IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-40634
Summary Calendar
ROBERT WARD, Individually, and as next friend
of Marian Ward, a minor; MARJORIE WARD,
Individually, and as next friend of Marian Ward,
a minor,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas
(USDC No. G-99-CV-556)
_______________________________________________________
March 14, 2002
Before REAVLEY, HIGGINBOTHAM and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should
not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Appellants Robert and Marjorie Ward, individually and on behalf of their daughter
Marian Ward, appeal the decisions of the district court to dismiss this case as moot and to
deny leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for actual damages. We affirm.
We essentially agree with the district court’s reasoning as set forth in its excellent
memorandum and order entered on March 23, 2001. The case is moot inasmuch as
Marian Ward has now graduated and the 1999 football policy at issue has been rescinded.
“[A] case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the
court can give meaningful relief.” McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir.
1998) (internal quotations omitted). The district court could fashion no meaningful relief
beyond the injunctive relief and attorney’s fees it had already granted.
The district court did not err in dismissing the claims of Robert and Marjorie Ward
as well. Regardless of their standing, their individual claims were also mooted by the
rescission of the 1999 football policy.
Appellants argue that their claim for nominal damages compelled the district court
to conclude that the case was not moot. In the circumstances presented, however, we fail
to see how the pendency of such a claim should allow the continuation of an otherwise
moot case. As discussed above, appellants received all the meaningful relief they sought
during 1999, and the 1999 policy has now been rescinded. The inclusion of a claim for
nominal damages does not in our view convert an otherwise moot case into a live
controversy. To hold otherwise would allow appellants to litigate the constitutionality of
a policy, and a controversy, which simply no longer exists.
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The remaining issue is whether the district court erred in denying leave to amend
the complaint to add a claim for actual damages. “Whether leave to amend should be
granted is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court, and that court’s ruling is
reversible only for an abuse of discretion.” Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139
(5th Cir. 1993).
The district court found that leave to amend should be denied because appellants
had waited almost a year to seek leave, which amounted to undue delay. Leave should be
freely given absent “any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay . . . .” Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In addition, the district court correctly noted that
even if the word “nominal” were deleted from the complaint as appellants asked in
requesting leave to amend, appellants did not proffer an amended complaint and the
original complaint would not support a claim for mental anguish damages. The mental
anguish damages to Marian Ward were presumably the result of alleged intimidation by
school officials at Sante Fe High school, but the complaint did not allege that this
intimidation was caused by a school district policy or custom reflecting a deliberate or
conscious choice by district policymakers, see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
389 (1989), or by an official with final policymaking authority, see Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481- 484 (1986), an essential element for liability of the
defendant school district. The complaint still would have been insufficient to support an
award of mental anguish damages. Leave to amend need not be given if the complaint as
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amended would be subject to dismissal. Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632
F.2d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 1980).
For these reasons we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in
denying leave to amend.
AFFIRMED.
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