misunderstood the plea negotiations as they were represented by retained
counsel, (2) he entered the guilty plea agreement based on retained
counsel's representation that his codefendant had made a written
statement against him when in fact the codefendant had only made an
oral statement against him, and (3) he was impaired by mental health
issues when he entered his plea. Appointed counsel informed the district
court that nothing in the record substantiated these claims. The district
court observed that no written motion to withdraw guilty plea had been
filed. It asked appointed counsel if he wished to file a written motion and
if there was a basis to do so. Appointed counsel responded no, whereupon
the district court proceeded with sentencing.
The record does not demonstrate that Bickford sought to
withdraw his guilty plea based on an alleged breach of the guilty plea
agreement (one of the grounds asserted on appeal), that appointed counsel
requested an evidentiary hearing, or that a presentence motion to
withdraw guilty plea was properly before the district court. See EDCR
3.70 (defendant who has counsel cannot file motions); EDCR 7.40(a)
(defendant who has counsel cannot appear on his own behalf without
court's consent). Accordingly, we conclude that Bickford has not
demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in this regard,
and we
ORDER the amended judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
J.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A e
cc: Hon. David B. Barker, District Judge
Clark County Public Defender
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(01 I947A ogpF,