[Cite as Hill v. Steel Ceilings, Inc., 2011-Ohio-6040.]
COURT OF APPEALS
LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DANIEL HILL : JUDGES:
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
:
STEEL CEILINGS, INC. : Case No. 11-CA-38
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 09CV2064
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 18, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
MARK E. DEFOSSEZ MARIBETH DEAVERS
CURTIS M. FIFNER 250 East Broad Street
495 South High Street Suite 900
Suite 300 Columbus, OH 43215
Columbus, OH 43215
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-38 2
Farmer, J.
{¶1} On December 2, 2009, appellee, Daniel Hill, filed a complaint against
appellant, Steel Ceilings, Inc., claiming an intentional tort for a workplace accident.
Appellee's fingers were crushed while operating a panel bending machine at work.
{¶2} On February 4, 2011, appellant filed a motion to bifurcate the trial
pursuant to Civ.R. 42(B) and R.C. 2315.21(B). Appellant sought to bifurcate the liability
and damages portions of the trial and the compensatory and punitive damages portions
of the trial. A hearing was held on March 16, 2011. By judgment entry filed March 22,
2011, the trial court denied the motion.
{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignments of error is as follows:
I
{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
MOTION OF DEFENDANT STEEL CEILINGS, INC. TO BIFURCATE THE TRIAL
UNDER CIV. R. 42(B)."
II
{¶5} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF
DEFENDANT STEEL CEILINGS, INC. UNDER R.C. §2315.21(B)."
I
{¶6} Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying its request to bifurcate the
liability portion of the intentional tort claim from the damages portion pursuant to Civ.R.
42(B). We disagree.
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-38 3
{¶7} Appellee suggests that a denial of a Civ.R. 42(B) motion is not a final
appealable order because it does not affect a substantive right. In Myers v. Brown, 192
Ohio App.3d 670, 2011-Ohio-892, ¶9-10, this court found the following:
{¶8} "Both the Hanners [v. Ho Wah Genting Wire & Cable SDN BHD, Franklin
App. No. 09AP-361, 2009-Ohio-6481] court and the Havel [v. Villa St. Joseph,
Cuyahoga App. No. 94677, 2010-Ohio-5251] court found a trial court's order denying a
motion to bifurcate implicitly determines that the mandatory bifurcation language in R.C.
2315.21(B) is unconstitutional. Hanners, supra, at paragraph 13; Havel, supra, at
paragraph 19.
{¶9} "We find that the order appealed from implies the bifurcation language in
the statute is unconstitutional, although it does not state so expressly. We conclude we
have jurisdiction to review the matter."
{¶10} Without suggesting error in this decision, in the interest of judicial
economy, we will address the trial court's denial.
{¶11} A trial court's decision to grant or deny bifurcation of trial under Civ.R.
42(B) rests with the trial court's sound discretion. Garg v. State Automobile Mutual
Insurance Co., 155 Ohio App.3d 258, 2003-Ohio-5960. In order to find an abuse of
discretion, we must determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore
(1983) 5 Ohio St.3d 217.
{¶12} In its judgment entry filed March 22, 2011, the trial court reviewed the
arguments of both parties and specifically found bifurcation under Civ.R. 42(B) was not
necessary:
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-38 4
{¶13} "In the Court's view, counsel will be able to present clear argument so as
to alleviate any possible confusion or prejudice. The jury will also receive the benefit of
proper and adequate instruction from the Court that will aid them in properly determining
the issues of liability and any potential damages. For these reasons, the first aspect of
Defendant's motion to bifurcate under Rule 42 is denied."
{¶14} After reviewing the arguments herein, we cannot find the trial court's
decision rose to any level of an abuse of discretion.
{¶15} Assignment of Error I is denied.
II
{¶16} Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying its request for bifurcation
pursuant to R.C. 2315.21(B). Appellant invites this court to reverse our previous rulings
in light of Hanners, supra. We are not so inclined and disagree with appellant's position.
{¶17} In Myers, supra, at ¶14-17, this court stated the following relative to
Hanners and R.C. 2315.21(B):
{¶18} "The Hanners court found that R.C. 2315.21(B) is a substantive law
because even though it mandates particular procedures for tort actions, the legislative
intent was to create and define a defendant's right to ensure that the jury does not
inappropriately consider the defendant's misconduct when determining questions of
liability or compensatory damages. Hanners, supra, at paragraph 28.
{¶19} "By contrast, the Havel court found that the statute is procedural, because
it 'plainly and unambiguously regulates the procedure at trial for determining
compensatory and punitive damages in a tort action.' Havel at paragraph 29. We
agree.
Licking County, Case No. 11-CA-38 5
{¶20} "We find that R.C. 2315.21(B) is not substantive, because it does not
create or define rights and duties giving rise to a cause of action. The statute gives
defendants no additional rights, but sets out the procedural rules whereby courts can
better protect the rights to a jury and to due process that the parties have always
possessed.
{¶21} "We find that R.C. 2315.21(B) clearly conflicts with the Supreme Court's
Rules, and the Rule controls. We also conclude that insofar as R.C. 2315.21(B)
mandates bifurcation, it is unconstitutional, because it violates Section 5(B), Article IV of
the Ohio Constitution."
{¶22} This court recently reaffirmed this decision in Plaugher v. Oniala, Stark
App. No. 2010 CA 00204, 2011-Ohio-1207.
{¶23} Assignment of Error II is denied.
{¶24} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
s/ Sheila G. Farmer_____________
s/ William B. Hoffman___________
s/ Patricia A. Delaney_______________
SGF/sg 1028 JUDGES
[Cite as Hill v. Steel Ceilings, Inc., 2011-Ohio-6040.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DANIEL HILL :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
STEEL CEILINGS, INC. :
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 11-CA-0038
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to
appellant.
s/ Sheila G. Farmer_____________
s/ William B. Hoffman___________
s/ Patricia A. Delaney_______________
JUDGES