[Cite as State v. Brothers, 2010-Ohio-3987.]
STATE OF OHIO, COLUMBIANA COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO ) CASE NOS. 10 CO 6
) 10 CO 7
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE )
)
VS. ) OPINION AND
) JUDGMENT ENTRY
JILL A. BROTHERS )
)
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeals from the Columbiana
County Municipal Court
Case Nos. 09 CRB 454; 09 CRB 1073
JUDGMENT: Dismissed.
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Robert Herron
Columbiana County Prosecutor
Atty. Kyde Kelly-Jones
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
38832 Saltwell Road
Lisbon, Ohio 44432
For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Brian J. Macala
11 South Lincoln Avenue
Salem, Ohio 44460-3101
JUDGES:
Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Dated: August 18, 2010
PER CURIAM.
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{¶1} This matter comes on appeal from a January 11, 2010 order of the
Columbiana County Municipal Court dismissing charges against appellant, but finding
probable cause existed for the issuance of a criminal trespass complaint and for
violation of a civil protection order.
{¶2} As this Court has authority to sua sponte raise a jurisdictional question,
we directed the appellant to file a jurisdictional statement. Appellant complied on
April 22, 2010, attaching two separate cases from the Eleventh District Court of
Appeals, issued the same day in 1985, which went to merit decision. However, in
neither case was the jurisdictional hurdle discussed, that is, whether the appellant
was an “aggrieved party,” when the criminal charges had been dismissed.
{¶3} In her supporting memorandum appellant argues that the finding of
probable cause in the criminal proceeding “* * * substantially impaired the ability of
Appellant to pursue those claims” (malicious prosecution and abuse of process).
(4/22/10 Brief in Support of Jurisdiction, p. 7.) Appellant contends she has been
prejudiced by such finding made without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.
{¶4} At page 12 of the Brief in Support of Jurisdiction, we note appellant
stipulated to probable cause as to the county prosecutor and law enforcement
agencies, but would not stipulate as it related to her father, who had obtained the civil
protection order, or Patrick Kerrigan, who notified police of appellant’s presence on
the business premises (after it had been negotiated that the CPO was to be
dismissed. It is alleged Kerrigan had knowledge of the settlement by virtue of his
signing the April 10, 2009 Settlement Agreement).
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{¶5} In a criminal case it is ordinarily the imposition of sentence which
constitutes a final order subject to review. State v. Shinkle (1986), 27 Ohio App.3d
54. Here, appellant suffered no deprivation of a present substantial right since the
charges were dismissed. She suffered no loss of liberty (although she spent a day in
jail when arrested). She suffered no financial loss by the payment of a fine. She is
not an aggrieved party since she prevailed.
{¶6} To be an aggrieved party one must show a present interest in the
subject matter of the litigation and that his personal rights have been substantially
affected by the order from which the appeal is taken. See Ohio Contract Carriers
Assn. v. Public Utilities Comm. (1942), 140 Ohio St. 160, citing 2 Am.Jur. 941, Sec.
149. A future, contingent or speculative interest is not sufficient to confer standing to
appeal. Id. at 161, citing Sec. 150.
{¶7} Admittedly, in this case, appellant is seeking a reversal simply to aid in
an anticipatory civil suit to recover damages for malicious prosecution and abuse of
process. That civil litigation will stand or fall on the evidence presented in that suit.
{¶8} It is not the function of this Court to review a criminal case to aid a party
for possible future civil litigation. Moreover, appellant acknowledges that the law
enforcement officials and prosecutor involved here had probable cause to pursue the
charges inasmuch as they had not been apprised of the settlement agreement.
{¶9} Accordingly, we find that appellant is not an aggrieved party with
standing to bring these appeals. Moreover, she has not had a substantial right
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impacted by the dismissal of the charges and therefore is not entitled to a review of
the dismissal orders.
{¶10} Appeals sua sponte dismissed.
{¶11} Costs taxed against appellant.
Vukovich, P.J., concurs.
Waite, J., concurs.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.