In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 12‐3890
ED FIALA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
B&B ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 10 C 2895 — Gary S. Feinerman, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 19, 2013 — DECIDED DECEMBER 26, 2013
____________________
Before POSNER, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of a RICO
class action suit that the district judge dismissed without de‐
ciding whether to certify it as a class action. The appeal is
from the judge’s denial of the defendants’ application for an
award of their attorneys’ fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
The principal defendant, B&B Enterprises, is a residential
real estate developer, mostly of high‐end custom‐home sub‐
2 No. 12‐3890
divisions. Active in Wasco, a community in northeastern Il‐
linois, in 1994 B&B (actually a company controlled by it but
we can ignore that detail) received from the Wasco Sanitary
District permits to connect to the district’s sewage system
almost 800 houses and other buildings that B&B and other
developers were building in a subdivision called Fox Mill.
(Some allegations concern other subdivisions in the same
general area, but, again to simplify the opinion, we’ll refer to
all the subdivisions as Fox Mill.) In 2010 plaintiff Fiala, the
owner of a home in Fox Mill, joined by Tim Kobler Custom
Houses, a homebuilder, brought this suit charging that B&B
(and other developers, whom we can ignore) had violated
RICO by engaging in a “pattern of racketeering activity” (in
RICO‐speak) consisting of bribery, theft, and fraud, all de‐
signed to deprive homeowners and builders of property. 18
U.S.C. § 1962. Kobler has since dropped out of the case, leav‐
ing Fiala as the sole plaintiff and appellee.
The alleged scheme involved what are called “Population
Equivalents” (“PEs”)—specified quantities of sewage (gen‐
erally 100 gallons per day) that a house or other building
(this case is just about houses, however) is estimated to
dump into the local sewage system. 225 ILCS 225/3(6); 35 Ill.
Admin. Code § 301.345. The more PEs that a house connect‐
ed to the system produces, the larger and so more costly the
system must be to handle all the wastewater discharged into
it, and therefore the higher the fee that the sanitary district
would be apt to charge for a permit to connect the house to
the district’s sewage system. The fee is charged to the build‐
er and thus becomes one of the costs that he tries to recoup
in the price that he charges for the house.
No. 12‐3890 3
The Wasco Sanitary District decided to allot 3.5 PEs to
each house that would be built in its district because that is
the allotment that the state recommends, though does not
require, for single‐family houses. 35 Ill. Admin. Code § 370,
Appendix A.
The complaint alleges that B&B had, mainly through
family connections, improperly taken control of the Wasco
Sanitary District and used that control to divert to itself
permit fees that should have gone to the district to finance
an expansion of its sewage system. As Fox Mill expanded,
the number of PEs that the sanitary district could grant
without having to expand its sewer system ran out; the sys‐
tem was surfeited. B&B, the suit charged, decided—so that it
could continue the expansion of Fox Mill—to “steal” PEs
from existing homes and sell the stolen PEs to builders, like
Kobler. The “stolen” PEs would enable the builder to obtain
a sewage permit for the buyer of each of the houses he built.
Why was B&B (allegedly) doing this?
Suppose a sewage treatment facility can process up to
20,000 gallons of wastewater a day—equivalent to 200 PEs.
A sanitary district that followed Illinois’s recommendation
to allot 3.5 PEs to every single‐family house would therefore
allow only 57 houses to be connected to the sanitary dis‐
trict’s sewage system. But 3.5 PEs per house is only an esti‐
mate of average wastewater discharge. Those 57 houses
might generate more, or fewer, than 20,000 gallons of
wastewater per day—fewer if 3.5 PEs per house is a con‐
servative estimate of the amount of wastewater discharged
by the average single‐family house. And probably it is, since
if it were an underestimate the sewage treatment facility
would be inadequate.
4 No. 12‐3890
B&B took advantage of the assumed conservative bias in
the estimate to allocate only 2.5 PEs per house. But the plain‐
tiff alleges that in order to obtain the required permits for a
residential development B&B represented to the sanitary
district that it was allocating 3.5 PEs to each house. This de‐
ceit would, in our example, allow B&B to build 80 rather
than 57 houses without necessarily straining the sewage
treatment facility—if indeed the average wastewater produc‐
tion per house is only 2.5 PEs. The sanitary district would
permit the fraud because it was controlled by B&B, and as
long as the sewage treatment facility was not strained, the
fraud, though creating a risk of harm, would impose no ac‐
tual harm on the development. Committing the fraud was
made easier by a long‐standing contract between B&B and
the sanitary district, under which B&B collected the permit
fees directly from the builders (as we noted earlier), and in
exchange promised to pay for the maintenance, and any
necessary expansion, of the district’s wastewater treatment
facility. (Whether the promise was real, given B&B’s control
of the district, is doubtful.)
B&B’s alleged wresting of control of the sanitary district
and use of that control to divert to itself fees that should
have gone to the district to finance any needed expansion or
improvement of the sewage system is the sort of conduct
that could if proved violate RICO. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1989);
United States v. Genova, 333 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 80‐81 (1st Cir. 2004); Unit‐
ed States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1506–07 (9th Cir. 1992).
The district judge, however, dismissed the suit for want of
“RICO standing.” To obtain relief under RICO a plaintiff
must be “injured in his business or property,” 18 U.S.C.
No. 12‐3890 5
§ 1964(c). Because that’s a subset of all injury, RICO standing
(which really ought to be called a limitation on the relief
available for a RICO violation) is narrower than Article III
standing, which does not place limits on the nature of the
actionable injury but requires only a potentially redressable
“injury in fact” caused by the defendant’s alleged wrongdo‐
ing. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992), with Holmes v. SIPC, 503 U.S. 258, 265–66 (1992). The
question then is whether there was an injury to Fiala’s prop‐
erty or to Kobler’s business; the parties appear to assume
that if neither Fiala nor Kobler has RICO standing, no other
class member does either.
The district judge said that “Fiala’s PEs are not property
and cannot have been taken or stolen from him. The sup‐
posed theft therefore does not provide a basis for RICO
standing.” He was right. A PE is just a measurement unit
used to estimate the amount of wastewater that a single‐
family house is likely to discharge—an estimate for use by
the sanitary district in sizing its wastewater treatment facili‐
ty (for example to comply with environmental regulations,
see, e.g., 35 Ill. Admin. Code § 304.120(b)) and in pricing
sewage permits accordingly. A PE is not a right to discharge
a given amount of wastewater. To treat it as a right would
have the absurd consequence that if the district or state
agency decided that 3.5 PEs was too conservative an esti‐
mate of the amount of wastewater likely to be used by the
average single‐family home and reduced the allotment to 3
PEs, the homeowner could complain that a portion of his
property had been taken for a public use, entitling him to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s just‐
compensation clause, though in fact he’d sustained no loss.
6 No. 12‐3890
It would be different if by reducing Fiala’s allotment of
PEs the sanitary district reduced the amount of waste that he
could discharge into the district’s sewage system. For then
he might have to install a septic tank (if that were permit‐
ted), or limit the use of his kitchen and bathrooms, in order
to reduce his wastewater discharge—and those would be
costs. But, to repeat, the allotment of PEs to a house is not a
limit on how much wastewater it can discharge into the
sewage system. The fee for a sewage permit is not a fee per
PE. The permit entitles you to discharge any amount of
wastewater.
So PEs aren’t rights; but whether they are or not actually
is irrelevant. RICO doesn’t require a plaintiff to prove that
his property or business was taken; all that’s required is an
injury to property or to business. In Fiala’s case it would
have to be injury to his home. But no direct injury to his
home was possible, because the “theft” of one, or for that
matter all, of his PEs could not affect his access to or use of
the sewage system. He would still have the permit, and the
permit runs with the land. (An indirect injury to Fiala from
the reduction of his allotted PEs would be possible, howev‐
er, as we’re about to see.) As for Kobler, there is no reason to
think he paid more to B&B for “stolen” waste discharge
rights than he would have paid to the sanitary district.
Fiala could have been injured indirectly by the scheme if
it deprived the sanitary district of fees that could have been
used to expand or improve its sewage system or meet other
public needs that would benefit Fiala. For the deprivation
might have degraded the system, resulting in a backup of
wastewater into homes, or have caused the sanitary district
to increase taxes to make up for the lost fees. But these pos‐
No. 12‐3890 7
sibilities, though alluded to in the plaintiff’s briefs, are not
claimed to be a source of compensable injury to members of
the class. And any injury to the sanitary district itself is irrel‐
evant to this case, because the district is neither a plaintiff
nor a class member—it’s a defendant, alleged to be an ac‐
complice of B&B in the scheme to steal and resell PEs.
Yet the district judge surprisingly remarked that the sani‐
tary district was the direct victim of the alleged scheme, that
it had been included in the litigation only as a “nominal” de‐
fendant, and that the “indirect purchaser” doctrine of anti‐
trust law, which forbids a purchaser from the victim of cartel
pricing to sue the cartelists even when the immediate victim
had passed on some or for that matter all of the cartel’s price
increase to its customers (the indirect purchasers), Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977); In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599,
605–06 (7th Cir. 1997), applies to RICO claims as well, as in‐
deed it’s been held to do. Holmes v. SIPC, supra, 503 U.S. at
265–68; James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Construction Co., 453
F.3d 396, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2006); Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d
1173, 1175–76 (7th Cir. 1985); McCarthy v. Recordex Service,
Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 855 (3d Cir. 1996); Rand v. Anaconda‐
Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1986). Not that, so
applied, it is an indirect‐purchaser doctrine. The sanitary dis‐
trict hadn’t bought anything from B&B. But the reasons that
have been given for the indirect‐purchaser doctrine are ap‐
plicable to a case such as this: it simplifies litigation, avoids
the bother and uncertainty of trying to determine how much
of an injury to a first tier of victims was transmitted to a sec‐
ond tier, and maximizes the incentive of members of the first
tier to enforce applicable law. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, su‐
pra, 431 U.S. at 745; BCS Services, Inc. v. Heartwood 88, LLC,
8 No. 12‐3890
637 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2011); Adams v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 2A Phil‐
lip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law § 346c, pp. 164–65 (3d ed.
2007).
But we don’t understand why the sanitary district—
B&B’s alleged accomplice—should be thought merely a
“nominal” defendant. The indirect‐victim doctrine (as the
indirect‐purchaser doctrine should be called when there’s no
purchaser) does not bar a suit against an accomplice. No
matter; the plaintiff has not challenged the district judge’s
indirect‐victim ruling. Nor has he presented any evidence of
any injury to himself or to the class members.
So the district judge was right to dismiss the RICO
claim—and the plaintiff has not appealed the dismissal. It’s
the defendants who have appealed, complaining—not about
the dismissal of course, but about the denial of their motion
for an award of their attorney’s fees as a sanction for what
they contend was a suit brought without ”an inquiry rea‐
sonable under the circumstances” to determine that the suit
was “not being presented for any improper purpose” and
was not frivolous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1) and (2). We dis‐
cussed the plaintiff’s case at length only because it’s the es‐
sential background to the defendants’ motion.
The defendants have missed the boat—they have failed
to engage the district judge’s grounds for denying the mo‐
tion. On whether the suit was frivolous or had been brought
for an improper purpose, the judge said that the plaintiffs’
theory (on which the suit pivoted, given RICO’s requirement
that the plaintiff show an injury to business or property) that
PEs were property “was wrong … but I don’t think it was so
wrong as to be sanctionable … . Referring to PEs as property
No. 12‐3890 9
… was part of the vernacular. The district’s commissioners
thought that PE was property … . PEs were apparently
treated as though they could be bought and sold.” And so
the plaintiffs’ suit, while meritless, was not frivolous. As for
its having been brought for an “improper purpose,” “cer‐
tainly, it is not improper to file a non‐frivolous claim in the
hope of getting paid.” Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th
Cir. 2003).
More troubling is the judge’s ground for rejecting the de‐
fendants’ argument that the plaintiffs had failed to conduct
an adequate pre‐complaint investigation, as required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), (4). The plaintiff’s complaint contained
supplemental state law claims for fraud and conspiracy,
claims that rested on the same facts as the main claim, the
RICO claim. When the judge dismissed that claim, he relin‐
quished supplemental jurisdiction over the state‐law claims
and remanded them to state court, where they are pending.
Having done so he denied the Rule 11 motion on the ground
that if he imposed sanctions for “objectively groundless fac‐
tual allegations of fraud and lying and conspiracy and theft
and it turns out that Mr. Fiala prevails in state court[,] I’d
look kind of foolish for jumping the gun, and I’d be stepping
on the toes of the state court judge, and I don’t think it’s ap‐
propriate to do that.” That was not a sound reason for deny‐
ing the defendants’ motion, for no basis is suggested for a
state court’s having jurisdiction to impose sanctions for mis‐
conduct committed in a federal proceeding.
What the district judge should have done, given his un‐
certainty about the merits of the motion and his belief that
the state court litigation might cast light on those merits, was
to stay action on the motion pending findings in the state
10 No. 12‐3890
case that might undermine or bolster it. That might seem in‐
consistent with Rule 11’s focus on the pre‐complaint investi‐
gation. But the question of the adequacy of that investigation
(which we address next) is different from whether the suit
was brought for an improper purpose, or was frivolous.
Whether the factual allegations turn out to be true is relevant
to that question. A complaint might be filed with no pre‐
complaint investigation whatsoever; but if the purpose was
not improper and all the alleged facts turned out to be true
and the plaintiff prevailed in the suit, there would be no ba‐
sis for imposing sanctions. So the judge wasnʹt wrong to
think that state court findings could affect the merits of the
Rule 11 motion, and therefore he could have waited to rule
on the motion, though he should not have denied it outright.
In the section of their brief that precedes the argument
portion and is captioned “The District Court’s Ruling,” the
defendants complain that “no determination whatsoever
was made [by the district judge] as to whether [class coun‐
sel] performed a reasonable pre‐filing inquiry.” But that
oblique complaint—that the judge should have made his
own determination rather than dumping the issue on the
state court—is neither elaborated, nor even mentioned, in
the argument portion of the brief. Not until their reply brief
do the defendants wake up and argue that the judge should
have made his own determination regarding the reasonable‐
ness of the pre‐complaint inquiry. There they point out that
“the district court’s ruling results in an automatic free pass
under Rule 11 for any plaintiff clever or lucky enough to
have coupled state law claims with [federal] claims.” That’s
a good point, but comes too late; an argument first made in
an appellant’s reply brief is forfeited. Georgou v. Fritzshall,
178 F.3d 453, 456–57 (7th Cir. 1999); EIMSKIP v. Atlantic Fish
No. 12‐3890 11
Market, Inc., 417 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2003); 16AA Charles A.
Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3974.3, pp. 277–82
(4th ed. 2008).
But this bobble by the defendants turns out not to matter,
because they have never made a persuasive case that the
pre‐complaint investigation had been inadequate. Class
counsel claims without contradiction to have devoted 170
hours to factual and legal research before filing the suit. The
fact that the research turned up negligible evidence of injury
to class members does not imply an inadequate investiga‐
tion, but merely a weak case. The builder Kobler may have
been injured by having to fork over $150,000 to B&B to re‐
ceive PE allotments that he needed in order to be able to ob‐
tain sewage permits, which he needed in order to be able to
build salable houses in Fox Mill. He testified that of course
the fees were costs to him and that he tries to recoup his en‐
tire costs in the price he charges for building a house, but he
was unclear whether he always succeeds in recouping the
fees. And though he agreed with the defendants’ lawyer at a
couple of places in his deposition that he had recouped
them, it’s unclear whether he understood the questions that
elicited that response. If the fees were higher than what the
sanitary district itself would have charged for permits, he
may have been hurt—anything that increases a seller’s costs
is likely to reduce his profits. For the tendency of an increase
in price is to reduce buyer demand, and the likelihood of
such a reduction may cause a seller to trim his price at some
sacrifice in profit to avoid losing customers. Kobler may
have thought that he had recouped the PE fees that he had
paid B&B but not some other cost. But maybe he hadn’t been
able to recoup the other cost because he he could not raise
12 No. 12‐3890
his price sufficiently to cover both it and the PE fees; in that
event any increase in those fees attributable to the alleged
RICO violation would have hurt him, albeit indirectly.
The complaint also alleged that B&B’s scheme “endan‐
ger[ed] the health and welfare of the plaintiffs and the citi‐
zens within the [sanitary district] and Illinois.” For both the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and the Illinois
attorney general notified the Wasco Sanitary District that it
was violating federal and state pollution regulations, and
conceivably that was because the district had been denied by
the plaintiffs’ fraud the resources it needed to make its sew‐
age system comply with those regulations. There’s no evi‐
dence to support that conjecture, however, and even if there
were it would establish merely a personal injury, which is
not compensable under RICO. Evans v. City of Chicago, 434
F.3d 916, 926 (7th Cir. 2006); Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
937 F.2d 899, 918–19 (3d Cir. 1991); cf. Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). Fiala presented no theory of
injury to his or the class members’ businesses or property
stemming from the effect of the defendants’ alleged conspir‐
acy on the district’s compliance with pollution regulations.
But all this is to one side of the alleged inadequacy of the
pre‐complaint investigation, which the defendants failed to
substantiate.
The district judge’s denial of the Rule 11 motion, though
based in part on an erroneous (but harmlessly so) ground,
must be
AFFIRMED.