[Cite as Jones v. Catholic Healthcare Partners, Inc., 2012-Ohio-6269.]
STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
CHRISTINE M. JONES ) CASE NO. 11 MA 23
)
APPELLEE )
)
VS. ) OPINION
)
CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE )
PARTNERS, INC., et al. )
)
APPELLANT )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 07CV4679
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
APPEARANCES:
For Appellee: Atty. Patrick E. Parry
434 High Street
P.O. Box 792
Warren, Ohio 44482
For Appellant: Atty. Thomas R. Wyatt
Atty. Jerry P. Cline
Andrews & Wyatt, LLC
561 Boston Bills Road, Suite 700
Hudson, Ohio 44236
JUDGES:
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Gene Donofrio
Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
Dated: December 31, 2012
[Cite as Jones v. Catholic Healthcare Partners, Inc., 2012-Ohio-6269.]
WAITE, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Catholic Healthcare Partners, Inc., appeals the trial court’s
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Christine M. Jones. The
trial court’s judgment upheld a bureau of workers’ compensation decision to allow
benefits for physical injuries and posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) resulting
from a hostage incident. Appellant does not dispute Appellee’s right to recovery for
the physical injury. However, Appellant argues that the award for PTSD was
inappropriate. Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence that
Appellee’s PTSD was a covered condition under applicable law, and that the trial
court should not have granted summary judgment affirming the bureau award and
compensation. Appellant’s argument is without merit and is overruled.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Appellee’s initial application for workers’ compensation was based on
the events of April 4, 2007. On that date, Appellee was employed at St. Elizabeth
Medical Center in Youngstown, Ohio and working as a unit clerk and monitor
technician. She and five others were taken hostage by an inmate who had been
transported to the hospital for treatment. The group was held for approximately
twenty-five minutes by the inmate, who then escaped. Appellee described portions of
the incident to her evaluating physician as follows:
He took a gun from a guard * * * the inmate “grabbed my left wrist. I
yanked away from him. Then he grabbed my right wrist, and pulled it
and banged it against a doorway and pressed it there—holding me.
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That’s when he brought the gun up and said, ‘I’ll f*****g kill both of you.’
* * * ‘I kept telling him to calm down. He kept saying over and over that
he would kill us—at least 15 times. He said he wouldn’t kill us if we did
what he said until his brother got there. I told Francine (other hostage)
that I wouldn’t let him hurt her.’ ”
(3/28/08 Heltzel Depo., Exh. A, p. 2.) The examining physician noted that she
described interacting extensively with the hostage-taker, including having been
forced to assist him when he changed into the guard’s uniform, and that she was
later able to alert hospital security. (3/28/08 Heltzel Depo., Exh. A, p. 2.) Although
the hostage-taker escaped, he was subsequently apprehended in another state.
Appellee’s wrist injury had not been fully diagnosed when she originally met with Dr.
Heltzel, and the physician referred to the injury in his initial report but stated that at
that time an assessment of the psychological aspect of her physical injury would be
deferred. (3/28/08 Heltzel Depo., Exh. A, p. 3.) Dr. Heltzel later explained during two
depositions that the assault and resulting physical injury to Appellee’s wrist as well as
the continuing close physical proximity of the hostage-taker were contributing and
perhaps aggravating factors in her resulting PTSD.
{¶3} Appellee filed a workers’ compensation claim for the wrist injury and for
PTSD resulting from the same incident. Initially, Appellee’s compensation claim for
PTSD was denied by the bureau of workers’ compensation. Compensation was
allowed for the physical injury to her wrist. Although the parties did not include the
bureau file in the record on appeal, they appear to agree as to the proceedings below
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and the actions taken by various levels within the bureau. According to Appellant’s
notice of appeal, filed December 14, 2007, and Appellee’s “Complaint (Petition for
Workers’ Compensation benefits)” filed December 31, 2007, Appellee appealed the
initial denial of benefits for her PTSD. According to the same documents, Appellee’s
administrative appeal of the denial of compensation was heard by a hearing officer
on September 17, 2007 and the denial of coverage was reversed. After the
September 2007, hearing, Appellee was awarded compensation for her PTSD by the
bureau.
{¶4} Appellant challenged the compensation award by filing an
administrative appeal of the hearing officer’s decision with the Industrial Commission
of Ohio. The commission refused to hear Appellant’s appeal. Apparently after
exhausting the administrative remedies, Appellant appealed both the decision
allowing compensation for Appellee’s PTSD and the denial of an administrative
appeal of the award to the common pleas court. Although Appellant identified both
the award of compensation for PTSD and the denial of review by the commission as
the grounds for review in the trial court, subsequent trial proceedings dealt only with
whether PTSD was a covered condition. In the proceedings before the trial court
there was no dispute between the parties concerning the factual events that caused
the wrist fracture and PTSD.
{¶5} When asked by counsel for Appellant whether the hostage incident
alone, rather than in combination with the assault and physical injury to Appellee’s
wrist, was the cause of her PTSD during the March 28, 2008 deposition, Dr. Heltzel
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explained “--he grabbed her. She was hurt. I think that does become an additional
factor.” (3/28/08 Heltzel Depo., p. 16.) The doctor concluded:
Again, I have to be very careful, because the fact that he grabbed her, I
mean, that does contribute to trauma, if you can imagine.
It’s not like he was well across the room threatening her. He was in
close contact with her and he physically grabbed her. I think that that
aspect of it, you know, is a part of it for her and I just don’t believe that
the wrist injury per se can explain the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
(3/28/08 Heltzel Depo., p. 23.) According to the doctor’s testimony during the
deposition, the anxiety and constant state of hyper-vigilance Appellee was
experiencing due to her disorder was interfering with her interpersonal
communication, her ability to concentrate and sustain focus, and the resulting level of
suffering and distress prevented her from working. (3/28/08 Heltzel Depo., p. 23.)
{¶6} Dr. Heltzel was deposed for a second time by Appellant on August 9,
2010. During that deposition, unlike the March 28, 2008 deposition, the doctor was
questioned by both counsel for Appellee and for Appellant. During the second
deposition, the doctor further explained the steps he took in diagnosing Appellee’s
PTSD, and responded to additional questions concerning the definition of PTSD and
the role of physical injury in the development of the disorder. Dr. Heltzel summarized
the definition of the disorder as follows:
I’ll need to scan my -- the definition because it’s quite lengthy. The
essential aspect of post-traumatic stress disorder is an experience of an
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event that involves actual or threatened death or serious injury or other
threat to one’s physical integrity; so that the concept of the physical
injury is incorporated into that initial definition.
Further on the definition states that the disorder may be especially
severe and long-lasting when the stresser [sic] is of human design,
such as torture or rape. The likelihood of developing this disorder may
increase as the intensity of the physical proximity to the stresser [sic]
increase.
(8/9/10 Heltzel Depo., p. 15.) Dr. Heltzel expressed his opinion that the proximity of
the stressor to the victim was a significant factor in the trauma, and explained that the
primary causes of the disorder are the perception of danger to one’s well-being
coupled wit the possibility of death. The doctor emphasized that there is not a single
trigger and what is referred to as the “traumatic event” is not a single moment, but
may “encompass many different facets.” (8/9/10 Heltzel Depo., pp. 16-17.) He
explained that “the direct threat with a weapon and the verbal threat by the inmate,
as well as the physical assault on Ms. Jones, which conveys a dominance over a
person, increase the sense of helplessness” and that these aspects contributed to
Appellee’s disorder. (8/9/10 Heltzel Depo., p. 17.) Dr. Heltzel concluded by saying
that the physical attack and fracture of Appellee’s wrist, which occurred during the
hostage incident, were “a definite contributing factor as one important feature of an
overall traumatic event” resulting in a clinical diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder. (8/9/10 Heltzel Depo., p. 20.)
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{¶7} The depositions of Dr. Heltzel, and his report, diagnosis and
conclusions concerning Appellee’s condition are the only medical evidence in the
record. No alternate expert or contradictory evidence has been offered by Appellant.
After the initial deposition, but before the second, Appellant sought summary
judgment. Appellant argued that the testimony of Dr. Heltzel failed to establish that
the allowable injury to Appellee’s wrist was the sole proximate cause of her PTSD.
Appellant argued that absent direct causation, PTSD is not a covered injury.
Appellant’s motion was initially denied, although the decision was vacated by the
court to allow Appellant to file objections to the magistrate’s decision. After
considering Appellant’s objections, on March 5, 2009 the trial court issued a final
decision denying the motion. The initial magistrate’s decision and subsequent trial
court decision adopting it noted that “[w]hen multiple factors contribute to produce
injury or illness, each is proximate cause.” (12/31/08 J.E.) The trial court concluded
that Appellant had failed to demonstrate that Appellee’s “physical injury sustained in
the assault was not the proximate cause of her psychiatric condition.” (3/5/09 J.E.)
{¶8} The matter was unsuccessfully referred to mediation. Various
subsequent filings continued through 2009 and into 2010, when Dr. Heltzel was
deposed for a second time and trial was scheduled. Although three notices of
deposition indicate Appellant’s intent to depose Appellee and one indicates an intent
by Appellant to depose her husband, no transcript of deposition of Appellee or her
husband appears in the record. On August 6, 2010, Appellee sought leave to file a
motion for summary judgment. Leave was granted and the motion was ultimately
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filed instanter on November 29, 2010. What appears to be a complete transcript of
the August 9, 2010 deposition of Dr. Heltzel is attached to Appellee’s motion for
summary judgment as Exhibit B. Appellee cites to and incorporates by reference the
transcript of the deposition in the motion for summary judgment, however, no
separate complete copy was filed, and no notice of filing of deposition is entered in
the record with regard to the August 9, 2010 deposition. Appellant did not object to
the form or use of the deposition transcript in support of Appellee’s summary
judgment motion, and in fact, also cites to portions of this deposition in a January 5,
2011 motion in opposition to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
{¶9} The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on
January 14, 2011. The trial court referred to Dr. Heltzel’s testimony in the August 9,
2010 deposition and noted that “Dr. Heltzel consistently testified during both
depositions that the physical injury was a cause of Ms. Jones’[sic] PTSD, albeit not
the sole cause.” (1/14/11 J.E., p. 1.) The trial court concluded that under the
applicable law, because it was undisputed that Appellee suffered both a covered
physical injury and PTSD resulting from events that occurred during the course of her
employment, Appellee’s PTSD “arose from and was accompanied by the allowed
injury.” (1/14/11 J.E., p. 3.) The court ordered that Appellee was to participate in the
workers’ compensation fund “by reason of the injury and condition post traumatic
stress disorder.” (1/14/11 J.E., p. 3.) Appellant filed a timely appeal from this
judgment.
Argument and Law
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that there is no
genuine issue of material fact to be litigated and Plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
{¶10} Although Appellant mentions both the trial court’s decision to grant
summary judgment in favor of Appellee and the commission’s decision not to hear an
appeal of the bureau hearing officer’s decision, the appellate brief focuses solely on
the decision to grant summary judgment. No record of proceedings in the bureau or
before the commission was included in the record on appeal. For these reasons, the
only issue before us is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of Appellee. Appellant posits that Appellee should be required to show that a
compensable physical injury was the sole cause of her PTSD before she can receive
compensation for her condition. The trial court, however, applied the same proximate
cause standard generally applied in tort and adopted by the Supreme Court for use in
workers’ compensation cases in Murphy v. Carrollton Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 575
N.E.2d 828 (1991).
{¶11} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of
evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Civ.R. 56(C). The party seeking summary judgment
“bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material
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fact concerning an essential element of the opponent’s case.” (Emphasis sic.)
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). “[S]ummary
judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation * *
* that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that
party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the
party’s favor.” Civ.R. 56(C). “When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response * * * must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Civ.R. 56(E). A
reviewing court has a “complete and independent power of review as to all questions
of law.” Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).
A trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment is a question of law and we review
this discretion de novo. Id.
{¶12} On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s decision characterizing
Dr. Heltzel’s testimony as consistent. Appellant rejects the court’s acceptance of the
doctor’s statement that the injury to Appellee’s wrist was “a cause,” “albeit not the
sole cause” was sufficient to support the conclusion that Appellee is entitled to
compensation for PTSD under R.C. 4123.01 as a matter of law. Appellant urges us
to adopt an interpretation of R.C. 4123.01 that would limit recovery for psychiatric
conditions arising out of employment, where occupational disease is not a factor, to
situations where a claimant can identify a physical injury as the sole cause of the
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psychiatric disorder. Adoption of the interpretation advocated by Appellant would
result in denial of Appellee’s compensation for PTSD awarded by the bureau’s
hearing officer. Appellant’s interpretation of this section would similarly bar any
claimant seeking compensation for PTSD after a hostage-taking or other traumatic
incident, regardless of whether a compensable physical harm was concurrently
suffered by the claimant.
{¶13} When considering “the issue of proximate cause in the workers’
compensation context, * * * the definition of and principles governing * * * the
determination of ‘proximate cause’ in the field of torts are applicable.” Murphy v.
Carrollton Mfg. Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 587, 575 N.E.2d 828 (1991) citing Oswald v.
Connor, 16 Ohio St.3d 38, 42 476 N.E.2d 658 (1985). “It is a well-established
principle of tort law that an injury may have more than one proximate cause.” Murphy
at 587. In “Ohio, when two factors combine to produce damage or illness, each is a
proximate cause.” Id. at 588 quoting Norris v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 48 Ohio
App.3d 66, 67, 548 N.E.2d 304, 305 (1988).
{¶14} The language of R.C. 4123.01 in effect at the time of Appellee’s original
claim provides:
(C) “Injury” includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental
means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of,
and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment. “Injury” does
not include:
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(1) Psychiatric conditions except where the claimant’s psychiatric
conditions have arisen from an injury or occupational disease sustained
by that claimant or where the claimant’s psychiatric conditions have
arisen from sexual conduct in which the claimant was forced by threat
of physical harm to engage or participate;
When applying the definitions of R.C. 4123.01 to a specific claim, the legislature has
also charged that the provisions “shall be liberally construed in favor of employees
and the dependents of deceased employees.” R.C. 4123.95.
{¶15} The definition of injury pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C) was last altered in
1986 when the limiting language concerning psychiatric conditions was introduced.
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 718. Prior to the 1986 amendment,
injury was defined broadly: “ ‘Injury’ includes any injury, whether caused by external
accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and
arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” (Emphasis sic.) Am.Sub.H.B.
No. 470, 128 Ohio Laws 743, 745, effective November 2, 1959 as quoted in McCrone
v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 275, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, ¶12.
The exception to the definition of injury found in R.C. 4123.01(C)(1), which denies
recovery for psychiatric conditions except in limited circumstances, was altered twice
in 2006. (Alterations effective June 30, 2006). The first 2006 amendment to R.C.
4123.01(C)(1) limits compensation for psychiatric conditions arising from an injury to
those instances in which both the injury and psychiatric condition are suffered by the
same person. This amendment was intended to correct the outcome reached in
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Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 5th Dist. No. 1999CA00084, 1999 WL
1072194 (November 1, 1999), affirmed by Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc.,
91 Ohio St.3d 38, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001), in which compensation was allowed in an
employee’s claim for “severe depression” resulting from witnessing the death of
another employee in an industrial accident that the claimant unintentionally caused.
(Id. at *1.)
{¶16} The second 2006 amendment to R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) expanded covered
conditions to include those resulting from coerced sexual conduct. This amendment
addresses the outcome in Connors v. Sterling Milk Co., 98 Ohio App.3d 711, 649
N.E.2d 856 (3rd Dist.1993) in which the claimant was denied compensation for PTSD
and depression resulting from an assault by a masked assailant who forced the
claimant at gunpoint to leave her place of work, enter an alley, and then told her to
perform a sex act or die, because the claimant did not sustain a physical injury during
the incident. At the time Connors was decided, a similarly situated employee
subjected to sexual misconduct and sexual battery in the workplace was relegated to
civil tort actions as a remedy. See e.g. Kearns v. Porter Paint Co., 61 Ohio St.3d
486, 575 N.E.2d 428 (1991), inter alia.
{¶17} In contrast to the 2006 amendments requiring that the injury and
psychiatric condition both be suffered by the same claimant and allowing coverage of
psychiatric conditions resulting from sexual assault suffered in the workplace, the
legislature has declined to modify the statute to specifically include or exclude the
Ohio Supreme Court’s 1984 expansive interpretation of R.C. 4123.01 “injury” to
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include conditions that develop gradually over time as a result of the performance of
an injured worker’s job-related duties. Village v. General Motors Corp., G.M.A.D., 15
Ohio St.3d 129, 472 N.E.2d 1079 (1984) (prior to the Village decision the Court read
the definition narrowly to cover only spontaneous, accidental, injuries; occupational
diseases are defined separately under the statutory scheme.).
{¶18} The history of revision, expansion, and inaction surrounding R.C.
4123.01 over the last thirty years reflects an evolving area of law and highlights the
need to adhere to “clear legislative intent” as expressed in the language of the statute
itself. Rambaldo v. Accurate Die Casting, 65 Ohio St.3d 281, 285, 603 N.E.2d 975
(1992) (citing the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lockwood v. Independent School Dist.
No. 877 (Minn.1981), 312 N.W.2d 924, 927). When considering the meaning and
application of R.C. 4123.01 we must consider the context of the amendments,
“because ‘a legislative body in enacting amendments is presumed to have in mind
prior judicial constructions of the section.’ ” Rambaldo at 286, citing State ex rel.
Huron Cty. Bd. of Edn. v. Howard, 167 Ohio St. 93, 96, 146 N.E.2d 604 (1957). “We
also presume that the General Assembly had in mind prior administrative
constructions of the statutory sections.” Id.
{¶19} Two Ohio Supreme Court cases on this subject are instructive: State
ex rel. Clark v. Industrial Commission, 92 Ohio St.3d 455, 751 N.E.2d 967 (2001);
and McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d
1. In Clark, the earlier of the two cases, the Supreme Court decided whether hostage
leave pay, which was paid pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining
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agreement, must be setoff against temporary total disability benefits awarded for the
injuries and PTSD resulting from a hostage-taking incident. The claimant in Clark
was a corrections officer working in the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility and was
taken hostage during an inmate riot.
{¶20} Clark was held by the inmates from April 11, 1993 until April 15, 1993,
and suffered multiple physical injuries including abrasions on his wrists, a laceration
on his forearm, an abrasion on his face, dehydration, and malnutrition. According to
the Supreme Court, “Clark suffered severe stress and anxiety as a direct result of
being held hostage as well as having been beaten.” Clark, p. 456. Thirteen days
after his release, Clark filed a claim with the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
for his injuries. Initially the bureau allowed a claim for “dehydration; malnourishment;
abrasions bilateral wrists and face; laceration right upper arm; [and] atrial fibrillation.”
Id. The bureau later allowed compensation for his claim of “post-traumatic stress
disorder” and his temporary total disability payments began on July 11, 1993. Id.
{¶21} After his release by the inmates but apparently prior to filing his
workers’ compensation claim, Clark also applied for and was granted hostage leave
pay by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement between the department and the Ohio Civil Services
Employees Association. According to the Court, Clark received hostage leave
payable at his regular rate beginning on April 18, 1993 and continuing until July 10,
1993. Subsequently, Clark filed a workers’ compensation claim for temporary total
disability benefits covering the period from April 12, 1993 through July 10, 1993,
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which overlapped the dates on which he received hostage leave pay. The
application for overlapping payment was denied by the bureau. The bureau decided
that any hostage leave paid during that period was required to be deducted from the
compensation award to avoid an overlap of benefits. Various levels of administrative
appeal affirmed the denial but a subsequent mandamus action in the court of appeals
resulted in an order granting compensation with no setoff for hostage pay.
{¶22} The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the appellate court decision and
examined the purposes of both workers’ compensation and the setoff provision
contained in R.C. 4123.56(A), which allows any “nonoccupational” benefit primarily
paid for by the employer to reduce the amount of compensation paid over the same
period. The Court concluded that the hostage leave payments were not a
nonoccupational benefit, and therefore, setoff was not required. The Court explained
that the hostage pay was intended to address a risk that corrections officers face
every day as a result of a job that requires “daily intimate contact with convicted
criminals, some of whom have violent propensities,” explaining that the “emotional
and physical pressures of extended incarceration can erupt into violence, rioting, and
prison takeovers, as in this case, which often involve hostage-taking of prison
employees.” Id. at 458. “Thus, this benefit is designed to address a risk that is
occupational, i.e., one that is clearly connected to the nature of the work.” Id. at 458-
459.
{¶23} The Court emphasized that “[i]n order to qualify for hostage leave, Clark
was not required to have suffered any physical injury; he was required to show only
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that he suffered from stress associated with being held hostage.” Id. at 459. This,
according to the Court, meant that the contractual benefit would protect employees
who, “without a corresponding physical injury,” would not receive compensation
under the workers’ compensation system. Id. (paraphrasing Bunger v. Lawson Co.,
82 Ohio St.3d 463, 464, 696 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (1998) “A psychological injury
without a corresponding physical injury is not compensable under the workers’
compensation system.”). The Court compared the hostage pay benefit to the civil
action remedy for claims concerning sexual assault that were not then covered under
the compensation statute, and were therefore not precluded by the section of the
statute limiting recovery to the benefits allowed by statute, identified in Kearns v.
Porter Paint Co., 61 Ohio St.3d, 575 N.E.2d 428 (1991). While Clark primarily dealt
with the idea of benefit setoffs, not at issue in the matter before us, a few principles
important to our understanding of our issue underlie the Clark court’s decision: (1)
workers’ compensation is designed to compensate employees for harms that occur
due to employment that would otherwise prevent the employee from earning wages;
(2) workers’ compensation excludes psychiatric injuries that have no
“contemporaneous” or “corresponding” compensable physical injury, but would allow
compensation for psychiatric conditions that do correspond to a physical injury.
{¶24} Officer Clark suffered a variety of physical injuries, both when he was
taken hostage (lacerations, abrasions) and due to being held (dehydration,
malnutrition, wrist abrasions). The Court’s description of Clark’s covered injuries
reflects multiple stressors that contributed to the covered psychiatric condition: “[i]n
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addition to his physical injuries, Clark suffered severe stress and anxiety as a direct
result of being held hostage as well as having been beaten.” Clark at 456. Officer
Clark’s ability to recover for PTSD when he had suffered a corresponding physical
injury was a not ever at issue. There is no discussion of the nature of the injuries or
the specific connection between the injuries and the psychiatric condition and there
was no separate appeal of those issues in Clark. The fact that Clark’s PTSD was
suffered as a result of both physical and non-physical trauma did not alter his
eligibility for workers’ compensation.
