[Cite as State v. Jordan, 2013-Ohio-162.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 91413
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
MOORIS JORDAN
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
APPLICATION DENIED
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CR-497993
Application for Reopening
Motion No. 461134
RELEASE DATE: January 18, 2013
FOR APPELLANT
Mooris C. Jordan, Pro Se
Inmate No. 544823
Lorain Correctional Institution
2075 S. Avon Belden Road
Grafton, OH 44044
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Katherine Mullin
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J.:
{¶1} On December 20, 2012, the applicant, Mooris Jordan, pursuant to App.R.
26(B) and State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), applied to
reopen this court’s judgment in State v. Jordan, 8th Dist. No. 91413, 2009-Ohio-4037, in
which this court affirmed Jordan’s conviction for rape, but remanded to correct the
sentencing entry concerning postrelease control.1 Jordan now contends that his appellate
counsel was ineffective because he did not argue the following: (1) the sentence was an
improper, disproportionate, unconstitutional sentence violating due process and was cruel
and unusual punishment; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
improper sentence; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing for a lesser
included offense. Additionally, appellate counsel was ineffective because he prevented
Jordan from assisting in his own appeal. For the following reasons, this court denies the
application to reopen.
{¶2} App.R. 26(B)(1) and (2)(b) require applications claiming ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel to be filed within 90 days from journalization of the
decision unless the applicant shows good cause for filing at a later time. The December
The jury found Jordan guilty of rape of a minor under the age of ten years old by compelling
1
the victim to submit by force or threat of force. Pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B), the trial judge
sentenced Jordan to life imprisonment without parole.
20, 2012 application was filed approximately three years and four months after this
court’s decision. Thus, it is untimely on its face.
{¶3} In an effort to show good cause, Jordan argues that he is indigent and cannot
hire an attorney, that he has limited education and a limited understanding of the law, and
that his appellate counsel refused to send him a copy of the transcripts, thus depriving him
of his ability to form an argument. He also relies upon State v. Chu, 8th Dist. Nos.
75583 and 75689, 2002-Ohio-4422, in which this court indicated that an application to
reopen may be granted if there was a genuine issue as to the effectiveness of appellate
counsel, even if the applicant did not proffer a cause for untimely filing. However, these
arguments do not establish good cause.
{¶4} This court has repeatedly held that difficulty in obtaining the transcript does
not constitute good cause. In State v. Towns, 8th Dist. No. 71244, 1997 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4709 (Oct. 23, 1997), reopening disallowed, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2030 (May
4, 2000), the applicant endeavored to show good cause for untimely filing by arguing that
his counsel was uncooperative and refused to send him any documents concerning the
case. This court rejected that argument, ruling that “being a layman and experiencing
delays in obtaining records related to one’s conviction are not sufficient bases for
establishing good cause for untimely filing of an application for reopening.” Id. at 3.
State v. Bussey, 8th Dist. No. 75301, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5707 (Dec. 2, 1999),
reopening disallowed, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3614 (Aug. 8, 2000); Newburgh Hts. v.
Chauncey, 8th Dist. No. 75465, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3732 (Aug. 12, 1999), reopening
disallowed, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 6261 (Oct. 20, 2000); State v. Chandler, 8th Dist.
No. 59764, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 975 (Mar. 5, 1992), reopening disallowed, 2001 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3624 (Aug. 13, 2001) — counsel’s delays in sending applicant the transcript
and refused access to parts of the transcript did not state good cause.
{¶5} Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. LaMar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467,
2004-Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d 970, and State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162,
2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, held that the 90-day deadline for filing must be strictly
enforced. In those cases, the applicants argued that after the court of appeals decided
their cases, their appellate lawyers continued to represent them, and their appellate
lawyers could not be expected to raise their own incompetence. Although the Supreme
Court agreed with this latter principle, it rejected the argument that continued
representation provided good cause. In both cases, the court ruled that the applicants
could not ignore the 90-day deadline, even if it meant retaining new counsel or filing the
applications themselves. The court then reaffirmed the principle that lack of legal
training, effort, and imagination and ignorance of the law does not establish good cause
for failure to seek timely relief under App.R. 26(B). Thus, Jordan’s reliance on the
earlier decision of Chu is misplaced.
{¶6} Accordingly, this court denies the application to reopen.
MELODY J. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, J., and
TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR