UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 00-11136
__________________
LACY A MAYBERRY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TARRANT COUNTY COMMUNITY SUPERVISION
AND CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT; KEN BARNES;
ROBERT GUNTER; DONALD R SMITH,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth
4:97-CV-933-Y
______________________________________________
March 26, 2002
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This appeal is from a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of an employer in
a race discrimination case. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect
to the appellant’s claim of discrimination arising under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII) and 42
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
U.S.C. § 1981. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the appellant’s retaliation claim under Title
VII and modify it to read with prejudice.
Lacy Mayberry was a probation officer in the Southeast Field Services Unit of the Tarrant
County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (“the Department”). In this position,
he was responsible for the supervision of several hundred misdemeanor probationers. Between 1994
and 1996, Mayberry made several complaints to the Department concerning the treatment of minority
probation officers in his unit. In 1994, Mayberry informed his supervisor, Ken Barnes, and the
Department’s Human Resources Director, Robert Gunter, that he had observed disparate treatment
of minorities within his unit. Specifically, Mayberry asserted that minority officers in the unit (1) were
more often targets for verbal abuse by Barnes and Kim Lowery, Mayberry’s immediate supervisors,
(2) received less assistance from supervisors and were less likely to be assigned student interns, (3)
received larger case loads, and (4) were more often required to perform “housekeeping” tasks. In
October 1995, Mayberry filed a separate grievance against Kim Lowery because she told him during
a heated conversation that “she was gonna wait for my black behind to get off work and then hurt
me.” In August 1996, Mayberry filed a complaint with the EEOC based on these grievances. The
EEOC dismissed the complaint, however, and Mayberry declined to file a private action on his own.
During this period, Mayberry was also the subject of several disciplinary actions. In June
1994, Mayberry received a first level discipline because he failed to report that two of his
probationers did not appear for a scheduled meeting.1 In February 1995, Mayberry received a second
level discipline because one of his probationers filed a complaint alleging that he had engaged her in
1
Mayberry asserts that probation officers commonly fail to report such violations and that
it is exceptionally rare for officers to receive a written reprimand for such an error.
2
an inappropriate conversation concerning her religious beliefs and her relationship with her boyfriend
in violation of the Depart ment’s ethics code. In March 1996, Mayberry received a third level
discipline because another probationer alleged that he made inappropriate comments concerning her
sexual lifestyle.2
In May 1997, a fellow probation officer filed a complaint alleging that Mayberry made
inappropriate sexual remarks to her at work. The Department immediately suspended Mayberry with
pay (later relabeled “administrative leave”) and, one month later, terminated his employment.
Mayberry filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that the Department terminated him based on his
race and in retaliation for his complaints of discrimination. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to
Sue in August 1997. Mayberry also appealed his termination to a panel of Tarrant County district
judges. The panel reinstated Mayberry but declined to award him back pay and ordered the
Department to assign him and the complaining co-worker to different offices.
In November 1997, Mayberry filed a complaint against the Department, Barnes, Gunter, and
Donald Smith alleging various Title VII violations and violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. In
a May 14, 1998 order, the district court dismissed Mayberry’s Title VII claims against the individual
defendants, his § 1983 claims against all defendants, and his § 1981 claims against the Department
and the individual defendants in their official capacities. In a May 14, 1999 order, the district court
granted summary judgment on Mayberry’s § 1981 claims in favor of Gunter and Smith in their
individual capacities. Finally, on June 15, 2000, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
2
According to Mayberry, the probationer did not file the complaint until five months after her
case had been transferred from Mayberry to either Lowery or Barnes. May berry suggests that
Lowery and/or Barnes persuaded the probationer to file the complaint as a means of retaliating
against him for his complaints.
3
of the defendants with respect to Mayberry’s Title VII claim against the Department and his § 1981
claim against Barnes. The court’s June 15 order also dismissed without prejudice Mayberry’s claim
of retaliation against the Department because Mayberry “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
for that claim.” Mayberry filed a notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mayberry appeals the district court’s grant of the appellees’ motion for summary judgment.3
This Court evaluates a district court's decision to grant summary judgment by reviewing the record
under the same standards the district court applied to determine whether summary judgment was
appropriate. Herrera v. Millsap, 862 F.2d 1157, 1159 (5th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the summary
judgment will be affirmed only when this Court is "convinced, after an independent review of the
record, that `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Brooks, Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1358, 1364 (5th Cir. 1987) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Fact questions
must be considered with deference to the nonmovant. Herrera, 862 F.2d at 1159. Thus, if a fact
question is dispositive of a motion for summary judgment, "we must review the facts drawing all
inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion.'" Id. (quoting Brooks, 832 F.2d at 1364).
Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
DISCRIMINATION
3
Mayberry filed the instant lawsuit pro se and later retained counsel who withdrew.
Mayberry filed pro se a brief before this Court. We appointed appellate counsel and will address only
the arguments raised in counsel’s brief. Cf. Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that, in the context of a criminal appeal, an appellant who accepts the assistance of
counsel waives his right to present pro se briefs).
4
The required showing to be made by any Title VII plaintiff is familiar: the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination; upon such a showing, the burden shifts
to the defendant(s) to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged
employment action; if such a showing is made, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the articulated reason was merely a pretext to unlawful discrimination. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
the plaintiff must show: “(1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) that he was qualified for
the position held; (3) that he was discharged from the position; and (4) that he was replaced by
someone outside of the protected group.” Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426
(5th Cir. 2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993).4
The district court held that Mayberry had failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of racial
discrimination because he had failed to demonstrate that he was qualified for the position. We
disagree.5 Mayberry introduced evidence regarding his college degree and prior work experience.
4
The same basic framework applies to claims under Title VII and to claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. See Byers, 209 F.3d at 422 n.1 (“Claims of intentional discrimination brought under Title
VII and Section 1981 require the same pro of to establish liability.” (citingWallace v. Texas Tech
Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996)). The appellees argue that Mayberry abandoned his §
1981 claim on appeal. We find that Mayberry’s brief adequately raises the § 1981 claim against
Barnes in his individual capacity.
5
The appellees argue that Fifth Circuit precedent indicates that an employee may become
unqualified during the course of employment and thus, Mayberry cannot rely on the fact that he was
qualified for the position when he was hired. Mayberry responds that the appellees’ argument
misconstrues his burden and improperly conflates the two distinct inquiries, i.e., prima facie case and
evidence of pretext. Specifically, Mayberry argues that he was not required to negate allegations of
misconduct or unsatisfactory performance as part of his prima facie case. There appears to be
conflicting language in our case law with respect to this issue. In Sreeram v. Louisiana State Univ.
Medical Center, 188 F.3d 314, 318-20 (5th Cir. 1999), this Court indicated that a plaintiff’s poor
5
Before joining the Department as a probation officer in 1992, Mayberry earned a B.A. in sociology
from Angelo State University and worked as a social worker for more than two years at the San
Angelo State School. In addition, Mayberry points to Ken Barnes’s statement in a 1995 performance
review that he “has sufficient knowledge of his job and the law” and his 1997 performance review
which provided that he met expectations and that his job performance had improved. Indeed, the
review board’s decision to reinstate Mayberry after his discharge is evidence that he was qualified for
the position. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, Mayberry brought forth sufficient competent
summary judgment evidence to show that he was qualified for his position as a probation officer.
With respect to the other elements, it is undisputed that Mayberry is a member of a protected group,
that he was discharged from the position, and that he was replaced by someone outside of the
protected group. Mayberry has satisfied his burden of establishing the elements of a prima facie
case.
Thus, the next question is whether Mayberry presented sufficient evidence showing that the
Department’s reasons for firing him were a pretext for discrimination. The Department argues that
it terminated Mayberry “for his failure to comply with the Department work rules, Criminal Justice
Assistance Division (CJAD) Code of Ethics, and the agency’s sexual harassment policy.” Mayberry
performance during her surgical residency outweighed her objective qualifications as a matter of law.
Previously, however, in Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1505-06 (5th Cir.
1988), this Court explained that placing plaintiff’s qualifications in issue at both the prima facie case
and pretext stages in termination cases is redundant. We explicitly stated that a plaintiff challenging
his termination or demotion can ordinarily establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
that she continued to possess the necessary qualifications for her position at the time of the adverse
action. Id. at 1506. We explained that this meant simply that the plaintiff “had not suffered physical
disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit
for the position for which he was hired.” Id. at 1506 n.3. In any event, we need not tarry here
because Mayberry brought forth sufficient evidence to establish he was qualified under either analysis.
6
apparently concedes (and we agree) that the appellees met their burden of articulating a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the challenged employment action.
Mayberry contends t hat he presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a jury
question concerning whether the Department’s reasons were pretextual. The district court granted
the Depart ment’s summary judgment motion, holding in the alternative that Mayberry “failed to
present competent . . . evidence demonstrating that Defendants intentionally discriminated against him
on the basis of [h]is race.” The co urt noted that Mayberry’s affidavit describing instances of
discrimination was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact because it “evidences only
his subjective belief that he has been discriminated against on the basis of his race.”
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination and the employer offers non-
discriminatory reasons for terminating the plaintiff, “the question for summary judgment is whether
a rational fact finder could find that the employer discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of
race.” Pratt v. City of Houston, Tex., 247 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir. 2001). See also Crawford v.
Formosa Plastics Corp., Louisiana, 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The ultimate determination,
in every case, is whether, viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, a
reasonable factfinder could infer discrimination.” (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000)). Although the Supreme Court has noted that it is “permissible
for the trier of fact to infer t he ult imate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's
explanation,” the Court also noted that an employer may be entitled to judgment as a matter of law
where “no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.” Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 148. For example, an employer may be entitled to judgment as a matter of law “if the record
conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the
7
plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there
was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.” Id.
Mayberry asserts that supervisors in his unit targeted minority employees for greater verbal
abuse, less assistance, and larger caseloads than non-minority employees. Mayberry’s observations
are fairly generalized, contested by the Department, and find no independent support in the record.
In short, these observations constitute little more than Mayberry’s subjective belief that the
Department discriminated against him. As a general rule, “‘a subjective belief of discrimination’” is
insufficient to support a discrimination claim only where “‘it alone st[ands] against unimpeached and
uncontradicted opposing testimony.’” Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 590 n.7 (5th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted). Mayberry argues that he also presented evidence that the Department’s
justifications for his discharge are false--that is, evidence that he was not actually fired for violations
of Department rules. Specifically, Mayberry relies on a 1996 performance review indicating that the
“overall quality of Lacy’s work has improved significantly”6 and a 1997 review noting satisfactory
performance and continued improvement. Although Mayberry did receive relatively positive
evaluations in 1996 and 1997, his performance is essentially unrelated to the sexual harassment charge
that was the immediate cause of his termination.
Mayberry also challenges the motivations behind the Department’s disciplinary actions against
him. In his affidavit, Mayberry asserts that the Department disregarded his explanations for the rules
violations for which he was disciplined and, instead, credited the uncorroborated assertions of the
complaining probationers and co-worker. Further, according to Mayberry, non-minority employees
typically received the benefit of the doubt when faced with similar allegations of misconduct.
6
In 1995, Mayberry’s evaluation indicated that he was performing “below expectations.”
8
Mayberry also alleges that the appellees treated him more harshly than they treated similarly situated
non-black employees. Specifically, he asserts that the appellees investigated similar complaints
against two white male employees (Bob Williams and Stephan Ateek), and those employees were not
suspended or terminated. The defendants responded that Stephan Ateek was not white.7 The
defendants further assert that Ateek was not similarly situated in that the charge of sexual harassment
was not sustained after an investigation. With respect to Bob Williams, the defendants assert that
Mayberry, who was charged with sexual harassment, was not similarly situated because Williams was
charged with making inappropriate racial and sexist remarks. After an investigation, Williams was
disciplined and demoted; however, the board of judges reinstated him to his prior position. We
conclude that Mayberry has not shown that he was similarly situated to the other employees inasmuch
as there is no indication that they had disciplinary histories sufficiently similar to Mayberry’s. See
Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 304-05 (5th Cir. 2000) (requiring “nearly identical”
circumstances and noting that “striking differences” between two situations accounted for different
treatment), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
In further support of his discrimination claim, Mayberry identifies two derogatory remarks
made by Lowery and Gunter8 and the fact that the Department notified Mayberry of his termination
7
It is not clear but it appears Ateek is a non-black minority.
8
As set forth previously, Lowery told Mayberry in 1996 that “she was gonna wait for my
black behind to get off work and then hurt me.” Also, in a separate incident after Mayberry was
reinstated in 1997, Gunter (who is an African-American male) told Mayberry that he was “tired of
black officers complaining” and that they should “find another job” because the complaints would not
be heeded. The Department responds that Lowery was no longer Mayberry’s supervisor at the time
of his discharge and that the remarks are insufficient to create an issue of material fact because neither
Gunter nor Lowery “possessed leverage, or exerted influence, over the decision making authority”
responsible for Mayberry’s termination. Of course, the Supreme Court has explained that requiring
evidence of discriminatory animus to be "in the direct context" of the employment decision is
9
on June 19th, the date on which Texas celebrates the “Juneteenth” holiday recognizing the freeing of
slaves in that state.
After reviewing the record and briefs, we conclude that Mayberry has failed to bring forth
"sufficient evidence" for a jury to reasonably conclude that the Department’s reasons for termination
are unworthy of credence and are a pretext for discrimination. See Crawford, 234 F.3d at 902-03.
More specifically, in light of Mayberry's admission of the conduct with respect to the first disciplinary
action and the fact that two probationers under his supervision and a co-worker accused him of
improper conduct in the work place, we are not persuaded that Mayberry presented sufficient
evidence to refute each of the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination to raise a
genuine issue of fact regarding whether the reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in granting the Department’s motion for summary judgment with respect
to the discrimination claims.
RETALIATION CLAIM
In its order granting motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed Mayberry’s
retaliation claim without prejudice because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
However, as Mayberry asserts, his allegations of retaliation stem from earlier charges of
discrimination and his subsequent EEOC filing. Accordingly, “it [was] unnecessary for [him] to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to urging a retaliation claim growing out of an earlier charge[.]
[T]he district court has ancillary jurisdiction to hear such a claim when it grows out of an
administrative charge that is properly before the court.” Gupta v. East Texas State University, 654
F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). Thus, the district court erred in dismissing the retaliation claim
incorrect. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151.
10
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Mayberry further asserts that the district court’s erroneous determination regarding
exhaustion necessitates reversal of the summary judgment regarding the claim of retaliation. We are
not persuaded. “We may affirm a summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even
if it is different from that relied on by the district court.” Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp.,
255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001).
The appellees contend that the retaliation claim involving denial of a raise was not properly
before the district court. We agree. In his first amended complaint, Mayberry alleged that he was
denied a raise after filing his 1996 charge of discrimination with the EEOC. With respect to his 1996
charge, the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue on May 3, 1996, informing Mayberry that he must
file suit within 90 days from the receipt or his right to sue would be lost. See 42 U.S.C. § 2003-
5(f)(1). The instant lawsuit was filed November 6, 1997, well beyond the 90-day period, and
Mayberry does not argue that the period was tolled. See Espinoza v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 754
F.2d 1247, 1248 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, Mayberry’s claim of retaliation involving the denial of
a raise is time-barred and should have been dismissed with prejudice. See Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-
CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the dismissal of a time-barred claim
is with prejudice). We therefore modify the district court’s dismissal of the retaliatory denial of a
raise claim to be with prejudice.
Mayberry next asserts that although the defendants explicitly moved for summary judgment
on his retaliatory claim based on the denial of a raise, they did not move for summary judgment based
on the retaliatory discharge claim. Mayberry thus argues that the district court erred in sua sponte
granting summary judgment with respect to the retaliatory discharge claim because it failed to afford
11
Mayberry notice or opportunity to respond.9 The record reflects otherwise. On December 11, 1998,
the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment that contained a section entitled
“Mayberry Has Not Stated a Prima Facie Case of Intentional Discrimination or Retaliation Against
the Individual Defendants.” In that section, the defendants argued that because Mayberry was
terminated for “clearly not meeting the expectations of his employer,” he had failed to establish a
prima facie case for discrimination. The defendants concluded the section by asserting that “[f]or
the same reasons he has not established a causal connection between the termination and his filing an
EEOC charge of harassment.” Under these circumstances, we believe that the defendants sufficiently
moved for summary judgment with respect to Mayberry’s claim of retaliatory discharge. Thus,
Mayberry incorrectly asserts that the district court sua sponte granted summary judgment with
respect to this claim.
We now turn to the merits of the retaliatory discharge claim. To demonstrate a claim for
retaliation, an employee must prove (1) that they engaged in an activity that was protected; (2) an
adverse employment action occurred; and (3) a causal connection existed between the participation
9
The appellees respond that Mayberry has “waived any argument regarding his retaliatory
discharge claim” by failing to properly raise his objections in district court. This Court has held that
“where the party against whom summary judgment is granted moves for reconsideration under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), but does not, in that motion, challenge the procedural propriety of the summary
judgment ruling, our court has reviewed the asserted procedural irregularity, raised for the first time
on appeal, only for plain error.” Love v. National Medical Enterprises, 230 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir.
2000) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). We note that this requirement is applicable only to
procedural challenges and is not applicable to challenges regarding the merits of the claims. Id.
Mayberry, proceeding pro se at that particular time during the district court proceedings, did not
precisely raise the instant procedural objection in his motion for new trial. However, he clearly
argued that the district court’s grant of summary judgment was premature in light of his request for
discovery. In any event, as set forth below, because we determine that the appellees had properly
moved for summary judgment with respect to Mayberry’s claim of retaliatory discharge, we need not
determine whether the motion for new trial adequately challenged the procedural propriety of the
district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment.
12
in the activity and the adverse employment action. Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc, 139 F.3d
532, 540 (5t h Cir. 1998). The framework for analyzing a retaliation claim is identical to the
framework utilized in the context of employment discrimination. Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 380
(5th Cir. 2001). “[O]nce the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action.” Id. (citation omitted). Lastly, the plaintiff must “‘adduce sufficient evidence that would
permit a reasonable trier o f fact to find that the proffered reason is a pretext for retaliation.’” Id.
(quoting Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998)). We have
explained that to meet this final burden the plaintiff must demonstrate that the adverse employment
action would not have occurred “but for” the protected activity. Id.11
First, Mayberry’s allegation of retaliatory discharge stems from earlier charges of
discrimination and his subsequent EEOC filing. This Court has explained that filing an administrative
complaint is clearly protected activity. Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that “[t]here can be no question that [the employee’s] retaliation claims satisfy the first element of the
analysis, filing an administrative complaint is clearly protected activity”). Thus, the first prong is
satisfied. Second, adverse employment actions include “hiring, granting leave, discharging,
promoting, and compensating.” Dollis, 77 F.3d at 782. Mayberry’s discharge satisfies the second
prong.
Third, the question is whether Mayberry demonstrated that a causal connection existed
11
Although Mayberry correctly contends that he need not show “but for” causation to
establish a prima facie case, he is required to make such a showing once the defendants have
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. Evans v. City of Houston, 246
F.3d 344, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2001).
13
between the filing of the EEOC charges and his termination. Mayberry offers the following evidence
or assertions to est ablish a causal connection. During a heated discussion with his immediate
supervisor, Kim Lowery, she stated that she “would wait until it was time for his `black behind’ to
go home and she `would hurt’ him.” Lowery denied saying “black behind,” apparently claiming that
she misspoke or Mayberry misunderstood her. After being reinstated after termination, another
supervisor, Gunter, stated he was “‘tired of black officers complaining’ and they should just ‘find
another job’ because nothing was going to come of their complaints.” Gunter also queried “what
were the black officers going to do, ‘let the white management drive the black officers crazy?’” Upon
returning after his termination, supervisor Barnes informed Mayberry that “they had won, and he had
lost.” While the appeal of his termination was pending, Mayberry claims a Dallas County probation
officer informed him that the Department was actively soliciting complaints against him from
probationers and other probation officers.
Assuming for the purposes of this appeal that Mayberry has demonstrated a prima facie case
of retaliatory discharge, the burden shifts to the appellees to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for Mayberry’s discharge. In the district court, the defendants adduced the following
evidence: Mayberry (1) received a first level discipline on June 23, 1994 for failing to timely report
two probation violations prior to the expiration of the probationers’ terms of supervision; (2) received
a second level discipline on February 14, 1996 for engaging in an inappropriate conversation with a
probationer concerning her cohabitation with a man and her religious beliefs; (3) received a third
level discipline on March 15, 1996 for again engaging in an inappropriate conversation with another
probationer concerning her sexual orientation and religious beliefs. Additionally, the Department
received a complaint against Mayberry from a fellow probation officer alleging sexual harassment.
14
After an investigation, Mayberry was terminated. We conclude that the appellees have shouldered
their burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Mayberry’s discharge. We
further conclude that, in light of his disciplinary history and the complaints levied against him by both
probationers under his supervision and a co-worker, Mayberry has failed to shoulder his burden of
demonstrating that his discharge would not have occurred but for his charge of discrimination.
Therefore, we modify the district court’s dismissal of the retaliation claim to read dismissed with
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment with
respect to Mayberry’s claims of discrimination. The district court’s dismissal of Mayberry’s
retaliation claim is MODIFIED to read DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. AFFIRMED AS
MODIFIED.
15