witness saw Toenniges enter the second building and gesture for the man
to join her. Moments later, Grey saw Toenniges and the man fleeing the
area of the second building while carrying her purse. Evidence was
presented connecting Hinkle to Toenniges, and Grey and Chapman
identified Hinkle as the male suspect in a pretrial photo lineup and at
trial.
We conclude that the jury could reasonably infer from the
evidence presented that Hinkle committed the charged crimes. See NRS
199.480(3)(g); NRS 205.060(1); NRS 205.220(1)(a); see also Garner u. State,
116 Nev. 770, 780, 6 P.3d 1013, 1020 (2000) ("Conspiracy is seldom
demonstrated by direct proof and is usually established by inference from
the parties' conduct."), overruled on other grounds by Sharma v. State, 118
Nev. 648, 56 P.3d 868 (2002). Circumstantial evidence can support a
conviction, Lisle u. State, 113 Nev. 679, 691-92, 941 P.2d 459, 467 (1997),
holding limited on other grounds by Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089,
1117 n.9, 968 P.2d 296, 315 n.9 (1998), and the jury's verdict will not be
disturbed on appeal where, as here, it is supported by sufficient evidence,
see Bolden u. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981).
Second, Hinkle contends that the district court erred by
denying his motion to strike the venire for failing to represent a fair cross-
section of the community and by doing so without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. We disagree with both contentions. Hinkle merely
challenged the "particular jury pool" drawn in his case and failed to
demonstrate that the underrepresentation of African-Americans in that
pool was a result of systemic discrimination in the jury selection process.
See Williams u. State, 121 Nev. 934, 940, 125 P.3d 627, 631 (2005); Duren
u. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979). Although Hinkle asserted that he
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was unable to make such a demonstration without examining the jury
commissioner, he failed to suggest how the commissioner's testimony
would substantiate his claim and did not allege sufficient facts to entitle
him to an evidentiary hearing on this basis. We conclude that the district
court did not err.
Third, Hinkle contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial because the State violated
its duty of disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Hinkle moved for a mistrial after a law enforcement officer testified that
he had stopped a man in the area who matched witnesses' descriptions of
the suspect. Both Chapman and Grey were asked if the detained
individual was the perpetrator; Chapman stated that he was not, but Grey
stated that she was not sure. The detained individual was released.
Hinkle argued that this information should have been disclosed because it
could have been used to develop an alternative suspect and impeach
Grey's subsequent identification. The State asserted that it had no duty to
disclose the information because it was not favorable to the defense, but
regardless, it had been disclosed via law enforcement's computer-aided-
dispatch log. The State agreed that the log was difficult to decipher, but
claimed it was not responsible for helping the defense interpret discovery.
The district court denied Hinkle's motion.
We agree that the evidence regarding Grey's inconclusive
identification was favorable to the defense, see Mazzan v. Warden, 116
Nev. 48, 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000), and was inappropriately withheld
because the dispatch log provided to the defense could not reasonably be
read to provide this information. However, given the evidence presented
at trial—which included testimony regarding Grey's inconclusive
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identification—there is not a "reasonable possibility" that the omitted
evidence would have affected the outcome. See id. at 66, 993 P.3d at 36;
Lay v. State, 116 Nev. 1185, 1196, 14 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2000). Therefore,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Hinkle's motion for a mistrial. See Raclin v. State, 120 Nev. 121, 142, 86
P.3d 572, 586 (2004) ("The trial court has discretion to determine whether
a mistrial is warranted, and its judgment will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion.").
Having considered Hinkle's contentions and concluded that no
relief is warranted, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 1
1, ;A:-Aiti P3/451
Douglas
cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
Bush & Levy, LLC
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
1 The fast track statement and reply submitted by Hinkle do not
comply with the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure because the text of
the brief, excluding headings, footnotes, and quotations, is not double-
spaced. See NRAP 32(a)(4); NRAP 3C(h)(1). We caution counsel that
future failure to comply with the rules of this court when filing briefs may
result in the imposition of sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n).
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