[Cite as State v. Finch, 2012-Ohio-4727.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
Hon. John W. Wise, J.
-vs-
Case No. 11-CA-114
RICHARD FINCH
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 10 CR 00158
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: October 8, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KENNETH W. OSWALT ERIC J. ALLEN
Licking County Prosecutor The Law Office of Eric J. Allen, LTD
713 South Front Street
By: Tracy F. Van Winkle Columbus, Ohio 43206
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
20 S. Second Street, Fourth Floor
Newark, Ohio 43055
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 2
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Richard Finch appeals the October 11, 2011
Judgment Entry entered by the Licking County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-
appellee is the state of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
{¶2} On April 5, 2010, the Licking County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on nine
counts of sexual imposition, misdemeanors of the third degree; two counts of
importuning, felonies of the third degree; one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a
minor, a felony of the fifth degree; one count of sexual imposition, a misdemeanor of the
third degree; and three counts of compelling prostitution, felonies of the third degree.
The charges were based upon several acts of sexual conduct with teenage males
beginning in mid-to-late 2009, and continuing until the spring of 2010. Some of the
males were minors at the time of the offenses.
{¶3} On December 6, 2010, Appellant entered pleas of guilty to seven counts
of sexual imposition, three counts of importuning and one count of unlawful sexual
conduct with a minor. Pursuant to the State's motion, the trial court dismissed the
remaining counts.
{¶4} After accepting Appellant's pleas, the trial court proceeded to sentencing.
After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of
seven years of incarceration. The court did not inform Appellant of his right to appeal
1
A rendition of the facts underlying the charges is unnecessary for our disposition of
this appeal.
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 3
under Crim.R. 32(B)(2) and (3). The Judgment Entry of sentence was filed on
December 17, 2010.
{¶5} Appellant filed a direct appeal to this Court in State v. Finch, 5th Dist. No.
11CA6, 2011-Ohio-4273, raising the following sole assignment of error:
{¶6} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTION TEN OF THE
OHIO CONSTITUTION BY ACCEPTING HIS GUILTY PLEAS WITHOUT NOTIFYING
HIM OF HIS APPELLATE RIGHTS.”
{¶7} This Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court holding while the trial
court did not inform Appellant of his right to appeal under Crim.R. 32(B)(2) and (3),
Appellant had failed to show prejudice. This Court found Appellant filed an appeal in the
matter and was represented by counsel; therefore, no reversible error occurred.
{¶8} On August 19, 2011, Appellant filed a petition to set aside or vacate his
conviction pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. Via Judgment Entry of October 11, 2011, the trial
court denied Appellant's petition.
{¶9} Appellant now appeals, assigning as error:
{¶10} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE APPELLANT’S
REQUEST FOR A HEARING REGARDING HIS POST CONVICTION PETITION.
{¶11} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND
THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS EFFECTIVE AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES MADE
APPLICABLE TO THE SEPARATE STATES BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.”
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 4
{¶12} Appellant's assignments of error raise common and interrelated issues;
therefore, we will address the arguments together.
{¶13} R.C. Section 2953.21 reads,
{¶14} "(A)(1)(a) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or
adjudicated a delinquent child and who claims that there was such a denial or
infringement of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the
Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States, and any person who has
been convicted of a criminal offense that is a felony and who is an offender for whom
DNA testing that was performed under sections 2953.71 to 2953.81 of the Revised
Code or under former section 2953.82 of the Revised Code and analyzed in the context
of and upon consideration of all available admissible evidence related to the person's
case as described in division (D) of section 2953.74 of the Revised Code provided
results that establish, by clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence of that felony
offense or, if the person was sentenced to death, establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, actual innocence of the aggravating circumstance or circumstances the
person was found guilty of committing and that is or are the basis of that sentence of
death, may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for
relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence
or to grant other appropriate relief. The petitioner may file a supporting affidavit and
other documentary evidence in support of the claim for relief.
{¶15} "***
{¶16} (5) If the petitioner in a petition filed under division (A) of this section was
convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony, the petition may include a claim that the
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 5
petitioner was denied the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Ohio
Constitution or the United States Constitution because the sentence imposed upon the
petitioner for the felony was part of a consistent pattern of disparity in sentencing by the
judge who imposed the sentence, with regard to the petitioner's race, gender, ethnic
background, or religion. If the supreme court adopts a rule requiring a court of common
pleas to maintain information with regard to an offender's race, gender, ethnic
background, or religion, the supporting evidence for the petition shall include, but shall
not be limited to, a copy of that type of information relative to the petitioner's sentence
and copies of that type of information relative to sentences that the same judge imposed
upon other persons.
{¶17} "***
{¶18} "(C) The court shall consider a petition that is timely filed under division
(A)(2) of this section even if a direct appeal of the judgment is pending. Before granting
a hearing on a petition filed under division (A) of this section, the court shall determine
whether there are substantive grounds for relief. In making such a determination, the
court shall consider, in addition to the petition, the supporting affidavits, and the
documentary evidence, all the files and records pertaining to the proceedings against
the petitioner, including, but not limited to, the indictment, the court's journal entries, the
journalized records of the clerk of the court, and the court reporter's transcript. The court
reporter's transcript, if ordered and certified by the court, shall be taxed as court costs. If
the court dismisses the petition, it shall make and file findings of fact and conclusions of
law with respect to such dismissal.
{¶19} "***
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 6
{¶20} "(E) Unless the petition and the files and records of the case show the
petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court shall proceed to a prompt hearing on the
issues even if a direct appeal of the case is pending. If the court notifies the parties that
it has found grounds for granting relief, either party may request an appellate court in
which a direct appeal of the judgment is pending to remand the pending case to the
court.
