[Cite as Quartz Scientific, Inc. v. Ohio Bur. of Unemp. Comp., 2013-Ohio-1100.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
QUARTZ SCIENTIFIC, INC., : OPINION
Appellant, :
CASE NO. 2012-L-090
- vs - :
DIRECTOR, STATE OF OHIO BUREAU :
OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION,
et al., :
Appellees. :
Administrative Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
12CV000442.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Paul H. Hentemann, Northmark Office Building, 35000 Kaiser Court, Suite 305,
Willoughby, OH 44094-4280 (For Appellant).
Mike DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, State Office Tower, 30 East Broad Street,
Columbus, OH 43215, and Laurel Blum Mazorow, Assistant Attorney General, State
Office Building, 11th Floor, 615 West Superior Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44113-1899
(For Appellees).
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.
{¶1} This case is an administrative appeal from the Ohio Unemployment
Compensation Review Commission (“Review Commission”) pursuant to R.C. 4141.282,
which governs appeals to the court of common pleas from decisions of the Review
Commission. Appellant, Quartz Scientific, Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial
court affirming the decision of the Review Commission. The Review Commission
determined that Claimant, Cynthia Manley (“Claimant”), was discharged from her
employment without just cause. Appellant maintains that the trial court’s decision
affirming the Review Commission’s determination was unlawful, unreasonable, and
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶2} Claimant was employed by appellant from May 23, 1992 through October
25, 2011. She last served as a plant manager. In late October, 2011, some of
Claimant’s co-workers reported to the Human Resources Manager, Paula Webber, that
Claimant was “punching in” her son, Michael Gray, at appellant’s time clock even
though he was not actually at work. Mr. Gray worked for appellant as a janitor.
{¶3} Claimant was terminated from her position by Ms. Webber on October 25,
2011, for dishonesty in connection with her work based on her belief that Claimant was
falsifying her son’s time records. In support of her decision, Ms. Webber emphasized
that Claimant was fully aware of appellant’s “Standards and Rules,” which provide that
falsification of time-keeping records is an example of an infraction that may result in
termination.
{¶4} Claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was disallowed
upon a finding that Claimant was discharged from employment for just cause. Following
Claimant’s request for redetermination, appellee affirmed its determination disallowing
benefits. Claimant filed a timely appeal from that redetermination, and jurisdiction of
appellant’s case was then transferred to the Review Commission.
{¶5} On January 23, 2012, a hearing took place before a hearing officer at the
Review Commission. Both Claimant and appellant appeared and offered testimony.
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Following consideration of the testimony, the Review Commission issued a decision
reversing appellee’s determination, finding that Claimant was discharged without just
cause. Appellant filed a timely request for review from the hearing officer’s decision, but
that request was disallowed. Appellant then appealed to the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas, which affirmed the decision of the Review Commission that Claimant
was discharged without just cause. Appellant timely appealed and raises the following
assignment of error for our review:
{¶6} “The decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission of
February 3rd, 2012, reversing the Director’s re-determination issued December 2nd,
2011, was against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
{¶7} Appellant argues that the Review Commission improperly reversed
appellee’s redetermination disallowing Claimant’s request for benefits because
appellant had just cause to discharge Claimant for falsifying her son’s time cards, and
that the Review Commission failed to consider testimony offered by Ms. Webber about
an admission by Claimant that she falsely clocked in her son.
{¶8} As this court has previously recognized, the Supreme Court of Ohio has
established that the standard of review in unemployment compensation appeals of just
cause decisions rendered by the Review Commission is the same for an appellate court
as it is for the common pleas court. Kovacic v. Higbee Dept. Stores, 11th Dist. No.
2004-L-150, 2005-Ohio-5872, ¶13, citing Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. Of
Emp. Services, 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 696 (1995). That is, “[a]n appellate court may
reverse the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review’s ‘just cause’ determination
only if it is unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id.;
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see also R.C. 4141.282(H). The Supreme Court of Ohio recently reaffirmed its opinion
regarding this standard of review in Williams v. ODJFS, 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-
2897.
{¶9} “Under the foregoing standard, reviewing courts are not permitted to make
factual findings or determine the credibility of witnesses, which are instead reserved for
decision by the Review Commission. Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.,
(1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17 * * *. The decision of the Review Commission may not be
reversed simply because reasonable minds might reach different conclusions from the
same evidence. Tzangas, supra, at 697, citing Irvine at 18.” Kovacic at ¶14.
{¶10} In order to qualify for unemployment benefits, a claimant must satisfy the
statutory requirements of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a), which provides:
{¶11} “(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual may serve a
waiting period or be paid benefits under the following conditions:
{¶12} “ * * *
{¶13} “(2) For the duration of the individual’s unemployment if the director finds
that:
{¶14} “(a) The individual quit work without just cause or has been discharged for
just cause in connection with the individual’s work, * * *.”
{¶15} “Just cause” within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) “is that which, to
an ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular
act.” Kovacic at ¶23, quoting Irvine at 17. A discharge is considered for just cause
when an employee demonstrates an unreasonable disregard for the employer’s best
interests. Kiikka v. Ohio Bur. Of Emp. Serv., 21 Ohio App.3d 168 (8th Dist.1985). This
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does not mean that an employee’s behavior must consist of misconduct, but it does
require some degree of fault on the part of the employee. Sellers v. Bd. of Rev., 1 Ohio
App.3d 161 (10th Dist.1981).
{¶16} Appellant alleges that it had “just cause” under its own “Standards and
Rules,” noted above, but also under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(e), which provides that benefits
will not be paid if “[t]he individual became unemployed because of dishonesty in
connection with the individual’s most recent or any base period work.” “Dishonesty” for
purposes of this section means “the commission of substantive theft, fraud, or deceitful
acts.” Id.
{¶17} During the hearing, Ms. Webber and Mr. Christopher Atwell testified on
behalf of appellant. Mr. Atwell works for appellant in sales. Ms. Webber testified that
she terminated Claimant based on the allegations of two other factory employees that
Claimant was punching in her son when he was not actually at work. Specifically, she
testified that “I had people telling me [Claimant] was punching in her son.” However,
neither of those two employees were present to testify at the hearing. The hearing
officer questioned Ms. Webber on that point. Ms. Webber claimed that prior to the
hearing, she faxed to ODJFS the written statements of the two employees as evidence
that could be placed in the case file and presented at the hearing regarding those
employees’ observations of Claimant’s conduct. The hearing officer noted that those
documents were not part of the Review Commission’s file because once the matter was
transferred to the Review Commission, ODJFS no longer had jurisdiction over the case
and was not the proper entity to receive the documents.
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{¶18} Also, Ms. Webber testified that she did not personally witness Claimant
punching in her son. Ms. Webber further testified that when she called Claimant in to
discuss the matter on the day of her discharge, Claimant admitted doing so and
promised to pay back any monies that appellant overpaid.
{¶19} Mr. Atwell testified that he observed Claimant punching in twice, and that
Mr. Gray was not present in the building at the time he was punched in. However, Mr.
Atwell also testified that he did not know Mr. Gray’s schedule, which varied, and that
due to Mr. Gray’s duties as a janitor, Mr. Gray could be anywhere in the building and
Mr. Atwell would not be aware of it. Furthermore, Mr. Atwell testified that he arrived at
work at 7:30 a.m., and that if Mr. Gray arrived prior to 7:30 a.m., he would not have
observed Mr. Gray clock in.
{¶20} Claimant testified on her own behalf and denied punching in another
employee on the time clock. She provided the explanation that she and her son often
rode into work together, and thus, punched in at the same time on many occasions.
Claimant also denied making any statements to Ms. Webber that she admitted to
punching in her son.
{¶21} As noted by both the Review Commission and the trial court, the
testimony and evidence presented in this case was conflicting. The trial court
concluded as follows:
{¶22} “The record reveals that there was testimony by one side that Ms. Manley
admitted punching in her son at the employer’s time clock although he was not at work.
However, there was also testimony by [Ms.] Manley at the hearing that she did not
admit that she clocked in her son. The hearing officer in this case made a
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determination regarding the veracity of the witnesses and chose to believe [Ms.]
Manley. It is not for this Court to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to
conclude that the hearing officer’s determination is incorrect. The Court finds that the
hearing officer’s final determination that [Claimant] was eligible to receive
unemployment benefits pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(G) is supported by the manifest
weight of the evidence and is not contrary to law or unreasonable.”
{¶23} We agree. This court has reviewed the testimony presented at the
hearing, the Review Commission’s decision, and the judgment of the trial court. In
consideration of the standard of appellate review, which prevents reviewing courts from
substituting their own judgment for that of the Review Commission, we cannot say that
the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the Review Commission was
unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶24} Last, regarding appellant’s argument that the Review Commission ignored
Ms. Webber’s testimony about the admission made by Claimant, we note that the
decision of the Review Commission, as well as the trial court, specifically mention that
allegation by Ms. Webber. Thus, the record does not support appellant’s contention.
{¶25} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit, and it is
the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
concur.
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