[Cite as State v. Walker, 2012-Ohio-604.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 95974
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DARREN WALKER
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
APPLICATION DENIED
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CR-536762
Application for Reopening
Motion No. 450223
RELEASE DATE: February 15, 2012
FOR APPELLANT
Darren Walker
Inmate No. 592-744
Mansfield Correctional Inst.
1150 N. Main Street
Mansfield, OH 44901
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Mark J. Mahoney
Daniel T. Van
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
{¶1} On December 9, 2011, the applicant, Darren Walker, pursuant to App.R.
26(B), applied to reopen this court’s judgment in State v. Walker, 8th Dist. No. 95974,
2011-Ohio-4239, 2011 WL 3806017, in which this court affirmed Walker’s convictions
for two counts of rape, two counts of kidnapping, and gross sexual imposition. Walker
maintains that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise various arguments.
For the following reasons, this court denies the application to reopen.
{¶2} App.R. 26(B)(1) and (2)(b) require applications claiming ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel to be filed within 90 days from journalization of the
decision unless the applicant shows good cause for filing at a later time. The December
2011 application was filed 106 days after this court’s decision on August 25, 2011.
Thus, it is untimely on its face. In an effort to establish good cause, Walker argues that
he did not have his transcripts and that he had trouble with the prison library in doing
research.
{¶3} However, these do not establish good cause for untimely filing an application
to reopen. This court has repeatedly held that difficulty in obtaining the transcript does
not constitute good cause. In State v. Towns , 8th Dist. No. 71244, 1997 WL 661883
(Oct. 23, 1997), reopening disallowed 2000 WL 574470 (May 4, 2000), the applicant
endeavored to show good cause for untimely filing by arguing that his counsel was
uncooperative and refused to send him any documents concerning the case. This court
rejected that argument, ruling that “being a layman and experiencing delays in obtaining
records related to one’s conviction are not sufficient bases for establishing good cause for
untimely filing of an application for reopening.” (Slip Op. at 3.) State v. Bussey, 8th
Dist. No. 75301, 1999 WL 1087494 (Dec. 2, 1999), reopening disallowed 2000 WL
1146811 (Aug. 8, 2000); City of Newburgh Heights v. Chauncey, 8th Dist. No. 75465,
1999 WL 608801 (Aug. 12, 1999), reopening disallowed 2000 WL 33126876 (Oct. 20,
2000); State v. Blackmon, 8th Dist. No. 48787, 1985 WL 8563 (July 18, 1985), reopening
disallowed 2000 WL 1901274 (Oct. 25, 2000); State v. Sanchez, 8th Dist. No. 62796,
1994 WL 258669 (June 9, 1994), reopening disallowed 2001 WL 931654 (Aug. 16,
2001); State v. Chandler, 8th Dist. No. 59764, 1992 WL 41856 (Mar. 5, 1992), reopening
disallowed, 2001 WL 931661 (Aug. 13, 2001) — counsel’s delays in sending applicant
the transcript and refused access to parts of the transcript did not state good cause.
{¶4} Furthermore, the courts have also repeatedly rejected the claim that limited
access to legal materials states good cause for untimely filing. Prison riots, lockdowns,
and other library limitations have been rejected as constituting good cause. State v.
Tucker, 73 Ohio St.3d 152, 1995-Ohio-2, 652 N.E.2d 720; State v. Kaszas, 8th Dist. Nos.
72546 and 72547, 1998 WL 598530 (Sept. 10, 1998), reopening disallowed, 2000 WL
1195676 (Aug. 14, 2000); State v. Hickman, 8th Dist. No. 72341, 1998 WL 213166 (Apr.
30, 1998), reopening disallowed, 2000 WL 1901272 (Dec. 13, 2000), and State v. Turner,
8th Dist. No. 55960, 1989 WL 139488 (Nov. 16, 1989), reopening disallowed, 2001 WL
1001014 (Aug. 20, 2001). Untimeliness alone is sufficient to dismiss the application.
{¶5} Moreover, Walker did not support his application with a “sworn statement of
the basis for the claim that appellate counsel’s representation was deficient” as required
by App.R. 26(B)(2)(d).
Accordingly, this court denies the application.
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., AND
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR