[Cite as Dilley v. Dilley, 2013-Ohio-4095.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY, OHIO
WILLIAM DILLEY, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
CASE NO. 2012-G-3109
- vs - :
TATIANA DILLEY, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Civil Appeal from the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas.
Case No. 08 DC 000591.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Joyce E. Barrett and James P. Reddy, Jr., 800 Standard Building, 1370 Ontario Street,
Cleveland, OH 44113-1752 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Heidi M. Cisan, Thrasher, Dinsmore & Dolan Co., L.P.A., 100 Seventh Avenue, Suite
150, Chardon, OH 44024-1079 (For Defendant-Appellee).
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, William Dilley, appeals the judgment of the Geauga County
Court of Common Pleas finding him in contempt for his failure to pay spousal support,
denying his motion to modify spousal support, and denying his motion to grant a
continuance because he was incarcerated at the time of the hearing on the spousal
support modification and contempt hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
{¶2} The trial court entered its final judgment of divorce on March 10, 2010.1
Pursuant to the court’s entry, appellant was to pay $2,000 per month spousal support.
Appellant was found guilty of contempt for failing to pay spousal support, but was
provided the opportunity to purge.
{¶3} Thereafter, appellant filed a motion to modify/terminate spousal support.
Appellee filed a motion to impose sentence. Appellee’s motion to impose was set for
hearing on November 21, 2011, but it was later continued because appellant was not
properly served. The hearing was continued to February 14, 2012, the same day the
hearing was set on the motion to modify spousal support. One day prior to the hearing,
appellant filed a motion to continue both hearings, stating that he was incarcerated and
unable to appear for the hearings. The hearings were rescheduled for May 3, 2012.
{¶4} Appellee then filed an additional motion to show cause based upon
appellant’s continued failure to make spousal support payments. The hearing on this
show cause motion was also scheduled to take place on May 3, 2012.
{¶5} On April 30, 2012, appellant filed a motion to continue the hearings set for
May 3, 2012, again stating his unavailability due to his incarceration. The trial court
denied appellant’s motion. Because appellee withdrew her motion to impose sentence,
as appellant was currently incarcerated, the hearing went forward on appellant’s motion
to modify/terminate spousal support and appellee’s motion to show cause.
{¶6} At the hearing, the parties stipulated to the payment history from Geauga
County Child Support Enforcement Division (“CSED”). Testimony was elicited that prior
to being incarcerated, appellant received monthly income from Social Security and
1. For a complete factual history, see this court’s opinion in Dilley v. Dilley, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2010-
G-2957, 2011-Ohio-2093. See also Dilley v. Dilley, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2012-G-3091, 2013-Ohio-994.
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Veteran’s Disability; however, due to his incarceration, appellant no longer receives
Social Security and his Veteran’s Disability was reduced to $100.
{¶7} In its judgment entry, the trial court overruled appellant’s motion to
modify/terminate spousal support, stating that appellant’s incarceration due to criminal
activity does not, alone, represent a change of circumstances. The trial court also found
appellant in contempt for failing to make spousal support payments. The trial court
focused its analysis on the 15-month period prior to appellant’s incarceration. The trial
court reasoned that although appellant was receiving monthly income, to wit: $2,060
from Social Security and $1,400 from Veteran’s Disability, he did not pay court-ordered
spousal support.
{¶8} The trial court sentenced appellant to 60 days in jail. Appellant was given
the opportunity to purge provided he pay appellee’s attorney fees in the amount of
$1,092 on or before March 1, 2013.
{¶9} Appellant filed a notice of appeal and asserts the following assigned
errors:
[1.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in not granting
appellant a continuance of the hearing due to his incarceration.
[2.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in finding
appellant in contempt for his failure to pay spousal support.
[3.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in denying
appellant’s Motion to Modify Spousal Support.
[4.] The trial court’s purge order was an abuse of discretion.
{¶10} For ease of discussion, we address appellant’s assigned errors out of
numerical order. We first address the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to
modify/terminate spousal support. Preliminarily, we note appellant’s motion for
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modification/termination of spousal support was properly before the court for
consideration because the trial court specifically retained jurisdiction to modify or
terminate the spousal support amount. See R.C. 3105.18(E)(1).
{¶11} The trial court engages in a two-step analysis when determining whether
to modify an award of spousal support. First, the court must determine whether “the
circumstances of either party have changed, which includes, inter alia, ‘any increase or
involuntary decrease in the party’s wages, salary, bonuses, living expenses, or medical
expenses.’” R.C. 3105.18(F). Second, if the trial court finds a change of
circumstances, it must determine whether the existing spousal support should be
modified. Kucmanic v. Kucmanic, 119 Ohio App.3d 609, 613 (1997).
{¶12} The trial courts are granted broad discretion concerning awards of spousal
support. Their orders will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.
{¶13} Here, in finding no change of circumstances, the trial court focused its
analysis on the 15 months prior to appellant’s incarceration. During that time, despite
his monthly income from Social Security and Veteran’s Disability, appellant failed to pay
his obligation of spousal support. The court also observed that even if appellant could
not make the entire monthly payment, he could have made a good faith effort by paying
a lesser sum. Moreover, the trial court observed that appellant’s incarceration is due to
his criminal conduct. Ohio courts have repeatedly held that criminal conduct is
considered voluntary for purposes of examining its effect on the rights to modification of
support obligations. Cole v. Cole, 70 Ohio App.3d 188, 191-193 (1990).
