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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-14390
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A087-780-845
QINRONG CHEN,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
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Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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(August 4, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Qinrong Chen, a native and citizen of China, filed an application for asylum,
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and relief
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on her claim
that she was persecuted for participating in underground Roman Catholic Church
gatherings. Chen claimed that police arrested her while she was attending a church
service and that she was detained for nine days. While detained, she was
interrogated, slapped, and beaten. The Immigration Judge (IJ) made an adverse
credibility determination and, alternatively, found that Chen failed to demonstrate
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ therefore
denied Chen’s application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed
her appeal. In seeking review before this Court, Chen argues that substantial
evidence does not support the agency’s adverse credibility finding and that she
demonstrated her eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
After review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we deny Chen’s
petition in part and dismiss in part.
Contrary to Chen’s contentions, the IJ offered specific, cogent reasons for
her adverse credibility finding, and that finding was supported by substantial
evidence. See Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006)
(explaining we will reverse an agency’s credibility determination under the
substantial evidence standard only if the record compels it, and stating “the IJ must
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offer specific, cogent reasons for an adverse credibility finding” (quotation
omitted)). In particular, the IJ noted that, in her asylum application, Chen stated
she decided to leave China after her arrest and detention, which conflicted with her
testimony that she had applied for a student visa to come to the United States prior
to her arrest. 1 The IJ also pointed to the inconsistency between Chen’s testimony
that her father paid 3,000 Yuan to the police to obtain her release on September 30,
2008, and a household register Chen submitted in support of her asylum
application indicating her father returned to China from the United States on
January 5, 2009. Although Chen explained that her father returned to the United
States before the date on the household register but was not registered until later
because the family did not know how to register him, we cannot say this
explanation would compel a reasonable factfinder to reverse the IJ’s credibility
determination. See Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that although a petitioner’s explanations for the implausible aspects of
his claim were tenable, they did not compel a reversal of the IJ’s credibility
determination); see also Lyashchynska v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 962, 967 (11th
Cir. 2012) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the
1
Although Chen argues her statements are not inconsistent because she was planning to
come to the United States for academic reasons before her arrest and that her arrest gave her a
new and different reason to come to the United States, Chen never presented that argument to the
BIA, and we do not consider it. See Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 494 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir.
2007) (declining to consider an equal protection argument because the petitioner failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies by raising it before the BIA).
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factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (quotation
omitted)). Nothing in the record compels reversal of the agency’s credibility
determination.
Similarly, the record does not compel reversal of the agency’s conclusion
that, even if credible, Chen failed to establish past persecution. We have held that
“persecution is an extreme concept,” and that “[m]inor physical abuse and brief
detentions do not amount to persecution.” Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577
F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations and alteration omitted). Viewed
cumulatively, Chen’s experiences do not rise to the extreme level of persecution.
See Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168, 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008)
(concluding that a finding of persecution was not compelled when a petitioner
suffered a 36-hour detention and was beaten with a belt and kicked, resulting in
multiple scratches and muscle bruises); see also Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1352-53
(concluding a four-day detention, coupled with a five-hour interrogation and
beating, did not compel a finding of persecution); Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451
F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding a finding of persecution was not
compelled by a petitioner’s five-day detention during which he was forced to
watch reeducation videos, stand in the sun for two hours, and sign a pledge to no
longer practice his religion).
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Chen’s reliance on Shi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 707 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2013), is
unavailing. In Shi, we recognized that “determining what constitutes persecution is
a highly fact-intensive inquiry” and that “each asylum case turns on its own facts.”
Id. at 1235-36, 1239. Thus, in concluding the petitioner in Shi suffered
persecution, we explained that, under the totality of the circumstances, “what
compels us to find, in this case, that Shi was persecuted” was the fact that Shi was
handcuffed to a bar and left outside overnight exposed to the elements, a fact we
said “highlights the unusual nature of the authorities’ efforts to suppress Shi’s
religious practice.” Id. at 1237. Here, Chen was not subjected to “as singularly
cruel a tactic” as being handcuffed to a bar and left outside overnight, a tactic we
analogized to the use of a hitching post and denounced as brutal, inhumane, and
extreme. Id. at 1238-39. Chen’s experiences do not compel a finding that she
suffered persecution.
Chen’s argument that she was entitled to a presumption of a well-founded
fear of future persecution also lacks merit. Having failed to establish that she
suffered past persecution, Chen was not entitled to a presumption of a
well-founded fear of future persecution. See De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
525 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] showing of past persecution creates a
rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.”). 2 Because
2
Chen does not make any substantive argument in her brief that she demonstrated a
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Chen failed to establish eligibility for asylum, she also failed to demonstrate her
eligibility for withholding of removal. See Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1352 (“Where
an applicant is unable to meet the well-founded fear standard of asylum, he is
generally precluded from qualifying for either asylum or withholding of removal.”
(quotations and brackets omitted)).
Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review Chen’s claim that she was entitled to
CAT relief because she did not raise it before the BIA. Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 712
F.3d 486, 492 (11th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, Chen’s petition for review of the
denial of her request for CAT relief is dismissed.
PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
well-founded fear of future persecution. Instead, Chen makes only a one-sentence passing
reference to the issue and it is therefore abandoned. See Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 745 F.3d 1140,
1152 n.12 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a petitioner abandons an issue by making only a
passing reference in her initial brief).
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