[Cite as Morell v. O'Donnell, 2013-Ohio-3921.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99824
DAN A. MORELL, JR.
RELATOR
vs.
JUDGE JOHN P. O’DONNELL, ETC.
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT:
WRIT DENIED
Writ of Prohibition
Motion No. 465356
Order No. 466779
RELEASE DATE: September 11, 2013
ATTORNEYS FOR RELATOR
Dan A. Morell, Jr.
Michael D. Schmit
Dan Morell & Associates L.L.C.
250 Spectrum Office Bldg.
6060 Rockside Woods Blvd.
Independence, Ohio 44131
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
For Judge John P. O’Donnell
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Charles E. Hannan, Jr.
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center - 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Wade and Kathleen Rome
T. Christopher O’Connell
Michael R. Stavnicky
Singerman, Mills, Desberg & Kauntz
3333 Richmond Road
Suite 370
Beachwood, Ohio 44122
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J.:
{¶1} Relator, Dan A. Morell, Jr. (“Morell”), filed this original action requesting
this court to issue a writ of prohibition ordering respondent, Judge John P. O’Donnell, of
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, to refrain from exercising any continued
jurisdiction in Rome v. Seidlemann, Cuyahoga County C.P. No. CV-726993 (hereinafter
the “underlying action”). Specifically, Morell seeks a writ of prohibition that prevents
Judge O’Donnell from enforcing the subpoena served on Morell and from taking any
further action on a motion to show cause why Morell should not be held in contempt of
court for his alleged failure to respond to the subpoena in the underlying action.
Respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment, which we grant for the reasons that
follow.
{¶2} Judge O’Donnell presided over the underlying action. It is undisputed that
Morell was not a party to that case but instead represented a creditor of plaintiff Wade
Rome in an unrelated matter. The underlying action was settled and dismissed.
However, additional proceedings ensued with regard to enforcing the settlement
agreement and culminated in the contempt proceedings that lead to this original action.
The point of conflict between Morell and Judge O’Donnell is whether the trial court
retained jurisdiction over the post-dismissal proceedings.
{¶3} Judge O’Donnell issued a journal entry in the underlying action on September
13, 2012, which provided:
Case called for second day of trial 9/13/2012. Parties and
counsel present. Court reporter Maureen Povinelli present.
Before trial resumed, counsel advised the Court that
settlement has been reached. Therefore, the trial is canceled
and this case is removed from the Court’s active docket. The
parties are given leave to file a more detailed final entry of
dismissal. Court cost assessed as each their own.
On September 24, 2012, Judge O’Donnell issued another journal entry that provided:
The Court has received correspondence from Plaintiffs’
counsel dated 9/21/2012 alleging that the defendant’s have not
abided by the recent settlement agreement. The Court
construes that letter, which was copied to opposing counsel, as
an oral motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and a
hearing is set on that oral motion as follows:
hearing set for 10/02/2012 at 03:00 PM. Courtroom 18-D,
Judge John P. O’Donnell.
The notice of dismissal that was filed on October 19, 2012 provided:
Plaintiffs and Defendants, by and through their respective
undersigned counsel, jointly stipulate pursuant to Civ.R
41(A)(1)(b) that the within matter is dismissed with prejudice,
that the Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter and its
resolution, each party to bear its own costs and fees.
The entry of this notice on the Court’s appearance docket does not set forth the full
content of the notice and simply provides: “Wade Rome notice of dismissal with
prejudice.”
{¶4} The docket reflects that additional motions were filed and that Judge
O’Donnell continued to exercise jurisdiction in the underlying action. For example, on
January 3, 2013, Judge O’Donnell denied plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to enforce the
settlement agreement, with leave to file “a future similar motion if they develop evidence
* * *.” On January 8, 2013, a subpoena was served on Morell. A motion to compel and
for finding for contempt was filed which Morell opposed, and Judge O’Donnell set for a
show cause hearing on April 24, 2013. On that day, Morell filed this original action and
Judge O’Donnell continued the hearing pending resolution of the instant action.
{¶5} A writ of prohibition “is an extraordinary remedy that is granted in limited
circumstances with great caution and restraint.” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d
551, 554, 2001-Ohio-15, 740 N.E.2d 265. Before it can be granted, Morell must prove
that: “(1) the lower court is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of power is
unauthorized by law, and (3) relator possesses no other adequate remedy at law.” Id.
However, when a court is patently and unambiguously without jurisdiction to act
whatsoever, the availability or adequacy of a remedy is immaterial. State ex rel. Tilford v.
Crush, 39 Ohio St.3d 174, 529 N.E.2d 1245 (1988). Therefore, if the lack of jurisdiction
is patent and unambiguous, the writ will be granted upon proof of the first two elements
alone.
{¶6} Absent such a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having
general jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action has authority to determine its own
jurisdiction. State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 771
N.E.2d 853, ¶ 21.
{¶7} A party challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law via
an appeal from the court’s holding that it has jurisdiction. State ex rel. Rootstown Local
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 78 Ohio St.3d 489, 678
N.E.2d 1365 (1997). The court has discretion in issuing the writ of prohibition. State ex
rel. Gilligan v. Hoddinott, 36 Ohio St.2d 127, 304 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
{¶8} “[I]n general, when a trial court unconditionally dismisses a case or a case has
been voluntarily dismissed under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), the trial court patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed, and a writ * * * will issue to prevent the
exercise of jurisdiction.” Sadler, 2002-Ohio-3605, ¶ 22, see also State ex rel. Northpoint
Props., Inc. v. Markus, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82848, 2003-Ohio-5252, ¶ 20 (whether a
trial court has jurisdiction to proceed following the settlement and dismissal of a case
depends upon whether the trial court unconditionally dismissed it.)
{¶9} Morell argues that Judge O’Donnell lacked jurisdiction because Morell
believes that the underlying action was unconditionally dismissed. Conversely, Judge
O’Donnell has moved for summary judgment asserting that the Court did not
unconditionally dismiss the underlying action and, therefore, retained jurisdiction over the
post-dismissal proceedings.
The determination of whether a dismissal is unconditional is
dependent upon the terms of the dismissal order * * * “when
an action is dismissed pursuant to a stated condition, such as
the existence of a settlement agreement, the court retains
jurisdiction over the authority to enforce such an agreement in
the event the condition does not occur.”
Markus, 2003-Ohio-5252, ¶ 20, quoting, Berger v. Riddle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
66195 and 66200, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3623 (Aug. 18, 1994).
{¶10} This court has found that reference to a settlement agreement in the court’s
dismissal entry is sufficient to retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of the settlement
agreement. E.g., Northpoint, 2003-Ohio-5252, ¶ 28, citing Fisco v. H.A.M. Landscaping,
Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80538, 2002-Ohio-6481 (“dismissal entry that stated, ‘the
instant matter is settled and dismissed’ was not an unconditional dismissal and the trial
court retained jurisdiction to hear a motion to enforce a settlement agreement.”); see also
State ex rel. Continental Mtge. Servs., Inc. v. Kilbane-Koch, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
75267, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 58, 1999 WL 14002 (Jan. 4, 1999) (finding a dismissal to
be conditional where the entry stated, “Pursuant to the settlement and agreement of the
[Plaintiff] and [Defendants], all claims against these Defendants only are hereby settled
and dismissed, with prejudice, at Defendants’ costs.”)
{¶11} Morell argues that Judge O’Donnell did not retain jurisdiction through any
entry. However, in this case, Judge O’Donnell’s September 13, 2012 journal entry
indicated the underlying action was “settled”; the matter was removed from the Court’s
“active docket”; and the parties were “given leave to file a more detailed final entry of
dismissal.” (Emphasis added.) Subsequently, the court exercised its jurisdiction by
setting a hearing on plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. This
transpired before the parties filed a stipulated notice of dismissal, which we presume was
the “more detailed final entry of dismissal” referenced by the Court’s prior entry. The
stipulated dismissal also indicated that “the Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter
* * *.”
{¶12} A “notice of voluntary dismissal is self-executing and completely terminates
the possibility of further action on the merits of the case upon its mere filing, without the
necessity of court intervention.” State ex rel. Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Russo, 129 Ohio
St.3d 250, 2011-Ohio-3177, 951 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 17; see also Wyman v. T.N.L. Invest. &
Realty Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94378, 2010-Ohio-4015, ¶ 7. In Wyman, this Court
found that the trial court retained jurisdiction where the parties’ stipulation of dismissal
“expressly stated that the case was settled and that the court retained jurisdiction to
enforce the settlement” even though the trial court’s subsequent dismissal entry did not
mention the settlement or retention of jurisdiction. Id.
{¶13} In this case, both the trial court’s journal entry and the stipulated notice of
dismissal reflect that the case was dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement which is
sufficient evidence of the court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.
{¶14} Further, the proceedings at issue involve post-dismissal contempt
proceedings. It is well settled that “trial courts may consider collateral issues like
criminal contempt * * * despite a dismissal.” State ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo, 131 Ohio
St.3d 137, 142, 2012-Ohio-47, 961 N.E.2d 1118, ¶ 28, quoting, State ex rel. Ahmed v.
Costine, 100 Ohio St.3d 36, 2003-Ohio-4776, 795 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 5. A contempt hearing
on a party’s alleged failure to comply with a subpoena and court order to provide
documents to a party may be civil or criminal in nature. State ex rel. Corn, 90 Ohio St.3d
at 555-556 (finding that nature of the contempt proceeding, i.e., whether it is civil or
criminal in nature, depends upon its purpose); see also State ex rel. Fifth Third Mtge. Co.,
2010-Ohio-3734, ¶ 14 (holding that relief in prohibition is not appropriate regarding a
contempt hearing because “[a]ppeal of any adverse contempt order is an adequate remedy
of law.”)
{¶15} For the foregoing reasons, Morell has not established that Judge O’Donnell
patently and unambiguously lacks the necessary jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena
served upon him or to entertain the motion for contempt. Judge O’Donnell is entitled to
summary judgment on Morell’s complaint for writ of prohibition. Accordingly, Judge
O’Donnell’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Morell to pay costs. It is further
ordered that the Clerk of the Eighth District Court of Appeals serve notice of this
judgment upon all parties as required by Civ.R. 58(B).
{¶16} Writ denied.
________________________________
KENNETH A. ROCCO, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., DISSENTS