In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 12‐1413
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
ELDRED C. CLAYBROOKS,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:08‐cr‐1028‐12 — Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 10, 2013 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 5, 2013
____________________
Before POSNER, WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. While investigating a large drug
distribution conspiracy involving Robert Atkins, federal
agents also uncovered a smaller operation involving Atkins
and his friend, Eldred Claybrooks. Claybrooks was eventual‐
ly charged with two drug‐related offenses arising from his
relationship with Atkins including one count of conspiracy
to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(a)(1). Following a trial in which Atkins served as the
2 No. 12‐1413
government’s key witness, Claybrooks was convicted and
sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Claybrooks argues that the government failed
to present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find him
guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not
view the evidence the same way. Both Atkins’s testimony
and recordings of conversations between Atkins and
Claybrooks supplied enough evidence for a reasonable jury
to find that the two men knowingly agreed to distribute co‐
caine. Claybrooks also challenges his sentence on the basis
that the district court did not make a determination regard‐
ing the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy. On this
issue, we agree. After reviewing the sentencing transcript,
we conclude that the district court did not make a finding
concerning the amount of drugs involved in Claybrooks’s
offense. Therefore, we affirm Claybrooks’s conviction but
vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2006, FBI agents began looking into various drug dis‐
tribution networks in northeastern Illinois. Investigators
soon focused their attention on Robert Atkins, a large‐scale
cocaine distributor in the area. To get a sense of Atkins’s op‐
erations, FBI agents obtained court orders for wiretaps on
two of his phones and began recording his telephone con‐
versations.
Over the course of their investigation, FBI agents inter‐
cepted several calls between Atkins and Eldred Claybrooks.
In the recorded conversations, Atkins and Claybrooks dis‐
cussed the details of various cocaine transactions. In one
May 2007 phone call, Claybrooks brokered the sale of two
No. 12‐1413 3
kilograms of cocaine between Atkins and Claybrooks’s
cousin.
The two men also discussed customer relations problems
that Claybrooks encountered when distributing cocaine he
received from Atkins. During one series of calls in June 2007,
Claybrooks complained to Atkins about the quality of some
cocaine that he had recently purchased. Claybrooks told At‐
kins that he wanted to return the cocaine in exchange for a
refund or another kilogram of better quality. When Atkins
asked whether the kilogram was largely intact (and therefore
suitable for return to Atkins’s supplier), Claybrooks said no.
Claybrooks stated that his customers had removed nine
ounces from the kilogram to test its strength, and, disap‐
pointed with the results, had returned the remainder to
Claybrooks. This was a problem for Atkins. With so much of
the original kilogram now missing, Atkins’s supplier would
not exchange it for another kilogram. Atkins then reminded
Claybrooks about the proper way to have his customers test
a kilogram of cocaine, which was to remove an ounce or two
from the corner while keeping the packaging intact:
I told you a million times … we went over this s‐‐t …
as long as it’s wrapped up, cut that corner[,] get you a
zip out or two, do what’ch you gotta do. If it ain’t
right, stick that s‐‐t back in that corner. Put some tape
on that corner and bring that s‐‐t back.
A grand jury eventually indicted Claybrooks on two
drug‐related felonies as a result of his dealings with Atkins.
Claybrooks was charged with one count of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five kilo‐
grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
4 No. 12‐1413
841(a)(1) and one count of distribution of 500 grams or more
of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
At trial, the government relied heavily on testimony from
Atkins to establish Claybrooks’s guilt. Atkins testified that he
began supplying Claybrooks with cocaine in 2001. Accord‐
ing to Atkins, over the next seven years he regularly distrib‐
uted cocaine to Claybrooks in quantities ranging from four
and a half ounces to several kilograms. Atkins typically pro‐
vided the drugs to Claybrooks on consignment. Under this
arrangement, Claybrooks would receive the cocaine from
Atkins, resell it, and then pay Atkins using the proceeds. If,
for some reason, Claybrooks could not resell the cocaine, he
could return it to Atkins. In total, Atkins estimated that he
distributed between twenty and thirty kilograms of cocaine
to Claybrooks over the course of their relationship. Nor was
their relationship entirely one‐sided: Atkins also stated that
Claybrooks supplied him with kilograms of cocaine on three
or four occasions.
Atkins also testified that Claybrooks occasionally bro‐
kered cocaine sales between Atkins and Claybrooks’s cus‐
tomers. On occasion, Atkins told jurors, Claybrooks would
identify a customer that wanted to purchase cocaine from
Atkins. Claybrooks would collect the purchase money from
his customer on Atkins’s behalf and then deliver the money
to Atkins. Once Atkins had the money, he would then give
Claybrooks a kilogram of cocaine for delivery to his custom‐
er. In one such transaction, Claybrooks told Atkins about a
customer in Bloomingdale, Illinois, who wanted to buy three
to four kilograms of cocaine. Atkins supplied Claybrooks
with the requested amount of cocaine and had him deliver it
to the customer.
No. 12‐1413 5
Atkins stated that his association with Claybrooks ended
in August 2008. Around that time, Atkins testified, he pro‐
vided Claybrooks with $60,000 to purchase two kilograms of
cocaine on Atkins’s behalf. According to Atkins, Claybrooks
took the money but never delivered the cocaine. Atkins tried
to resolve the situation but Claybrooks kept avoiding him
and would not return his phone calls.
Atkins also testified about certain recorded telephone
conversations he had with Claybrooks. After a portion of the
conversation was played for the jury, Atkins would testify
regarding the meaning of the coded language used and pro‐
vide context about the matters discussed. In this way, Atkins
described a May 2007 conversation in which Claybrooks
brokered a cocaine deal between Claybrooks’s cousin and
Atkins. Atkins also informed the jury of the details sur‐
rounding some calls in June 2007 regarding Claybrooks’s
customer relations issues.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Claybrooks
guilty of both the conspiracy charge and the distribution
charge. In addition to the general guilt determination, the
jury also made special findings regarding the amount of
drugs involved in each offense. On the verdict form, the jury
was asked to select which of three possible quantity ranges
correctly characterized the amount of cocaine involved in
each offense: (1) a measurable amount but less than 500
grams; (2) at least 500 grams, but fewer than five kilograms;
or (3) five kilograms or more. The jury found that both
counts involved at least 500 grams but fewer than five kilo‐
grams of mixtures containing cocaine.
The United States Probation Office prepared a Presen‐
tence Investigation Report (“PSR”) on Claybrooks following
6 No. 12‐1413
his conviction. In the PSR, the Probation Office concluded
that Claybrooks should be held responsible for at least seven
kilograms of cocaine. The Probation Office based its drug
quantity finding on the following evidence: (1) Atkins’s tes‐
timony and wiretap recordings suggesting that Atkins pro‐
vided Claybrooks with one kilogram of cocaine in June 2007;
(2) Atkins’s testimony that Claybrooks supplied him with a
kilogram of cocaine on three occasions; and (3) Atkins’s tes‐
timony that he provided Claybrooks with three kilograms of
cocaine for delivery to a customer in Bloomingdale. On this
last point, the PSR contained a notation that the transaction
was corroborated by proffer statements from Claybrooks’s
co‐defendant, Robert Wasp, in which Wasp stated that he
delivered three kilograms of cocaine to Claybrooks on At‐
kins’s behalf. Based on its drug quantity finding and
Claybrooks’s prior felony drug conviction, the Probation Of‐
fice concluded that he was subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of 20 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
Claybrooks’s sentencing hearing took place on February
14, 2012. At the hearing, the government argued that
Claybrooks was responsible for at least 20 kilograms of co‐
caine based on Atkins’s testimony that he supplied between
20 and 30 kilograms to Claybrooks over the course of their
relationship. In response, Claybrooks contended that At‐
kins’s estimate was too unreliable. Instead, Claybrooks asked
the court to adopt the jury’s finding as to the quantity of co‐
caine involved in his offenses, between 500 grams and 5 kil‐
ograms, an amount that would set Claybrooks’s mandatory
minimum sentence at 10 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
In the end, the district court declined to adopt the drug
quantities advanced by either Claybrooks or the govern‐
No. 12‐1413 7
ment. The court noted that Atkins’s 20–30 kilogram approx‐
imation of the amount of drugs he dealt to Claybrooks was
“too indefinite for me to even find that it satisfies prepon‐
derance.” The court was uncomfortable with accepting At‐
kins’s estimate of the total amount of drugs involved in light
of certain ambiguities in his testimony:
So we’ve got [Atkins] talking about a relationship that
started with dealing 4.5‐ounce quantities and over
time became a relationship where there were kilos
transferred, but he never told us how many kilos a
year were transferred. He just said the relationship ac‐
tually grew to that. So I think that—and then, you
know, we’ve got three or four times he says that he
thinks the defendant provided him with a kilo.
Given its concerns with Atkins’s testimony on this issue,
the court concluded that “we’re pretty secure based on the
testimony in going with the PSR, which is 5 to 15 kilo‐
grams.” The court characterized this amount as a “compro‐
mise between Atkins’[s] estimate, which he didn’t pin down
at all, and the jury’s finding, which was minimal.”
On this reasoning, the district court determined that
Claybrooks’s mandatory minimum sentence was 20 years.
After acknowledging that “the mandatory minimums as
they operate in this case make no sense,” the district court
sentenced Claybrooks to the mandatory minimum term of
incarceration. Claybrooks now appeals both his conviction
and his sentence.
II. ANALYSIS
Claybrooks presents two challenges on appeal. He first
argues that the government did not present sufficient evi‐
8 No. 12‐1413
dence at trial to prove he was guilty of conspiring with At‐
kins to distribute cocaine. He next contends that the district
court erred in failing to make a finding as to the amount of
cocaine implicated in his offense conduct.
A. Government Presented Enough Evidence to Support
Conspiracy Conviction
Claybrooks asks that we vacate his conspiracy conviction
because the evidence in the trial record was insufficient for a
reasonable jury to find that he entered into an agreement
with Atkins to distribute cocaine. Because Claybrooks pre‐
served this argument by moving for a judgment of acquittal
at the close of the prosecution’s case, we review his claim de
novo. United States v. Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir.
2010). When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, “we consider the evidence in the light most favor‐
able to the prosecution, making all reasonable inferences in
its favor, and affirm the conviction so long as any rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant to have commit‐
ted the essential elements of the crime.” United States v. Val‐
lar, 635 F.3d 271, 286 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
According to Claybrooks, the government’s evidence on‐
ly established a series of transactions between him and At‐
kins and could not support a finding that the two men were
part of a larger conspiracy to distribute drugs. To convict a
defendant of conspiracy the government must establish that
(1) two or more people agreed to commit an unlawful act;
and (2) the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined in
the agreement. United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th
Cir. 2008). For a drug‐distribution conspiracy, the govern‐
ment must prove “that the defendant knowingly agreed—
No. 12‐1413 9
either implicitly or explicitly—with someone else to distrib‐
ute drugs.” United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir.
2010). Proving a conspiracy requires more than simply
showing that the individuals involved agreed to consum‐
mate a number of drug deals. Instead, “the government
must offer evidence establishing an agreement to distribute
drugs that is distinct from evidence of the agreement to
complete the underlying drug deals.” Vallar, 635 F.3d at 286
(internal citations omitted). The government may prove the
existence of this agreement through circumstantial evidence.
United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2006).
When evaluating the sufficiency of the government’s cir‐
cumstantial proof of an agreement to distribute, we “consid‐
er the totality of the circumstances … tak[ing] into account
all the evidence surrounding the alleged conspiracy and
mak[ing] a holistic assessment” of whether the evidence
could support the verdict. See United States v. Brown, No. 12‐
2743, 2013 WL 4048243, at *8 (7th Cir. Aug. 12, 2013). Alt‐
hough this approach allows for the examination of many
types of evidence indicative of conspiracy, some forms of ev‐
idence are more powerful than others. See id. (“True, repeat‐
ed consideration of similar circumstances seems to have
identified a few per se rules.”). For example, “[a] consign‐
ment sale that permits the middleman to return the unused
drugs is quintessential evidence of a conspiracy.” Johnson,
592 F.3d at 755 n.5. Consignment sales suggest an agreement
between the seller and purchaser to engage in retail drug
distribution “because neither party profits until the middle‐
man distributes the drugs to others.” Id.; see also Brown, 2013
WL 4048243, at *5 (“[A] consignment arrangement also ex‐
hibits another key attribute we have stressed in identifying
10 No. 12‐1413
conspiracies: an actively pursued course of sales”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the government presented enough evidence
for a reasonable jury to find that Claybrooks and Atkins
knowingly agreed to form a cocaine distribution enterprise.
Atkins’s testimony regarding the consignment sales between
Claybrooks and him constituted strong evidence of a distri‐
bution conspiracy. See Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755 n.5. Atkins
routinely supplied Claybrooks with large quantities of co‐
caine, allowed him to pay for the drugs after reselling them
to customers, and permitted him to return the cocaine if he
could not sell it at retail. The nature of their business rela‐
tionship indicates that both men were aware of, and con‐
sented to, Claybrooks’s retail distribution activities. Moreo‐
ver, Atkins testified that he provided drugs to Claybrooks on
this basis for seven years, a lengthy period of collaboration
suggestive of a conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Contreras, 249
F.3d 595, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding insufficient evi‐
dence of conspiracy in absence of “prolonged cooperation”
with alleged co‐conspirator).
Apart from the consignment sales, other aspects of
Claybrooks’s relationship with Atkins supported the exist‐
ence of an agreement between them to distribute drugs. For
example, Atkins testified that Claybrooks acted as his agent
by identifying customers willing to purchase cocaine in bulk
from Atkins. See United States v. Payton, 328 F.3d 910, 912 (7th
Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen the … seller is assisted by a third person,
that collaboration is punishable as a conspiracy … because
the conspirators are on the same side of the sale”) (emphasis
in original). Furthermore, recorded conversations demon‐
strated that Atkins advised Claybrooks on certain aspects of
No. 12‐1413 11
his operation, including the proper method for sampling co‐
caine. See Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755–56 (listing “indication that
one party advised the other on the conduct of the other’s
business” among factors suggestive of conspiracy). When
viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a rea‐
sonable jury could easily infer that Claybrooks knowingly
entered into an agreement with Atkins to distribute cocaine.
B. District Court’s Drug Quantity Finding Was Inade‐
quate and Constituted Clear Error
Claybrooks maintains that the district court erred at sen‐
tencing by failing to make a determination of the amount of
drugs attributable to him as a result of his conspiracy convic‐
tion. We review a district court’s factual findings at sentenc‐
ing, including the quantity of drugs involved in an offense,
for clear error. See United States v. Thomas, 510 F.3d 714, 725
(7th Cir. 2007). Under this standard, “[w]e will not upset a
district court’s factual findings unless we are ‘left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit‐
ted.’” United States v. Williams, 718 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir.
2013) (quoting United States v. Sauerwein, 5 F.3d 275, 278 (7th
Cir. 1993)).
For those defendants convicted of drug‐related offenses,
a determination of the quantity of narcotics involved in their
offense forms an essential part of the sentencing analysis.
District courts “should begin all sentencing proceedings by
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). “The first step in that
calculation is to ascertain the correct base offense level.”
United States v. Dean, 574 F.3d 836, 845 (7th Cir. 2009). For
drug crimes, a defendant’s base offense level is largely a
function of the amount of drugs involved in his offense. See
12 No. 12‐1413
United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994); see al‐
so U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. In light of the significance attached to the
amount of drugs involved in a defendant’s offense, “we re‐
quire that a sentencing court make an explicit drug‐quantity
finding” to facilitate appellate review of the ultimate sen‐
tence. United States v. Palmer, 248 F.3d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 2001).
At first glance, the transcript suggests that the district
court did render a drug quantity finding by stating that
“we’re pretty secure based on the testimony in going with
the PSR, which is 5 to 15 kilograms.” Ordinarily, a court’s
adoption of the PSR findings would be enough to satisfy us
that the district court rendered a specific determination of
the amount of drugs involved. See United States v. Are, 590
F.3d 499, 525 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the district court
adopts the PSR’s findings … [it] rarely needs to add de‐
tails”).
But the court did not stop there. Instead, it explicitly
questioned the reliability of the evidence cited by the Proba‐
tion Office to support its drug quantity calculation. During a
lengthy discussion of the problematic aspects of Atkins’s tes‐
timony, the court mentioned his statement that Claybrooks
provided him with one kilogram of cocaine on three or four
occasions:
So we’ve got [Atkins] talking about a relationship that
started with dealing 4.5‐ounce quantities and over
time became a relationship where there were kilos
transferred, but he never told us how many kilos a
year were transferred. He just said the relationship ac‐
tually grew to that. So I think that—and then, you
know, we’ve got three or four times he says that he
thinks the defendant provided him with a kilo.
No. 12‐1413 13
This was no minor quibble. The Probation Office used this
portion of Atkins’s testimony as the basis for finding that
Claybrooks’s drug conspiracy conviction involved three kil‐
ograms of cocaine. Given that the PSR concluded that a total
of seven kilograms were involved, the district court’s state‐
ment constituted a significant challenge to the Probation Of‐
fice’s finding. When these three transactions are removed
from the equation, the remaining evidence cited by the PSR
only adds up to four kilograms, not the “5 to 15 kilograms”
announced by the district court. In light of the district court’s
discomfort with the underlying evidence, we are convinced
that the court did not adopt the Probation Office’s conclusion
on this point. See Dean, 574 F.3d at 845 n.12 (concluding that
district court did not accept drug quantity finding when dis‐
trict court made statements “at odds with the finding in the
PSR”).
Despite refusing to credit the evidence supporting a sig‐
nificant portion of the PSR’s drug quantity finding, the dis‐
trict court nonetheless settled on “5 to 15 kilograms” as an
acceptable compromise, or halfway point, between the jury’s
drug quantity finding and the amount urged by the gov‐
ernment:
Well, I think that Atkins’[s] testimony about the 20 to
30 kilos is too indefinite for me to even find that it sat‐
isfies preponderance. I actually think that the proba‐
tion office’s compromise between Atkins’[s] estimate,
which he didn’t pin down at all, and the jury’s find‐
ing, which was minimal, is probably the safest thing
to do in this case.
This is not the same thing as determining the quantity of
drugs that were involved in an offense. See id. at 845 (con‐
14 No. 12‐1413
cluding that district court’s attempt to “‘split the difference’”
between drug quantity in PSR and jury’s finding did not
equate to independent determination of drug amount). We
recognize that calculating the amount of drugs involved in a
particular offense is an inexact science. In making this de‐
termination, a court must necessarily engage in “some
amount of reasoned ‘speculation and reasonable estima‐
tion.’” United States v. Hollins, 498 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir.
2007) (emphasis in original). But a district court cannot simp‐
ly select a number without at least some description of the
reliable evidence used to support the finding and the meth‐
od used to calculate it. See United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d
519, 530–31 (7th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing permissible find‐
ing with others in which the quantity was “pulled out of thin
air”). Based on the sentencing hearing transcript, we cannot
discern what reliable evidence the district court relied upon
to arrive at the “5 to 15 kilograms” drug quantity. The court
did not clearly adopt the evidence cited by the PSR. Instead,
the court disputed the reliability of the testimony supporting
a substantial part of the PSR’s drug quantity finding, and it
did not provide any alternative evidentiary rationale to
make up for the deficiency. Without such an explanation, we
must conclude that the district court clearly erred by not
making any finding on this important question. See United
States v. Fox, 548 F.3d 523, 532–33 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although a
district court’s findings of relevant conduct are reviewed on‐
ly for clear error, even such deference cannot cure an ab‐
sence of findings on key elements of the analysis”).
C. District Court Must Apply Alleyne On Remand
Aside from rendering a finding as to the amount of drugs
involved in Claybrooks’s offense, on remand the district
No. 12‐1413 15
court should also set the mandatory minimum in a manner
consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent. After oral
argument in this case, the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). In Alleyne,
the Supreme Court overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S.
545 (2002), which held that the Sixth Amendment allows
judges to independently determine facts that raise a defend‐
ant’s mandatory minimum sentence. Harris, 536 U.S. at 565.
In Alleyne, the Court reversed course and decided that the
Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause require a jury to determine any fact that increases the
mandatory minimum punishment for an offense. Alleyne,
133 S. Ct. at 2162–63.
After Alleyne, Claybrooks’s mandatory minimum sen‐
tence must be determined by the drug quantity described in
the jury’s special verdict form. Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (holding that statutory maximum for
Sixth Amendment “purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”) (emphasis in origi‐
nal). Because the jurors concluded that Claybrooks’s drug
conspiracy conviction involved more than 500 grams but less
than 5 kilograms of cocaine, his mandatory minimum sen‐
tence is 10 years’ imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). This
is the mandatory minimum sentence for this case. The dis‐
trict judge cannot raise the mandatory sentencing floor
based on its own determination that Claybrooks’s offense
involved additional amounts of narcotics beyond those de‐
termined by the jury. Cf. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162 (“[I]f a
judge were to find a fact that increased the statutory maxi‐
mum sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth
Amendment”).
16 No. 12‐1413
Although judicially determined facts are no longer rele‐
vant to deciding the applicable mandatory minimum, a dis‐
trict court should continue to make whatever factual find‐
ings are needed to calculate a defendant’s advisory Guide‐
lines range. See id. at 2163 (“Our ruling today does not mean
that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be
found by a jury”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233
(2005) (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select
a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has
no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge
deems relevant”); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481
(2000) (“[N]othing in this history suggests that it is imper‐
missible for judges to exercise discretion—taking into con‐
sideration various factors relating both to offense and of‐
fender—in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed
by statute”) (emphasis in original). On remand, the district
court must independently determine the amount of cocaine
involved in Claybrooks’s offense in order to calculate his ad‐
visory sentencing range under the Guidelines. See generally
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.1
1 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne, we asked the par‐
ties to file supplemental briefing on the effect, if any, of the Court’s deci‐
sion on the sentencing in this case. In response, each side filed a supple‐
mental brief discussing whether Claybrooks’s sentence violated his
rights under the Sixth Amendment. While we thank the parties for their
efforts, we need not decide the issue in light of our remand based on the
absence of a drug quantity determination. At resentencing, the district
court will of course ensure that sentence is imposed consistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne.
No. 12‐1413 17
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM Claybrooks’s conviction. We VACATE
Claybrooks’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing con‐
sistent with this opinion.
United States v. Eldred Claybrooks
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date filed: 2013-09-05
Citations: 729 F.3d 699
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion