narcotics for her new companions but failed to find a buyer. When she
returned to the motel room empty-handed she told Taz and Lavelle-Taylor
that she could not work as a prostitute for them and asked how much she
owed them for the methamphetamine she used the night before. Lavelle-
Taylor told the victim that she owed him $500 and that she was going to
prostitute and not leave "until it was done." The victim believed she had
only used $60 worth of methamphetamine. Although Lavelle-Taylor told
her she could not leave, the victim left the motel room and told another
associate in the motel about her predicament. The associate gave her a
few dollars and encouraged her to get on a bus and leave the area.
Instead, the victim returned to the motel room to collect her belongings
which included the hypodermic needles that she used to get high. Lavelle-
Taylor and Taz told the victim she could not have her belongings back and
again told her that she could not leave. Later, Taz repeatedly punched the
victim in the head and gave the victim's estranged husband permission to
sexually assault her in the motel bathroom. Taz also showed the victim a
Taser electroshock weapon, claimed to keep a handgun under the
mattress, and told the victim that they were going to take her to
California, make her a prostitute, and then Taz was going to kill her.
Another witness testified that Taz called the victim a "hostage." Lavelle-
Taylor and Taz placed the bed against the door and rearranged the other
furniture so that the victim could not escape. The following day, Taz and
Lavelle-Taylor took the victim to the greyhound bus station where they
unsuccessfully attempted to purchase three bus tickets to San Francisco.
Short on money, the pair took the victim to another motel. There, the
victim mouthed "help me" to a man at the front desk, ran into the
manager's office when he opened the door, and begged him to call the
police. When the manger called the police, Taz and Lavelle-Taylor fled.
SUPREME COURT According to the victim, throughout the incident Lavelle-Taylor was
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A e
"backing" Taz up and "basically enforcing what she says. So if I did try to
get away, he would go after me." On one occasion, Lavelle-Taylor told the
victim, "just listen to Taz, don't say anything, and everything will be fine."
We conclude that a rational juror could infer from these
circumstances that Lavelle-Taylor directly committed second-degree
kidnapping. See NRS 195.020; NRS 200.310(2). The jury's verdict will not
be disturbed on appeal where, as here, sufficient evidence supports the
conviction. Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981);
Buchanan v. State, 119 Nev. 201, 217, 69 P.3d 694, 705 (2003)
(circumstantial evidence alone may sustain a conviction).
Second, Lavelle-Taylor contends that the district court erred
by failing to give a mere presence jury instruction sua sponte. "Failure to
object or to request an instruction precludes appellate review, unless the
error is patently prejudicial and requires the court to act sua sponte to
protect a defendant's right to a fair trial." Flanagan v. State, 112 Nev.
1409, 1423, 930 P.2d 691, 700 (1996). Lavelle-Taylor has not
demonstrated that the absence of a mere presence jury instruction was so
patently prejudicial that the district court was required to issue this
instruction sua sponte to protect his right to a fair trial
Third, Lavelle-Taylor contends that the district court erred by
admitting evidence that the victim was sexually assaulted by her
estranged husband while she was in Taz and Lavelle-Taylor's motel room.
Lavelle-Taylor failed to object and we review for plain error. NRS
178.602; Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003). Lavelle-
Taylor has the burden of establishing that the district court erred, this
error was plain or clear from the record, and the error affected his
substantial rights. Green, 119 Nev. at 545, 80 P.3d at 95. Instead of
persuading this court, however, Lavelle-Taylor admits that the
SUPREME COURT prohibitions discussed in Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 946 P.2d 1061
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A 4A4g4,9
(1997), and Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev. , 270 P.3d 1244 (2012), "do not
explicitly apply." We agree. Moreover, it is not plain or clear from the
record that the evidence of sexual assault was not admissible under the
res gestae doctrine or that the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See NRS
48.035(1), (3). Lavelle-Taylor has not demonstrated that the district court
plainly erred.
Fourth, Lavelle-Taylor contends that the district court erred
by allowing a police officer to testify about "street culture" and "street
logic." Lavelle-Taylor failed to object and we review for plain error. NRS
178.602; Green, 119 Nev. at 545, 80 P.3d at 95. Lavelle-Taylor contends
that the officer lacked sufficient personal knowledge about these topics to
offer his opinion on the subject. However, because Lavelle-Taylor failed to
object or voir dire the witness, this court has no information about the
officer's personal knowledge to substantiate the alleged error. Therefore,
Lavelle-Taylor has not demonstrated plain error.
Having considered Lavelle-Taylor's contentions and concluded
that they lack merit, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
J.
Parraguirre Saitta
cc: Hon. David A. Hardy, District Judge
Richard F. Cornell
Attorney GenerallCarson City
Washoe County District Attorney
SUPREME COURT
OF
Washoe District Court Clerk
NEVADA
4
(0) I94Th
Lavelle-Taylor (Rodney) v. State
Combined Opinion