[Cite as Hart v. Ridge Tool Co., 2013-Ohio-1487.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
GRADY HART C.A. No. 12CA010234
Appellant
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
v. ENTERED IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
RIDGE TOOL CO., et al. COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
CASE Nos. 06CV148324
Appellees 09CV164536
10CV169629
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: April 15, 2013
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Grady Hart appeals the decision of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas.
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
I.
{¶2} This case arises out of an injury suffered by Mr. Hart during his employment at
Ridge Tool Company, a self-insured employer. Mr. Hart made a workers’ compensation claim
seeking coverage for depression arising from the injury. He also filed a second claim seeking
coverage for opiate dependence. Both claims eventually came to the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas on appeals by Ridge Tool from decisions of the Industrial Commission, and
protracted settlement negotiations ensued. On April 24, 2012, the parties informed the court
below that they had reached an agreement. The lower court entered judgment in both cases,
ordering that Mr. Hart could no longer pursue his claims for opiate dependence or depression.
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{¶3} Mr. Hart has appealed, raising a single assignment of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY I HAVE RESEARCHED THE
AUTHORITIES AND CASES ON THIS BRIEF. I DO NOT ALWAYS
UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHAT I READ, IT [(SIC)] SOME AUTHORITIES
COULD BE INCORRECT. ACCORDING TO WHAT I HAVE
UNDERSTOOD UNDER THE LAW I DO HAVE A RIGHT TO A TRIAL.
{¶4} While Mr. Hart’s precise arguments are difficult to follow, it is clear that he
asserts that the lower court should not have entered judgment and terminated his cases in the
manner it did. We agree.
{¶5} We note that Mr. Hart has appeared pro se. It is well-established that pro se
litigants should be granted reasonable leeway, and their motions and pleadings should be
construed liberally so as to decide the issues on the merits as opposed to technicalities. See, e.g.,
Pascual v. Pascual, 9th Dist. No. 12CA0036–M, 2012–Ohio–5819, ¶ 5. “However, a pro se
litigant is presumed to have knowledge of the law and correct legal procedures so that he remains
subject to the same rules and procedures to which represented litigants are bound. He is not
given greater rights than represented parties, and must bear the consequences of his mistakes.”
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Id. With this in mind, we turn to Mr. Hart’s
argument that the lower court should not have closed the case in the manner it did.
{¶6} Though Mr. Hart’s argument is not easily discernible, he does argue that the
lower court prematurely closed the cases and cites to R.C. 4123.65. “R.C. 4123.65 regulates the
settlement of workers’ compensation claims by providing for administrative review to protect
parties against settlements that are ‘clearly unfair’ or that constitute ‘gross miscarriage[s] of
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justice.’” (Footnote omitted.) Gibson v. Meadow Gold Dairy, 88 Ohio St.3d 201, 202-203
(2000), quoting R.C. 4123.65(D). R.C. 4123.65(C) provides that
[n]o settlement agreed to * * * by a self-insuring employer and the self-insuring
employer’s employee shall take effect until thirty days after * * * the self-insuring
employer and employee sign the final settlement agreement. During the thirty-
day period, * * * the employer or employee, for self-insuring settlements, may
withdraw consent to the settlement * * *.
R.C. 4123.65 “applies to claims on appeal to a common pleas court under R.C. 4123.512 as well
as to claims still at the administrative level.” Gibson at syllabus.
{¶7} While the record in this case is extremely limited, it is clear that the lower court
closed the cases and entered judgment on the claims prior to the parties having a binding
settlement agreement. See id. at 204 (R.C. 4123.65 “does not restrict a trial court’s power to
enforce a binding settlement; rather, the statute identifies the point at which a .512 settlement
becomes binding (and, thus, enforceable).”) (Emphasis sic.). On April 24, 2012, the lower court
issued its judgment entries that declared that Mr. Hart could no longer pursue his claims for
depression or opiate dependency. However, the transcript of the hearing that occurred that day
indicates that the parties had notified the lower court that an agreement had been reached which
the parties intended to reduce to writing. Thus, it is apparent that the required 30-day waiting
period of R.C. 4123.65(C) had not run, and the lower court’s entries of judgment, which
contained statements that Mr. Hart could not pursue his claims, were premature because any
agreement the parties reached had not yet become binding. See Gibson at 203 (“The oral
settlement never legally bound Gibson and thus could not be enforced because Gibson had not
signed the agreement and, moreover, would have had thirty days from signing to withdraw his
written consent.”); R.C. 4123.65(C).
{¶8} Accordingly, Mr. Hart’s assignment of error is sustained.
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III.
{¶9} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common
Pleas is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellees.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:
GARY C. HART, pro se, Appellant.
MICHAEL L. WILLIAMS and GREGORY P. MATHEWS, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.
MICHAEL DEWINE, Ohio Attorney General, and SANDRA J. LISOWSKI and SARAH E.
THOMAS, Assistant Attorneys General, for Appellee.