[Cite as Jackson v. Cleveland Dept. of Bldg. & Hous., 2012-Ohio-3688.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97706
JOHN JACKSON
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
CITY OF CLEVELAND DEPARTMENT OF BUILDING
AND HOUSING ETC., ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-728792
BEFORE: Sweeney, P.J., Jones, J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 16, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Patricia McGinty Aston, Esq.
Carolyn M. Downey, Esq.
Assistant Law Director
City of Cleveland
601 Lakeside Avenue, Room 106
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Thomas I. Perotti, Esq.
Perotti Law Offices
7181 Chagrin Road, Suite 200-A
Chagrin Falls, Ohio 44023
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J.:
{¶1} The city of Cleveland (“the City”) appeals the court’s reversal of the City of
Cleveland Board of Building Standards and Building Appeals’ (“the Board”) decision
upholding the City’s emergency demolition of John Jackson’s property at 1602-1604 E.
82nd St. (“the property”) without prior notice. After reviewing the facts of the case and
pertinent law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
{¶2} On October 29, 2009, the City received a complaint that part of the property
had collapsed onto the sidewalk. City officials viewed the structure, declared it an
emergency, particularly in light of the upcoming Halloween weekend, and ordered
emergency demolition. The house was demolished on October 30, 2009. The City
issued notice to Jackson on November 3, 2009.
{¶3} On April 28, 2010, a hearing was held before the Board. The City
presented evidence, via a building inspector and exhibits, that the front porch of the house
had collapsed onto the public sidewalk and that the damage was structural in nature.
The City received a call from a neighbor who “heard when the structure fell” as well as
“several complaints from the councilman and the adjoining neighbors.” The City
determined that it was a “serious hazard and it needed to be removed.” The City “took
action * * * immediately * * * [and] didn’t wait. * * * So, we believe it was a reasonable
action. We believe it was necessary to abate the nuisance.”
{¶4} At the hearing, Jackson did not challenge that the situation was an
emergency. Rather, he argued that he should have received notice prior to the
demolition of his property.
{¶5} The Board unanimously upheld the City’s action to demolish the property as
an emergency without notice to Jackson. On June 9, 2010, Jackson filed an
administrative appeal in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas challenging the
Board’s decision. On November 17, 2011, the court reversed the Board’s decision,
concluding that it “violates Jackson’s State and Federal rights to due process and due
course of law, contravenes State law, and is otherwise unsupported by the preponderance
of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record.”
{¶6} The City appeals and raises five assignments of error for our review.
I. The common pleas court abused its discretion and erred when it
reversed the Cleveland Board of Building Standards and Building Appeals’
decision to uphold the City’s actions in an emergency situation at the
property and provide post-deprivation notice and hearing because that
decision was supported by the preponderance of reliable, probative and
substantial evidence.
II. The common pleas court erred as a matter of law when it held that the
City violated Appellee’s due process and/or constitutional rights by failing
to give prior notice of its intention to demolish an unsafe structure in an
emergency situation because the court disregarded the City’s lawful acts
under the “quick action ” doctrine * * *.
III. The common pleas court erred as a matter of law when it found that
Ohio Rev. Code § 715.26 and Cleve. Cod. Ord. § 3103.09 require prior
notice of demolition by the City in an emergency situation.
IV. The common pleas court erred as a matter of law when it found that
the post-deprivation hearing conducted by the Cleveland Board of Building
Standards and Building Appeals did not afford appellee the due process to
which he was entitled.
V. The common pleas court erred as a matter of law because appellee
failed to prove that any code requirement at issue in this matter is
unconstitutional as applied to his property including the City’s exercise of
its emergency demolition procedure in this case.
{¶7} In an administrative appeal under R.C. Chapter 2506, the
common pleas court considers the “whole record,” * * * and determines
whether the administrative order is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of
substantial, reliable, and probative evidence. * * *
The standard of review to be applied by the court of appeals in an R.C.
2506.04 appeal is “more limited in scope.” (Emphasis added.) Kisil v.
Sandusky (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 12 Ohio B. Rep. 26, 30, 465 N.E.2d
848, 852. “This statute grants a more limited power to the court of appeals
to review the judgment of the common pleas court only on ‘questions of
law,’ which does not include the same extensive power to weigh ‘the
preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence,’ as is granted
to the common pleas court.” Id. at fn. 4. “It is incumbent on the trial court
to examine the evidence. Such is not the charge of the appellate court. * *
* The fact that the court of appeals, or this court, might have arrived at a
different conclusion than the administrative agency is immaterial. Appellate
courts must not substitute their judgment for those of an administrative
agency or a trial court absent the approved criteria for doing so.” Lorain
City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio
St. 3d 257, 261, 533 N.E.2d 264, 267.
Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147, 735 N.E.2d 433
(2000).
{¶8} Furthermore, this court has held that “[although] courts of appeals have a
limited scope of review on R.C. 2506 appeals, interpretation of a city’s ordinance presents
a question of law that must be reviewed de novo.” Moulagiannis v. Cleveland Bd. of
Zoning Appeals, 8th Dist. No. 84922, 2005-Ohio-2180, ¶ 10.
{¶9} In its November 17, 2011 journal entry and opinion, the court found that the
City failed to comply with Cleveland Codified Ordinances (C.C.O.) 367.04(b), which
outlines the procedure the City must follow when notifying a property owner of housing
violations.
{¶10} The court also found that the City failed to comply with C.C.O.
3103.09(h)(6), which states the following: “Notice of Intent to Demolish. * * * the [City]
shall give written notice informing the owner * * * of the City’s intention to demolish and
remove the unsafe building or structure at least thirty (30) days before the intended action
by the City. * * *.”
{¶11} Finally, the court found that the City violated R.C. 715.26(B), which
states, in pertinent part, that a municipality may:
[p]rovide for the * * * removal of insecure, unsafe, or structurally defective
buildings or other structures * * *. At least thirty days prior to the removal
* * * of any insecure, unsafe or structurally defective building, [the City] *
* * shall give notice by certified mail of its intention with respect to such
removal * * * to owners of record of such property. * * * If any emergency
exists, as determined by [the City], notice may be given other than by
certified mail and less than thirty days prior to such removal * * *. If for
any reason notice is not given * * *.1
{¶12} In its journal entry, the court found that the “City’s decision to declare
emergency is entitled to deference and may not be disturbed.” However, it read R.C.
715.26 to “expressly require prior notice even when an emergency is determined to exist.”
1
The remainder of this sentence in the statute contemplates conditions under which
municipalities can recover demolition costs from property owners. Although this scenario is not at
issue, the drafters of the ordinance realized that a property owner may not receive prior notice of an
emergency demolition.
Additionally, the court determined that C.C.O. 3103.09(j), which provides for the
“prompt removal” of structures in the event of an “emergency,” did not “obviate the need
for prior notice” found in C.C.O. 3103.09(h)(6) and 367.04(b).
{¶13} Upon review, we find that the court erred as a matter of law in interpreting
the above cited statutes and ordinances. Our reasoning follows.
{¶14} When construing a statute or ordinance, we are guided by several
principles. One of the basic rules is that subsections of a statute do not exist in a
vacuum, and statutes are to be read in their entirety. D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty.
Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 19. A second
rule is that “we must * * * review the statutory language, reading undefined words and
phrases in context and construing them in accordance with the rules of grammar and
common usage.” State ex rel. Portage Lakes Edn. Assn. v. State Emp. Rels. Bd., 95
Ohio St.3d 533, 2002-Ohio-2839, 769 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 36.
{¶15} Generally, notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the demolition of
property by a municipality is required. Cleveland v. Bedol, 8th Dist. No. 93061,
2010-Ohio-1978. See C.C.O. 3103.09(h)(6); 367.04(b). This applies to “insecure,
unsafe, or structurally defective buildings.” R.C. 715.26(B); C.C.O. 3103.09(h)(6).
{¶16} However, C.C.O. 3103.09(j) clearly creates an exception to the general
rule of notice. This subsection is titled “Cases of Emergency,” and is set apart from the
general section that authorizes the City to demolish a home for noncompliance with the
building code after proper notice. C.C.O. 3103.09(j) states in pertinent part as follows:
“Cases of Emergency. In cases of emergency that, in the opinion of the Director,
involve immediate danger to human life or health, the Director shall promptly cause the
building, structure or a portion of those to be made safe or removed * * *.”
{¶17} Additionally, R.C. 715.26(B) states that, in the event of an emergency,
notice is no longer mandatory; rather, it becomes discretionary. “If any emergency
exists, as determined by [the City], notice may be given * * * less than thirty days prior to
such removal * * *. If for any reason notice is not given * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶18} A common definition for the word emergency is “an unforeseen
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action.”
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 407 (11th Ed.2006).
{¶19} In Youngstown v. Huffman, 7th Dist. No. 10 MA 72, 2011-Ohio-4753, the
Seventh District Court of Appeals of Ohio analyzed an adminstrative appeal similar to the
case at hand. Huffman’s house was demolished by the city of Youngstown in July 2007
after a fire, and Huffman alleged that Youngstown failed to comply with the relevant
ordinances and code sections regarding notice. At the hearing, Youngstown presented
evidence that the city followed its procedure under the emergency demolition ordinances,
Youngstown Codified Ordinances 1525.02 and 1525.05. Huffman, ¶ 6-17.
{¶20} The Huffman court found that if the city of Youngstown categorized the
property as a safety concern under the ordinance, then notice was required.
However, under Youngstown Codified Ordinance 1525.05, when a building
is in a state of emergency, such that there is “actual and immediate danger
of failure or fire or collapse of [it] or any part thereof so as to endanger life
or property,” then the City may take action “whether the [notice] procedure
elsewhere in this chapter has been instituted or not.” Therefore, in
emergency situations, the City may act to demolish a building without
following the notice procedures found in Youngstown Codified Ordinance
1525.02.
Id. at ¶ 31.
{¶21} Furthermore, the Huffman court found that the “lawful demolition” did not
violate due process.
[B]ecause the City determined the condition of the property was an
emergency, it proceeded with demolition pursuant to Youngstown Codified
Ordinance 1525.05, which does not require notice. Thus, there were no
due process requirements the City had to meet before demolishing
Huffman’s property.
Id. at ¶ 39.
{¶22} In conclusion, we find that, in emergency situations, C.C.O. 3103.09(j)
creates an exception to the general rule that notice is required prior to demolition of
property. Our analysis is bolstered by R.C. 715.26(B), Huffman, and common sense.
Assignments of error one, two, three, and four are sustained. Assignment of error five is
moot. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
{¶23} Judgment reversed and case remanded to trial court for reinstatement of the
Board’s decision.
It is, therefore, considered that said appellant recover of said appellee its costs
herein.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, PRESIDING JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR