appeals the July 10, 2013 judgment entry of the Tuscarawas
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, and assigns the following
as error:
{¶10} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO A SEPARATION AGREEMENT WHERE THE
MAGISTRATE ANNOUNCED TO APPELLANT PRIOR TO THE FINAL EVIDENTIARY
HEARING THAT SHE WOULD GRANT A DIVORCE BY THE END OF THE DAY
UNLESS APPELLANT ESTABLISHED THAT HIS WIFE HAD BEEN CHAINED TO A
BED FOR THE LAST YEAR.”
I.
{¶11} Appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the
magistrate’s decision because the actions and announcements of the magistrate
displayed a disregard for the rule of law and created a state of duress in the mind of
appellant. In support of his argument, appellant asserts the magistrate, while the
parties were off the record, told the parties a divorce would be granted by the end of the
day unless the evidence demonstrated appellee was chained to her bed and that the
magistrate improperly limited appellant’s time for trial. In support of his argument,
appellant cites the Iowa case of Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 265 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1978) in
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0033 6
which the court recognized the trial court judge could be the cause of duress that forced
a party into a settlement agreement. We disagree with appellant.
{¶12} In this case, appellant entered into the settlement agreement in the
magistrate’s presence. “Where the parties enter into a settlement agreement in the
presence of the court, such an agreement constitutes a binding contract.” Jackson v.
Jackson, 5th Dist. Richland No. 12CA28, 2013-Ohio-3521, quoting Tyron v. Tyron, 11th
Dist. Trumbull No. 2007-T-0030, 2007-Ohio-6928. “The enforceability of an in-court
settlement agreement depends on whether the parties have manifested an intention to
be bound by its terms and whether these intentions are sufficiently definite to
specifically enforced.” Id. Absent fraud, duress, overreaching, or undue influence, a
settlement agreement entered into by parties in a divorce is enforceable, if the parties
intended to contract on its essential terms and intended to be bound by its terms.
Walther v. Walther, 102 Ohio App.3d 378, 657 N.E.2d 332 (1st Dist. 1995).
{¶13} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, “[t]o avoid a contract on the
basis of duress, a party must prove coercion by the other party to the contract. It is not
enough to show that one party assented merely because of difficult circumstances that
are not the fault of the other party.” Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 551 N.E.2d
1249, syllabus (1990). Three elements are common to situations were duress has been
found to exist: (1) one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2)
circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) said circumstances were the
result of the coercive acts of the opposite party. Id. at 246. Dissatisfaction with or
general remorse about consenting to a settlement agreement does not constitute
duress. Murray v. Murray, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1305, 2011-Ohio-1546.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0033 7
{¶14} We first note there is a question of whether someone other than the other
party to the contract can assert duress sufficient to avoid a settlement agreement.
Maury v. Maury, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 06CA837, 2008-Ohio-3326. However, even if
Ohio recognized this theory of third-party duress, appellant would not prevail. Our
review reveals nothing in the record indicating appellant was coerced or pressured into
consenting to the settlement agreement. Appellant explicitly and repeatedly
represented to the court that he agreed to the settlement and he repeatedly assented to
the terms of the settlement on the record and thus did not involuntarily accept the terms
of the settlement agreement as required for duress. Twice during the March 7, 2013
hearing, appellant confirmed he was entering the agreement of his own free will. Also
at the March 7, 2013 hearing, appellant confirmed the agreement as discussed and
read into the record was the full agreement of the parties, all his questions were
answered, and he was satisfied with the terms of the agreement. Further, that he
understood as part of the agreement the grounds for divorce would be that the parties
lived separate and apart for longer than one year. Both appellant and appellee testified
they had been living separate and apart for at least one year as of the date of the March
2013 hearing. In his objections to the magistrate’s decision, appellant admits he
participated in the negotiations of all issues in the settlement agreement. In her
response to the trial court, the magistrate indicated appellant asked relevant questions
during the March 2013 hearing and appeared to have a clear understanding of the
settlement agreement. The transcript reflects that both parties were examined under
oath, acknowledged they had resolved all of the issues in the case, and that they
understood and agreed to the settlement agreement of their own free will.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0033 8
{¶15} There is no evidence appellant was prevented from demanding a trial if he
was not in agreement with the parties’ resolution of the issues and thus he had an
alternative to the settlement agreement. In his objections to the magistrate’s decision,
appellant admits he participated in the settlement but wanted to present evidence on the
grounds for the divorce. While the magistrate states she did inform counsel and the
parties they would have a limited amount of hours to present their case, there is no
indication that the evidence appellant sought to present would exceed this allotted time,
especially since it related to only one aspect of the settlement agreement.
{¶16} We further do not agree with appellant’s contention that he was subjected
to duress by the magistrate when she merely informed appellant that she would likely
grant the divorce on the grounds of living separate and apart for one year since both
parties admitted to living separate and apart for over one year. As noted above,
appellant had the opportunity to present evidence on this issue if he so chose.
{¶17} Finally, though appellant contends the magistrate told him she would grant
the divorce by the end of the day unless he could show appellee was chained to the bed
for the last year, such a statement does not appear in the record in this case.
Accordingly, we presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings. Knapp v.
Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980).
{¶18} We find there is no evidence appellant was under any coercion which
would constitute the kind of duress necessary to invalidate the consent agreement.
There was a meeting of the minds regarding the terms of the agreement to which both
parties agreed in open court. That agreement is binding on the parties and the trial
court did not err in adopting it as its judgment in this case.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0033 9
{¶19} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s assignment of error is overruled. The
July 10, 2013 judgment entry of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas,
Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Wise, J., and
Baldwin, J., concur