[Cite as Basch Chelik, Inc. v. Alavanja, 2012-Ohio-4726.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 98344
BASCH CHELIK, INC., ET AL.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
vs.
ALEXANDER ALAVANJA, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-758377
BEFORE: Cooney, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Jones, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 11, 2012
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
Andrew J. Simon
Freedom Square II, Suite 165
6000 Freedom Square Drive
Independence, Ohio 44131
FOR APPELLEES
Attorney for Basch Chelik, Inc., et al.
Kent R. Minshall, Jr.
2189 Professor Avenue
Suite 100
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Lola Jovanovic
Lola Jovanovic, pro se
6195 St. Joseph Drive
Seven Hills, Ohio 44131
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.:
{¶1} This case came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to
App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1. Defendants-appellants, Alexander Alavanja (“Alavanja”)
and the Estate of Vukomir Alavanja (“the Estate”) (collectively referred to as
“appellants”), appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion for attorney fees and
expenses. We find no merit to the appeal and affirm.
{¶2} Plaintiffs-appellees, Basch Chelik, Inc. and Nenad Stanisic (collectively
“appellees”), filed suit in 2009 against appellants and Lola Jovanovic (“Jovanovic”) to
recover money damages from an unpaid loan. They voluntarily dismissed the case
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A) and refiled the complaint 11 months later in June 2011. When
appellees refiled the complaint, they set forth the same address in the caption for Alavanja
that they had used to obtain service in the earlier litigation. However, instead of using
the address they had previously used to obtain service on the Estate, appellees attempted
to obtain service on the Estate at attorney John Kealy’s (“Kealy”) address. Kealy had
previously represented the Estate in the prior litigation but had withdrawn and no longer
represented the Estate.
{¶3} After service at Kealy’s address failed twice, Kealy advised the court that
he no longer represented appellants and that service should be made individually.
However, rather than serve the Estate individually, appellees submitted an affidavit to the
court as evidence that service had been made by publication. The affiant stated that
appellees were unable to obtain service by certified mail, ordinary mail, or personal
service on either appellant. However, the affidavit failed to outline any steps taken to
ascertain the correct address.
{¶4} In January 2012, appellants, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of service pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(5) and 4(E). The court granted the
motion and dismissed appellants from the case. Appellants subsequently filed a motion
for attorney fees and other expenses for having had to defend against appellees’
“frivolous misconduct.” The court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
{¶5} In their sole assignment of error, appellants argue the trial court erred in
denying their motion for attorney fees and expenses without a hearing. They contend
they were entitled to attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51 because the record clearly
evidenced appellees’ frivolous conduct.
{¶6} First, we note that appellants never requested a hearing on their motion for
attorney fees. They incorporated their motion to dismiss with evidentiary materials,
including affidavits. They also filed a two-page reply to appellees’ brief in opposition.
And because they claim the record is clear, we find no error in the court’s ruling without a
hearing.
{¶7} “R.C. 2323.51 provides for an award of attorney fees to a party harmed by
‘frivolous conduct’ in a civil action.” Moss v. Bush, 105 Ohio St.3d 458,
2005-Ohio-2419, 828 N.E.2d 994, fn. 3; State ex rel. Ohio Dept. of Health v. Sowald, 65
Ohio St.3d 338, 343, 1992-Ohio-1, 603 N.E.2d 1017. The General Assembly vests the
trial court with discretion when deciding whether to award sanctions, including an award
of reasonable attorney fees. R.C. 2323.51(B)(1). Accordingly, we will not reverse the
trial court’s decision on whether to award sanctions under R.C. 2323.51 absent an abuse
of discretion. Ron Scheiderer & Assoc. v. London, 81 Ohio St.3d 94, 98, 1998-Ohio-453,
689 N.E.2d 552. We note, however, that the trial court is in the best position to appraise
the conduct of the parties, and “an appellate court must defer to the trial court’s ruling on
a motion for sanctions.” First Place Bank v. Stamper, 8th Dist. No. 80259,
2002-Ohio-3109, ¶ 17.
{¶8} R.C. 2323.51 defines “frivolous conduct,” in pertinent part, as:
(a) Conduct of a * * * party to a civil action * * * that satisfies any of the
following:
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party
to the civil action * * * or is for another improper purpose, including, but
not limited to, causing unnecessary delay or a needless increase in the cost
of litigation.
(ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or
cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new
law.
(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that
have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.
(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not
warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not
reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
{¶9} Appellants contend that appellees’ repeated attempts to obtain service on
Kealy rather than on the actual parties, and their false attempt to obtain service by
publication constitutes frivolous conduct. They further assert that appellees’ motion for
default judgment constituted frivolous conduct because they made misrepresentations to
the court.
{¶10} Appellees should have served appellants individually “by delivering a copy
to the person summoned or notified, or by leaving a copy at the residence.” R.C. 2151.29.
Indeed, appellees obtained service on appellants at their residence in the prior litigation.
Although appellants’ motion to dismiss shielded them from potential liability, they were
never in danger of having a judgment rendered against them because appellees failed to
obtain service on them.
{¶11} Further, appellees obtained a default judgment on the cognovit note
involving Jovanovic, which suggests they presented meritorious claims in the underlying
action. Whether appellees’ claims against appellants had merit or were frivolous is not
an issue here because the case never reached that point in litigation where the merits of
those claims were tested.
{¶12} Under these circumstances, we cannot say that appellees’ conduct was
frivolous as defined by R.C. 2323.51 or that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying appellants’ motion for attorney fees and expenses.
{¶13} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶14} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover of appellants costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________________________
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY;
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION ATTACHED)
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., DISSENTING:
{¶15} Respectfully, I dissent. I believe that the trial court should have conducted
a hearing to determine whether the appellees engaged in frivolous conduct warranting the
award of attorney fees.
{¶16} As the majority opinion states, there is no dispute that the appellees had the
appellants’ Seven Hills address from the first lawsuit. However, instead of seeking to
serve the appellants at this address for the second lawsuit, they served the appellants’
attorney. After being informed the attorney no longer represented the appellants,
appellees inexplicably sought service by publication instead of serving the appellants at
the Seven Hills address. Interestingly, their discovery requests were sent to the Seven
Hills address. I agree with the appellants that the appellees’ inept attempts at service
could have been a strategy by appellees to attempt to receive default judgment.
{¶17} Accordingly, I believe the trial court should have conducted a hearing to
determine if appellees engaged in frivolous conduct. Thus, I would reverse the trial
court’s judgment and remand for a hearing.