In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13-‐‑1500
ANNEX BOOKS, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-‐‑Appellants,
v.
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA,
Defendant-‐‑Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:03-‐‑cv-‐‑00918-‐‑SEB-‐‑TAB — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JANUARY 15, 2014 — DECIDED JANUARY 24, 2014
____________________
Before FLAUM, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. The Supreme Court has held
that state and local governments may regulate adult estab-‐‑
lishments by using time, place, and manner restrictions to
reduce the secondary effects of those businesses on third
parties, but may not regulate them to restrict the dissemina-‐‑
tion of speech disapproved by local residents. Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); Renton v. Playtime
2 No. 13-‐‑1500
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); see also, e.g., Illinois One
News, Inc. v. Marshall, 477 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 2007).
Indianapolis requires adult bookstores to remain closed
between the hours of midnight and 10 a.m. every day, and
all day Sunday. Other retail businesses are not subject to the-‐‑
se restrictions. In earlier rounds of this litigation, Indianapo-‐‑
lis contended that closure would curtail secondary effects,
but we concluded that the evidence it offered was weak,
contested in material respects, or concerned different kinds
of businesses or different kinds of laws, such as minimum
distances between adult outlets rather than closure. See 581
F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2009); 624 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2010). The dis-‐‑
trict court then held a trial. Indianapolis gave a single justifi-‐‑
cation: fewer armed robberies at or near adult bookstores.
The district court found this adequate and entered judgment
for the City. 926 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (S.D. Ind. 2013).
The current justification is weak as a statistical matter.
The City did not use a multivariate regression to control for
other potentially important variables, such as the presence of
late-‐‑night taverns. The change in the number of armed rob-‐‑
beries is small; the difference is not statistically significant.
The data do not show that robberies are more likely at adult
bookstores than at other late-‐‑night retail outlets, such as liq-‐‑
uor stores, pharmacies, and convenience stores, that are not
subject to the closing hours imposed on bookstores. And
most of the harm of armed robberies falls on the bookstores
(and their patrons) rather than on strangers. The secondary-‐‑
effects approach endorsed by Alameda Books and Playtime
Theatres permits governments to protect persons who want
nothing to do with dirty books from harms created by adult
businesses; the Supreme Court has not endorsed an ap-‐‑
No. 13-‐‑1500 3
proach under which governments can close bookstores in
order to reduce crime directed against businesses that know-‐‑
ingly accept the risk of being robbed, or persons who volun-‐‑
tarily frequent their premises. As we remarked in New Alba-‐‑
ny DVD, LLC v. New Albany, 581 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2009),
adults may decide for themselves what risks to run by the
literature they choose, and cities must protect readers from
robbers rather than reduce risks by closing bookstores. Cf.
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-‐‑
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (fear that readers will act unwise-‐‑
ly does not justify restricting otherwise-‐‑lawful speech).
That the City’s regulation takes the form of closure is the
nub of the problem. Justice Kennedy, whose vote was essen-‐‑
tial to the disposition of Alameda Books, remarked that “a city
may not regulate the secondary effects of speech by sup-‐‑
pressing the speech itself.” 535 U.S. at 445 (opinion concur-‐‑
ring in the judgment). Yet that’s what Indianapolis has done.
The benefits come from closure: shuttered shops can’t be
robbed at gunpoint, and they lack customers who could be
mugged. If that sort of benefit were enough to justify clo-‐‑
sure, then a city could forbid adult bookstores altogether.
Indianapolis observes that customers are free to patron-‐‑
ize stores during the hours they are allowed to be open. As
the City depicts things, there is no loss to speech—anyone
who wants any magazine, book, or movie can get it, eventu-‐‑
ally—and some gain in the reduction of armed robberies.
With even a little gain on one side, and no loss on the other,
the City maintains that it must prevail.
To test the proposition that delay in obtaining reading
matter does not cause loss, we put a hypothetical at oral ar-‐‑
gument. Suppose Indianapolis were to prohibit the distribu-‐‑
4 No. 13-‐‑1500
tion of newspapers on Sundays. (Just newspapers: our hypo-‐‑
thetical law differs from a general Sunday-‐‑closing statute.
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).) Closure
could achieve multiple benefits, including a reduction in the
number of traffic accidents (newspapers generate lots of traf-‐‑
fic because trucks deliver newsprint to plants and printed
papers throughout the region; home delivery carriers may
drive their own cars); a reduction in robberies of paper de-‐‑
liverers, who may be on the street when few others are
awake to protect them; and a reduction in the newspaper’s
carbon footprint and other pollutants. All the news (and ads)
now in the Sunday paper could appear in Monday’s paper,
so readers would retain access, and anyone who wants up-‐‑
to-‐‑the-‐‑minute news could get it on the Internet while avoid-‐‑
ing accidents, robberies, and pollution. The lawyer repre-‐‑
senting Indianapolis was shocked at the idea, however; he
proclaimed that the City could not do such a thing consistent
with the first amendment.
What is the difference between preventing a newspaper
from selling paper copies on Sunday (or before 10 a.m.) and
preventing an adult bookstore from selling paper copies on
Sunday (or before 10)? Not secondary effects: the harms to
third parties caused by a newspaper likely exceed those
caused by an adult bookstore. The difference lies in the con-‐‑
tent of the reading material. Indianapolis likes G-‐‑rated
newspapers but not sexually oriented books, magazines, and
movies. Yet neither Alameda Books nor Playtime Theatres per-‐‑
mits units of government to stop the distribution of books
because their content is objectionable, unless the material is
obscene. See also, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460
(2010) (“crush videos” cannot be suppressed); American
Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
No. 13-‐‑1500 5
1985), affirmed summarily, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (material
that is pornographic, but not obscene, cannot be sup-‐‑
pressed). Indianapolis does not contend that any of the
plaintiffs sells obscene material; it follows that objection to
the plaintiffs’ stock in trade cannot justify closure.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the
case is remanded with instructions to enter an injunction
against enforcement of the closure ordinance.