[Cite as Raus v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 2011-Ohio-4937.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
ROGER RAUS C.A. No. 25796
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
STATE OF OHIO BMV AKRON MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. 10 CV 02075
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 28, 2011
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Roger Raus, appeals the order of the Akron Municipal Court that
denied his petition to obtain an Ohio driver’s license. This Court reverses.
{¶2} Mr. Raus had many convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol over
the course of at least twenty years. In 1988, he was convicted in the state of Florida. Thereafter,
he renewed his Ohio driver’s license once with no problems, but in 2008, he could not renew his
license because the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles’ database indicated that his license had been
blocked as a result of the Florida conviction. Mr. Raus petitioned the Akron Municipal Court for
permission to apply for a new license. The trial court denied his petition, and Mr. Raus
appealed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING O.R.C. SECTION 4510.54 TO
AN OHIO DRIVER WHOSE LICENSE WAS PERMANENTLY REVOKED
BY THE STATE OF FLORIDA AND WAS BASED ON APPELLANT’S
HAVING FOUR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL
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CONVICTIONS, INCLUDING ONE IN FLORIDA IN 1988; THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED O.R.C. 4507.08(D)(5) AND O.R.C.
SECTION 4510.61 WHICH REQUIRE THAT OHIO COURTS TREAT
SUSPENSIONS OR REVOCATIONS FROM OTHER STATES AS THOUGH
THE CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO THE FLORIDA REVOCATION HAD
OCCURRED IN OHIO. SINCE OHIO HAS NEVER PROVIDED FOR A
LIFETIME SUSPENSION FOR MISDEMEANOR OVI CONVICTIONS, THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ORDERED THE OHIO BMV TO PERMIT
APPELLANT TO TEST TO RENEW HIS OHIO DRIVER’S LICENSE.”
{¶3} Mr. Raus’ assignment of error is that the trial court erred by applying the
Interstate Driver’s License Compact to his case in conjunction with R.C. 4510.54(A), leading to
the conclusion that he could not apply for a driver’s license until 2016. We agree that the trial
court erred, but for a different reason.
{¶4} This matter involves the interaction of three statutes. R.C. 4510.61 enacts the
Interstate Drivers License Compact, which seeks, in part, to “[m]ake the reciprocal recognition
of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor more just and equitable” with respect to uniform
compliance with motor vehicle laws from state-to-state. R.C. 4510.61, Article I, Section (b)(2).
To that end, the Compact requires “[t]he licensing authority in the home state *** [to] give the
same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article III of this compact, as it would if such
conduct had occurred in the home state” for driving under the influence of alcohol. R.C.
4510.61, Article IV, Section (a)(2).
{¶5} R.C. 4507.08 and R.C. 4510.54, on the other hand, describe how an Ohio driver
whose license has been suspended or revoked may obtain driving privileges again. Under R.C.
4510.54, a driver whose license has been suspended for life or for a period greater than fifteen
years may petition the sentencing court to modify the term of the suspension. R.C. 4510.54(A).
In addition to demonstrating financial responsibility and, in the case of a suspension for driving
under the influence, completion of a substance abuse treatment program and resulting sobriety, a
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driver who petitions under the statute must demonstrate two things related to the passage of time.
First, the driver must show that at least fifteen years have passed since the suspension began.
R.C. 4510.54(A)(1). Second, the driver must show that he or she has had no felonies, moving
violations, or any drug or alcohol-related offenses in the fifteen years preceding the petition.
R.C. 4510.54(A)(2) and (A)(4)(c).
{¶6} Under R.C. 4507.08, a person whose driver’s license is cancelled or revoked,
regardless of the jurisdiction in which the revocation occurred, is not eligible to apply for a new
Ohio driver’s license until one year after the revocation. R.C. 4507.08(D)(5). A driver in that
situation may, however, petition the municipal court with jurisdiction over his residence to
permit the application. Id. The petition should allege “that the conduct involved in the offense
that resulted in suspension, cancellation, or revocation in the foreign jurisdiction would not have
resulted in a suspension, cancellation, or revocation had the offense occurred in this state.” Id.
{¶7} Applications to obtain a new Ohio driver’s license after a cancellation or
revocation, therefore, are handled differently than modifications of a suspension. Mr. Raus’
petition referred to revocation of his license by the State of Florida, but it is unclear from the
record whether a revocation or suspension is at issue. Both the magistrate and the trial court
analyzed this case as though Mr. Raus is subject to a lifetime suspension. As the statutes
discussed above demonstrate, a “suspension” and a “cancellation” or “revocation” are not the
same. See, generally, R.C. 4501.01. The trial court erred by analyzing this case under R.C.
4510.54 without first determining whether Mr. Raus’ driver’s license was revoked or suspended.
Mr. Raus’ assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
{¶8} Mr. Raus’ assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the trial court is
reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Akron Municipal
Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
BELFANCE, P. J.
WHITMORE, J.
CONCUR
APPEARANCES:
PHILIP J. KOREY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
CHERI B. CUNNINGHAM, Director of Law, and DOUGLAS J. POWLEY, Chief City
Prosecutor, for Appellee.