[Cite as Grahams Used Car Outlet v. Stutchman, 2013-Ohio-3609.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GRAHAMS USED CAR OUTLET JUDGES:
Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P. J.
Plaintiff-Appellant Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs-
Case No. 12CA92
BRYCE STUTCHMAN, et al.
Defendants-Appellants OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 09CVH851
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 19, 2013
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendants-Appellees
JAMES L. BLUNT, II
445 West Longview Avenue
Mansfield, Ohio 44903
Richland County, Case No. 12CA92 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Grahams Used Car Outlet appeals the August 31, 2012,
decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio, following a
garnishment hearing.
{¶2} Defendant-Appellee Bryce Stutchman has not filed a brief in this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶3} The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:
{¶4} In 2008, Defendant, Bryce Stutchman filed an initial Bankruptcy Chapter
13 Plan; 11 U.S.C.S. Chapter 13, which was ultimately dismissed on November 12,
2008.
{¶5} On March 26, 2009, Plaintiff-Appellant Grahams Used Car Outlet filed a
Complaint against Defendants Bryce Stutchman and Thomas Eaton.
{¶6} On April 3, 2009, Appellant filed a Notice of Dismissal as to Defendant
Eaton.
{¶7} On July 17, 2009, Plaintiff-Appellant was granted a judgment against
Defendant Bryce Stutchman in the amount of $1,696.64 plus court costs and interest at
the contractual rate of 24.14%.
{¶8} Defendant Stutchman filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy on June 26,
2010. Plaintiff-Appellant was listed as an unsecured creditor in the amount of $2,917.69,
which was the amount of the claim allowed.
{¶9} Plaintiff-Appellant received no payments from Defendant or the
Bankruptcy Trustee in the second bankruptcy case. The second bankruptcy was
Richland County, Case No. 12CA92 3
dismissed on September 30, 2011. See the Bankruptcy Order in Case No. 10-34399
attached to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Lieu of Appearance.
{¶10} On March 16, 2012, Plaintiff-Appellant proceeded to execute on said
judgment by mailing Defendant a "Notice of Court Proceeding to Collect Debt".
{¶11} On April 3, 2012, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a garnishment on Defendant.
{¶12} Defendant requested a hearing on the garnishment, pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code §2716.06.
{¶13} The trial court held a hearing where Defendant presented the trial court
with a title to the vehicle that did not list Plaintiff-Appellant as a lien holder. The trial
court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing to allow for the presentation of evidence
as to why the title did not include Plaintiff-Appellant’s lien.
{¶14} An evidentiary hearing was held before a Magistrate on August 16, 2012.
{¶15} At the evidentiary hearing, counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant explained to the
Magistrate that the clear title meant the Defendant had paid the secured portion through
her initial Chapter 13 Plan; therefore, Defendant was entitled to have the lien removed
from the title. (T. at 7).
{¶16} According to Plaintiff-Appellant, Defendant's initial Bankruptcy Chapter 13
plan included interest at the rate of 10% by the Bankruptcy Court. Plaintiff-Appellant did
not receive any interest on the unsecured portion through the initial Chapter 13
Bankruptcy.
{¶17} The Complaint in the case sub judice was filed after the first bankruptcy
was dismissed, and judgment was obtained prior to Defendant's second bankruptcy
being filed.
Richland County, Case No. 12CA92 4
{¶18} Plaintiff-Appellant was included as an unsecured creditor in Defendant's
second Chapter 13 Bankruptcy; 11 U.S.C.S. Chapter 13.
{¶19} On August 31, 2012, the Magistrate signed and filed a Judgment Entry
finding:
{¶20} “… Defendant, Bryce Stutchman, having filed Chapter 13 Bankruptcy in
the above matter and having fully paid on the full said secured amount and that there
was no unsecured amounts showing finds in favor or [sic] the Defendant. All funds held
in escrow to be released to the Defendant.”
{¶21} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following Assignments of Error.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶22} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HAVING A MAGISTRATE SIGN A
JUDGMENT ENTRY CONTRAY [SIC] TO CIVIL RULE 53.
{¶23} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING OBJECTIONS TO BE
HEARD ON THE JUDGMENT ITSELF, PURSUANT TO ORC §2716.06.
{¶24} “III. THE TRIAL COURT SUA SPONTE VACATED THE JUDGMENT
CONTRARY TO OHIO CIVIL RULE 60B.
{¶25} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RELYING ON THE DEFENDANT'S
BANKRUPTCY WHICH WAS DISMISSED ON TWO OCCASSIONS [SIC] AND FAILED
TO RESTORE ALL PROPERTY RIGHTS TO THE POSITION IN WHICH THEY WERE
FOUND AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE BANKRUPTCY CASE.”
I.
{¶26} In its First Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the Magistrate did not
have authority to sign the judgment entry in this case. We agree.
Richland County, Case No. 12CA92 5
{¶27} “Where a matter is referred to a magistrate, the magistrate and the trial
court must conduct the proceedings in conformity with the powers and procedures
conferred by Civ.R. 53. ‘Magistrates are neither constitutional nor statutory courts.
Magistrates and their powers are wholly creatures of rules of practice and procedure
promulgated by the Supreme Court.’ ” Yantek v. Coach Builders Limited, Inc., Hamilton
App. No. C–060601, 2007–Ohio–5126, ¶ 9, citing Quick v. Kwiatkowski, Montgomery
App. No. 18620, 2001–Ohio–1498, citing Sec. 5(B), Art. IV, Ohio Constitution.
{¶28} Civ.R. 53 does not permit magistrates to enter judgments. This is the
function of the judge, not the magistrate. Brown v. Cummins (1997), 120 Ohio App.3d
554, 555, 698 N.E.2d 501; In re K.K., Summit App. No. 22352, 2005–Ohio–3112, at ¶
17; Harkai v. Scherba Industries, Inc. (2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 211, 217–218, 736
N.E.2d 101; Kidd v. Higgins (Mar. 29, 1996), Lake App. No. 95–L–112.
{¶29} The exercise of the magistrate's powers under Civ.R. 53 is intended only
to “assist courts of record.” Yantek, supra at ¶ 10. “A magistrate's oversight of an issue
or issues, even an entire trial, is not a substitute for the [trial court's] judicial functions
but only an aid to them.' ‘[E]ven where a jury is the factfinder [in a proceeding before a
magistrate], the trial court remains as the ultimate determiner of the case. It is the
primary duty of the trial court, and not the magistrate, to act as the judicial officer.” Id.
citing Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 6, 1993–Ohio–177, 615 N.E.2d 617.
{¶30} One of the acts of the judicial officer is found in Civ.R. 58 where it states
the court must sign the judgment.
{¶31} Based on the foregoing, we find the Magistrate in this case did not have
the authority to sign the August 31, 2012 Judgment Entry.
Richland County, Case No. 12CA92 6
{¶32} Appellant’s First Assignment of Error is sustained.
II., III., IV.
{¶33} Base on our disposition of Appellant’s First Assignment of Error, we find
Appellant’s remaining errors to be moot.
{¶34} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio, is
reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the law
and this opinion.
By: Wise, J.
Farmer, P. J., and
Delaney, J., concur.
___________________________________
HON. JOHN W. WISE
___________________________________
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
___________________________________
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
JWW/d 0723
Richland County, Case No. 12CA92 7
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GRAHAMS USED CAR OUTLET :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
BRYCE STUTCHMAN, et al. :
:
Defendants-Appellants : Case No. 12CA92
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio, is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs assessed to Appellant.
___________________________________
HON. JOHN W. WISE
___________________________________
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
___________________________________
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY