[Cite as Bank of Am., N.A. v. Harris, 2013-Ohio-5749.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99272
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
FREDERICK D. HARRIS, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-767055
BEFORE: Boyle, P.J., McCormack, J., and E.T. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 26, 2013
FOR APPELLANT
Frederick D. Harris, pro se
55 East Juniper Lane
Moreland Hills, Ohio 44022
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Monica Levine Lacks
James S. Wertheim
Barbara Friedman Yaksic
McGlinchey Stafford, P.L.L.C.
25550 Chagrin Boulevard
Suite 406
Cleveland, Ohio 44122
ALSO LISTED
Bernice Belle Harris
55 East Juniper Lane
Moreland Hills, Ohio 44022
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Frederick Harris, appeals from the trial court’s
decision granting summary judgment to plaintiff-appellee, Bank of America, N.A. He
raises one assignment of error for our review, arguing that “[t]he trial court erred as a
matter of law by granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee.”
Finding no merit to his appeal, we affirm.
Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶2} In July 2005, Harris executed a note, secured by a mortgage, in the amount
of $693,600 for the purchase of property located in Moreland Hills, Ohio. In October
2011, Bank of America filed a complaint for foreclosure against Frederick and Bernice
Harris, as well as several other defendants not at issue in this appeal, alleging that it was
the owner and holder of Harris’s note and mortgage, and therefore, it had standing to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Bank of America attached several exhibits to the
complaint, alleging that the documents established that it had standing. It further
alleged that the note was in default and that Harris owed $744,327.59, plus interest at the
rate of 5.75 percent per annum from the date of default, December 1, 2009.
{¶3} Harris moved for summary judgment in June 2012, arguing, inter alia, that
Bank of America lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure because the bank was “a
party solely by virtue of a purported assignment from [Mortgage Electronic Registration
System (‘MERS’)].” It argued that MERS had no authority to assign the mortgage to
Bank of America, and thus, Bank of America had no standing to bring the suit.
{¶4} In September 2012, Bank of America moved for summary judgment,
contending that it did have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and that Harris
was in default. It attached an affidavit in support, as well as several documents.
{¶5} The trial court denied Harris’s motion for summary judgment and granted
Bank of America’s motion. It is from this judgment that Harris appeals.
Standing
{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Harris maintains that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment to Bank of America because Bank of America lacked
standing to bring the foreclosure action against him. He essentially raises the same
arguments here that he raised in his summary judgment motion.
{¶7} An appellate court reviews a decision granting summary judgment on a de
novo basis. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241
(1996). Summary judgment is properly granted when: (1) there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and,
(3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to
the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Civ.R. 56(C); State
ex rel. Duganitz v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 77 Ohio St.3d 190, 191, 672 N.E.2d 654
(1996).
{¶8} Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing in a
foreclosure action. In Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d
13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, the court found that a plaintiff must have
standing at the time it files the complaint in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
Id. at ¶ 41-42. In foreclosure cases, standing exists where a party is the holder of the
note and mortgage at the time the complaint is filed. Arch Bay Holdings, L.L.C. v.
Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25073, 2012-Ohio-4966, ¶ 16.
{¶9} Harris’s main argument throughout his brief is that “MERS in its capacity,
solely as nominee for Countrywide,” had no right or authority to assign the note to
anyone. Thus, Harris maintains that because MERS had no authority to assign the note
to Countrywide, then Bank of America lacks standing as successor to Countrywide by
merger.
{¶10} Harris’s argument is without merit. Ohio courts have held that a party
who receives an assignment of mortgage from MERS as nominee has standing to
foreclose on the mortgage when the borrower defaults on the loan. See Deutsche Bank
Natl. Trust Co. v. Ingle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92487, 2009-Ohio-3886; BAC Home
Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Hall, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2009-10-135, 2010-Ohio-3472.
{¶11} Harris also argues that “the purported assignment in this cause is
purportedly signed by Michelle Brewer, ‘Vice President’ to MERS.” Harris contends
that Michelle Brewer is not a vice president at MERS, nor is she even an employee at
MERS. But Harris offered no evidence in support of this argument.
{¶12} After review of the evidence in the record, we find that Bank of America
did establish that it had standing at the time it filed the complaint.
{¶13} Bank of America attached an affidavit to its summary judgment motion
from “Arsheen Littlejohn, AVP, Operations Team Lead of Bank of America.” Harris
does not challenge Littlejohn’s affidavit. Littlejohn properly authenticated the
documents attached to Bank of America’s summary judgment motion and established
that Harris owed Bank of America $744,327 plus interest from December 1, 2009 and
costs.
{¶14} Regarding standing, Bank of America attached several documents to its
complaint and summary judgment motion. It attached a copy of the note, with the
original lender listed as Countrywide Bank, a division of Treasury Bank, N.A.
(“Countrywide”). The note was endorsed in blank. Under R.C. 1303.25(B), “[w]hen
an instrument is indorsed in blank, the instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be
negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed.” R.C. 1301.201
provides that “holder” means a “person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is
payable * * * to bearer[.]” Bank of America had possession of the note, which was
payable to bearer. Thus, Bank of America was the current holder of the note entitled to
enforce it. R.C. 1303.31.
{¶15} Bank of America also attached an allonge to the note, which established
that Countrywide transferred the “rights, title, and interest” in the note from “BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP, fka Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP.”
{¶16} Further, Bank of America attached the mortgage, which was recorded on
August 3, 2005, and an assignment of the mortgage dated May 19, 2010. The mortgage
listed the Harrises as borrowers; MERS as a “separate corporation that is acting solely as
a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns”; and Countrywide as the
Lender. The assignment stated that MERS “acting solely as nominee for Countrywide
Bank, a division of Treasury Bank, N.A. (‘Assignor’)” transferred the mortgage to “BAC
Home Loans Servicing LP, fka Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP (‘Assignee’).”
{¶17} Bank of America also attached a copy of a certificate of merger from the
office of the secretary of state of Texas, stating that BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP
merged into Bank of America, N.A., effective July 1, 2011.
{¶18} When a merger between two companies occurs, one of those companies
ceases to exist. “[A] merger involves the absorption of one company by another, the
latter retaining its own name and identity, and acquiring the assets, liabilities, franchises
and powers of the former. Of necessity, the absorbed company ceases to exist as a
separate business entity.” Morris v. Invest. Life Ins. Co., 27 Ohio St.2d 26, 31, 272
N.E.2d 105 (1971). “[T]he absorbed company becomes a part of the resulting company
following merger [and] the merged company has the ability to enforce * * * agreements
as if the resulting company had stepped in the shoes of the absorbed company.”
Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, 133 Ohio St.3d 356, 2012-Ohio-4648, 978 N.E.2d
823, ¶ 6. Once “an existing bank takes the place of another bank after a merger, no
further action is necessary” to become a real party in interest. Huntington Natl. Bank v.
Hoffer, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2010-CA-31, 2011-Ohio-242, ¶ 15.
{¶19} Accordingly, we find that Bank of America met its burden of proof
establishing that it was the real party in interest at the time it filed the foreclosure
complaint against Harris, and therefore, Bank of America had standing to bring the
action.
{¶20} Harris’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶21} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE
TIM McCORMACK, J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR