[Cite as Hawkins v. Green, 2011-Ohio-5175.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96205
SANFORD HAWKINS
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
MICHELLE GREEN
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-706500
BEFORE: Stewart, J., Blackmon, P.J., and Boyle, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 6, 2011
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Daniel Walker
White & Walter Co., L.P.A.
75 Public Square, Suite 1310
Cleveland, OH 44113
FOR APPELLEE
Michelle Green, Pro Se
1758 Sunset Drive
Richmond Hts., OH 44143
MELODY J. STEWART, J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Sanford Hawkins, appeals from the trial court’s entry of
judgment for defendant-appellee, Michelle Green, in an action alleging breach of an oral
contract for residential remodeling services. Hawkins complains that the trial court erred
in finding that: (1) his contract performance was incomplete, (2) he failed to prove
claimed damages by a preponderance of the evidence, and (3) Green was not in breach of
the oral agreement. Hawkins also contends that these determinations were against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 2} Initially, Green and contractor Wilson Jones negotiated and signed a written
contract in the amount of $16,878 for home improvement services to be rendered. Green
gave Jones a down payment of $8,000. Hawkins had referred Jones to Green, since
Hawkins and Jones were longtime friends and alleged business partners. Hawkins was
also present when the written contract was entered into, but was not a signatory. He
participated in the undertaking as a project manager.
{¶ 3} In April 2009, Green terminated Jones for poor workmanship. Thereafter,
Hawkins expressed remorse for the resulting predicament and allegedly entered into an
oral agreement with Green to complete the home refurbishing project, utilizing Jones’s
previous written contract as a template for tasks to be finished.
{¶ 4} Hawkins enlisted numerous subcontractors to assist him in completing the
project, but did not provide receipts to Green describing the labor and materials
expended. Thereafter, Hawkins presented Green with a close replication of the original
written contract and entitled it “itemized final invoice for work performed.” The
invoice was for the amount of $8,338, payable upon receipt. The invoice, dated
September 8, 2009, further indicated that the work was completed on July 2, 2009, that
Green had prepaid an amount of $2,000, and then another $1,000 after presentment, with
a balance owed of $7,338. Green balked at making any additional payments, and on
October 9, 2010, Hawkins filed suit.
{¶ 5} A bench trial was held on November 16, 2010, to determine if a contract
existed, and if so, the terms of the contract. Hawkins’s account of the verbal contractual
terms wholly conflicted with Green’s account. Hawkins testified that he started the
project under the assumption that his compensation would be the outstanding balance on
the original written contract ($8,878) along with out-of-pocket expenses, upon
completion. Hawkins also called witness Jeffrey Martin, a worker who aided in the
renovation. Martin testified that he was present during a discussion between Green and
Hawkins where Green agreed to compensate Hawkins in the amount remaining on the
written agreement upon completion. Hawkins further claimed that his agreement with
Green entailed carrying out the tasks that remained on the contract [except for the
bathroom], with payment due upon completion. He also testified that he had completed
the unfinished remodeling projects in their entirety, and then offered into evidence the
invoice dated September 8, 2009.
{¶ 6} Green, proceeding pro se, did not offer any sworn testimony. She made an
opening statement, conducted cross-examinations, made a closing argument, and entered
into evidence a copy of the original written contract along with cancelled checks and a
money order, paid to Hawkins and Martin, in the amount of $3,141. She also
authenticated and submitted into evidence receipts for construction materials that she had
obtained from counsel for Hawkins, in the amount of $2,705.64. While doing so, Green
stated to the court that she had doubts about the accuracy of one particular receipt related
to a floor refinishing project, since the job had not been completed.
{¶ 7} The trial court found that an oral contract for services did exist. Testimony
from Hawkins and receipts in evidence established that Green had incrementally
compensated Hawkins prior to the alleged completion of the contract and had additionally
paid Hawkins again after he presented the invoice. However, the court found that the
evidence in the record, consisting of Hawkins’s testimony and a single invoice, did not
support his contention that he had completely performed the contract. The court also
found that he had not established the damages element of his breach of contract claim
through credible evidence. Nevertheless, the court concluded that Hawkins’s
documented expenditures for construction materials, evidenced by receipts in the amount
of $2,705.64, was sufficient to prove damages. Green’s cumulative payments to him of
$3,141, however, exceeded Hawkins’s demonstrated expenses. Therefore, since Green
had paid Hawkins an amount greater than his damages as supported by the receipts, the
court determined that Green was not obligated to pay Hawkins any further money
pursuant to their agreement.
{¶ 8} Hawkins, in his sole assignment of error, complains that the trial court’s
ruling in favor of Green was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 9} On a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence in a civil case, we
neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Our duty is to
determine whether there exists competent and credible evidence in the record upon which
the fact-finder could base its decision. Abernethy v. Abernethy, 8th Dist. No. 92708,
2010-Ohio-435. “Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to
all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being
against the manifest weight of the evidence.” C.E. Morris v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54
Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578, at syllabus.
{¶ 10} “[T]o prove a breach of contract claim a plaintiff must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a contract existed, (2) the plaintiff fulfilled his
obligations, (3) the defendant failed to fulfill his obligations, and (4) damages resulted
from this failure.” Circuit Solutions, Inc. v. Mueller Elec. Co., 9th Dist. No.
07CA009139, 2008-Ohio-3048, ¶12. As a general rule, the measure of damages in a
contract action is the sum necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a position
as he would have been had the contract been fully performed. F. Ent., Inc. v. Kentucky
Fried Chicken Corp. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 154, 351 N.E.2d 121. A plaintiff can only be
compensated for damages for breach of contract for “an amount that is established by the
evidence with reasonable certainty.” Kinetico, Inc. v. Indep. Ohio Nail Co. (1985), 19
Ohio App.3d 26, 30, 482 N.E.2d 134.
{¶ 11} In Gadd v. Riddle, 7th Dist. No. 288, 2002-Ohio-1570, ¶2, a contractual
dispute between a residential remodeling contractor and a homeowner, “[a] disagreement
arose between the parties concerning payment of the final amount owing and completion
of the work.” In this instance, the trial court was upheld on appeal when it relied only
upon “competent, credible evidence,” in the form of testimony, material lists, and
itemized lists of expenses to calculate an amount due under the contract. Id. at 30; see,
also, Yuhanick v. Cooper, 7th Dist. No. 99 CO 37, 2001-Ohio-3202, ¶4 (“time logs for the
labor and receipts for the materials” is competent, credible evidence in support of
damages flowing from breach of oral construction contract).
{¶ 12} Here, while the trial court found that an actionable oral contract existed
between Green and Hawkins, its conclusion that Hawkins failed to fulfill his obligations
pursuant to that contract is based upon competent and credible evidence: the absence of
numerous receipts for claimed labor and materials expenditures. Hawkins did not
produce receipts for materials utilized for repairs and upgrades to cabinetry, electrical
upgrades, tiling, flooring, doors, and gas lines. This in turn cast doubt upon the
accuracy and trustworthiness of his invoice.
{¶ 13} The trial court tallied the receipts presented by Hawkins, as well as
cancelled checks offered into evidence by Green. See Gadd, 7th Dist. No. 288, ¶29
(awarding remodeling contractor difference between his receipts for construction
materials and homeowner’s documented expenditures). An uncomplicated mathematical
calculation of the evidence revealed that Hawkins had been compensated by Green in
excess of his proven expenditures.
{¶ 14} Hawkins’s sole assignment of error is without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant her costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
___________________________________________
MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR