In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 12‐3912
KENNY A. JONES, Sr.,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
CITY OF ELKHART, INDIANA, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:10‐cv‐00402 — Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2013 — DECIDED DECEMBER 12, 2013
____________________
Before WILLIAMS, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
TINDER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff‐Appellant Kenny A. Jones,
Sr., alleges that Defendants‐Appellees violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment.
From the first, however, counsel for Jones stated his claims
broadly and vaguely. He listed a series of irrelevant facts un‐
tethered to any legal claims, and asserted constitutional inju‐
ry without specifying what provisions of the Constitution
were violated and how. Defendants—the City of Elkhart, In‐
2 No. 12‐3912
diana and individual officers in the Elkhart police depart‐
ment—and the district court were forced to guess at his ar‐
guments in order to address them. Unfortunately, on appeal,
counsel fashioned his brief in a similar manner, asking us to
reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment for
Defendants. The argument sections of Jones’s brief recite le‐
gal standards for the elements of the case but offer us no
analysis on how to apply them to the facts at hand.
Once we reconstruct what we believe to be Jones’s argu‐
ments, as we were required to do under these circumstances,
the completed structure shows that both of Jones’s substan‐
tive assertions hinge on one critical fact: whether the Elkhart
police officers who stopped his car and arrested him did so
without probable cause. Because the record supports the dis‐
trict court’s conclusion that the officers had probable cause
and there is no evidence putting that conclusion in question,
we affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment
and dismiss the appeal. We also find that the district court
did not abuse its discretion with regard to the discovery or‐
ders or its ruling on Jones’s Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection claim.
I. Factual Background
On October 21, 2008, Kenny Jones attended an evening
class at Ivy Tech Community College in South Bend, Indi‐
ana. He left class around 7:30 p.m. and then went home,
where he had a sandwich and drank a 12‐ounce bottle of
beer (Bud Light), the only alcoholic beverage he claims he
consumed that evening. Shortly thereafter Jones drove to his
sister’s house in Elkhart. He left the apartment around 1:00
a.m. and drove to a McDonald’s, where he purchased some
food and ate in his car. Around 1:20 a.m., Jones began driv‐
No. 12‐3912 3
ing south on Nappanee Street, going towards his home in
South Bend.
At about 2:15 a.m. on October 22, Lt. Chris Snyder of the
Elkhart Police Department initiated a traffic stop of Plain‐
tiff’s vehicle for speeding. While traveling northbound on
State Road 19 in Elkhart, Snyder observed Jones’s vehicle
traveling south at a speed above the posted 35 miles per
hour speed limit, and confirmed that Jones was traveling at
53 miles per hour with his moving radar, which had been
tested with a tuning fork and an internal check both before
use and after the traffic stop. Snyder stated that he turned
his car and followed Jones’s vehicle for a couple of blocks,
during which he observed Jones swerving in his lane. He
then turned on his emergency lights.
When Jones stopped his car in response to Lt. Snyder’s
emergency lights, Snyder approached the vehicle and re‐
quested Jones’s license and registration. Snyder stated that
Jones had alcohol on his breath and red, watery eyes. He al‐
so observed that Jones’s speech was slow and slurred. When
asked if he had been drinking, Jones responded that he had
consumed one beer at 7:30 p.m.
Officer Bryan Moore arrived on the scene to provide
backup. According to Snyder, Moore used Snyder’s portable
breath test (PBT) device to determine Jones’s blood alcohol
content (BAC). The PBT showed a BAC of 0.096%. Jones con‐
tends that Snyder, not Moore, administered the PBT, and
that Jones was never told of the reading on the PBT. Jones
also claims that he did not see Moore until after Jones exited
his vehicle at Snyder’s request.
4 No. 12‐3912
Snyder stated that he observed that Jones’s balance was
not steady as he walked from the car to a paved area off the
road. Snyder explained and demonstrated a one‐leg stand
for Jones, and asked if Jones had any medical problems that
would prevent him from doing the test. Jones responded
that he was extremely bowlegged as a result of a childhood
accident in which both legs were broken. When Snyder
asked if Jones’s condition would prevent him from standing
on one leg, Jones answered yes. Snyder then explained and
demonstrated a different field sobriety test—the walk and
turn test. Jones stated that he did not have any questions re‐
garding the test. When Snyder asked whether anything
would prevent Jones from performing the test, Jones stated
no and began to perform the test. Snyder noted that Jones
could not keep his hands at his sides, that he swayed back
and forth, and that he did not touch his heel to his toe for the
majority of steps on the two passes.
Snyder then read Jones the Indiana Implied Consent No‐
tice, explaining that he had probable cause to believe that
Jones had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
Snyder explained to Jones that while Jones had a choice to
submit to the chemical test, there would be consequences to
refusing to consent to the chemical test, including suspen‐
sion of his license. Jones expressed confusion because he had
already taken a breathalyzer test.
Jones asserts that he was not speeding because he travels
the road on a regular basis and recognizes the area as a
speed trap. Although he also states that he makes sure to
pay close attention while driving, which presumably in‐
cludes monitoring his speed, he cannot positively state that
his speedometer continually showed a speed of 35 miles per
No. 12‐3912 5
hour or less. Jones also tries to quibble with the detail of
Snyder’s location prior to the traffic stop: he claims he drove
past Snyder, who was sitting in a vehicle parked off to the
side of the road with the lights out. After Snyder and Jones
made eye contact and Jones’s vehicle passed Snyder, Snyder
turned on his headlight, trailed Jones’s vehicle for five to six
seconds, and then turned on his emergency lights.
Whether Jones consented to the chemical test is in dis‐
pute. Snyder states that he placed handcuffs on Jones, but
expressed that Jones was not under arrest and was merely
being transported to the station for the test, to which Jones
had consented. Jones claims that he asked Snyder whether
he was under arrest, and that as he was asking follow‐up
questions about why he was being asked to ride downtown
in the squad car, Snyder handcuffed Jones. When Snyder
asked Jones whether he was going to take the test, Jones did
not answer the question, but expressed frustration over the
options being described. Snyder told Jones he was under ar‐
rest for suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while intoxi‐
cated and refusing a chemical sobriety test (“operating while
intoxicated‐refusal”). Moore then transported Jones to the
station. Further confusion ensued at the station, but those
events are not material to the appeal here.
II. History of Litigation
A. Claims Raised
Jones sued the City of Elkhart and Officers Snyder,
Moore, and Jeff Gorball, as well as Elkhart Police Chief Dale
Flibsen. His suit alleges that Snyder unlawfully stopped and
seized Jones without probable cause; that Snyder and Moore
did not have probable cause to search the vehicle or arrest
Jones; that Moore and Snyder conspired to deprive Jones of
6 No. 12‐3912
his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments based on racial animus; and that Officer Gor‐
ball, who was present at the jail, maliciously and without
probable cause recorded that Jones refused the chemical test
at the police station. As to the City of Elkhart’s liability, the
Complaint states:
On information and belief, the violation of
plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by the defendants was consistent with
an institutionalized practice of the City of
Elkhart Police Department, which was known
to and ratified by defendant City of Elkhart,
the defendants acted with deliberate indiffer‐
ence, having at no time taken effective action to
prevent Elkhart Police Personnel from continu‐
ing to engage in such conduct, including stop‐
ping of citizens without probable cause based
on race.
Based on these facts, Jones appears to raise the following
separate claims:
1. A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amend‐
ment violations against some combination of Snyder,
Moore, and Gorball alleging false arrest, excessive
force, and unlawful search;
2. A § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
claim against Snyder and Moore alleging that they
made the traffic stop and arrest without probable
cause based on racial animus, and conspired in ser‐
vice of this violation;
No. 12‐3912 7
3. A § 1983 claim against the City of Elkhart alleging the
existence of a policy or custom that, through arrests
without probable cause based on racial animus, in‐
flicts constitutional injury.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment that
explicitly addressed the false arrest, excessive force, and un‐
lawful search Fourth Amendment claims as well as the con‐
spiracy claim. The summary judgment motion also argued
that the Monell claim should fail because Jones suffered no
constitutional injury.
B. The Discovery Disputes
Jones claims that he was unable to resolve several dis‐
covery issues with Defendants. In pursuit of his theory that
the traffic stop was racially motivated, Jones sought produc‐
tion of police reports on warrantless arrests and records of
traffic stops. Specifically, he asked to inspect approximately
eleven years of records of arrests and traffic stops made by
the Elkhart Police Department, encompassing 59,092 arrests
and 120,862 citations. Defendants produced an electronic
version of data from 2005—including a spreadsheet detailing
the age, sex, race, and address of the arrestee, and the nature
and date of the arrest—but Jones claims this data was in‐
complete because it did not include probable cause affida‐
vits, and because Jones had requested to inspect the physical
documents. Furthermore, Jones claims that Defendants con‐
tinually evaded his questions about the existence of the
physical documents, until suddenly presenting him with the
offer to copy all of the physical documents for a prepayment
of $17,955 for the copying expenses.
8 No. 12‐3912
Defendants claim that they were limited in the infor‐
mation they could provide to Jones because of federal and
state laws about the confidentiality of the databases in ques‐
tion. Civilians are barred from accessing the databases Jones
requested to use: the Indiana Data and Communications
System (“IDACS”) and the federal National Crime Infor‐
mation Center (“NCIC”). Defendants also argue that Jones
requested an unreasonable volume of data, and that he had
refused Defendants’ proposed, reasonable methods of nar‐
rowing the scope of his discovery request. When Jones had
refused to narrow the scope of his requested data at all, De‐
fendants claim they offered to produce physical copies of the
documents for the reasonable fee of 10 cents a page.
The magistrate judge denied Plaintiff’s motion for order
compelling discovery, and granted Defendants’ motion to
quash the subpoena. The district court also ruled against
Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the magistrate’s order. The
district court’s opinion on this matter included lengthy find‐
ings affirming Defendants’ position that they were prohibit‐
ed by state and federal law from allowing Jones access to the
IDACS and NCIC databases, and that Defendants had pro‐
posed reasonable and various methods of narrowing down
Jones’s request, including a sample CD including more than
7,000 pages of printouts and spreadsheets summarizing in‐
formation from the electronic reports.
C. Summary Judgment
In its order ruling on the motion to reconsider, the dis‐
trict court also ordered Jones to answer Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment. Jones filed a statement of genuine
issues of material fact, which set out the legal claims that
Jones intended to pursue. Those issues included:
No. 12‐3912 9
1. Whether Snyder and Moore wrongfully stopped, de‐
tained, searched, falsely arrested and imprisoned
Plaintiff to meet patrol division shift minimums for
completed traffic citations pursuant to a wide spread
practice that although not authorized by written law
or express City of Elkhart Policy, was so permanent
and well settled at the time as to constitute a custom
or usage with the force of law, caus[ing] them to vio‐
late Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Rights and rights un‐
der the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
2. Whether probable cause existed for the wrongful
stop, detention, search, false arrest and false impris‐
onment of Jones on October 22, 2008, for speeding,
OWI [Operating While Intoxicated] refusal and OWI
endangerment.
3. Whether Defendants Snyder and Moore conspired
and agreed under color of state law to violate Plain‐
tiff’s rights under the Constitution of the United
States and under state law.
4. Whether [a] heel to toe sobriety test constitutes delib‐
erate indifference to Plaintiff’s physical limitations
and denial of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
5. Whether Jones refused to take [the] chemical test pur‐
suant to the Indiana law for implied consent to test
for intoxication.
10 No. 12‐3912
6. Whether Snyder violated City of Elkhart Police De‐
partment policy by not activating his in‐car camera at
scene.
7. Whether Snyder, Moore and Gorball acting under
color of state law, violated department policy regard‐
ing bias‐based profiling/discriminatory practices and
Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Rights under the United
States Constitution
(Pl.’s Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Facts in
Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., 1, 4, 16, 20, 25, 31, 34, ECF
No. 65.)
The district court granted Defendants’ motion for sum‐
mary judgment on all counts. Jones has appealed the sum‐
mary judgment ruling partially, arguing to this court that (1)
the district court abused its discretion in quashing Jones’s
subpoena; (2) the district court abused its discretion by
granting summary judgment sua sponte on Jones’s equal pro‐
tection claim; (3) there exist genuine issues of material fact as
to whether the Elkhart police department has policies or cus‐
toms that cause constitutional deprivation; and (4) a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether Snyder “acted in
good faith” in falsely arresting Jones.
III. Analysis
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Jones. Matthews
v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2012). How‐
ever, Jones “may not simply rest upon the pleadings but
must instead submit evidentiary materials that ‘set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
No. 12‐3912 11
Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (quot‐
ing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The evidence Jones presents must
be “evidence on which a reasonable jury could rely.” Good‐
man v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010).
In submitting these evidentiary materials, Jones “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 937. He
must “present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal.” Par‐
ent v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir.
2012) (citing Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d 921,
924 (7th Cir. 2004)).
We begin our analysis by clearing the brush as to what
matters have been appealed for our review. It is clear to us
that Jones did not appeal items 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in his list of
self‐styled genuine issues of material fact; accordingly, those
arguments are waived. See, e.g., Wachovia Secs., LLC v. Banco
Panamericano, 674 F.3d 743, 758 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that
an issue not raised in the opening appellate brief is waived).
The discovery issues and the district court’s allegedly sua
sponte judgment on the equal protection claim are discrete
and easy to isolate. The claim that Snyder did not “act in
good faith” in arresting Jones appears to be asserting that
Snyder did not have probable cause in stopping or arresting
Jones—an appeal of Genuine Issue Number 2.
But slightly more perplexing is Jones’s § 1983 claim
against the City of Elkhart. After juggling theories for both
alleged Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional violations in the district court, Plaintiff states
outright in his appellate brief that “[i]n this case the action
alleged to be unconstitutional is, [sic] the stop, seizure,
search and false arrest of Jones in bad faith without probable
12 No. 12‐3912
cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” As the brief
omits any mention of racial profiling or injury to rights gov‐
erned by the Equal Protection Clause, we find that Jones has
waived the racial profiling claim. Id.
The two substantive issues before us, then, are 1) the
claim that Snyder lacked probable cause in stopping and ar‐
resting Jones, and 2) the claim that the City of Elkhart is lia‐
ble for constitutional injuries resulting from the stop and ar‐
rest of Jones without probable cause. Because on the first is‐
sue we find that the record leaves no doubt that there was
probable cause for the traffic stop and the arrest, we may
dispose of the second issue as well. It is well established that
if the plaintiff suffered no violation of his constitutional
rights, the City cannot be liable under § 1983. See Sallenger v.
City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 2010). As lack of
probable cause is the only articulated constitutional violation
on appeal, once that violation is defeated, the City cannot be
held liable. And, naturally, once we find that the officers had
probable cause, they cannot be held liable in their individual
or official capacities either.
After analyzing the probable cause issue, we discuss the
two ancillary issues: the claim that the district court abused
its discretion in issuing its discovery orders, and the asser‐
tion that the court improperly ruled sua sponte on the equal
protection claim.
A. Probable Cause
We should first address Jones’s assertion that the false ar‐
rest claim that he appeals here is a “common law false arrest
claim,” not a § 1983 false arrest claim. In raising a new state
law claim grounded in no aspect of the pleadings or the trial
No. 12‐3912 13
court briefings, Jones seems to be attempting to circumvent
the district court’s finding of qualified immunity for the po‐
lice officers. It is a curious and unsuccessful workaround, as
we need not even reach the (unappealed) qualified immuni‐
ty finding to defeat Jones’s probable cause argument. In any
case, as Indiana requires no different a showing of probable
cause than does the federal claim—and as probable cause is
an absolute defense to false arrest claims in both the § 1983
context, Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 713–14
(7th Cir. 2013), and the Indiana state context, Beauchamp v.
City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 746 (7th Cir. 2003)—we
proceed with a traditional probable cause analysis.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, the existence of probable cause ren‐
ders both traffic stops and resulting warrantless arrests per‐
missible. “Probable cause exists if at the time of the arrest,
the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge
are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reason‐
able caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that
the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense.” Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 246
(7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omit‐
ted). “Probable cause … ‘is a fluid concept that relies on the
common‐sense judgment of the officers based on the totality
of the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Reed, 443
F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2006)). We objectively “step into the
shoes of a reasonable person in the position of the officer,”
and consider the facts known to the officer at the time. Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do not
consider the subjective motivations of the officer. Id.
14 No. 12‐3912
In the case of Jones, there existed probable cause both for
the traffic stop and the arrest. “When a police officer reason‐
ably believes that a driver has committed a minor traffic of‐
fense, probable cause supports the stop.” United States v.
Garcia‐Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). Officer Snyder had probable cause for the initial
traffic stop based on the reading given by his radar gun—
which indicated that Jones was traveling well above the
posted speed limit in the area, in violation of local traffic
rules—as well as the fact that Jones was swerving in his lane.
Moreover, Snyder states in an affidavit that the radar gun
was tested and checked before and after the traffic stop, with
no malfunctions detected.
Jones presents us with no evidence to rebut this showing
of probable cause. In his statement of facts, he denies that he
was speeding because he was always careful to obey the
speed limit when driving on that stretch of road—but this
assertion, on its own, does nothing to rebut the fact that
Snyder reasonably believed Jones was speeding, or to put
into question the accuracy of the radar gun. United States v.
Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e need only in‐
quire whether the officer had probable cause to believe that
a traffic violation occurred, not whether [the driver] actually
was tailgating”) (internal citation omitted); United States v.
Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2000) (officers’ esti‐
mate of the fact undergirding a violation need not be “per‐
fectly accurate”; it need only be reasonable for the officer to
believe a violation had occurred). Even Jones’s quibbles
about the location of the squad car fails to rebut the fact that
Snyder possessed an objectively reasonable belief that Jones
was speeding, based on the reading from his radar gun and
his observation of Jones’s car. As we stated above, we re‐
No. 12‐3912 15
quire from Jones “definite, competent evidence in rebuttal,”
Parent, 694 F.3d at 922, “evidence on which a reasonable jury
could rely,” Goodman, 621 F.3d at 654. Jones has not present‐
ed us with any evidence of this nature here. As there is no
documentary evidence rebutting the assertion that Snyder
had probable cause, the traffic stop did not violate Jones’s
Fourth Amendment rights.
Once Officer Snyder had probable cause to conduct the
traffic stop of Jones for speeding, he could arrest Jones with‐
out violating his Fourth Amendment rights. See Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001); United States v.
Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 953 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A person arrested
for an offense punishable only by a fine typically is given a
citation (a ‘ticket’) and released, but Atwater holds that the
Constitution allows the police to place the person in custody
and take him to be booked.“). Thus, we need not address
whether Officers Snyder and Moore also had probable cause
to arrest Jones for OWI‐refusal or OWI‐endangerment.
However, we note that the facts in the record clearly
show that these officers had a reasonable basis to conclude
that Jones was intoxicated, and thus had probable cause to
arrest Jones for OWI‐endangerment. See, e.g., Qian v. Kautz,
168 F.3d 949, 953–54 (7th Cir. 1999) (police reasonably sur‐
mised that a driver who had difficulty walking, was
hunched over, and whose speech seemed slurred had been
operating vehicle while intoxicated); cf. Gutierrez v. Kermon,
722 F.3d 1003, 1011–12 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying Indiana law
and noting “common indicia of intoxication” including “wa‐
tery or bloodshot eyes,” “the odor of alcohol on the breath,”
“unsteady balance,” and “failure of field sobriety tests”).
Again, none of Jones’s arguments on this point rebuts this
16 No. 12‐3912
showing of probable cause. A quibble over the identity of
the officer administering the PBT does not put in dispute the
administration of the test, or the results of the test that indi‐
cated Jones’s BAC was 0.096%. The assertion that Jones con‐
sumed one bottle of beer that evening does not put into
question the fact that Jones consumed alcohol that evening.
While there might be a question of fact about whether one
light beer would cause an accurate registration of 0.096%
hours later (though Jones produced no facts of a scientific
nature to raise that question), there is not a disputed fact that
the machine did register that BAC for Jones. That test result
was sufficient to support probable cause for OWI‐
endangerment.
As for the OWI‐refusal charge, in the proceedings below
Jones submitted that he was not given adequate opportunity
to submit to the chemical test. But we agree with the district
court’s analysis that despite Jones’s subjective confusion
over why the police were taking him into custody, the police
officers reasonably understood Jones’s response to indicate
refusal of the chemical test. As Jones presents no evidence
suggesting that the officers’ understanding that he refused
the chemical test was unreasonable, we find that the officers
had probable cause to arrest Jones for OWI‐refusal.
Because the officers had probable cause for both the traf‐
fic stop and the arrest, the false arrest claim is barred,
whether it is a § 1983 claim or a state law claim. There is
therefore no remaining claim holding the officers liable in
their official or individual capacities. Furthermore, as Jones
is unable to identify a constitutional injury, the § 1983 claim
against the City is also defeated. We conclude that the dis‐
No. 12‐3912 17
trict court correctly granted summary judgment on both
claims.
B. Discovery Matters
Jones claims that the magistrate judge and district court
abused their discretion in quashing Plaintiff’s subpoena for a
large volume of arrest records and traffic citations. However,
magistrate and district courts enjoy extremely broad discre‐
tion in controlling discovery. A district court may only over‐
turn a magistrate’s decision if the decision is “clearly errone‐
ous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). In turn, we
may only review a district court’s discovery rulings for
abuse of discretion. Scott v. Chuhak & Tescon, P.C., 725 F.3d
772, 784 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95
F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1996)). The district court does not
abuse its discretion “unless one or more of the following cir‐
cumstances is present: (1) the record contains no evidence
upon which the court could have rationally based its deci‐
sion; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of
law; (3) the decision is based on clearly erroneous factual
findings; or (4) the decision clearly appears arbitrary.” Id.
(citing Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir.
2004)). Furthermore, “we will not reverse a district courtʹs
decision concerning discovery absent a clear showing that
the denial of discovery resulted in actual and substantial
prejudice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omit‐
ted).
None of the circumstances are present here. Jones’s brief
presents no argument that the record before the district court
lacked evidence upon which the court could have based its
decision; that the district court’s decisions were based on an
erroneous conclusion of law or factual findings; or that the
18 No. 12‐3912
decisions were clearly arbitrary. His only evidence is to
simply state that he was “prejudiced by Magistrate’s abuse
of discretion.” We have held that a mere demonstration that
the production of discovery items would be helpful is not
sufficient to reverse a discovery order as prejudicial. Scott,
725 F.3d at 784. “Without any references to legal authorities
or any statement that generously could be considered legal
argumentation,” Jones “has given us no reason to reverse.”
Id.
C. Sua Sponte Ruling on Equal Protection Claim
Jones asserts that the district court ruled sua sponte on the
equal protection claim. Because Defendants did not brief the
equal protection argument in their summary judgment brief,
Jones argues, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
on the issue constitutes impermissible sua sponte conduct.
This assertion inadvertently bolsters our earlier com‐
plaint about the style and substance of Jones’s briefs. It is not
difficult to see why Defendants had difficulty grappling
with the legal claims in play in this case. The complaint is
drafted in broad, generalized strokes. It is true that the most
generous possible reading of the complaint would yield the
conclusion Jones’s complaint does make a conclusory sug‐
gestion of an equal protection claim, and with the benefit of
hindsight we are able to make out the pieces of the com‐
plaint that would support such a claim. But it is by no means
a clearly presented argument to which Defendants failed to
respond, either out of irresponsible lawyering or some tacti‐
cal decision to conceal the equal protection claim.
Our decision is made easier, however, because the dis‐
trict court noted Defendants’ omission when ruling on
No. 12‐3912 19
Jones’s motion to reconsider the magistrate’s denial of his
motion to compel discovery, which ruling was made before
Jones had filed his response to the summary judgment
briefs. Defendants had an adequate opportunity to respond
to this new argument. That is, this was by no means a true
sua sponte decision in which the judge “decide[s] [a] suit[]
without warning on the basis of considerations the litigants
were not contesting.” Pactiv Corp. v. Rupert, 724 F.3d 999,
1001 (7th Cir. 2013). Indeed, Plaintiff raised the issue in his
briefing on the motion to compel. The court took note of this
dispute, observed that the equal protection claim
“hinge[s] … in part, on the fact that his traffic stop and ar‐
rest occurred without any probable cause,” and ordered
Jones to answer the summary judgment motion, which had
been filed by the Defendants prior to the motion to compel.
Plaintiff and Defendants both briefed the equal protection
issue, in the opposition brief and the reply brief in support of
the summary judgment motion, respectively. Accordingly,
we do not find evidence of any impropriety on the part of
the district court. The court provided the litigants with no‐
tice of the issue and an opportunity to brief it; that is all that
the Federal Rules require it to do in granting summary
judgment for an issue not raised by the initial summary
judgment brief. Id. (quoting Rule 56(f)).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for the Defendants.