[Cite as Maxim Ents., Inc. v. Haley, 2011-Ohio-6734.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
MAXIM ENTERPRISES, INC. C.A. No. 25459
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
STEPHEN T. HALEY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant/Cross-Appellee CASE No. CV 2008-07-5093
and
BAC FIELD SERVICES CORP.
Defendant/Cross-Apellant
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: December 28, 2011
DICKINSON, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
{¶1} Stephen Haley has attempted to appeal an order of the trial court granting Bank of
America’s motion to vacate judgment. According to Mr. Haley, Countrywide Field Services
Corporation hired Maxim Enterprises to inspect and preserve its real properties. Maxim, in turn,
hired subcontractors to perform the work. When Countrywide did not pay Maxim, Maxim did
not pay the subcontractors. After some of the subcontractors assigned their rights to Mr. Haley,
Maxim sued Mr. Haley and those subcontractors, alleging that the assignments were invalid. Mr.
Haley subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Countrywide. Because Countrywide
had been purchased by Bank of America, he named “Bank of America fka Countrywide Field
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Services Corporation” in his complaint. When Bank of America did not answer, Mr. Haley
obtained a default judgment against it. Bank of America subsequently moved to vacate the
judgment under Rule 60(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Mr. Haley did not
name the correct entity. The trial court granted Bank of America’s motion. Mr. Haley has
attempted to appeal, assigning as error that the trial court incorrectly granted Bank of America’s
motion to vacate. We dismiss the attempted appeal because the trial court’s order is not
appealable under Rule 54(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.
JURISDICTION
{¶2} Under the Ohio Constitution, Ohio’s courts of appeals “have such jurisdiction as
may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the
courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district . . . .” Ohio Const. Art. IV §
3(B)(2). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that Article IV Section 3(B)(2) “empower[s] the
General Assembly to alter the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.” State v. Collins,
24 Ohio St. 2d 107, 108 (1970). The Ohio General Assembly, in Section 2501.02 of the Ohio
Revised Code, has provided that the courts of appeals “shall have jurisdiction . . . to review,
affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders of courts of record inferior to the
court of appeals within the district . . . .” See also R.C. 2505.03(A) (providing that “[e]very final
order, judgment, or decree of a [lower] court . . . may be reviewed on appeal[.]”). “It is a basic
principle of our system of appellate procedure that only judgments and final orders are subject to
review.” Humphrys v. Putnam, 172 Ohio St. 456, 457 (1961).
{¶3} Even if a trial court’s journal entry is a judgment or final order, it is not
appealable if it does not comply with the rules prescribed by the Ohio Supreme Court regarding
the timing of appeals. Under Article IV Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio
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Supreme Court has authority to “prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of
the state . . . .” Exercising that authority, the Supreme Court has prescribed the Ohio Rules of
Civil and Appellate Procedure, which contain requirements regarding the timing of appeals. See
Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 49 Ohio St. 2d 158, 159-60 (1977) (“Questions involving
the joinder and separation of claims and the timing of appeals are matters of practice and
procedure within the rule-making authority of this court . . . .”). For instance, under Rule 54(B)
of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, “[if] more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is
no just reason for delay.”
{¶4} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, if Rule 54(B) is applicable, a judgment
must comply with it to be appealable. Whitaker-Merrell Co. v. Geupel Constr. Co., 29 Ohio St.
2d 184, 186 (1972). Accordingly, to determine whether a trial court’s journal entry is appealable
in a multiple party or multiple claim case, we engage in a two-step analysis examining (1)
whether it is a judgment or final order under Sections 2501.02 and 2505.03 of the Ohio Revised
Code and (2) whether it complies with Rule 54(B) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio St. 3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, at ¶10 (“The general rules
regarding final appealable orders in multiparty and/or multiclaim cases involve the tandem of
R.C. 2505.02(B) for substance and Civ.R. 54(B) for procedure.”).
{¶5} We will focus on the second step of the analysis because, under Section
2505.02(B)(3), “[a]n order that vacates or sets aside a judgment” is a “final order.” As noted
previously, under Civil Rule 54(B), “[if] more than one claim for relief is presented in an action .
. . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more
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but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just
reason for delay.” “In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any
order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or parties . . . .” Id.
{¶6} This case has involved numerous claims by numerous parties. Some of those
claims have been resolved, but others have not. It is not necessary to list all of the parties and
their claims in this opinion. We have reviewed the trial court’s order granting Bank of
America’s motion to vacate judgment and note that it does not resolve all of the outstanding
claims or determine that “there is no just reason for delay.” Accordingly, the order is not
appealable under Civil Rule 54(B). Greenpoint Mortgage Funding Inc. v. Kutina, 9th Dist.
24275, 2011-Ohio-2241, at ¶9; Milton Banking Co. v. Dulaney, 182 Ohio App. 3d 634, 2009-
Ohio-1939, at ¶8 (concluding that order granting relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(B) for
one defendant was not appealable because it did not satisfy Civil Rule 54(B) requirements). The
attempted appeal is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
{¶7} The trial court’s order does not resolve all of the outstanding claims or contain a
determination that there is no just cause for delay. Mr. Haley’s attempted appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
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period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CLAIR E. DICKINSON
FOR THE COURT
CARR, P.J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY
MOORE, J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY
APPEARANCES:
JEFFREY C. MILLER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
JAMES S. WERTHEIM and MONICA LEVINE LACKS, Attorneys at Law, for
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.