{¶25} The Court subsequently cited Clark in support of the proposition that
covered “[c]onditions suffered by the claimant could be mental disorders, provided
that they arose from a physical injury.” McCrone, supra, ¶16. In McCrone, the Ohio
Supreme Court determined that the exclusion of benefits for psychiatric conditions
that do not arise from a compensable physical injury or occupational disease does
not rise to the level of a violation of the equal protection clauses of the Ohio and
United States Constitutions. In McCrone, the claimant filed for PTSD but had
suffered no physical injury during two armed robberies at the bank where she
worked. The claimant was diagnosed with PTSD as a result of having witnessing the
first robbery and then being the teller robbed during the second. The claimant
argued that a workers’ compensation scheme that denies compensation for
psychiatric harm except where such harm is accompanied or evidenced by a physical
injury violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and the Ohio
Constitutions. The Fifth District Court of Appeals found the statute unconstitutional,
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and certified a conflict on appeal from its ruling. The Ohio Supreme Court’s review of
the issue was limited to the issue of equal protection because due process and article
two violations were not raised in the proposition of law or certified conflict. The
certified question before the Court asked “[w]hether R.C. 4123.01(C)(1) violates the
Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, where it
excludes from Workers’ Compensation coverage psychological or psychiatric
conditions occurring in the course of and arising out of the claimant’s employment,
but [which] do not arise from or occur contemporaneously with a compensable
physical injury.” Id. at ¶5.
{¶26} The Court began its evaluation of the question by discussing the history
of the definition and the treatment of covered injuries by the courts and by the Ohio
Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. The Court noted that “courts have held that
compensable injuries under the workers’ compensation system require a physical
component suffered by the claimant” both before and after amendments to the
definition of injury that explicitly excluded psychiatric conditions in the absence of
physical harm. Id. ¶16. Similarly, the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation itself
“has required a physical injury to the claimant before granting compensation for a
psychiatric condition both before and after the 1986 amendments.” Id. at ¶17. The
Court concluded: “Because the General Assembly has classified mental conditions
as compensable under workers’ compensation laws only when they are accompanied
by physical injury,” “psychological or psychiatric conditions that do not arise from a
compensable physical injury or occupational disease are excluded from the definition
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of ‘injury’ under R.C. 4123.01(C)(1).” Id. ¶18-19. The Court decided that
psychological or psychiatric conditions, in the absence of a physical injury, could be
excluded from coverage without violating the equal protection clause. Id. ¶38. In the
Court’s formulation, the phrases “accompanied by” and “arise from” are
interchangeable.
{¶27} None of the various appellate court cases cited by Appellant in an
attempt to support the enhanced standard Appellant would have us adopt involve the
denial of coverage to a claimant suffering both a covered physical injury and a
psychiatric condition resulting from the same work-place incident. The cases cited by
Appellant generally involve a denial of coverage to a claimant suffering from a work-
related psychiatric condition who has not suffered a concurrent physical injury. (E.g.
Bunger, supra (no physical injury); Rambaldo, supra (no physical injury, denied claim
by an employee who charged that he suffered from major depression and mixed
personality disorder because his employer required him to do things which were
dishonest or somewhat unethical); Banks v. LTV Steel Co., 100 Ohio App.3d 585
(1995) (recovery is allowed to claimant who was diagnosed with PTSD in addition to
the chest, spinal, arm and leg injuries she suffered in an industrial accident);
Karavolos v. Brown Derby, Inc. 99 Ohio App.3d 548 (1994) (remanded for trial to
determine whether there exists a connection between employee’s back injury and
various mental conditions including drug addiction); Wood v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol,
156 Ohio App.3d 725, 2004-Ohio-1765 (5th Dist.) (no physical injury); Ireland v. S.
Ohio Corr. Facility, 2006-Ohio-3519 (5th Dist.) (no physical injury). Appellant also
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brings to our attention Dunn v. Mayfield, 66 Ohio App. 3d 336, 584 N.E.2d 37 (4th
Dist.1990). In Dunn, the employee filed a workers’ compensation claim requesting
relief for acute anxiety and PTSD. The claim was left open for claimant to provide
additional evidence of a physical injury. Claimant failed to meet the deadline to
supplement and appealed the resulting denial of compensation. The appellate court
reversed summary judgment against the claimant and, using proximate cause
language, remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings, placing the
burden on the claimant to show a connection between any physical injuries and the
diagnosis of PTSD. Dunn actually appears to support the current matter in that
Appellee could receive benefits for her PTSD so long as it can be said to be
proximately caused by the physical injury. Nothing in Dunn requires physical injury to
be the single or only cause of the psychiatric disorder. This Court has not considered
the specific issue now before us, but we have previously denied coverage for PTSD
in the absence of any physical injury. Fields v. City of Youngstown, 7th Dist. No. 88
CA 89, 1989 WL 59014 *2 (May 30, 1989) (claimant specifically stated “I did not have
or get any physical injury”).
{¶28} Although no Ohio court has ruled on the precise issue raised by
Appellant, the Second District Court of Appeals has affirmed a trial court decision that
denied recovery for PTSD where the claimant also sustained physical injuries as a
result of employment. However, the court did not apply the “sole cause” formulation
advocated by Appellant. Armstrong v. Jurgenson Co., 2nd Dist. No. 2011-CA-6,
2011-Ohio-6708. The 2011 decision affirmed the trial court’s finding that the physical
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injuries suffered by a teamster, who was the victim of a rear-end crash while working,
were not the cause of his PTSD. At trial, there was conflicting testimony on the
central issue of causation. The claimant’s examining physician originally diagnosed
the teamster with PTSD and referred to his physical injuries in the report relied on by
the Industrial Commission to grant this PTSD benefits. The treating physician also
testified at trial that the physical injuries contributed to and were causal factors in the
claimant’s PTSD. Id. at ¶15.
{¶29} At trial, the parties stipulated that the accident was work-related; that
claimant suffered a variety of physical injuries due to the accident; and that claimant
was suffering from PTSD due to the accident. However, the employer presented a
contradicting expert witness who concluded that although the claimant was suffering
from PTSD, the cause of the disorder was the act of witnessing the collision and
resulting harm to the other driver (who died), and was not related in any way to the
claimant’s own back and shoulder injuries.
{¶30} The reviewing court’s majority opinion agreed with the trial court’s
reading of the statute’s limitation on coverage to those psychiatric conditions that
“have arisen from an injury or occupational disease sustained by that claimant.” The
court held that in order to be compensable, psychiatric conditions must be “started by
and therefore result[ing] from a physical injury or occupational disease the claimant
suffered.” Id. at ¶35. Both the trial court and the reviewing court relied on the
testimony of the employer’s expert who testified that there was no causal link
between the physical injuries and PTSD, rather than the testimony of the treating
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physician who identified the injuries as a contributing cause. This matter appears to
rest entirely on a credibility determination; the trial court found the claimant’s
physicians were not credible and the employer’s expert was credible. Hence, this
credibility determination would be upheld on review.
{¶31} The matter before us does not involve conflicting testimony. It does
involve a claim for both physical injury and psychiatric condition resulting from a
single hostage-taking incident. The two depositions of Appellee’s treating physician
provide consistent testimony that the physical injury to Appellee is a proximate cause
of her PTSD, although concededly not the sole proximate cause. She also suffers
from the stress of being taken hostage. Both factors contributed to and resulted in
her PTSD. In this instance, Appellee is most similarly situated to the claimant in
Clark, who was similarly held hostage and was physically injured by his assailant.
Without evidence ruling out her physical injury as one cause of PTSD, it appears that,
were we to reverse the bureau’s decision granting compensation and the trial court’s
decision allowing recovery, we must interpret the statute more narrowly than does the
Ohio Supreme Court. This would result in the imposition of an evidentiary standard
on claimants suffering from multiple work-related harms that ignores the principles of
causation applicable to workers’ compensation. This is not reflective of controlling
precedent. Accordingly, applying the principles of causation prescribed by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Murphy and its progeny, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Conclusion
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{¶32} Appellee’s uncontradicted evidence of both a compensable physical
and concurrent psychiatric condition was sufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact to be litigated. Appellee
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is
without merit and is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in full.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
Vukovich, J., concurs.
Jones v. Catholic Healthcare Partners, Inc.
Combined Opinion