{¶21} "***
{¶22} "(G) If the court does not find grounds for granting relief, it shall make and
file findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall enter judgment denying relief on the
petition. If no direct appeal of the case is pending and the court finds grounds for relief
or if a pending direct appeal of the case has been remanded to the court pursuant to a
request made pursuant to division (E) of this section and the court finds grounds for
granting relief, it shall make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall
enter a judgment that vacates and sets aside the judgment in question, and, in the case
of a petitioner who is a prisoner in custody, shall discharge or resentence the petitioner
or grant a new trial as the court determines appropriate. The court also may make
supplementary orders to the relief granted, concerning such matters as rearraignment,
retrial, custody, and bail. If the trial court's order granting the petition is reversed on
appeal and if the direct appeal of the case has been remanded from an appellate court
pursuant to a request under division (E) of this section, the appellate court reversing the
order granting the petition shall notify the appellate court in which the direct appeal of
the case was pending at the time of the remand of the reversal and remand of the trial
court's order. Upon the reversal and remand of the trial court's order granting the
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 7
petition, regardless of whether notice is sent or received, the direct appeal of the case
that was remanded is reinstated."
{¶23} Herein, Appellant maintains the trial court erred in denying his petition
without holding a hearing, and in not finding he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel in the proceedings before the trial court.
{¶24} A criminal defendant seeking to challenge his conviction through a petition
for post-conviction relief is not automatically entitled to a hearing. State v. Calhoun
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 279. Before granting a hearing on the petition, the court must
determine whether there are grounds to believe the petitioner was denied his rights so
as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the
Constitution of the United States. R.C. 2953.21. If the petition, the files and the record
show the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court may dismiss the petition without an
evidentiary hearing. State v. Byrd (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 318. It is the defendant's
burden to demonstrate such evidence as would merit relief.
{¶25} When raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner
"bears the initial burden to submit evidentiary documents containing sufficient operative
facts to demonstrate the lack of competent counsel and the defense was prejudiced by
counsel's ineffectiveness.” State v. Jackson (1980), 64 Ohio St.2nd 107. When a
petitioner seeks to support his petition by affidavits, a trial court is not obligated to
accept the affidavit as being true. However, even with the truthfulness of an affidavit
assumed, if the information it contains does not rise to the level of demonstrating a
constitutional violation, then the actual truth or falsity of the affidavit is inconsequential.
State v. Calhoun (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 279.
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 8
{¶26} Our standard of review for ineffective assistance claims is set forth in
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Ohio
adopted this standard in the case of State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538
N.E.2d 373. These cases require a two-pronged analysis: First, we must determine
whether counsel's assistance was ineffective; whether counsel's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonable representation and was violative of any of his
essential duties to the client. If we find ineffective assistance of counsel, we must then
determine whether or not the defense was actually prejudiced by counsel's
ineffectiveness such that the reliability of the outcome of the trial is suspect. This
requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's
unprofessional error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. Trial counsel
is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675, 693
N.E.2d 267.
{¶27} Appellant asserts he was denied the effective assistance of counsel as his
counsel failed to investigate a past head injury, failed to investigate case facts and failed
to file a motion to suppress. In support, Appellant offers his own affidavit, along with
affidavits of his business partner, manager, and co-producer, as well as, those of
various clients. Appellant does not offer an affidavit of an expert, but rather attaches a
police report from September of 1985, purporting to demonstrate a head injury to
Appellant. Appellant thereafter claims the injury is likely to cause permanent injury or
disfigurement, but does not offer scientific, medical or expert testimony in support. We
find Appellant's self-serving affidavit is insufficient to demonstrate Appellant suffered
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 9
any prejudice by his counsel’s failure to investigate his head injury and therefore was
not denied the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law. Maluke v. Lake Twp.
5th Dist. 2012CA00001, 2012-Ohio-3661. Appellant's suggestion of prejudice as a
result of counsel's alleged errors is speculative at best.
{¶28} Further, Appellant claims his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a
motion to suppress. The failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Mobley 5th Dist. 2010CA0018, 2011-Ohio-
309; Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986), 477 U.S. 365, 384. Failure to file a motion to
suppress constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel only if, based on the record, the
motion would have been granted. State v. Butcher, Holmes App.No. 03 CA 4, 2004-
Ohio-5572, ¶ 26, citing State v. Robinson (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 428, 433, 670
N.E.2d 1077.
{¶29} We find Appellant has not demonstrated, based upon the record, the
motion would have been granted. The trial court was free to assess the credibility of the
affiants and determine if Appellant's self-serving affidavit demonstrated ineffective
assistance.
{¶30} In the case sub judice, Appellant was interviewed by the officers on two
occasions. The second interview was conducted a day after the first. Appellant made
incriminating statements and wrote letters of apology during both interviews. Further,
DNA evidence linked Appellant to the conduct at issue. Accordingly, Appellant has
failed to demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of Strickland, supra, and the
trial court did not err in denying his petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing.
{¶31} Appellant's first and second assignments of error are overruled.
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 10
{¶32} The October 11, 2011 Judgment Entry of the Licking County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Gwin, J. and
Wise, J. concur
s/ William B. Hoffman _________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ W. Scott Gwin _____________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
s/ John W. Wise _____________________
HON. JOHN W. WISE
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-114 11
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
RICHARD FINCH :
:
Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 11-CA-114
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the October 11, 2011
Judgment Entry of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to
Appellant.
s/ William B. Hoffman _________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ W. Scott Gwin _____________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
s/ John W. Wise _____________________
HON. JOHN W. WISE
State v. Finch
Combined Opinion