In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 13‐2098
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
LESLIE WILLIAMS‐OGLETREE,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 11‐CR‐203 — Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.
ARGUED JANUARY 22, 2014 — DECIDED MAY 12, 2014
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and MANION and WILLIAMS,
Circuit Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge. Leslie Williams‐Ogletree was
indicted in a six‐count indictment related to a scheme to file
false tax returns. Count one charged Williams‐Ogletree with
conspiracy to defraud the United States government and the
remaining counts charged her with five specific incidents of
presenting false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims to the United
States Department of Treasury. She pleaded not guilty, but,
2 No. 13‐2098
following trial, a jury convicted her on all counts. The district
court sentenced her to 51 months’ imprisonment. Williams‐
Ogletree appeals her sentence, arguing the district court erred
in calculating the loss involved and in assessing the § 3553
sentencing factors. We affirm.
I.
In 2005, Leslie Williams‐Ogletree (“Ogletree”) ran Chicago‐
based LKJ Tax Services, a tax preparation service. Ogletree
applied for and obtained an Electronic Filers Identification
Number (“EFIN”) from the IRS, which allowed her to file tax
returns electronically in other people’s names and to obtain
electronic refunds. In late 2005, Ogletree conspired with
Robtrel White and Larryl White to submit false income tax
returns to the IRS. Robtrel and Larryl would obtain and
provide Ogletree with various birth dates and social security
numbers for individuals unlikely to file income tax returns,
and then Ogletree would file the false returns with LKJ’s
EFIN, using that personal information. The co‐conspirators
also generated false W‐2 wage and tax statement data to
support the false refund claims.
Between February and October 2006, Ogletree used LKJ’s
EFIN to file 200 fraudulent income tax returns for the tax year
2005 in the names of individuals supplied by Robtrel, Larryl,
and others. These tax returns sought refunds in the amount of
$834,548 and the actual tax loss to the IRS was $652,730. The
proceeds from the fraudulent tax returns were obtained in the
form of a tax refund anticipation loan (“RAL”) check which
Ogletree printed at LKJ’s offices, pursuant to an agreement
with Bank One. Robtrel then deposited many of these checks
No. 13‐2098 3
into his own bank accounts. Ogletree also received direct
payment from Bank One of a portion of the refund, which
represented her purported tax preparation fee. In total, she
received $62,203 in tax preparation fees for the 200 fraudulent
returns. A review of Ogletree’s bank account also showed cash
deposits in 2006 totaling approximately $28,000.
In 2007, Robtrel established a storefront business called
“Tax Pro” in Chicago and obtained several additional EFINs
for new tax preparation entities, including NP Financial
Service and PJH Financial Service. According to Robtrel,
Ogletree continued to participate in the conspiracy in early
2007, before she had a falling‐out with her co‐conspirators.
(Ogletree claims she had withdrawn from the conspiracy and
had not filed any fraudulent tax returns in 2007, or later years.)
Robtrel and Larryl continued the fraudulent tax‐filings scheme
into 2008, before they were caught.
When the government eventually detected the scheme, it
indicted Ogletree, Robtrel, and Larryl, charging them with
conspiracy and filing false claims with the IRS. Specifically, the
government charged Ogletree with one count of conspiracy to
defraud the United States government, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 286, and five counts of presenting a false, fictitious, or
fraudulent claim upon and against the United States Depart‐
ment of Treasury, IRS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and 2.
Robtrel and Larryl pleaded guilty, but Ogletree pleaded not
guilty and proceeded to trial.
At trial, the government presented testimony from numer‐
ous witnesses, including an IRS agent who testified that a
review of tax returns filed in 2006 with the EFIN issued to
4 No. 13‐2098
Ogletree’s tax preparation business, LKJ, revealed that 200
returns were fraudulent. The jury also heard from five individ‐
uals in whose name Ogletree had filed tax returns. These
individuals testified that they had not worked in 2006; did not
live at the addresses listed on the tax returns; had not hired
Ogletree to file tax returns on their behalf; had never met
Ogletree; and had not received the tax refunds. Some of the
individuals admitted to selling their personal information to
Robtrel and/or Larryl, while others claimed that their personal
information had been stolen. The government also presented
testimony from a Bank One representative who explained the
tax refund anticipatory loan process and the tax preparation
fees deposited into Ogletree’s account.
Ogletree did not call any witnesses. Instead, her attorney
argued that the government did not establish that Ogletree had
joined the conspiracy or knowingly filed false returns. Her
attorney focused on the fact that the witnesses all pointed to
Robtrel and Larryl and that no one had identified Ogletree as
being involved. The jury rejected Ogletree’s argument and
found her guilty on all counts.
Sentencing followed. At the sentencing hearing, Ogletree
strenuously challenged the government’s position that she had
continued to participate in the tax conspiracy in 2007. The
district court, though, found the government had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that Ogletree had continued to
file false tax returns and held her responsible for 68 fraudulent
tax returns filed under PJH Financial’s EFIN in 2007, with
intended losses totaling $253,073. When taken in combination
with the $834,548 of intended losses from the 200 fraudulent
returns filed in 2006, the total intended loss involved exceeded
No. 13‐2098 5
$1,000,000 and resulted in a base offense level of 22. Following
other adjustments, not at issue on appeal, Ogletree’s guideline
range was 51–63 months’ imprisonment. The parties then made
extensive arguments on the § 3553 sentencing factors. Follow‐
ing argument, the district court sentenced Ogletree to 51
months’ imprisonment.
Ogletree appeals only her sentence. She challenges first the
district court’s loss calculation, arguing that the evidence did
not support the court’s finding that she participated in the tax
fraud scheme in 2007. Second, she argues that the district court
did not adequately consider the § 3553 sentencing factors and
that her 51‐month sentence was substantively unreasonable.
II.
A. Loss Calculation
In sentencing Ogletree, the district court first considered
her base offense level. The base offense level for her crimes of
conviction depends on the attempted or intended tax loss.
U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(c)(1); United States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666, 677
(7th Cir. 2002). Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1, the base offense
level for a tax loss greater than $400,000 is 20 and the base
offense level for a tax loss greater than $1,000,000 (but less than
$5,000,000) is 22. The district court concluded that the intended
loss in Ogletree’s case was between one and five million
dollars, based on the intended loss of $834,548 related to the
200 false and fraudulent income tax returns submitted in 2006
via the LKJ Tax Services’ EFIN, and the $253,073 in intended
loss from the 68 fraudulent tax returns filed in 2007 under PJH
Financial’s EFIN.
6 No. 13‐2098
Ogletree argues on appeal, as she did before the district
court, that she did not file any tax returns under PJH Finan‐
cial’s EFIN and that the district court erred in including the
$253,073 related to those returns in its loss calculation. This
court reviews a district court’s tax‐loss determination for clear
error. United States v. Collins, 685 F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 2012).
To show clear error, a defendant “must show that the district
court’s calculation was not only inaccurate but outside the
realm of permissible computations.” United States v. Al‐Shahin,
474 F.3d 941, 590 (7th Cir. 2007).
Ogletree cannot clear this high hurdle. The evidence in this
case was more than sufficient to support the district court’s
finding that Ogletree was responsible for filing the 68 fraudu‐
lent tax returns in 2007. First, the district court relied on co‐
conspirator Robtrel White’s plea agreement. In his plea
agreement, Robtrel stated that Ogletree continued to partici‐
pate in the tax fraud conspiracy in early 2007, operating out of
Robtrel’s “Tax Pro” office, and filing fraudulent tax returns
using PJH Financial’s EFIN. The district court then relied on
the fact that 68 returns filed using PJH Financial’s EFIN, all on
approximately January 4, 2007, used the same identifying
information as fraudulent tax returns filed the previous year
with Ogletree’s LKJ Tax Services’ EFIN. Finally, the district
court noted that Ogletree’s continued participation in the tax
fraud scheme in early 2007 was confirmed by a tax log sheet
recovered from Robtrel’s home.
In response, Ogletree argues this evidence is not reliable
and, as such, cannot support the district court’s factual
findings. First, she points out that Robtrel “had every reason to
downplay his role in the conspiracy and to place blame on
No. 13‐2098 7
Ogletree.” But that does not make his statements unreliable.
See United States v. Johnson, 489 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Accordingly, their status as self‐interested co‐conspirators
does not thereby render the information inherently unreli‐
able.”). Rather, “[w]e have repeatedly held … that even the
testimony of a potentially biased witness is sufficient to
support a finding of fact.” Id. In fact, the district court may
credit testimony that is “totally uncorroborated and comes
from an admitted liar, convicted felon, or large scale drug‐
dealing, paid government informant.” Id. (internal quotation
and citations omitted).
Further, the district court did not merely rely on Robtrel’s
statement; the court also relied on a tax log recovered from
Robtrel’s home during an unrelated search that took place
during a response to a domestic disturbance. That tax log ran
about ten pages and listed names, social security numbers,
dates, and the names of “preparers,” as well as the names of
“runners,” i.e., individuals who had obtained the taxpayer
identification information. There were about a half‐dozen
different names or initials listed under the column for pre‐
parer, including “Leslie” and LKJ. The district court found that
this document corroborated Robtrel’s statement that Ogletree
had continued in the conspiracy in early 2007 because the dates
listed on the tax log bore dates in mid‐January of 2007.
Ogletree argues the tax log is also unreliable. She points out
that no one authenticated it and that it is unclear who prepared
the document. That is true, but at sentencing the district court
can rely on unauthenticated documents, as long as they bear an
indicia of reliability. United States v. White, 639 F.3d 331, 338
(7th Cir. 2011). In this case, the fact that the tax logs were
8 No. 13‐2098
recovered during a search of co‐conspirator Robtrel’s home
provides them with the indicia of reliability.
Ogletree further attacks the reliability of the tax log by
noting that it listed 2007 as the “Tax Year,” but that the
government relies on it to establish that she participated in the
tax conspiracy for the 2006 Tax Year. But the dates listed were
in early 2007 and this document was seized from Robtrel’s
home in mid‐2007, so the district court could reasonably find
that the “2007ʺ written next to “Tax Year” meant the year the
returns were submitted, especially since, unlike Ogletree, her
co‐conspirators were not trained tax preparers.
She also stresses that next to “Leslie” was written “male,”
and argues that this shows that she was not the male preparer
named “Leslie.” However, the government presents a more
reasonable interpretation of the tax log gender‐identifier: It is
not the gender of the preparer, but of the taxpayer. This view
is more consistent with the totality of the tax log because the
gender next to the preparer did not always remain constant.
For instance, preparer “low” had both “male” and “female”
listed next to his moniker. Further, next to some of the
“male”/”female” identifiers was the phrase “under 21.” This
additional identifier is more consistent with the government’s
view that the “male”/”female” identifier was related to the
purported taxpayer and not the tax preparer. Thus, the listing
of “male” next to Leslie’s name does not render the tax log
unreliable.
In sum, both Robtrel’s plea agreement and the tax log
support the district court’s finding that Ogletree continued to
file fraudulent tax returns in 2007. The district court further
No. 13‐2098 9
found Ogletree responsible for filing 68 specific tax returns,
based on the fact that those returns were filed on approxi‐
mately January 4, 2007, using PJH Financial’s EFIN and that
those returns all bore the same identifying information (i.e.,
names, social security numbers, purported employers) as the
fraudulent tax returns filed the previous year by Ogletree,
under her LKJ Tax Services’ EFIN.
In response, Ogletree argues that there was no reason for
her to use PJH Financial’s EFIN because she had her own LKJ
Tax Service’s EFIN. She asserts that if she filed under the PJH
Financial’s EFIN she would be depriving herself of her only
remuneration for the offense—her tax preparer fees. But at
trial, the government presented evidence that Ogletree made
cash deposits of about $28,000 into her bank account in 2006
and this easily supports an inference that she received cash
sums for her participation in the tax fraud scheme (and would
continue to do so in 2007).
The PSR provides further support for the district court’s
finding that Ogletree was responsible for filing the 68 tax
returns in early 2007. The PSR stated that according to Robtrel,
Ogletree used PJH’s EFIN “to file false tax returns for many of
the same individuals whose false returns had been filed the
previous year by LKJ.” The PSR further explained that Ogletr‐
ee left the conspiracy after an argument between her and
Robtrel stemming from the “IRS flagging claims filed under
PJH Financial’s EFIN because they were using repeat informa‐
tion for claims previously filed under LKJ.” A district court
may rely on information contained in a PSR so long as it
appears reliable. United States v. Heckel, 570 F.3d 791, 795 (7th
Cir. 2009). Statements in a PSR based on co‐conspirator’s
10 No. 13‐2098
statements clear that hurdle. A defendant may challenge the
reliability or correctness of the facts in the report, but absent
more than a “‘bare denial’ of the information” contained in the
PSR, the government need not present further evidence
confirming its reliability. Id. (quoting United States v. Mustread,
42 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir. 1994)). As just noted, Ogletree
presents a bare denial to her continued participation in the
scheme and that is not enough. Accordingly, the district court
did not clearly err in finding her responsible for the filing, in
early January of 2007, of 68 fraudulent tax returns with
intended losses of $253,073 and in calculating her guideline
range at 51–63 months’ imprisonment.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
After calculating Ogletree’s guideline range at 51–63
months’ imprisonment, the district court heard arguments on
the appropriate sentence and the § 3553 sentencing factors.
Following argument, the district court sentenced Ogletree to 51
months’ imprisonment. Ogletree claims on appeal that her
sentence is substantively unreasonable.
This court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a
defendant’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Dachman, 743 F.3d 254, 263 (7th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, the
district court sentenced the defendant to a within‐guideline
range sentence, there is a presumption of reasonableness. Id.
“[S]o the burden [Ogletree] must overcome to prove its
unreasonableness is a hefty one.” Id.
In attempting to overcome this hefty burden, Ogletree
makes passing reference to several facts she claims the court
failed to properly weigh. She notes that she was sentenced
No. 13‐2098 11
based on the intended losses and not the lower actual loss; that
she had no role in selecting the tax refund amounts sought;
that “her primary source of remuneration came in the form of
fixed tax preparer fees,” while Robtrel benefitted from the
scheme by receiving the large tax refund amounts; and that
only 19.3% of the fraudulent returns were filed while she was
a member of the conspiracy. The district court, though,
expressly addressed Ogletree’s argument for a lower sentence
based on her role compared to Robtrel’s, and in fact gave her
a lower sentence. (Robtrel received a higher sentence—74
months—and he had also accepted responsibility and pleaded
guilty.) In explaining its sentence, the district court also
highlighted that Ogletree was involved in the scheme “in a
time period when the highest loss amount occurred,” and as
“the one with the EFIN and the tax preparer knowledge,” she
was “instrumental to this scheme going forward.” The district
court’s explanation more than adequately showed that it
properly weighed the nature of the offense and Ogletree’s role
in it.
That leaves Ogletree’s main challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of her sentence: She maintains that the district
court failed to give proper weight to her extraordinary familial
circumstances, namely her role, prior to her incarceration, as
the primary caregiver to her two teenage sons and her teenage
nephew. While this court has recognized that giving “short
shrift” to the possibility of “extraordinary hardship” on one’s
family is a sound basis to remand for resentencing, United
States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir. 2008), there were
no such extraordinary hardship in this case. In Schroeder, the
defendant was the primary caregiver for his daughter who had
12 No. 13‐2098
a severely compromised immune system, rendering child care
almost impossible if he were incarcerated. There were no
analogous extraordinary hardship at play here. Yes, Ogletree
cared for her children and nephew and they suffer emotionally
from her incarceration. But there is nothing to take this case
outside the normal realm of hardship all children suffer when
a caregiving parent is incarcerated. To the extent there was a
hardship, the district court took that into account, allowing
Ogletree to delay the start of her sentence to allow her to make
arrangements for the children. Under these circumstances,
there was no abuse of discretion in sentencing her to 51
months’ imprisonment.
III.
A jury convicted Ogletree of tax fraud and at sentencing the
government presented sufficient evidence to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the intended loss for her
offenses was between $1,000,000 and $5,000,000. The district
court did not clearly err in relying on that evidence and in
setting her offense level at 51– 63 months’ imprisonment based
on that loss amount. The district court also did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Ogletree to 51 months’ imprisonment.
The district court more than adequately considered the § 3553
factors and there were no extraordinary familial circumstances
to justify a below‐guideline sentence. We AFFIRM.