magistrate's probable cause determination released it from its promise not
to oppose probation and, over Izadi's objection, argued for a sentence of 19-
48 months' imprisonment.
First, Izadi contends that the district court erred by revoking
his bail before conducting a hearing and relying on the wrong standard of
proof at the hearing. We conclude that no relief is warranted because
Izadi fails to demonstrate that he had a constitutional or statutory right to
bail after he pleaded guilty, see NRS 178.484 (recognizing the "[flight to
bail before conviction"); NRS 176.015(1) (providing the district court with
discretion to grant bail pending sentencing); Bergna v. State, 120 Nev.
869, 872, 102 P.3d 549, 551 (2004) (recognizing that there is no
constitutional right to bail after conviction), or that the district court
abused its discretion by revoking his bail.
Second, Izadi contends that the district court erred by failing
to conduct an evidentiary hearing before allowing the State to argue at
sentencing. Izadi asserts that the failure to conduct a hearing prevented
him from presenting evidence that the State knew of the facts which led to
the new charges prior to entry of his plea. We conclude that no relief is
warranted. While some of the new charges may have been based on
conduct which occurred prior to entry of the plea, a majority of the charges
were the result of acts which were alleged to have occurred after entry of
the plea. Because the agreement clearly authorized the State to argue
under the circumstances, an evidentiary hearing was not required and the
district court did not err. See Sparks v. State, 121 Nev. 107, 111, 110 P.3d
486, 488 (2005).
Third, Izadi contends that the district court erred by allowing
the State to argue at sentencing because the "stay out of trouble" provision
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is illusory and was negotiated in bad faith, violating his right to due
process and rendering the agreement "constitutionally deficient." We
decline to consider these contentions because they challenge the validity of
the plea and are not properly raised on direct appeal from a judgment of
conviction. See Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368
(1986) ("Al defendant must raise a challenge to the validity of his or her
guilty plea in the district court in the first instance, either by bringing a
motion to withdraw the guilty plea, or by initiating a post-conviction
proceeding.").
Fourth, Izadi contends that he was prejudiced at sentencing
because the district court (1) demonstrated bias by revoking his bail, (2)
demonstrated bias by interrupting and chiding counsel, and (3) relied on
an inaccurate presentence investigation report (PSI).
This court will not disturb a district court's sentencing
determination absent an abuse of discretion. Parrish v. State, 116 Nev.
982, 989, 12 P.3d 953, 957 (2000). At the initial sentencing hearing,
counsel for Izadi noted that the PSI inaccurately described a prior
misdemeanor as a felony and sentencing was continued. At the
subsequent hearing, counsel reminded the district court of the error,
identified circumstances mitigating the offense, and noted that Izadi did
not have a serious criminal record. Counsel also expressed concern that
the district court would base its sentencing determination on the acts
alleged in his new case. The district court responded that it did not know
the facts• of the new case and was only considering the facts of the case
before it, and imposed a prison term of 12 to 34 months. The sentence is
within the parameters provided by statute, see NRS 193.130(2)(d); NRS
193.330(1)(a)(4); NRS 200.481(2)(b), and lower than that requested by the
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State. Izadi fails to demonstrate that the district court possessed
impermissible bias, see Allum v. Valley Bank of Nevada, 112 Nev. 591,
594, 915 P.2d 895, 897 (1996) (procedural rulings "almost never" indicate
bias (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cameron v. State, 114
Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998) ("[R]emarks of a judge made
in the context of a court proceeding are not considered indicative of
improper bias or prejudice unless they show that the judge has closed his
or her mind to the presentation of all the evidence."), or that it based its
sentencing determination on facts supported "only by impalpable or highly
suspect evidence," see Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161
(1976). Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 2
gam. J.
Pickering
•• ••
Parraguirre s
Saitta
2 The fast track statement and reply do not comply with the
formatting requirements of NRAP 32(a)(4) because the text in the body of
the briefs, excluding headings, footnotes, and quotations, is not double-
spaced, and the briefs do not have margins of at least 1 inch on all four
sides. See NRAP 3C(h)(1) (requiring fast track filings to comply with the
provisions of NRAP 32(a)(4)-(6)). We caution Izadi's counsel that future
failure to comply with the rules of this court when filing briefs may result
in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n).
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cc: Hon. Douglas Smith, District Judge
Gordon Silver
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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