[Cite as Aronhalt v. Aronhalt, 2012-Ohio-1703.]
COURT OF APPEALS
COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JAMES W. ARONHALT : JUDGES:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
: Hon. John W. Wise, J.
-vs- :
:
ANDREA M. ARONHALT : Case No. 11-CA-13
:
Defendant-Appellee : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 07DV0744
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: April 6, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
VAN BLANCHARD, II JASON STORCK
402 Main Street 111 South Buckeye
Coshocton, OH 43812 Suite 210
P.O. Box 1023
Wooster, OH 44691
Coshocton County, Case No. 11-CA-13 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On April 16, 2005, appellant, James Aronhalt, and appellee, Andrea
Aronhalt, were married. One child was born as issue of the marriage on July 31, 2005.
On October 16, 2008, the parties filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage along
with a separation agreement and a shared parenting plan. Everything was approved on
October 29, 2008.
{¶2} On March 19, and April 13, 2010, appellee and appellant, respectively,
filed motions to alter and/or terminate the shared parenting plan due to the child
needing to attend kindergarten and the parties living more than fifty miles apart. On
July 13, 2010, appellee filed an amended motion to alter the shared parenting plan and
a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment regarding the removal of appellant's
name from an automobile loan. The parties also filed contempt motions against each
other.
{¶3} Hearings before a magistrate were held on July 7, August 19, and
November 24, 2010. By decision filed January 21, 2011, the magistrate recommended
the termination of the shared parenting plan with appellee named the residential parent
and legal custodian, the alteration of the child support order, the amendment by
appellant of his 2009 tax return, and the granting of relief to appellee regarding the prior
order to remove appellant's name from the automobile loan. A judgment entry
correcting the magistrate's decision relative to child support was filed on March 22,
2011.
Coshocton County, Case No. 11-CA-13 3
{¶4} Appellant filed objections. By judgment entry filed July 29, 2011, the trial
court overruled the objections and approved and adopted the magistrate's decision and
the March 22, 2011 judgment entry.
{¶5} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:
I
{¶6} "IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
TERMINATE THE SHARED PARENTING PLAN AND NAME THE APPELLEE THE
RESIDENTIAL PARENT OF THE MINOR CHILD OF THE PARTIES."
II
{¶7} "IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND
THE APPELLANT IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND FURTHER TO ORDER AS A
PURGE CONDITION THAT THE APPELLANT AMEND HIS 2009 INCOME TAX
RETURN WITHOUT ALSO ORDERING THE APPELLEE TO AMEND HER 2009
INCOME TAX RETURN."
III
{¶8} "IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO GRANT
THE APPELLEE RELIEF FROM THE PRIOR ORDER OF THE COURT PURSUANT
TO CIVIL RULE 60(B)."
I
{¶9} Appellant claims the trial court erred in terminating the shared parenting
plan and naming appellee as the residential parent and legal custodian of the child as
Coshocton County, Case No. 11-CA-13 4
the decision was predicated on the Guardian ad Litem's report which was flawed and
prejudicial. We disagree.
{¶10} A trial court's decision to terminate a shared parenting plan is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. In re J.L.R., Washington App. No. 08CA17,
2009-Ohio-5812. In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial
court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error
of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983) 5 Ohio St.3d 217. A judgment
supported by some competent, credible evidence will not be reversed by a reviewing
court as against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley
Construction Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279. A reviewing court must not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court where there exists some competent and credible
evidence supporting the judgment rendered by the trial court. Myers v. Garson, 66 Ohio
St.3d 610, 1993-Ohio-9.
{¶11} R.C. 3109.04 governs parental rights and responsibilities and shared
parenting. Subsections (E)(2)(c) and (d) and (F)(1) state the following in pertinent part:
{¶12} "(c) The court may terminate a prior final shared parenting decree that
includes a shared parenting plan approved under division (D)(1)(a)(i) of this section
upon the request of one or both of the parents or whenever it determines that shared
parenting is not in the best interest of the children.
{¶13} "(d) Upon the termination of a prior final shared parenting decree under
division (E)(2)(c) of this section, the court shall proceed and issue a modified decree for
the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the children under the
standards applicable under divisions (A), (B), and (C) of this section as if no decree for
Coshocton County, Case No. 11-CA-13 5
shared parenting had been granted and as if no request for shared parenting ever had
been made.
{¶14} "(F)(1) In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section,
whether on an original decree allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care
of children or a modification of a decree allocating those rights and responsibilities, the
court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
{¶15} "(a) The wishes of the child's parents regarding the child's care;
{¶16} "***
{¶17} "(c) The child's interaction and interrelationship with the child's parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
{¶18} "(d) The child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and community;
{¶19} "(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation;
{¶20} "(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting
time rights or visitation and companionship rights."
{¶21} The parties conceded the placement of the child into kindergarten created
the inevitable demise of the shared parenting plan. With the parties living some fifty-
plus miles apart in two non-contiguous counties, the 50/50 time split of shared parenting
was not practicable.
{¶22} The trial court was faced with the dilemma of choosing between two good
parents to place the child. Appellant argued for Coshocton schools and appellee for
Fairview Park schools. Both parents work and out of necessity, the child must attend
both pre and after school care.
Coshocton County, Case No. 11-CA-13 6
{¶23} The trial court's decision was based upon keeping the child with her half
sibling; the child's current daycare in Fairview Park is in the same facility as her
kindergarten (T. at 55); and appellee's residence and workplace are within ten to fifteen
minutes of the school. T. at 142, 144. The trial court also found appellant's workplace
was some seventy-four miles from his residence, requiring a caregiver to get the child
ready for school. T. at 106, 113. In balancing the distances, the trial court concluded
appellee would be able to respond to an emergency better than appellant. See,
Magistrate's Decision filed January 21, 2011.
{¶24} The trial court also considered the Guardian ad Litem's recommendation.
The Guardian ad Litem opined that it would be in the child's best interest to be placed
with appellee. T. at 56-57. It is this opinion that appellant argues was unduly prejudicial
to him and should not have been a basis for the trial court's decision. Appellant argues
the Guardian ad Litem did not adequately investigate the Coshocton schools or
appellant's arrangements for caregiving. However, the Guardian ad Litem testified
about Keene Elementary in Coshocton County as a highly ranked school. T. at 53-54.
The Guardian ad Litem testified that apart from the statutory factors to be considered,
the child was "very fragile" as a result of the emotional tug and pull between the
parents. T. at 46. This opinion is corroborated by a simple review of the trial court's
docket. It was the Guardian ad Litem's recommendation that the emotional support
needed would be best supplied by appellee. Id. Logistically, the better plan was the
one for pre and after school care advanced by appellee. T. at 47. The Guardian ad
Litem was in each home an equal amount of time. T. at 48.
Coshocton County, Case No. 11-CA-13 7
{¶25} Appellant argues the process was weighted against him. However,
appellant was able to cross-exam the Guardian ad Litem and emphasize the claimed
deficiencies in the report and to present witnesses. Appellant's sister, Tanya Slade, the
child's former teacher, Tisha King, and the child's neighbor, Sharon Horn, testified
favorably to appellant's parenting skills. Appellant testified if the child resided with him,
the child would spend less time in after school care as the Coshocton kindergarten was
all-day as opposed to half-day at Fairview Park. T. at 144, 298-299.
{¶26} Upon review, we find the evidence supports the trial court's decision, and
we find no undue prejudice to appellant from the Guardian ad Litem's report, testimony,
or cross-examination.
{¶27} Assignment of Error I is denied.
II
{¶28} Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding him in contempt of court for
using the child deduction for his 2009 income tax return per the parties' mutual
agreement. We disagree.
{¶29} It is undisputed that the parties agreed dissolution decree gave the 2009
child tax deduction to appellee:
{¶30} "Husband shall be entitled to claim the minor child for income tax
purposes on his federal, state and local income tax returns in the even numbered years
beginning with tax filing year 2008 and Wife shall be entitled to claim the minor child for
income tax purposes on her federal, state and local income tax returns in the odd
numbered years beginning with tax filing year 2009."
Coshocton County, Case No. 11-CA-13 8
{¶31} Appellant argues appellee relinquished the 2009 child tax deduction in
exchange for claiming mortgage interest expenses and real estate taxes paid by
appellant. T. at 115, 330-332.
{¶32} We note the weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the
witnesses are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182,
certiorari denied (1990), 498 U.S. 881. The trier of fact "has the best opportunity to view
the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something that does not
translate well on the written page." Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 1997-
Ohio-260.
{¶33} The testimony as to the relinquishment of the 2009 child tax deduction by
appellee was not definitive. T. at 154. The trial court chose appellee's testimony over
appellant's which was clearly within its province.
{¶34} We conclude the trial court did not err in enforcing the parties' agreement
and making appellant amend his tax return for 2009 in compliance with the agreed
dissolution decree.
{¶35} Assignment of Error II is denied.
III
{¶36} Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting appellee relief from
judgment as it was error to negate appellee's responsibility to remove his name from the
automobile loan. We disagree.
{¶37} A motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) lies in the trial court's
sound discretion. Griffey v. Rajan (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 75; Blakemore, supra. In GTE
Coshocton County, Case No. 11-CA-13 9
Automatic Electric Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, paragraph two
of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held the following:
{¶38} "To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must
demonstrate that: (1) the party has meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is
granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R.
60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where
the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the
judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken."
{¶39} The parties' agreed dissolution decree contained the following provision:
{¶40} "Wife shall have all right, title and interest in the 2004 Chevrolet Impala
automobile free and clear of any claim of Husband. Husband and Wife agree to transfer
the title to said vehicle to Wife upon the issuance of a decree of dissolution or divorce,
and Wife agrees to satisfy and pay timely as due and hold Husband harmless on any
obligations due and remove him from liability within six (6) months of the filing of a
decree of dissolution or divorce in this matter."
{¶41} Appellee testified she has attempted to remove appellant's name from the
loan, but has been unable to do so because of credit problems that may or may not
have been a result of appellant's late mortgage payments. T. at 157-158.
{¶42} We find the parameters set by the case law relative to a Civ.R. 60(B)
motion has not been met. However, the record establishes appellee was not in willful
contempt of the trial court's order. See, Appellee's Affidavit filed July 14, 2010. The
language of the parties' agreement is broad enough to cover the failure to have
appellant's name removed from the loan as it includes a hold harmless provision.
Coshocton County, Case No. 11-CA-13 10
Further, the magistrate's/trial court's decision was not to grant total relief from the
agreement, but to establish a time frame of three months for the removal of appellant's
name from the indebtedness.
{¶43} Assignment of Error III is denied.
{¶44} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Coshocton County, Ohio
is hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Wise, J. concur.
_s/ Sheila G. Farmer_______________
_s/ William B. Hoffman_____________
_s/ John W. Wise__________________
JUDGES
SGF/sg 313
[Cite as Aronhalt v. Aronhalt, 2012-Ohio-1703.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JAMES W. ARONHALT :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
ANDREA M. ARONHALT :
:
Defendant-Appellee : CASE NO. 11-CA-13
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Coshocton County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs
to appellant.
s/ Sheila G. Farmer_______________
_s/ William B. Hoffman_____________
_s/ John W. Wise__________________
JUDGES