affidavits from four of the five commissioners, stating that they believed
discontinuing the town board form of government was in Pahrump's best
interests. The district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction, the
question was placed on the ballot, and a majority of the voters voted to
discontinue the town board. After the election, Nye and Pahrump filed
cross-motions for summary judgment and stipulated that the matter was
ripe for disposition based on all previous filings in the case. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Nye, and Pahrump appealed.
On appeal, Pahrump argues that the district court erred by
concluding that NRS 269.022 did not require the commission to make an
express determination that the town board form of government was no
longer in the best interests of Pahrump.
Standard of review
We review a district court's order granting a motion for
summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729,
121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the
pleadings, . . . together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." NRCP 56(c).
The district court did not err by concluding that NRS 269.022 does not
require an express finding by the commission
Pahrump argues that NRS 269.022 requires the commission to
expressly find that the town board form of government is not in the best
interests of Pahrump. Nye responds that NRS 269.022 merely requires
that the commission's decision be based on such a rationale, but no
express finding is required.
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We review a district court's interpretation of a statute de novo
and give clear and unambiguous statutory language its plain meaning.
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist, Court, 123 Nev. 468, 476, 168
P.3d 731, 737 (2007). "A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being
understood in two or more senses by reasonably well-informed persons."
Id. Where a statute is ambiguous, we interpret it in light of its context
and spirit and seek to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Id. at
476-77, 168 P.3d at 737-38.
NRS 269.022 provides that "[i]f the board of county
commissioners determines that the best interests of the town are no longer
served by a town board form of government, it may order the question to
be put on the ballot at the next general election." (Emphasis added.) NRS
Chapter 269 does not define "determines," and both Pahrump's and Nye's
interpretations appear reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that NRS
269.022 is ambiguous, and we seek to interpret the statute to give effect to
the Legislature's intent. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 123 Nev. at 476-77, 168
P.3d at 737-38.
Comparison to other Nevada statutes suggests that, if the
Legislature intended to require some formal recitation of the NRS 269.022
best interests determination, it would have done so explicitly. See State
Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Woodall, 106 Nev. 653, 657, 799 P.2d 552, 555 (1990)
(stating that if the Legislature intended a particular result, "the
[L]egislature would have indicated as much in the statutes themselves so
the judiciary would not be required to divine such a rule out of thin air.")
For example, NRS 244.290(2) provides: "If the board determines that . . .
reconveyance [of real property] would be in the best interest of the county
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and its residents, the board may formally adopt a resolution stating that
determination." (Emphases added.) In addition, NRS 244.2815(2)(b)
allows a board of county commissioners to dispose of real property only if
the board "[a]dopt[s] a resolution finding that it is in the best interest of
the public to" dispose of the property. NRS 244.281(1)(a) similarly
provides that a board of county commissioners may take action if it "has
determined by resolution" certain facts. Likewise, NRS 318.490(1) allows
a board of county commissioners to alter a general improvement district if
"a majority of the members of the board . . . deem it to be in the best
interests of the county and of the district, . . . [and] the board of county
commissioners shall so determine by ordinance, after [certain facts are]
first found, determined and recited in the ordinance." (Emphases added.)
In each of these statutes, the Legislature explicitly required a
determination to be formalized in an ordinance or resolution. In contrast,
NRS 269.022 merely requires a determination and never mentions a
resolution, ordinance, or other formal or express statement of this
determination, suggesting that no formal or express determination is
required.
The purpose and context of MRS 269.022 further supports this
relaxed interpretation of "determines." See D.R. Horton, Inc., 123 Nev. at
476-77, 168 P.3d at 738. The commission's determination that the town
board form of government no longer served Pahrump only allowed the
question to be placed on the ballot for the voters to ultimately decide. See
NRS 269.022. The Legislature could reasonably have concluded that less
formality was necessary under these circumstances because the voters
themselves haveS the opportunity to express agreement or disagreement
with the determination by voting. Allowing the commission to make an
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informal determination thus accords with the context and purpose of NRS
269.022.
We therefore conclude that NRS 269.022 only requires a board
of county commissioners to base its decision on the best interests of the
town and does not require a board of county commissioners to expressly or
formally state its rationale. 1
Conclusion
The record indicates that a majority of the commissioners
believed that the town board form of government no longer served the best
interests of Pahrump, and this is all that NRS 269.022 requires. We
therefore conclude that the district court did not err by granting Nye's
motion for summary judgment.
'In addition, Pahrump argues that the commissioners' affidavits
could not cure the commission's failure to expressly determine that the
town board form of government no longer served Pahrump's best interests.
Because we conclude that NRS 269.022 does not require such an express
determination, we reject this argument.
Pahrump further argues that it did not stipulate to the district
court's construction of the facts and genuine issues of material fact
remain. Pahrump waived this argument by stipulating that the matter
was ripe for disposition without a hearing. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. u.
Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the
trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to
have been waived and will not be considered on appeal."). Pahrump also
fails to indicate which facts it disputes, and the record directly supports
the district court's findings of fact. See NRAP 28(a)(9)(A), (e)(1) (stating
that briefs must provide citations to parts of the record on which the party
relies). Accordingly, we also reject this argument.
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Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Pit's& tuf J.
Pickering
J
rAct., AA; J.
Hcsty
J.
Parraguirre
J.
Douglas
---1(•0772-
Cherr
a itta
cc: Hon. Robert W. Lane, District Judge
Armstrong Teasdale, LLP/Reno
Nye County District Attorney
Nye County Clerk
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