[Cite as Grimm v. Lynch, 2011-Ohio-5189.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96712
ROBERT GRIMM
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
BRIAN LYNCH, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-744331
BEFORE: Keough, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Rocco, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 6, 2011
FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Grimm, pro se
510 Locklie Drive
Highland Heights, OH 44143
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
BRIAN LYNCH AND JOHN RUSNOV
Frank J. Groh-Wargo
Frank J. Groh-Wargo Co., LPA
2 Berea Commons, Suite 215
Berea, OH 44017
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶ 1} This cause came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to
App.R. 11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1, the trial court records and briefs of counsel. The purpose
of an accelerated appeal is to allow the appellate court to render a brief and conclusory
opinion. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 463
N.E.2d 655; App.R. 11.1(E).
{¶ 2} Plaintiff-appellant, Robert Grimm (“Grimm”), appeals the trial court’s
decision granting the motion to dismiss his complaint filed by defendants-appellees, Brian
Lynch (“Lynch”) and John Rusnov (“Rusnov”) (collectively “appellees”). Donald Mull
(“Mull”) was also named as a defendant in the complaint.1
{¶ 3} The facts of this case arise from an appraisal conducted by defendants for
the purpose of a sheriff’s sale of Grimm’s property in connection with a foreclosure
action pending in Cuyahoga County Court of Commons Pleas case number CV-609684
(“foreclosure case”).
{¶ 4} In February 2010, the plaintiff in the foreclosure case, Parkview Federal
Savings, ordered the Clerk of Courts to refer Grimm’s property to sheriff’s sale, and the
Clerk issued an order of sale in March 2010. In April, three appraisers (not defendants)
assessed the value of Grimm’s property at $300,000. Grimm moved to reject the land
appraisal. That appraisal was subsequently rendered moot when Grimm filed for
bankruptcy. After the bankruptcy stay, Parkview again directed Grimm’s property to
sheriff’s sale. The Clerk issued an order of sale with reappraisal in October 2010. The
county appointed three different real estate appraisers — appellees and Mull — to assess
the value of Grimm’s property. They also appraised the property at $300,000. Grimm
moved to reject this appraisal in November.
{¶ 5} Prior to the hearing on his motion, the sheriff sold the property for the
minimum bid of $200,000. On December 27, 2010, Grimm then filed his complaint in
Mull did not file an answer to Grimm’s complaint with the trial court, nor has he entered an
1
appearance in the appeal before this court.
this action, maintaining that the defendants knowingly appraised his property lower than
its true value and thus caused him damages. Lynch and Rusnov moved for dismissal.
{¶ 6} In the foreclosure case, the court granted Grimm’s motion to stay
confirmation of sheriff’s sale pending a ruling on his motion to reject the appraisal. A
hearing on the motion was held on March 22, 2011. However, on March 25, 2011, the
trial court in this case granted appellees’ motion to dismiss.
{¶ 7} Grimm now appeals, raising two assignments of error.
{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Grimm contends that the trial court erred in
dismissing the case. Appellees moved to dismiss Grimm’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R.
12(B)(1), (2), and (6).
{¶ 9} Under our de novo standard of review, we find that dismissal was proper
under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Brown v. Bur. of Workers’
Comp., Cuyahoga App. No. 96209, 2011-Ohio-3695, ¶7; Herakovic v. Catholic Diocese
of Cleveland, Cuyahoga App. No. 85467, 2005-Ohio-5985.
{¶ 10} The standard for the trial court to apply to a dismissal motion made
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is whether the plaintiff has alleged any cause of action that
the court has authority to decide. McHenry v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 56,
62, 587 N.E.2d 414.
{¶ 11} In this case, the subject of Grimm’s complaint was already in dispute in the
foreclosure case, thus invoking the jurisdictional-priority rule. This “rule applies even
when the causes of action are not the same if the suits present part of the same ‘whole
issue.’” State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2011-Ohio-4082, ___
N.E.2d ___, ¶29, citing State ex rel. Sellers v. Gerken (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 115, 117,
647 N.E.2d 807; see, also, John Weenink & Sons Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common
Pleas (1948), 150 Ohio St. 349, 82 N.E.2d 730. Grimm’s complaint and the motion to
reject filed in the foreclosure case involved the same issue: whether the appraisal by
appellees and Mull was in conformity with Chapter 2329 of the Revised Code. The issue
of the lawfulness of the appraisal was already under the jurisdiction of the foreclosure
case when Grimm filed his complaint against appellees and Mull.
{¶ 12} Finally, although only Lynch and Rusnov moved for dismissal, we find that
lack of subject matter jurisdiction applies equally to Mull because all three defendants
appraised Grimm’s property.
{¶ 13} Having concluded dismissal was proper for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, we need not address the other grounds for dismissal raised in the trial court.
Accordingly, Grimm’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 14} In Grimm’s second assignment of error, he contends that the trial court
erred in not setting forth any facts or conclusions to afford meaningful appellate review
when it granted appellees’ motion to dismiss. It is well settled that the trial court has no
obligation to issue a written opinion when granting a Civ.R. 12 motion to dismiss.
Kovacs v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (Apr. 21, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65295, citing Vrabel v.
Vrabel (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 263, 459 N.E.2d 1298. Dismissal of a complaint in
response to a Civ.R. 12 motion without explanation does not violate the due process and
due course of law provisions of the federal and state constitutions. Vrabel at 272.
Accordingly, Grimm’s second assignment is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR