J-A15011-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SCOTT BOWEN
Appellant No. 1127 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 22, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013590-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED AUGUST 05, 2014
Appellant, Scott Bowen, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered February 22, 2013, by the Honorable Diana Anhalt, Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm.
For a detailed recitation of the facts of this case and the conflicting
memorandum opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/13 at 2-4. Briefly,
on September 3, 2011, Bowen and the victim, Aaron Rasmussen, engaged in
an altercation at Ladder 15, a bar and restaurant located in Philadelphia.
Although both Bowen and the victim offered different accounts as to who
started the argument, it is undisputed that at some point after the parties
were escorted outside, a confrontation again ensued, at which point Bowen
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stabbed the victim in the upper left abdomen. The victim was transported to
the hospital for surgery.
Bowen was subsequently arrested and charged with Aggravated
Assault,1 Possession of an Instrument of Crime,2 Simple Assault,3 and
Recklessly Endangering another Person.4 Following a non-jury trial on
January 7, 2013, the trial court convicted Bowen of Aggravated Assault and
Possession of an Instrument of Crime. On February 22, 2013, Bowen was
-sentence motions on
March 1, 2013, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Bowen raises the following issues for our review:
1. ainst the weight of the
evidence insomuch as no reasonable factfinder could find that
the Commonwealth proved Mr. Bowen guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt?
2.
evidence insomuch as no reasonable factfinder could find that
the Commonwealth proved Mr. Bowen was not acting in self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt?
3. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the
verdict?
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a).
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a).
3
18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a).
4
18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
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Preliminarily, we note that Bowen has waived his challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. In order to preserve a
1925(b) statement must state with specificity the element or elements of
the crime for which the appellant alleges the evidence was insufficient. See
Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013);
Commonwealth v. Gibbs
specificity is of particular importance in cases where, as here, the appellant
was convicted of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements
Gibbs,
981 A.2d at 281. In Garland
panel of this court found that the sufficiency challenge was waived on
appeal. Id. at 344.
ement states in pertinent part,
1925(b) Statement of matters Complained of on Appeal, 7/23/1 at 2.
is challenging, but also which conviction he is challenging. That Bowen
additionally fails to specify in his appellate brief the elements he is
challenging further inhibits our review of this claim. Accordingly, we are
the sufficiency of the evidence
waived on that basis. See Garland, supra.
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against the weight of the evidence. A challenge to the weight of the
evidence
seeks a new trial on the ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so
weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one's sense of
Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1015 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). Our standard when reviewing a weight of the evidence
claim is well settled.
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a
mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
ing all
the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to
ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to
be awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a
new trial is imperative so that right may be given another
An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear
and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will
give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons
advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's
determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting
or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that
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the verdict was or was not against the weight of the
evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the
interest of justice.
This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial
court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a
challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In
describing the limits of a trial court's discretion, we have
explained:
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion
within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for
the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge.
Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason,
as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or
arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused where the course
pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but
where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where
the law is not applied or where the record shows that the
action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Id. at 1015-1016 (citation and emphasis omitted).
Bowen primarily argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his self-
defense claim.
when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other
PA.CONS.STAT.ANN. § 505(a). Although the defendant has no
burden to prove self-
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740 (Pa. 2012)
(citation omitted).
Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a defense beyond a
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See Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d 342, 345
(Pa. 2001).
The Commonwealth sustains its burden if stablishes at least one of
the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in
danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or
continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the
retreat w Commonwealth v.
McClendon
remains the province of the [finder of fact] to determine whether the
accused's belief was reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and
Id.
With our standard of review in mind, we have examined the certified
the applicable law, and we find that the trial court ably and methodically
addressed the issues Bowen presented on appeal. We agree with the trial
convictions and request for a new trial is without merit. Accordingly, we
affirm on the bas -written memorandum opinion.
See Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/13 at 5-7.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/5/2014
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