[Cite as Pinkney v. Salett, 2011-Ohio-4121.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96130
PAMELA M. PINKNEY
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
DON M. SALETT
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Court
Case No. D-333484
BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Kilbane, A.J., and Boyle, J.
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RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 18, 2011
FOR APPELLEE
Pamela M. Pinkney, pro se
c/o P.O. Box 5672
Cleveland, Ohio 44101
FOR APPELLANT
Don M. Salett, pro se
10702 Kinsman Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44104
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} This is an accelerated appeal brought pursuant to App.R. 11.1
and Loc.R. 11.1.
{¶ 2} Rev. Pamela M. Pinkney (“Pinkney”) appeals from the decision of
the trial court, denying her motion for a domestic violence civil protection
order. Pinkney argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant her a
civil protection order and that such error has placed her life and the lives of
her four children at risk. Finding no merit to this appeal, we affirm the
decision of the trial court.
{¶ 3} In putting forth her assigned errors, appellant fails to cite to any
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legal authority for her claims, a failure that allows this court to disregard
her arguments. App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7); State v. Martin (July 12,
1999), Warren App. No. CA99-01-003, citing Meerhoff v. Huntington Mtge.
Co. (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 164, 658 N.E.2d 1109; Siemientkowski v. State
Farm Ins., Cuyahoga App. No. 85323, 2005-Ohio-4295. “If an argument
exists that can support this assigned error, it is not this court’s duty to root it
out.” Cardone v. Cardone (May 6, 1998), Summit App. Nos. 18349 and
18673.
{¶ 4} Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court finds that the trial
court did not err in denying Pinkney’s petition for a civil protection order.
In the magistrate’s opinion filed November 4, 2010, the court specifically
found that the basis of Pinkney’s fear for her safety arose from past acts that
occurred prior to the parties’ separation in 2002. The magistrate further
found it inconsistent with Pinkney’s allegations of fear that she had
requested and was provided with a ride from the airport from Salett and that
the two were together in a restaurant for their son’s birthday party — both
without incident. Lastly, the court found that Pinkney failed to establish
any evidence of any contemporary act of domestic violence.
{¶ 5} While a court may consider past acts to determine whether the
incident at issue constitutes domestic violence, the issuance of a civil
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protection order cannot be based solely on previous incidents of alleged
domestic violence. Solomon v. Solomon, 157 Ohio App.3d 807,
2004-Ohio-2486, 813 N.E.2d 918; Bruner v. Bruner, Mahoning App. No.
99CA285, 2000-Ohio-2554. Rather, the petitioner must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that an act of domestic violence occurred on
the date set forth on the petition for a civil protection order. Id.;
Eichenberger v. Eichenberger (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 809, 816, 613 N.E.2d
678.
{¶ 6} The trial court’s reasoning, to which we must give deference,
indicated that appellant did not fear for serious physical harm from appellee
on the date set forth in the petition and that past acts of domestic violence,
without anything more, was not enough to warrant a present civil protection
order. Solomon. As a result, any past acts committed by Salett are not
part of the equation in determining whether the civil protection order should
have been granted. While it is true that past acts may be used to establish
a genuine fear of violence in the present situation, there must be an
indication that the person was fearful in that present situation. See
Eichenberger.
{¶ 7} We cannot find error in the trial court’s decision to reject the
magistrate’s decision.
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{¶ 8} Pinkney’s assignments of error are overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said lower court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR
Appendix
Assignments of Error:
“This matter is found to be in error in many ways such as the
fact that I approached this situation believing that there were
people in place who value my life and the lives of my children
etc. I could call the role on many detriments that this has
caused me but time will not allow for such. The fact that in
each instance that I have come to this court and gone to the
lower courts on behalf of my children and me only to be told
that the law does not accommodate us is an error within itself.”
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“I have followed procedure after procedure while trying to
protect and provide for myself and my children even as I am
doing right now only to be tied up in policy and procedure that
closes doors, hearts, minds, hand, ears, and mouths to the
value of my time and life.”
“The technical errors would be those of the fact that I have
gone before the proper authorities previously to get Civil
Protection Orders and not only have they been rejected but the
one I did finally receive was not enforced as it should have
been which caused me to have to flee to another state with four
of my children to try to be safe. Then the order was revoked
portraying me to be the criminal.”
“Another technical error would be the fact that the courts in
this county and state have me at risk right now caught up in
technicalities and formalities instead of taking what I have
said to be the truth.”