[Cite as State v. Tabor, 2011-Ohio-3200.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
: Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs- :
:
BRIAN TABOR : Case No. 11CA33
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas,
Case No. 2007CR100D
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 24, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
DANIEL J. BENOIT BRIAN TABOR, PRO SE
38 South Park Street Inmate No. A574-130
Mansfield, OH 44902 N.C.C.T.F.
2000 South Avon-Belden Road
Grafton, OH 44044
Richland County, Case No. 11CA33 2
Farmer, P.J.
{¶1} On August 28, 2007, appellant, Brian Tabor, was sentenced to five years
of community control in the case sub judice. On May 13, 2008, appellant was ordered
to complete a treatment program at the Licking–Muskingum Community Correction
Center (hereinafter "LMCCC"). Thereafter, appellant was released from treatment and
placed on electronic monitoring. Due to repeated probation violations, appellant was
ordered to serve twelve months in prison. See, Journal Entry filed December 8, 2009.
{¶2} On March 4, 2011, appellant filed a motion for jail time credit for the period
of time he spent in the LMCCC and on electronic monitoring. By order filed March 11,
2011, the trial court credited appellant with 88 days for his time spent in the LMCCC,
and denied credit for the electronic monitoring as that was not "confinement" within the
meaning of the jail time credit statute.
{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for
consideration. Assignment of error is as follows:
I
{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN FAILING TO
GIVE THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT JAIL TIME CREDIT AGAINST THE IMPOSED
PRISON SENTENCE FOR TIME CONFINED ON ELECTRONIC MONITORED HOUSE
ARREST, WHILE ON COMMUNITY CONTROL. THIS DENIED HIS DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE STATE OF OHIO, AND CONTRARY TO OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION
2967.191 AND OHIO REVISED CODE, SECTION 2949.08(D)."
Richland County, Case No. 11CA33 3
{¶5} This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R.
11.1 which states the following in pertinent part:
{¶6} "(E) Determination and judgment on appeal
{¶7} "The appeal will be determined as provided by App.R. 11.1. It shall be
sufficient compliance with App.R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason for the court's
decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary form.
{¶8} "The decision may be by judgment entry in which case it will not be
published in any form.***"
{¶9} This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned
rule.
I
{¶10} Appellant claims the trial court erred in failing to give him jail time credit for
the electronic monitoring he served while on community control. We disagree.
{¶11} By order filed March 11, 2011, the trial court found "[e]lectronic monitoring
is not 'confinement' within the meaning of the jail credit statute, and that portion of
defendant's motion is overruled."
{¶12} A copy of the electronic monitoring requirements is not included in the file.
All we have before us is an affidavit by appellant filed on March 4, 2011 wherein he
averred the following:
{¶13} "I am the Defendant in the above captioned case. The Defendant was
required to participate in Electronic Monitoring during Re-Entry Program as part of his
sentence in Case No. #07-CR-0100, and would have been subject to an escape charge
under O.R.C. Section 2929.34 if he had left without permission, failed to return to home,
Richland County, Case No. 11CA33 4
or removed, altered or in any way tampered with electronic monitor. The Defendant
was not permitted to leave home between 10 PM till 6 AM. until after the Defendant
finished his programming. Likewise, the Defendant could not have visits during this
period. Defendant was never allowed to leave Richland County, without permission.
He was required to attend twelve step recovery meetings, and he was required to have
his attendance verified. During Re-Entry programming the Defendant remained under
significant restrictions."
{¶14} Pursuant to R.C. 2949.08(C)(1):
{¶15} "If the person is sentenced to a jail for a felony or a misdemeanor, the
jailer in charge of a jail shall reduce the sentence of a person delivered into the jailer's
custody pursuant to division (A) of this section by the total number of days the person
was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the person was
convicted and sentenced***."
{¶16} The issue in this case is whether appellant's electronic monitoring
constitutes "confinement." Because the word "confinement" is not defined in the
criminal code, courts use the word "detention" as a substitute which is defined in R.C.
2921.01(E) as follows:
{¶17} " 'Detention' means arrest; confinement in any vehicle subsequent to an
arrest; confinement in any public or private facility for custody of persons charged with
or convicted of crime in this state or another state or under the laws of the United States
or alleged or found to be a delinquent child or unruly child in this state or another state
or under the laws of the United States; hospitalization, institutionalization, or
confinement in any public or private facility that is ordered pursuant to or under the
Richland County, Case No. 11CA33 5
authority of section 2945.37, 2945.371, 2945.38, 2945.39, 2945.40, 2945.401, or
2945.402 of the Revised Code; confinement in any vehicle for transportation to or from
any facility of any of those natures; detention for extradition or deportation; except as
provided in this division, supervision by any employee of any facility of any of those
natures that is incidental to hospitalization, institutionalization, or confinement in the
facility but that occurs outside the facility; supervision by an employee of the department
of rehabilitation and correction of a person on any type of release from a state
correctional institution; or confinement in any vehicle, airplane, or place while being
returned from outside of this state into this state by a private person or entity pursuant to
a contract entered into under division (E) of section 311.29 of the Revised Code or
division (B) of section 5149.03 of the Revised Code. For a person confined in a county
jail who participates in a county jail industry program pursuant to section 5147.30 of the
Revised Code, 'detention' includes time spent at an assigned work site and going to and
from the work site."
{¶18} In this case, appellant was only required to be at home between the hours
of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. which was merely a curfew requirement. Appellant was
free to move around within the county and could leave the county with permission as
long as he abided by the terms of his community control.
{¶19} In State v. Blankenship, Franklin App. No. 10AP-651, 2011-Ohio-1601,
¶19, our brethren from the Tenth District held, "[i]n light of the case law and statutory
analysis set forth above, we hold that a person convicted of a misdemeanor offense is
not entitled to time-served credit under R.C. 2949.08(C) for time spent under EMHA as
Richland County, Case No. 11CA33 6
a condition of postconviction probation." Although Blankenship involved a misdemeanor
case, we agree with the well-reasoned analysis therein.
{¶20} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in denying appellant jail time
credit for his time spent on electronic monitoring.
{¶21} The sole assignment of error is denied.
{¶22} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is
hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, P.J.
Edwards, J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
_s/Sheila G. Farmer__________________
_s/ Julie A. Edwards__________________
_s/ Patricia A. Delaney________________
JUDGES
SGF/sg 614
Richland County, Case No. 11CA33 7
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
BRIAN TABOR :
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 11CA33
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to
appellant.
_s/Sheila G. Farmer__________________
_s/ Julie A. Edwards__________________
_s/ Patricia A. Delaney________________
JUDGES
State v. Tabor
Combined Opinion