{¶14} We do not find merit in appellant’s third assignment of error.
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{¶15} Under his first assignment of error, appellant argues that it was error for
the trial court to deny his motion to continue the hearing.
{¶16} Appellant first argues that although he received the statutory notice
pursuant to R.C. 2705.31, the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
continue the hearing, as appellant was incarcerated and unable to defend himself. We
disagree.
{¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[t]he grant or denial of a
continuance is a matter which is entrusted to the broad, sound discretion of the trial
judge. An appellate court must not reverse the denial of a continuance unless there has
been an abuse of discretion.” State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981).
{¶18} In his brief, appellant claims, without citing to any authority, that the trial
court has no procedure for transporting inmates to hearings and has no electronic
means to make a remote appearance. The record, however, demonstrates that
appellant neither requested transportation to the hearing nor did he request to attend
the hearing by electronic means. Appellant was aware in February 2012 that this
hearing was scheduled for May 3, 2012; however, it was not until April 30, 2012—three
days before the hearing—that appellant requested a continuance. At the hearing,
appellant was represented by counsel.
{¶19} We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in failing to continue the
hearing. As evidenced by the record, appellant was served the required notice of the
hearing, yet he failed to request transportation to the hearing and failed to request
attendance via electronic means.
{¶20} We do not find merit in appellant’s first assignment of error.
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{¶21} Under his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court
abused its discretion in finding appellant guilty of contempt for failure to pay spousal
support.
{¶22} At the outset, we recognize that “[c]ontempt is a disregard of, or
disobedience to, an order or command of judicial authority.” First Bank of Marietta v.
Mascrete, Inc., 125 Ohio App.3d 257, 263 (1998). The contempt process was created
“to uphold and ensure the effective administration of justice[,] * * * to secure the dignity
of the court[,] and to affirm the supremacy of law.” Cramer v. Petrie, 70 Ohio St.3d 131,
133 (1994).
{¶23} “[T]he burden of proof for civil contempt is clear and convincing evidence.”
Delawder v. Dodson, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 02CA27, 2003-Ohio-2092, ¶10. (Citation
omitted.) Before the imposition of a sentence for civil contempt, the trial court must
afford the contemnor an opportunity to purge himself of the contempt. Id. (citation
omitted). “The contemnor is said to carry the keys of his prison in his own pocket since
he will be freed if he agrees to do as so ordered.” Brown v. Executive 200, Inc., 64 Ohio
St.2d 250, 253 (1980). Failure to pay court-ordered child support and alimony
constitutes civil contempt. R.C. 2705.031; Herold v. Herold, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
04AP-206, 2004-Ohio-6727, ¶25.
{¶24} An appellate court will not overturn a trial court’s finding of contempt
absent an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Ventrone v. Birkel, 65 Ohio St.2d 10, 11
(1981). An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable,
and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-
Ohio-1900, ¶62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.2004).
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{¶25} An individual charged with contempt for the violation of a court order may
defend by proving that it was not in his power to obey the order. State v. Cook, 66 Ohio
St. 566 (1902). In Cook, the Ohio Supreme Court held:
{¶26} “In a proceeding in contempt against a party who has refused to comply
with a money decree for alimony, it is not essential that the complaint allege that the
party is able to pay the money. The decree imports a finding of the court that he is able
to pay, and the burden is on him, by allegation and proof, to establish his inability.” Id.
at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶27} Appellant maintains that he is unable to pay the alimony, citing to his
current incarceration and lack of any income. Appellant’s argument is flawed, however,
because in finding appellant guilty of contempt, the trial court considered only the 15-
month time period prior to his incarceration.
{¶28} In its judgment entry, the trial court found appellant guilty of contempt by
considering the period from January 30, 2011—the last time appellant had been found
in contempt—until his incarceration in April 2012—before appellant’s benefits were
impacted by his incarceration. During this time period, the record demonstrates that
appellant was receiving approximately $3,500 each month from Social Security and
Veteran’s Disability benefits. Despite receiving these monthly benefits, appellant did not
make any payments to appellee during the 15 months prior to his incarceration;
appellant failed to present any documentation to support his inability to pay the
arrearages. The trial court also reasoned that no evidence was presented to
demonstrate that prior to his incarceration, appellant was unable to be gainfully
employed.
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{¶29} We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding that appellant
failed to meet his burden of proof to establish his inability to pay.
{¶30} Under his fourth assignment of error, appellant claims the purge order to
pay appellee the sum of $1,092 for her attorney fees is an abuse of discretion, as
appellant has no funds to pay said amount due to his incarceration.
{¶31} Because appellant failed to comply with the court order to pay spousal
support, the trial court found him in contempt. R.C. 3105.18(G) requires the trial court
to “require the person to pay any reasonable attorney’s fees of any adverse party, as
determined by the court, that arose in relation to the act of contempt.” This court has
upheld the imposition of attorney fees as a condition of purging contempt. Bradenburg
v. Bradenburg, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2004-Ohio-085, 2005-Ohio-6417, ¶10-11 (“If it is
permissible to make the payment of attorney fees a condition of the purge, then it
logically follows that failure to pay the attorney fees must result in imposition of the
contempt penalty, even if that includes a jail sentence.”).
{¶32} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit.
{¶33} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Geauga
County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
concur.
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